



miesięcznik polityczny

WARSZAWA - KRAKÓW

**ZMIERZCH KOMUNIZMU  
WYBIĆ SIĘ NA NIEPODLEGŁOŚĆ  
EUROPA PRZYSZŁOŚCI  
W WOLNEJ POLSCE**



**Opracowanie i wstęp Józefa Darskiego  
WYBÓR Z PIERWSZYCH 28 NUMERÓW**

## Introduction

The journal 'Independence'<sup>1</sup> was established in January 1982 and set itself the task of politicizing the opposition. We believed and still believe that social opposition is no longer enough if we are to effectively fight communism. Being aware of upcoming rapid changes, caused by the degeneration and fall of communism we should prepare ourselves organizationally and politically for the upcoming changes. This means, among others, creating groups that are fully aware of their political goals, because an awakened society in this respect needs a multitude of ideas and organizations.

Publishing a political journal was not an end in itself, but was also to help us crystallize our vision of FREE POLAND and the path leading to it, and to present a coherent program to our potential supporters. The next step was the establishment of the Liberal Democratic Party "Independence" on November 11, 1984. On the political map, "Independence" is on the democratic right, because we are supporters of neoconservative values in the American sense. At the same time, our grouping belongs to the independence camp, as regaining independence is our strategic goal.

Let us emphasize once again - the restoration of concepts from the political dictionary and the creation of independent political groups will not overthrow communism. However, when the latter collapses, the existence of the political elite and relatively high political awareness of the society will be of paramount importance. For today, however, it will protect us from the manipulations of communist social engineering.

Those who would like to see a recipe for regaining independence in the political program, while ridiculing or criticizing our building projects for the shape of independent Poland, make the mistake he spoke about in an interview for "Labour and Restraint"<sup>2</sup> (№ 4/1983), a journal published by the Michaelite Fathers, associate professor Jerzy Łojek, discussing nineteenth-century independence programs:

"... formulating programs was the Achilles' heel of Polish independence thought, Polish programs suffered from the inability to formulate firm political objectives (...). Therefore, Polish political plans were mostly combat plans, and did not deal with the situation of Poland after a possible victory." N "№ 28).

The basis for this issue was the *Selection* published in Poland in January 1984, which consisted of articles published in the first 20 issues of "Independence". It has now been supplemented with materials from issues 21-27

and a new, full version of the program, published in May 1984, in issue 28. Only the article "Liberalism - political thought of freedom" comes from issue 31/32<sup>3</sup> of the journal. The reason for its inclusion was the intent to present our views on this issue in a fairly comprehensive manner.

Starting with issue 28, "Independence" is published simultaneously in Poland - in the underground - and in the West, where reprints are made by the Independent Polish Agency - IPA in Lund.

The articles in this *Selection* have been arranged thematically. They are abbreviated (often significantly), eliminating repetitions or fragments irrelevant to a given chapter. Errors - both the editorial and typo - were also corrected: mistakes, twists, and omissions - and stylistic corrections were made, but the content was not changed in terms of merit meaning. The system of aliases has also been standardized so that all articles by one author bear the same signature.

The presented book is primarily a discussion with the opposition. This question is explained by the editors themselves:

"Criticism and polemics - sometimes malicious - are directed much more often towards the Underground (its tactics and strategy) than against the communists.

Although at first glance such a line of writing confuses some of our readers (Who is behind it? Who is publishing it?), arousing surprise and outrage (Who is it for? Why is it for?), it seems logical to us. We really have nothing to discuss with the communists. We consider a settlement with them to be pointless. Quite simply - in the center of Europe, at the end of the 20th century, a nation of thirty-several million, with a thousand-year history, Christian culture, democratic-liberal traditions and age-old dreams of freedom, does not „*negotiate an agreement*” with the authorities. It has the full right to choose and change if it does not meet its expectations.

We consider a polemic with the philosophical, political, social and economic assumptions of real socialism senseless. What is socialism, especially real socialism, everyone can see, and the supporters of the Reds constitute such a small margin in society that it is simply ... not worth it.

We also do not intend to reform communism (Radio Free Europe, Voice of America, St. Bratkowski, intellectuals writing letters and memos, a legion of underground journalists - they will do it for us).

In our opinion, it is unreformable, because the Reds are only interested in power, power at all costs, even at the cost of the moral and material ruin of the country, and not economic and political reform that would take some of this power away from them.

The situation on our side of the barricade is very different. The whole society will pay for the inability to free oneself from the habits and methods of the past (Solidarity) period, for setting non-realistic goals, and for

choosing methods that are not suitable for their implementation. All of us - and those who supported and those who adhered to what it will end up with.

If we also pay attention to the most important ones: the communists had almost no influence on the failure to implement the concept of politicizing the Underground, but the leaders (TKK, RKW "M") and journalists from opinion-forming centers ("TM", "KOS") had significant one - then the tune of our publications becomes more understandable. So if we express ourselves critically about the activities of "S" after December 13, and, as we are increasingly finding out, we are not alone - it is only to serve a cause that makes sense in our opinion - to regain full state independence. Therefore, for fundamental reasons, and not out of personal sympathies or dislikes, we must remain in political opposition to groups that have chosen to seek „*settlement*” with communists as a strategic goal of their activities. We are therefore opposed to pretended unity on the basis of the historically proven assumption of the pluralism of views in a democratic and democratic society. We are convinced that only through fierce discussions can socio-political programs (not a single program) emerge that reflect the diverse attitudes and views of Poles. (...)

"Solidarity" in its ideological and organizational form from 1980-81 is a past that will not repeat itself in Poland. We emphasized this statement not to embarrass and irritate its greatest admirers ("N" conducts destructive action), but because we realized that even the most enduring sentiments cannot build the real political life of a nation. We would be happy if this organization could finally realize that simulated actions will not lead to freedom and independence of Poland. Until that happens, we will remain in political opposition, regardless of the opinions expressed about us.

TKK, the underground leadership of "S", as if not aware of the depletion of the capital of emotions and the fatigue of society, copied and still repeats only symbols, perhaps beautiful and noble, but only symbols. We are not for the symbolics, but for filling the political void that has arisen in a politicized society. Our goal is the creation of an independent Polish state; we realize that we will never achieve this, if we are not able to emerge from ourselves the political representation of the nation. The next step will be to achieve the independence of the state. No nation can be truly free unless it is able to select a group that would become an authentic national political representation.

And next:

The politicization of the underground "*Solidarity*" turned out to be impossible. It would be ridiculous and politically useless to ignore the reality that it is as it is. Irrespective of the position of the official „S”, we shall build the self-aware political underground. Together with other groups in the underground, with even partial political self-awareness, we must start a

discussion on the shape of future Poland. We intend to search for what unites us all in it and to make ourselves aware of what divides us.

The result of such a discussion should be the awareness of not only what Poland we do not want (communist), but also what we intend to build. In our opinion, it shall be an INDEPENDENT, FREE, DEMOCRATIC Poland.

Józef Darski

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## THE SUNSET OF COMMUNISM

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"The economic system she created (i.e. the nomenclature - note by "N") is characterized by poor results, because it is impossible to imagine a noticeable improvement in labor productivity without its change, and any reform is unacceptable for the nomenclature because it would mean the end of her monopoly. Therefore, it is left with expansion to the outside world - possible domination over foreign countries and the exploitation of their riches"

Mikhail Woslensky, *Nomenclature*

### The Sunset of Communism

The world is divided; his future was decided in early 1945. The two powers have divided the globe among themselves, and nothing else can happen. Poland is located in the Soviet zone. The USSR is one of the two powers that rule our planet. It is a fact, and gentlemen and intellectuals do not argue with the facts. The consequences of the Yalta dictate are probably unpleasant, but they are real, and what is real is necessary. Hegel said so, and educated people know Hegel. So what is the meaning of society's democratic aspirations? They can be considered in sociological, psychological or moral categories, but from a practical point of view it is "whishfull thinking". Where are we to measure with countries such as France or West Germany, and yet they too are careful not to provoke the anger of the elderls from the Kremlin. Therefore, Poland remains to accept the limitations and look for solutions only within them. Everything else is just dreams.

Does opposing the Yalta order really mean a lack of realism? Does realism consist in recognizing reality as unchangeable? It seems that accusing someone of being unrealistic is not a very fertile activity. Every man engaged in politics considers himself a realist, and therefore from his point of view he is a realist, because realism is the behavior resulting from the anticipated course of events. Each politician makes predictions, which is one of the fundamental issues in his activity. The dissimilarity of the forecasts results from different assumptions adopted when making them, from different perception and assessment of the observed affairs. The reality is never unequivocal, some processes are accompanied by others, and their effects can be opposite. The task of a politician is to assess which processes will prevail and what effects they will have. In this assessment, he is guided by his experience and thoughts, his "feel", although he

often has a staff of advisers, scientific studies and more and more precise research methods. However, they are never solid enough to prevent mistakes. Politician is always realistic and always makes mistakes.

The purpose of this article is to present our assessment of the situation and predictions, thanks to which we consider it possible to oppose the post-Yalta reality.

The real socialism is 65 years old. During this short period of time, it was quite successful. From an archaic and weak country that was pre-revolutionary Russia, he managed to build an empire far beyond the reach and power of the former tsarist state of its most glorious period. Let us consider what factors made it possible for the communists to strengthen their power, build a military power, as well as territorial and ideological expansion.

Communism won in a country with a vast territory and very backward. Also after the Second World War (after Yalta), the backward countries, with few exceptions, fell under the rule of communism. This had its consequences. In a backward country (economically and socially), progress can be achieved relatively easily; it is the result of concentrating efforts on areas of the economy recognized as particularly important. The centralization of decisions, the control of society and the economy, and hence the elimination of normal mechanisms, are of great use here. This has made it possible to achieve effects that cannot be achieved in more liberal and decentralized countries, such as non-communist countries, not excluding any of the traditional tyrannies. Let us explain our reasoning on the basis of two examples.

I. Elimination of illiteracy - One of the most characteristic distinguishing features of a backward society is illiteracy. Its liquidation under normal conditions is difficult for several reasons, although not all of them must occur. Let's list only the most important ones:

- the ruling and educated groups are not interested in eliminating anal-fabetism;
- even if they are interested, they do not consider it the most important matter, and therefore do not allocate sufficient resources to it;
- traditional, ie uneducated and illiterate, generally rural society is reluctant to accept the compulsory education. This may have a religious background, for example, in relation to the education of women in Muslim countries;
- the lack of totalitarian control makes it impossible to register the population and fight illiteracy.

The above-mentioned factors do not exist in communism. He is interested in breaking down traditional structures as they hinder the central ruling of society. The elimination of illiteracy is closely related to the elimination of patriarchal structures based on respect for tradition. Every written word has a propaganda value for communists, because people who can read and write, which does not mean that they are really educated, can assimilate communist propaganda much

more effectively. Therefore, social progress in this case is closely related to the interests of the central government. In the course of the fight against illiteracy, control over society increases, and the reluctance of traditional social structures to educate is broken by force. Overall, the fight against illiteracy is part of the arsenal of social manipulation methods used to achieve desired behaviors, ie social engineering, although an increase in the level of education is undoubtedly an indicator of social progress.

II. Steel production - in the nineteenth century the industrial revolution resulted in a previously unprecedented increase in steel production. Therefore, its size was considered the most important indicator of industrial development. It should be noted, however, that it was not steel (iron) that built the industry, but the increase in its production resulted from the growing demand of other branches of industry. Thus, the dynamics of steel production meant the dynamics of the development of the entire industry. (...)

In the USSR, steel production increased sixfold between 1918 and 1940. It therefore took a much shorter time to reach a production level on par with the world level than the countries undergoing the capitalist industrial revolution. How was that possible?

In capitalism, the factor limiting production is demand; its size depends on the demand for a given product. The level of overall demand therefore depends on the degree of economic development. If there is no demand for steel, for example during a crisis, its production does not increase and may even decrease. This phenomenon results from the market mechanism, which is effectively liquidated in the communist system. The volume of production depends only on technical capabilities (supply factors), and the concept of "overproduction" does not exist. Steel is used for machines, which in turn for the production of metallurgical equipment and steel smelting. Production for production, machines make machines, and statistics record development. In fact, the overarching goal of this vicious circle is military reinforcement, although other tasks may also be carried out.

The possibility of concentrating resources on selected sectors of the economy means that the communist state is able to achieve completely fantastic goals, unattainable even for incomparably richer capitalist countries. The market mechanism makes it difficult, and in some cases, even makes it impossible to undertake many production projects. However, a centrally planned economy knows no such obstacles. Unprecedented economic successes are possible and even necessary, if only for propaganda reasons. It can be the development of a desert with an area of millions of square kilometers, the conquest of space or the construction of the largest ironworks in Europe. No capitalist company would be able to build this steel plant, as no one would be able to raise enough funds for a venture doomed for bankruptcy.

In real socialism, however, bankruptcy does not exist. The spectacular



successes of economic and social policy were accompanied in the first years of communist rule by a real social revolution. It consisted in the territorial and social displacement of millions of people. The seizure of power by the communists, both in Russia and in other satellite countries, triggered mass migrations. Let us also note that they were preceded by the deaths of millions of people in World War I and II. In addition, there were further victims of the civil war, during which whole huge social groups were physically liquidated: the intelligentsia, clergy, former officials, etc. Leaving aside the moral assessment of this phenomenon, let us emphasize that it created a vacuum that could be filled by new groups. In this way, the first years of communism created an opportunity for promotion on an unprecedented scale. People who were doomed to exist in the lowest social strata before the communist coup, became officials of the new power after the revolution. Communists, distributing promotions and privileges, bought themselves the allegiance of a part of the society. Another thing is that, at least in Poland, they could never even dream of supporting by the majority. Opportunities for social advancement were not limited to clerical positions. Migration of people from the countryside to the cities, related to rapid industrialization, also caused a kind of social advancement, and at the same time destroyed old rural structures, much more resistant to communist state leaders than the young and devoid of tradition working class. This new working class, and above all the new intelligentsia coming from advancement, ignorant of history and having no background of extensive humanistic knowledge, succumbed to communist ideology. It seemed to explain, especially in its Stalinist, vulgarized version, the totality of social and even natural phenomena, and was so simple that for ignorant intellectuals it was often an irresistible temptation. This was the main secret of the expansion of the communist ideology in the first years after gaining power. Everything overlapped and strengthened each other. The country boy, who, thanks to the new power, was able to leave the countryside for the city, finish his studies, become a manager, secretary or chief, during his accelerated career he also learned about Marxist-Leninist philosophy, which answered the questions he might have asked himself and taught himself new rules of the game: career matters, winners are right - and only communism is victorious. The first years after the communists took power were therefore completely successful. Let's summarize what has already been said:

- the new system successfully carried out accelerated industrialization;
- enabled the social advancement of millions of people;
- implemented a left-wing social policy (health protection, elimination of illiteracy);
- created a new working class and intelligentsia which, it would seem, should be faithful to the new rulers.

Let's consider what the costs of these operations were. We have already talked about the millions of victims of the civil war and terror in the first years after the revolution. Communists say they were essential to happiness in the new society.

We will not discuss this thesis. For the communists, however, the victims of hunger and terror that prevailed several years after the revolution are more difficult to explain. In the 1930s, in the first years of collectivization of agriculture, over 10 million people died of starvation in Russia and Ukraine. But human sacrifice does not exhaust the cost of building communism. In fact, any success of industrialization entails enormous losses, both for the society involved in the project and for future generations. Why has this happened and is still happening? It is not that the construction of Magnitogorsk or Chelyabinsk was costly, as each investment costs money. It is about the effect that was achieved thanks to these spendings - and it was smaller than the results that could be achieved with the application of other economic policies.

The economy of capitalist countries is governed by the law of values. Without going into details or repeating academic lectures, one fact must be strongly emphasized: any economic decision resulting from the law of value is more effective than disregarding it. The spectacular economic successes of the Soviet Union and its satellites disregarded the law of value. Everything is possible in communism. Decisions here depend on the fantasy, skills or individual interests of decision-makers.

After all, no one asks about the cost, only the effect counts. The fact that a similar result can be obtained with less resources is not important. Does the described phenomenon prove stupidity of decision-makers? Of course not! Without overestimating the intellectual abilities of the state helmsmen of real socialism, it must be clearly stated that this is not the cause of the crisis. Obviously, more rational moves may delay it (Kadar's policy), and less sensible moves may lead to a crash faster (Gierek's policy). However, even the best minds are unable to make optimal economic decisions in a situation where the market is lacking. The central planner cannot replace it, even if he has a mathematical apparatus and appropriate IT equipment, and usually does not.

How is the market different from a centrally managed economy?

The market promotes what brings profit, i.e. the difference between expenditures and effects. Overall, the market rewards efficiency. He does it with cruelty, condemning unprofitable enterprises to bankruptcy. Their failure means that the economy as a whole will not go bankrupt, that it is healthy. In centralized economics, on the other hand, decisions are made primarily on the basis of political criteria - the interest of the central planner or the particular interests of the conflicting apparatus: industrial and mining lobbies, and competition between voivodships.

Every central decision is a product of these interests. Even if the central planner wishes to make a decision based on the criteria of macroeconomic optimisation there is no such possibility because the economy has neither the right prices nor the instruments to convey this decision without distortion during execution. (...)

In total, large investments, the so-called *communist ventures* mean the accumulation of economic inefficiency, the costs of which we must constantly pay. The liberation of communism from the rule of the law of values, which makes it possible to make every decision and implement every undertaking, at the price of ineffectiveness. As long as an economy was established in an industrial desert, it was, as a rule, unnoticable. The victims of the *communist ventures* were treated as tribute to be paid to progress. However, the accumulation of inefficiency also has its limits. Several decades after the victory, communism falls sick. Is it a fatal disease? What is it all about? Before answering these questions, let us explain why the intelligentsia and the working class are rebelling when they owe so much to the communist rulers?

We have already talked about the gigantic advancement "up" of millions of people in the first years of real socialism. This upward movement had its reasons, which we have already mentioned, but it could not last forever. Due to the gradual disappearance the possibility of a greater collective advancement was blocked. In theory, vertical advancement should be replaced by horizontal promotion: increasing wealth, better life, pursuing passion at work, but this did not happen, or at least to a sufficient degree to relieve social frustration. The reason was simple: communism, due to its economic inefficiency, is incapable of realizing material aspirations. Needs, additionally awakened by social policy, grow faster than the possibility of satisfying them. Why is this happening? What is the disease of the communist economy called? The answers vary: the disease of "empty shelves" and "long lines", the disease of rising prices and inflation, the disease of debt and declining growth or backward agriculture. They are, however, the symptoms of one disease to which all socialist countries fell, no matter what the symptoms of the individual patient. Well-supplied Hungary and emaciated Romania, indebted Poland and undebted Czechoslovakia suffer from an ineffective economy, which can be identified by:

- high and long-term increasing capital intensity;
- high material and energy consumption;
- "resistance" to technical progress;
- obsolete and uncompetitive on world markets industrial production.

This disease results in phenomena observed in everyday life: poor supply, high prices, production of rubbish, debt or stagnation, and most often all at once. Socialist countries must incur ever increasing expenditures in order to obtain an adequate income. In order to obtain funds for investments, they must take out loans (Poland, Hungary) or radically reduce the level of consumption (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the USSR), or stay stuck in stagnation. This last stage takes place in all the countries of the bloc, because credits cannot flow only in one direction. After some time, they have to be repaid, which is impossible for an ineffective economy to cope with (uncompetitive goods), unless at the price of extreme sacrifices - restriction of import and consumption. The circle is therefore closed.

This is combined with the social discontent caused by the blocking of the paths of promotion, and an explosive situation arises. The eruption does not have to happen at the same time, however, as its arrival depends on the degree of organization of society and the level of repression applied. The best organized was and is the Polish society, which not only has its own Church, but also in the 1970s formed the seeds of independent political organizations. Therefore, the eruption in Poland was the earliest.

In a situation of a growing crisis, it becomes necessary for the communist leadership to suppress the independence of society, which will subdue or pacify the outbreak. The only question is: for how long? At the moment, no one is in a position to answer it. The Soviet Block leaders are aware of the necessity to intensify the repression.

Martial law in Poland might as well have been introduced in December 1970 - 11 years of freedom were paid for with loans. Anyway, the postponement of martial law by a decade (a higher degree of repression) was the result of the weakness of the ruling party and Gierek's misunderstanding of the historical necessity. However, repressions do not eliminate the crisis, they only allow it to turn into a revolution. It should be clearly realized that the crisis in Poland is only a special form of crisis affecting the entire bloc.

What conditions must be met to unlock the economy and remove the disease of inefficiency?

The economy cannot be subordinated to the center, but to economic laws. The resignation from the subordination of the center causes the collapse of the communist monopoly at the most sensitive point, which is the economy. This means that the governing apparatus has lost a great deal of power, which is unacceptable to it. Martial law in Poland was introduced at a time when the "S", albeit slowly, was getting ready to deprive the PZPR of decisive influence on the economy, seeking to break the monopoly of the communists in this area through the democratic elections of state enterprises directors. Improving the efficiency of the economy is therefore closely related to the liquidation of the existing social system. As we have shown above, the communist system is doomed to decay, and treating its disease must mean its destruction.

Solutions such as the "Hungarian reform" are only apparent, as they only eliminate some symptoms of the disease, e.g. empty shelves, by strengthening others: rising prices, debt. The decaying economy will be shielded by repression by its managers. This may save them in the short run, but in the long run, the collapse of the economy will cause the system to collapse. The only question is: how soon?

At the beginning of this article, we set ourselves the objective of explaining why the world order defined by the Yalta Treaty will collapse. It is based on the balance of two military and economic blocs. The Soviet bloc will experience shocks caused by the decomposition of the economy in the coming years. It is inevitable, but what these shocks will involve is another matter. Will they manifest

themselves in a social outbreak like in Poland or in mass starvation (already occurring in the provinces of Russia), or will they turn into a series of military attacks? The answers will come in the coming years. One thing is clear: the Yalta order will not survive the communist system, and this can bring us both hope and an apocalypse.

"Independence" № 6, June 1982, pp. 7-17

## **Reform of the East - illusions of the West?**

(...)

Communism is an artificially established system, the implementation of the utopian ideas of Marx and his successors. The organization of society and economics results from ideological premises. The primacy of ideology over rationality means that the communist countries are unable to compete with the West on the economic level. They are not even able to feed themselves on their own and overall consumption levels are low, which creates social tensions. Communist politicians are guided by the Marxist doctrine and therefore, for ideological reasons, they do not allow the changes necessary to improve economic efficiency. The purity of the doctrine is of greater value to them than the efficiency of the economy. In their communist principledness, however, they are not uniform. In general, therefore, we can distinguish those for whom the idea has value as faith for the early Christians and those who are inclined to be flexible about it in the name of economic improvement. The dispute between these two groups (hardliners and pragmatists) is the axis around which the political game in the countries of real socialism has been going on for several decades. In this game, the pragmatists have an advantage, if only because their opponents are much more limited in their actions by doctrine, which must have an impact on their effectiveness. However, pragmatists must act with caution, because the Kremlin, which is the center of disposition of the entire communist movement, is dominated by hardliners. The future, however, definitely belongs to the pragmatists who push for economic reforms, the meaning of which is to decentralize and take into account the laws of the market economy. Since this trend is constant, and the example of an efficient economy is very encouraging, it can be assumed that the ranks of the hardliners will shrink and the pragmatists will grow in strength, and the economy will become similar to the free market in proportion to this. This rapprochement has no limits, since the reforms are counteracted by hardliners. The ultimate goal of the described process is communism with a free market economy. The political principles will be preserved: the monopoly of the communist party, the functioning of the Marxist ideology as the official state religion, and the economy will be ruled by rational law and separated from politics. This briefly presented diagram is typical of the

reasoning of most Western specialists. They see a pragmatist almost in every new Kremlin ruler; Recently, their favorite is Andropov, and it is worth looking at the old newspapers to see how good for the press was the pragmatist Stalin in the 1920s; They also have great hopes for the reforms of Kadar and Jaruzelski.

This scheme is incorrect and results from a great misunderstanding of the essence of the communist system.

A Western manager, both a politician and a businessman, make decisions in the conditions of competition, which forces him to adapt to certain rules of the game. A company that operates below a certain level of efficiency must go bankrupt. Likewise, an unsuccessful politician, a political party that leads to an economic or political catastrophe, must disappear from the scene.

The political and economic life of communism, on the other hand, is governed by completely different laws. For there is only one company that counts - the state - the party. In the total absence of competition, the decisions made by socialist managers are independent of the principles of rational action. This does not mean that they are not subject to any regularity, but it is not rationality in the sense of a Western man. An example of this is the often shocking decisions concerning the distribution of large investments, transport routes, clusters of qualified personnel, etc.

Lenin once wrote that politics is a condensed economy, and his successors strongly prefer this concentrate. Their economic decisions are based primarily on politics. The general-social criterion is the first principle of making economic decisions. What does that mean?

Everything that strengthens the communist system is effective. Let us give two basic examples: accelerated industrialization and collectivization of agriculture.

Communism generally prevailed in underdeveloped countries. In the first years, they pushed the extraordinary rapid pace of development of heavy industry. The expansion of metallurgy and mining was definitely faster than that of industries producing consumer goods. Industrialization was based on outdated technologies, while the production structure forced the excessive use of raw materials, materials and energy. This situation continues to this day and in extreme cases it leads to production for production. According to economic criteria, this is a mistake, because the material consumption grows faster than the production itself, so despite the gigantic steel mills, there is still a shortage of steel; as coal production increases, its deficit deepens, etc.

However, economic blunder is not political nonsense. Accelerated industrialization destroys traditional social structures and causes enormous migration of rural people to cities. Therefore, the new structure can be formed according to the model of the central planner. Economic decisions thus become an instrument of social engineering.

Second, in addition to the possibility of shaping a new social structure, the

reason for forcing the rapid pace of industrialization, especially heavy industry, is of course the need of the military. Communist countries have - always powerful armed forces above the level resulting from the degree of their economic development.

General political criteria (social engineering, arming) are not the only determinants of economic decisions. Communist power structure is never a monolith. Center disposition is also not able to control the whole socialist economy. Particular interests also come to the fore. Informal groups (in Poland it is said commonly "cliques" or "gangs") are, contrary to the ideology and the statutes of the party severely prohibiting factional activities, holding real power in the country, and therefore also in the communist economy. The new paradox: the giant company, which is a centrally planned economy, managed by hundreds of thousands of senior and lower managers are almost always able to fight for themselves rather broad autonomy, not arising at all from formal legislation, but from the real system of relations which results in the fundamental contradiction of the so-called planned economy. The communist system, eliminating all economic pluralism and competition is not, at the same time, able to provide efficient management of the economy through the Center. Therefore, the search for an effective method of management underlies the reforms undertaken by the system.

The decisions of the communist top-level managers are not constrained either by the law that does not exist, or by the economic regulations to which the system is not subjected to. Therefore, the communist leader appears to be completely free in creating reality. However, this paradise does not exist, and if it does, it is for a very short time. The extent of voluntarism is limited by the minimal needs of society in the sphere of consumption. The masses, deprived of democratic rights, still have the right to revolt, the specter of which weighs upon the decisions of the leaders of communist countries. At the root of social disturbances in the Soviet bloc is always the dissatisfaction of the masses with their standard of living. However, rebellion can be quenched by force, which has always been successful until now. The greater the social discontent, the greater the repression needed to pacify the mood. Communism knows in its history periods of poverty that exceed the threshold of biological existence - the starvation of millions of people in fertile Ukraine and the accompanying repressions on a scale comparable only to the Nazi genocide. The carrot-and-stick policy has a simple logic - the less carrot, the thicker the stick. Repressions on the scale of those of the 1930s, 1940s and early 1950s are not an end in themselves, they are not even desirable for communists. They serve to keep the society in check, but when they exceed a certain threshold, they can attack the very elite of the communist government. For this reason, "enlightened communism" tries to keep the level of repression below a critical threshold and thus keep consumption above a critical minimum. This does not mean, of course, that it always manages to do so, but this principle is the basic

requirement. restricting the freedom of the communist manager. He cannot allow the economy to completely decompose, and therefore he feverishly seeks, especially at critical moments, for ways to improve efficiency. The second reason forcing the communist rulers to do so is the ongoing arms race. The armaments sector is an area separated and powered by the best human resources and imported technologies, thanks to which it does not feel "bottlenecks" blocking other sectors. This enclave cannot, however, be completely independent of what is happening outside it. The rest of the economy and the efficiency of this work cannot remain completely indifferent to it. Hence it is much higher in communist countries than in Western democracies, but it cannot increase indefinitely. In the long run, the arms race therefore depends on economic growth and therefore improvements in efficiency. There are strong motives for this, prompting communist helmsmen to look for ways to free the growth of productivity. The specific system of economic management turns out to be the main brake here.

The market does not exist, so there are no normal incentives for enterprises to compete through greater efficiency, work efficiency and lower costs. The first idea of the communists to replace the market is a warrant. The economic system based on it looks more or less as follows:

The center of economic decisions is in the Planning Commission, which acts as a staff to translate into economic language the political decisions taken at the meetings of the Communist Party Politburo. The commission is the place where the economic tasks are balanced and the resources needed for their implementation are distributed. At this level, the planned tasks are carefully balanced. There is also a long list of products considered particularly important, the production of which is directly controlled by the center. It also takes decisions on the distribution of investments, labor, average wages, the balance of foreign trade, etc. Production tasks are assigned to individual ministries, voivodships and lower administrative units, enterprises, departments, brigades and so they go directly to the workshops level. Let us recall that we are discussing the first stage of communism, when sanctions for failure to perform tasks can still be very severe. Such cases are often explained by sabotage and severely punished. As communism becomes civilized, penal sanctions give way to administrative (dismissal) and financial (cutting wages), but the mechanism itself does not change significantly. Administrative assessment of individual management levels causes that all their attention is directed towards securing against the consequences of failure to implement the plan. The fact that the plans are not adapted to the real possibilities of the workplace does not require a long explanation.

After all, the Center does not have the technical capacity to correctly assess the potential of individual enterprises, as it relies on information from the lowest levels. So the game begins. The lower units maximally underestimate their capabilities and exaggerate their needs. The higher levels, however, try to do exactly the opposite. This poker has complicated rules. Each level in the economic



hierarchy is duplicated by the political hierarchy - the communist party. Another partner at the green table is the local administration. Personally, all players are covered by the nomenclature, that is, the party committee staffing system, and since it is not a monolith, each partner is associated with different groups within it. The actual position is therefore different than it would appear from the formal gradation of levels. Decisions regarding the allocation of tasks and resources do not have an economic rationale, but are the result of the game described above. Economic arguments are only the language of the game and are purely instrumental, as is ideological language. Economic, social or ideological arguments play the role of spells used by all partners in the game to obtain a beneficial effect - minimum tasks and maximum resources. The metaphysical nature of economic language is determined, for example, by the fact that the individual factors of production are not properly valued. Prices depend on the administrative decision, and therefore a subjective one. Therefore, economic arguments can never be verified before making a decision. It is only the time that does this, which usually gives negative judgments to communist managers, but it does not matter much for the current game.

One of the most desirable stakes in the game are investment funds. For if there are investments - there are no job limits, money for bonuses and overtime, opportunities for promotion and going abroad to discuss supplies or for training, etc. Not everyone will get equally, but when the trough is full - is enough for everyone: one will receive a bonus and a raise, the director of the enterprise will travel to the country behind the iron curtain, the voivodship first secretary, voivode or militia commander will always carve a villa for himself from the investment pool. Investments are an Eldorado. Therefore, the battles for them are fought at the highest levels of the party-state hierarchy. The strongest wins: the machine industry (read - armaments), mining, sometimes chemical. There is no place for weaklings; agriculture or the food industry has little chance. The communist economy is chronically overinvested, which is the cause of its cyclical crises.

The communist party occupies a special position in the game being described. She often plays the role of an umpire, although she also takes part in the game; something like one of the players was the referee in a football match. The party often sets the rules of the game, holds in its hand the threads of personnel decisions - the nomenclature. This in turn means that no nomination can take place without the approval of the appropriate party level. The higher the position of the nomination, the more direct the party's interference is.

Therefore, the appointment of a worker as a foreman would not pose much of a problem. The approval of the secretary of the works committee is often formal here. Personnel policy in the plant rests in the hands of the economic administration. The director of the enterprise is, however, already thoroughly verified by the local secretary (voivodeship or commune). Hence - the higher the management level, the greater the degree of "partyisation". The direct control of

the party hierarchy on personnel policy is the cornerstone of communist domination. In the critical situation they can go on extensive compromises with social groups they do not control (eg. "S" in Poland). The nomenclatures, however, cannot be surrendered under the threat of losing power. Here are the limits of the concessions. Why is this happening?

Totalitarianism consists in the full control of social life by the party-state. The communist party is the sole founder of the organization of society. For no formal group can remain outside the control of the communists. Poland was always an exception, as it was rightly considered the weakest link in the bloc. The monopoly of organizing society, the accompanying monopoly of compulsion and information, and the monopoly of labor are among the indispensable features of full totalitarianism. Thanks to them, communism not only exercises power at a given moment, but also controls the past; the information monopoly is the monopoly of history and the future controlled by the center.

Many Westerners, including journalists dealing with the issues of the countries of real socialism, confuse totalitarianism with an authoritarian system of power. In an authoritarian dictatorship, physical strength is sufficient to keep it in power at the cost of repression. The totalitarian dictatorship, especially in mature communism, uses repression less frequently than, say, the South American junta. Does not have to; moreover, it exercises much more complete control. The perfect model does not exist anywhere, but all countries of real socialism strive for the ideal - total party monopoly. The liquidation of any of the aforementioned monopolies would cause problems for the system that are difficult to describe. The lack of one monopoly would have to be replaced by the party by strengthening the other, and above all by repressions. It is no coincidence that the intensification of repression always occurs when one of the monopolies is shaken: the beginnings of building communism, Hungary 56, Poland under martial law, etc.

Let us return to our considerations on economic reform. The previously described "economic game" leads to a waste of human resources and an excessive use of material resources. The production capacity is not fully utilized, and the quality of goods is low. The absurd investment boom continues, and difficulties are mounting. The Center, on the other hand, is worried about the lack of economic effects, there is a threat of a social explosion, troubles even reach the military enclave - and the authorities are throwing out the slogan to improve the management model, and in extreme form it even talks about reform.

We will deal with the economic aspects of the reform in a moment. Now let us only note that the slogan of the reform has an important propaganda meaning: it channels ferment in creative circles, gives illusions to the masses and grounds for seeking help from the West. The World Bank, private and commercial banks are more willing to grant loans to the communist state which is preparing a reform. It is a value that can be sold, or at least pledged. Dozens of pages of the reform act are the most expensive paper sold.

Reform can only go in one direction - decentralizing the economy and allowing elements of private initiative. Both, however, must not threaten the monopoly of the communist party or violate the nomenclature. A private initiative in Poland or Hungary covers about 1% of the employed (this does not apply to Polish agriculture). One percent of people are unable to move forward a dead economy; anyway, the party never loses control over the private sector. In a country where the decisions of the authorities constitute the law, private enterprises may cease to exist in one day. To exist, the so-called private players must participate in the game. Therefore, it is no coincidence that private companies often include former celebrities or families of the current dignitary, former sportsmen or people of the stage. They all have the information necessary for a private initiative to function. Where there is no acquaintance, a bribe must suffice.

The decentralization of the state economy aims to change the rules of the game and therefore strengthens the formal position of the lower echelons of the economic hierarchy at the expense of the center. However, it never violates the position of the party, which is not governed by any legal provisions; no changes to the regulations are able to threaten it, because the position of the party results from the very essence of communism, from the monopolies it exercises, and the law in this system means the will of the authorities.

In a game played by the rules changed by the political center, the lower tiers of the economic hierarchy exercise greater control than before over areas of uncertainty, and thus the game becomes more uncertain for the center. However, the market still does not exist, there is no competition, and economic analysis is still a metaphysics. The phenomenon of self-fulfilling prophecy plays an important role here. Enterprises do not believe in reform, so they play by the old rules, only that they are formally stronger. The Center appeals to the directors of workplaces, speaks of the spirit of the reform, but does not give any real independence, as the party is still an arbiter and does not create conditions for undertaking economic activities; because there is no competition market, and there is chaos in the price structure, albeit according to new rules. A new mystery is underway, based on spells, slogans and pseudo-arguments. A séance of spiritist inducing the spirit of reform is underway. On the basis of the current Polish reform, the performance can be briefly described as follows:

Enterprises are free to determine the amount of employment and the wage fund as well as profit distribution, and no one imposes production tasks on them. Further, they can set prices themselves for some of the commodities they produce.

We will consider bets that set prices themselves (so-called contract prices). They operate almost always in the situation of a monopolist, so they dictate the conditions of the recipient, and they do not have to worry about the quality of their products. The Center applies financial incentives to enterprises, stimulating them in the direction desired by it: increase in production, reduction of costs, stabilization of prices and wages, increasing labor productivity. The thing is, however, that the

possibilities of this stimulation are quite limited. Excessive growth in employment and wages, admittedly, encounters a barrier in the form of taxation on the so-called The Employment Activation Fund, but it is not able to effectively inhibit neither prices nor earnings. Financial incentives must also not reduce production costs and reduce material consumption, in short - rationalize the economy. Enterprises do not have to reduce costs, because due to the lack of competition, each irrationality will be paid by the customer in price. Taxes aimed at stabilizing prices also act as a guillotine cutting the gains from savings, and therefore act as an anti-incentive for them. The failure of this stage of the reform causes mutual disputes. The center accuses company managements of acting against the spirit of reform, which is reflected in excessive increases in prices and wages. Enterprises, in turn, argue that the game is played as the opponent allows and that this is the result of the reform. The center says that wages need to be cut, as there is a threat of inflation that will put the reforms down, and enterprises that wage cuts will inhibit production, which will also put the reform down. The Center claims that it is obligatory to allocate a predetermined part of the profit to the development fund (ie investments financed from the company's own funds), as the companies, in their independence, consume all the profit and allocate it to additional payments. Enterprises say, on the other hand, that this mandatory indicator will be the end of independence, and therefore of reform.

The spells of the Center do not convince the companies, of course. In fact, no one believes in reform. Enterprises make a prediction: the reform is a fiction and everything will return to its previous state, so you have to play by the old rules. The mechanism of the self-fulfilling prophecy works flawlessly. The Center is not able to control solely by means of financial incentives, as long as it does not lead to a real independence of the economy. Under totalitarianism, it is impossible, because its lack results from the very essence of communism. Until this system is abolished, no serious manager will believe in independence. As long as the law is the decision of the communist boss, any project to reform the economy will be just a scrap of paper.

Unable to steer the economy in the direction it desires, and unable to evoke the spirit of reform with spells, the Center intensifies administrative pressures. In the current year, for example, most prices have been qualified for administrative determination. Profit is to be compulsorily divided according to the index imposed from above into the consumed part and allocated to investments. Regulation of employment may be expected; a discussion on this has already begun in the press. Rationing on most raw materials and machinery has never been abolished. No one will officially withdraw from the reform, as it has already become part of the state religion. The real retreat began with its introduction.

The mechanism described above is universal. It can also be explained on the basis of the theory of organization. Each system has a certain inertia that causes the elimination of foreign structures. Minor changes made to it are rejected as a foreign

body and the system returns to its previous state.

There is a threshold amount of changes that must be made for the essence of the system to change. In the case of the communist regime, the threshold value is: the introduction of the market, the abolition of the rationing of the factors of production, and the introduction of permanent political pluralism. No reform had the above-mentioned features, neither in Hungary, nor in Poland, and even less in any other country. These were only "pulsating" reforms. After the adoption of the rules that usually decentralize the economy, there is a gradual retreat and after a few years the level of centralization returns to its previous state. Then new slogans for reform are launched, etc.. That was in Hungary in 1968 – and it was over in the early 1970's. In Poland, the WOG was introduced in 1973-74, although the reform was never withdrawn, it did not work already in 1975. This is also the case now with the Jaruzelski reform. A new reform was introduced in Hungary in 1980. According to official statements by Hungarian politicians, it must now be changed - the inert system rejects it, and therefore either another reform will be introduced or it will be abandoned for the time being.

Is it possible to introduce changes ensuring the minimum threshold protecting against withdrawal? This question is equivalent to the more popular one: is communism reformable? The above threshold size of change simply means the handing over of power by the communists. It is impossible to combine communist totalitarianism with a real reform. For reform to succeed, totalitarianism must change. It is therefore necessary to assume either the voluntary surrender of power by enlightened rulers or their downfall. The first of these versions is hard to believe, while the second does not seem likely so far.

The inability to reform the economy, and hence the loss in the world of technological and economic race, with the simultaneous durability of power based on monopolized control of society and repression, is the basic contradiction that determines the dynamics of events in the countries of real socialism in the coming years.

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## **Is communism comprehensible?**

(...)

Western specialists often make a mistake when, when analyzing political decisions made by the groups ruling in communist countries, they equate their interest with the interest of the country as a whole, and therefore with the interest of the whole society. At the same time, they assume the goodwill of the rulers, who fail to reform because they are ideologically blind. For this reason, discussions undertaken by Westerners with communists ruling in the countries of the Soviet bloc often boil down to the praxeological plane, i.e. they concern methods of

effective action. They try to explain to the communists that departing from the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism will allow them to better develop the economy, meet social needs, etc. they ever played it. The communist system as it exists today allows the ruling groups to achieve the greatest profits and, at the same time, carries with it the smallest portion of risk. The departure from the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism has nothing to do with the ideological disputes or the theories of Marx and his friends, but results from the well-understood self-interests of the ruling elite.

It is hard to believe that some Polish activists are making a similar mistake. I mean, first of all, the DiP<sup>4</sup> community with its leading activist S. Bratkowski, who for many years has been trying to reconcile fire with water and explains to the authorities how it should govern to make the society better. What do communists care about? (...)

Since the inception of communism, its opponents have proven that this system cannot exist, that it is artificial, and therefore will soon fall apart. Meanwhile, it still exists. Therefore, in order to understand it, it is necessary to consider not only its weaknesses, but also the ways in which the power of communism manifests itself, which enables it to endure, despite numerous indications of failure. We must investigate why communism continues despite its ineffectiveness.

I will try, without pretending to present a comprehensive theory, of course, to point to a few advantages that the communists have at their disposal. They prove to be weaknesses in the long run, but in some situations they allow them to survive acute crises. Here are examples of the strengths of the communists:

I. Directing all activities to maintain power. All the behavior of communists can be included in the sphere of social engineering, i.e. methods of manipulating society in order to obtain the desired behavior. In times of crisis, maintaining power becomes the sole goal, and therefore all energy is spent in this direction. For example: in the fall of 1980, when the economic crisis was clearly visible and when saving the economy was equal to saving the country, the communists kept a cool head and not only did nothing meaningful for it, but began to boycott the government at all, and the goal was to divide society as much as possible.

The rulers were not interested that a divided society would not be able to recover from the crisis - they were interested that a divided society would not be able to overthrow their power. Every piece of news and rumors circulated were elements of social engineering. Governments in Western countries have many responsibilities, while under socialism it all boils down to one goal - to maintain power at all costs.

II. Omitting strategic, i.e. long-term goals, in favor of tactical, i.e. short-term goals. This regularity is of course related to the first. The real strategic goal is to maintain power, and therefore such goals as demographic balance, ecological issues, long-term economic development, which are considered strategic in free societies, are neglected in our country. Under socialism, short-term goals are

preferred over long-term ones, which causes constant imbalance and difficulties, but in times of crisis it allows the communists to gain time. A classic example illustrating our thesis was incurring debts by the Gierk team. In 1977-78, when it was already clear that the debt could not be released, the government took out new loans on much worse conditions than before to gain time. Time is a natural ally of the communists, because they always hope that by means of social manipulation they will ward off the danger of losing power. The "August Agreements" and all subsequent agreements and negotiations were also acting on time. The time gained in this way turned out to be salutary for the communists, because the society was gradually neutralized, and when the power was strengthened - it was broken. One cannot live on credit indefinitely and postponing further goals in order to deal with only the most urgent ones must one day end in failure for the government. However, this is only a half-truth, because the authorities have developed mechanisms that allow for the cancellation of some "debts". One of the basic methods is the replacement of the ruling teams, and with it the elimination of some old obligations. In this sense, crises are an important means of rebalancing the system.

III. The communist regime may completely disregard the laws of the economy, which is fatal in the long run - but again short-wave goals turn out to be more important than strategic ones. This is why we are not yet unemployed. It's just that the junta decided that unemployment at the moment would be politically unprofitable for her, which does not mean that it will be like that in a few months.

What practical conclusions result from our theoretical considerations? There seem to be two:

- the communist system may continue for many years, despite the difficulties experienced throughout the block. Without reforming it can survive thanks to mechanisms; which he has worked out for himself and which are not sufficiently known. We must therefore prepare for a much longer period of martial law than a few months. It is clear that, at least in Poland, this system will exist in this form, regardless of its official name: state of emergency, special powers of the government, etc .;

- in order to fight communism better, we must get to know it well. Here is an appeal to scientists who do not feel like collaborators: in independent research centers, serious research should be carried out on the system in which we live. I would like to emphasize once again that we can make important decisions in this area.

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## **31 years after Stalin**

We have a full year of Orwell and Almarik. The prognosis, however, was not

correct; both unpleasant (Orwell) and optimistic (Almarika). England is not yet ruled by Big Brother, and the Soviets have not yet fallen under the blows of the "yellow". Every observer, however, notices that despite the continued expansion of the Soviet Empire in the period after Stalin's death, by pro-Soviet clique, the smell of decay clearly hovers over the center of the bloc.

At the outset, I would like to emphasize that I see absolutely no possibility of a return to classical Stalinism. Unfortunately, I also do not expect a quick collapse of the system of real socialism, because the cause of the weakness of this system, that is, the focus of decay, is at the same time the source of its strength enabling it to continue vegetation.

Classic Stalinism was a mixture of terror and overwhelming propaganda. In the darkest years, mainly in the USSR, every gray citizen and member of the Politburo could be sentenced to the death penalty or to life imprisonment, even if he moved only under the convention defined by editorial articles from the party newspaper. Man's self-preservation instinct is extremely strong and thanks to it people who are threatened with sudden and irrational death try to humbly fulfill the orders of their persecutors. It is rare to put up active resistance, because as a result of it you can lose your life very quickly, and cooperation with the executioner could extend it. In this matter, it is very instructive to get acquainted with the notes of Czerniaków and Ringelblum from the Warsaw ghetto published in Poland last year. Their accounts confirm the thesis that people subjected to terror are more willing to cooperate with the executioner than to actively resist. This is irrespective of the nationality, religion or culture of the victims. Of course, there are exceptions to every rule, and we also know them from our own history. We should remember, however, that there were only a few who actively resisted, while most were of the opinion that opposition to the executioner would only increase the extent of the persecution, and in general they were right.

So I understand why people who were threatened by the seemingly irrational terror of Stalinism not only behaved passively, but were also critical of the resistance of others. Stalinism was not a terror-based dictatorship, however, as propaganda was its other arm. It also developed at a time when there was no television yet, and the radio was only in its infancy. Therefore, in every institution or neighborhood, there were political instructors who organized countless meetings, in which, above all, a sense of danger from imaginary external and internal enemies was instilled. This was only one aspect of the propaganda. The second was to convince everyone that it was necessary to make huge sacrifices to build a communist society, called rather socialist in Poland (why? - it's really hard to find out), which will be a real paradise. It was going to come very soon; already 60 years ago, the then thirty-year-olds were guaranteed that they would see it.

Stalinism also promised a quick promotion to all who decided to participate actively in the system; people, especially from the lowlands, were given power that, before the revolution, even in their dreams, they could not dream of.



The system involved everyone except the peasants who remained in the countryside and continued to cultivate the land. The engineers, starving and devoured by tuberculosis, drew plans for new industrial plants in "camps", i.e. camps for technical staff, made inventions, adapted foreign technologies at night. Workers working for a slice of dry bread built factories, they dug sewers and built houses. The enthusiasm of many was certainly successful, but no one said: "are you standing or lying ...".

The efficiency of Stalinism, however, resulted not only from the intimidation of "non-farmers" with terror and cunning propaganda promising golden mountains to death in the future; it was primarily a simple derivative of the efficiency of the apparatus of power, which was subjected to terrorism similar to that of simple workers. purges also of executioners (Cheka, NKVD) and the party apparatus, including the Politburo. For many years, the party bureaucracy sucked talented and ambitious people out of the social lowlands, very susceptible to propaganda. They also felt a strong threat of losing their heads during the next purge. Therefore, they carried out the orders of their superiors promptly and efficiently, and showed considerable own initiative. whether or not they were crimes which lead to the economic decay and extermination of millions of people, such as collectivization, or ambitious, such as the Soviet nuclear or missile program.

This system outlived its creator for a dozen or so years and at the end of the 1960s the Soviets had their credit: catching up with the West in the production of nuclear weapons, the most modern and largest steel plants, the best tanks and combat aircraft, launching the first iron (sputnik), dog (Laika) and human (Gagarin). They also mass-produced various household appliances: radios, televisions, washing machines, vacuum cleaners, refrigerators, shavers, kitchen robots, watches, etc., the construction and design of which were copied from Western products. The Soviets had no special problems either with the acquisition of technology or with the launch of large-scale production. They achieved these economic successes thanks to the enthusiasm and professionalism of their technical staff, the efforts of the workers, and above all, the efficiency of the apparatus, which continued to motivate people to work efficiently and creatively, and at the same time was able to organize it well.

The above comments relate to a large extent to satellites, including Poland. Stalinism was introduced there, however, much later and lasted shorter, but the economy of these countries at the end of the sixties looked similar to that of the USSR (except for agriculture in the People's Republic of Poland). It should be emphasized once again that for reasons incomprehensible to the end, the collective farm has never resembled a factory. The peasant did not work as enthusiastically as the laborer, and the management of the collective farms was always lame. Perhaps a peasant could always survive without a salary (money) from theft or illegal cultivation or breeding, while a steelworker and a miner had to earn money and only buy something for the funds obtained in this way.

The first symptoms of rotting Stalinism are visible to me in the first half of the 1960s. All countries of the bloc then take out loans in the West, buy many licenses, etc. This is how the period of relaxation begins, the times of dynamic development or, if you prefer, the communist and capitalist systems approaching each other. For me, however, these are symptoms of the decay of Stalinism, evidence of the inevitable, albeit very slowly, end of communism in general.

I have heard voices, even lamentations, that it is a mistake to sell the Soviets modern Western technology. It is said that, according to Lenin's prophecy: "the capitalists will sell us (the Bolsheviks) a rope on which to hang them." I agree, there is such a danger, especially of selling this proverbial rope on credit. market economy, especially in the conditions of fierce competition for markets, is interested in exporting its products and is not guided by political criteria in selecting customers.

Let us consider what type of purchases are and what is their fate. We distinguish:

1. licenses for the production of a product that has not been produced so far in the countries of the block
2. technologies enabling large-scale production.

An example of the first transaction may be the tv color picture tube factory in Piaseczno, and the second one, the Massey-Fergusson-Perkins tractor factory in Ursus. Theoretically speaking, if we have efficient equipment, a group of enthusiastic engineers and willingly working workers, the production of licensing plants should start as soon as possible, the production of various small parts, initially imported, should be mastered quite quickly, and the experience gained through contacts with Western technique and technology should be used in other enterprises in the country and throughout the Soviet empire. The purchased license or technology should also provide an incentive for local engineers to develop it creatively. What happened to Polkolor in Piaseczno and the factory in Ursus does not need to be explained to anyone. There are almost no benefits, and rather no production. So let's leave Poland and look at the car industry in the Soviet bloc. Two countries: Czechoslovakia and East Germany had a strong auto industry when the communists took power there. They also had a staff of engineers, technicians and workers not inferior to their colleagues in Western Europe. What happened next? Well, the decline and backwardness of the car industry in the communist countries can be explained by the neglect that prevailed there for many years, resulting from the assumption of the primacy of collective consumption over individual consumption. The passenger car was therefore not at the top of the list of preferred goods. After the fall of Khrushchev, the new team of Brezhnev decided to make up for backwardness and in Stavropol, hastily renamed Togliatti, Fiat built after 1968 the huge Zhiguli (Lada) car factory. 20 years have passed and this great power continues to produce a very little modified car, built by Italian engineers in the 1950s. Interestingly, instead of modernizing Zhiguli, the Soviets, out of

concern to maintain a monopoly on the export of cars to the poor, blocked the development of the automotive industry in Czechoslovakia and the GDR, preventing Skoda and Wartburg from working together. Therefore, both companies produce cars, the basic technical parameters of which were defined before the Second World War.

Such examples could be multiplied indefinitely, but I chose the car industry, because almost everyone in Poland has heard that some companies in the West now give a 5-year warranty on the body, and modern engines of various Opel, Volkswagen, Honda and Toyota it is a maximum of 6 liters of cheap and unleaded fuel (crude oil-diesel) per 100 km. Apart from that, they are quite large, light, comfortable and fast cars, suitable for communist cars such as Zhiguli to Pobeda, if someone still remembers the latter.

Of course, a light, low-burning and non-rusting car is not only a luxury toy, but also a product that affects the entire economy and the balance of payments of a given country (crude oil, steel, etc.). Not everyone knows that modern cars are manufactured in factories where most of the operations are performed by computer-controlled robots (e.g. welding and painting), and engineers using CAD (Computer Aided Design) systems can produce even better models quickly and efficiently.

I will not describe the backwardness of the Soviet empire in microprocessor technology and its anticipated effects. I would like to return to the main topic of these considerations, namely the collapse of Stalinism - the cause of the decay of the empire, so evident in the technological backwardness and in the fate of the license.

As experts in the problem claim, especially Awtorchanow, the author of the book: "The mystery of Stalin's death. Beria's conspiracy ", Josef Wisarionovich was murdered by Beria and his associates literally on the eve of the start of the new purge. Remember that almost all of them also included the liquidation of the secret police. During the purges, Beria's predecessors, Yagoda and Yezhov, were exterminated, followed by Stalin blamed them for all the failures of his governments and blamed them for some of the slaughter. Beria murdered Stalin to save his head, but he was too dangerous for the rest of the Politburo, led by Khrushchev. He was lured unarmed to the meeting at which he was to be handed over to the supreme authority, and there he was also shot by Marshal Konyev.

The execution of Beria opened a new chapter in the history of the USSR. It seems that the people in the highest office have entered into a "treaty of bloodless rivalry." It does not mean the end of the power struggle, but since then it has been fought without dead bodies. And the party leader never shoots his close associates. of this rule are, of course, the murders in Afghanistan (Taraki, Amin), Ethiopia, Cuba or executions in Hungary after 1956. After all, after 1953 no typical Stalinist purge took place with its characteristic show trials, mass arrests, etc. The author himself clearly benefited from this novelty. After his overthrow by Brezhnev,

Khrushchev quietly lived to see his days. for which he would have been smoothly condemned to death in Stalin's time, but Dubcek was not brought to trial, but was briefly sent as ambassador to Turkey, then We were ordered to work in a kolkhoz. In the event of a party coup, the milk tray is not shortened by a head now - it will go to the post or receive a good retirement pension. Thanks to this "humanitarian" policy, we had such a period in Poland that during the rule of the newest first secretary, four of his predecessors lived: Gomulka, Gierak, Ochab and Kania, but they can wait for rehabilitation in the event of another coup (like recently Gomulka or Jaszczuk).

The collapse of Stalinism was first noticed by the people holding the highest positions in the apparatus. So they could go to bed without fear that someone would knock on the door at night and that a comfortable apartment or an impressive villa would have to be turned into a cell - a vestibule for the show trial and death. The struggle for power has also taken on a completely different character since then. It is no longer just about denouncing and wishing its opponents a sudden death in some next purge. The power struggle grew more subtle; Losing it is no longer a tragedy, because after a period of lucrative disfavor in an interesting post of ambassador, you may have a chance to return (see the example of Olszewski or Kociolek).

The lack of fear in the apparatus has greatly diminished its efficiency and has led to a series of known drawbacks: corruption, particularism, nepotism and laziness. Let us emphasize that particularism is called a phenomenon, which at the same time means looking only through the prism of one's own backyard (factory, province, ministry) and not being afraid of superiors. Such a member of the apparatus, which, contrary to clear instructions from above, mainly pursues the interests of his area, enterprise, clique or even private, acts in a particular way. Was something like this possible in the days of classical Stalinism? Well, absolutely not, because it would be treated as a sabotage, and the apparatchik practicing particularism was quickly shortened by a head. Now, for a long time, non-obeying the orders of superiors is considered a proof of courage in the nomenclature and improves the well-being of the local satrap (the local term should be understood in this case not only in the geographical sense). Because what can happen to a guy with a camera who is not particularly concerned about the pile of telexes, telegrams or telephonograms coming from various decision-makers? Basically nothing! For the orders are often contradictory, since the quality of work at the higher levels is as bad as at the lower levels. Besides, it is not very clear who is responsible for what. However, if the consequences of mistakes are to be suffered, it will not be a trip to Siberia or the death penalty, as in Stalinist times, but a transfer to another managerial position with wonderful appanages, a company car, etc.

The apparatus, which has been slowly demoralizing since 1953, no longer has the same means of driving people to work as in the Stalin era. First, ordinary people have also noticed that the times of terror are gone and will not come back.

Secondly, thirty-year-olds who were encouraged to work efficiently for a poor wage, promised to live in a communist paradise, have long died and their grandchildren do not believe in it at all (e.g. in the USSR). Therefore, now the engineer will not work at night on new technologies for the happiness of communism, and the laborer will not spend extra hours in the May Day deed with a shovel or a machine. Both have to be paid well, although the quality of their work will still be low.

With the development of the mass media, the function of the party apparatus was also limited. Propagandists and political activists now operate mainly on television, and not in every factory and block committee. Despite this, the party bureaucracy is more numerous than it was in Stalin's time. It deals with the so-called managing the economy, i.e. robbing it and disorganizing it.

In my opinion, the effect of Khrushchev's conclusion of a "non-aggression pact" among the Soviet Politburo is that we no longer have Stalinism, but a constantly decaying structure called "real socialism." Currently, its characteristic features are: lack of discipline and corruption in the apparatus, economic stagnation, lack of development of domestic technology and low quality of work in all sections.

As I said in the introduction, the main source of the system's weakness is also its strength. The system collapses because of its apparatus of power, and at the same time this apparatus is most interested in maintaining it. The apparatus is not only the Politburo, the Central Committee, ministries, the army commanding staff or all party members. The broadly understood apparatus also includes managers of various levels, propaganda workers, etc. Together they probably account for over 3 million people in Poland, not counting families.

How to become an apparatchik was best described by Woslenski in the book „*Nomenclature*”. It concerns the situation in the USSR, but with us it is basically the same. The nomenclature is entered mainly thanks to the support of someone who is already in this apparatus. So it is family acquaintances and connections that are decisive; it is quite similar to how the Sicilian mafia works.

The common saying goes that promoted first of all is "mediocre, passive, but faithful." I will try to prove that this is not entirely true at the moment. the passive do so in the least visible way, for wholly private purposes, and also fidelity has long been a great problem.

In the old concept, fidelity meant both ideological correctness (fidelity to ideas), as well as devotion to superiors and loyalty to the introducer to the nomenclature. The collapse of classical Stalinism provided the members of the apparatus with "personal inviolability" and greatly loosened the former discipline. The fidelity of ideology does not exist in principle, because it is not known now what this ideology is. in Stalin's times, it does not exist now. The reaction of subordinates to the slogan, once serious, today may become unforeseen - up to and including the outburst of laughter. clever, rarely loyal. "

Who was mainly promoted to the apparatus during Stalin's time? They were young peasants or workers, sometimes declassed intellectuals. They were stuffed in special schools with slogans for every occasion, they were instilled with faith in the bright future of communism, their education was low, although they had great intentions - "*not a high school diploma, but a sincere will will make you an officer.*" people claiming to be workers or peasants; they also constituted a large part of the employees of the terror apparatus (NKVD, UB). Their "faithfulness" was excellent, and in the atmosphere of Stalinist terror they performed their functions excellently.

Currently, a large part of the people of the apparatus have higher education; almost every minister or member of the Politburo has a professor or doctorate. Sometimes there is a curiosum in the form of Albin Siwak, but he also probably does his habilitation thesis in concreting, and he is a laughingstock of most of the nomenclature. In the system of realsocialism, a typical member of the apparatus is half or quarter intelligent.

The most characteristic moment in the career of a member of the nomenclature is crossing the so-called the level of competences, i.e. the level in the occupational hierarchy which a given person should not exceed due to their qualifications. Let us take an example. Well, the worker, thanks to training in the evening courses, became a foreman. His skills and personal qualities make it the highest position he should hold; he is therefore a competent foreman. Due to coincidence, arrangements, party affiliation, etc., he will, however, be appointed manager. However, he is completely unfit for this position - he has exceeded the level of competence - he has reached the level of incompetence.

The paradox of nomenclature is that it is only when you enter the level of incompetence that promotes promotion and opens up a wonderful career for a given individual, and enables participation in a continuous carousel of positions.

The further promotion of a person who is no longer proven in a lower position causes that the exceeding of incompetence is clearly noticed by her. The promoted person knows that he is not suitable for a given position, but is attracted by the power and material benefits gained in this way. He has an inferiority complex, so he treats subordinates either with humble sucking up or with arrogance. The most important thing, however, is that he knows about himself that he is naked.

However, the described example with a worker who should only become a foreman and was promoted to manager, is not typical. Most often, the *nomenclature* is used by people who have never encountered manual labor, were unable to get into studies, were employed in various clerical positions or in the apparatus of youth organizations, who signed up for the PZPR. They also made sure that someone from the nomenklatura noticed them and sent them to a course, preferably to the Higher School of Social Sciences at the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party<sup>5</sup>. Graduating from this "*university*" guarantees low-level work in the apparatus and entry into the so-called pool of "backup

management staff". If anyone is interested in it, please come to the corner of Bagatela St. and Aleje Ujazdowskie St. in Warsaw. There you can see WSNS "students" going to the bus to return to their "dormitory" at the corner of Belwederska St. and Gagarin St. It is not nice to judge people by their faces, but the conclusion is irresistibly that entrusting any managerial position to graduates of WSNS guarantees exceeding the level of competence. This is not the only mechanism for advancement to the apparatus; similar, although less prestigious, schools for young "talents" exist at voivodship committees of the PZPR.

The fastest career in the apparatus is recently pursued by various professors and appreciators who have long found themselves on the level of incompetence. It is enough to give the example of professors: Krasieński, Żygulski, Porębski, Gorywoda, Messner, Zawadzki, Rybicki in the Politburo and the government and Giertych in the Sejm (this is the one with a mustache who solved "S") and the appointment of an assistant professor exceeded the level of competence. Examples of dizzying careers of mediocrity, which the stupider and less competent, the easier they make them, are numerous. An emissary to the World Health Organization, and now a member of the PRON; professor Jasiorowski, the famous "Jew tracker" from 1968, rewarded with a very profitable foreign exchange job at FAO in Rome, then the rector of the Warsaw University of Life Sciences (SGGW)<sup>6</sup> and the infamous creator of the "milk ring" around Warsaw - an investment which made the capital city lacking milk for several years. Probably now advising others to throw-away millions on new milk rings.

Why, then, exceeding the level of competence and reaching the level of incompetence is a guarantee of further promotions?

Well, I have already talked about the promoted inferiority complex; he knows that he is not suitable for the position he holds. He also suspects that those who appoint him also know about it. So he will do a lot to please the mountain. One can understand, then, why the nomenclature no longer has the advantage of the young workers and peasants who hastily trained on Marxism-Leninist courses. Under the conditions of real socialism, without Stalinist terror, one cannot count on their loyalty. They could always take their lessons seriously and attack the mountain of nomenclature from ideological purity.

Instead of an apparatchik with overworked hands of a worker, we see a generally fat and cheerful quarter-intelligent (sometimes thin people will also come across: Krasieński, Żygulski, Gertych), a loser who has long found himself on the level of incompetence. The titled apparatchiks bore us with long interviews in the press, radio and television, clearly avoiding the quotations from the classics used in the past in similar circumstances. So unlike the old ones, they are not even strong in Marxism-Leninism. The professors are supported by the hosts of students of the WSNS, who have so far been awarded the title of master, sometimes doctor.

The real socialism comes out poorly on such a nomenclature. Incompetence, particularism and a sense of impunity make the apparatus disorganize the economy

(see the fate of the license) and discourage the few who want to work with their example. Unfortunately, such a camera is also a source of system stability.

The apparatchiks who find themselves at the level of incompetence and in a few further moves (carousel of positions) achieved numerous titles and positions know that they are naked. They also realize that if the time of truth came, instead of professors, directors, etc., they would have to get completely different positions. For many, even street cleaning would probably be too difficult. One Krasinski would probably find a better job with Pietrzak<sup>7</sup> - as promised - in a cabaret.

Thus, millions of Polish half and a quarter intellectuals of the nomenclature are vitally interested in prolonging the agony of real socialism. They are therefore the strength of this system. Communism promotes different people every day, for example to lower management, entwines new victims in its nets, which will be the source of its inefficiency, but out of fear for their jobs, they will become its submissive servants.

If we compare Stalinism to a speeding car, then the "pact on bloodless rivalry" concluded by Khrushchev with his colleagues from the Soviet Politburo can be compared to turning off the engine and throwing the ignition key out of the window. The party apparatus are people with mechanic diplomas, but none of them can get a new key. So they push the car, lubricate the bearings, and remove the stones from the road. It is important, however, since we know this car will stop someday, so that we can prevent it from falling into the abyss on too tight a bend.

"Independence" № 26, February 1984, pp. 20-26

## **Communism - elements of the theory**

Classic Marxist doctrine describes the reality of socialism as a conflict-free idyll of the coexistence of social, ruled and ruling classes, various professional, ethnic and territorial groups. Such a description assumes the following conditions:

- society's consent to the basic values of the system;
- realization by the system of basic aspirations of society: material and spiritual;
- building an ideal organization encompassing the state from which negative phenomena would be eliminated.

The above conditions are necessary for the realization of the vision of an ideal socialist society. If they could be fulfilled, the ideal would become a reality. The official picture of socialism is presented by a healthy, resilient society, accepting its power and the values it promotes, and having one. objective. It found its symbolic reflection in the art of the period of socialist realism. To this day, it is also in force in many countries of the camp, especially in the USSR, Bulgaria, Romania and



non-European socialist countries. Does this image only have a propaganda meaning? Yes and No We must remember that official propaganda in communism is a form of reality, because collective consciousness has no experiences other than those given by this propaganda.

Therefore, the possibilities of its influence are very large. Collective awareness is therefore the awareness of official propaganda. There is a phenomenon of self-fulfilling prophecy. Admittedly, the awareness of propaganda is false, but due to the monopoly of information, only it reaches the individual, so the calling is accepted by him as his own. The propaganda effect is therefore achieved.

It seems that opposition activists tend to underestimate this influence on the whole society. Meanwhile, propaganda achieved considerable success in the bloc countries, including Poland. The greatest is the recognition by the majority of society of the basic values of the system. All sociological research confirms this incredible truth. Of course, it is not about accepting the system, but about the values it proclaims. Thus, the first condition of the three mentioned at the beginning was fulfilled in the countries of realsocialism. Let us try to explain what values are accepted in line with the officially propagated ones. Here are a few of them:

- social egalitarianism;
- the special role of the "*working class*" in society;
- the exercise of power by a group not elected in free elections, but having the mandate of "*historical necessity*".

This last statement may seem at least controversial in the light of the events of the last two years in Poland, but nevertheless it should be considered as true. Polish society, neither in August 1980, nor in March 1981, nor after the imposition of martial law turned out to be mentally mature to take power into its own hands. It wanted to control the rulers, sign agreements, but did not want to overthrow it, which was largely the result of „*communist-like*” social consciousness.

Therefore, to create a conflict-free communist system, it is only necessary to meet the needs of society. This case, however, is much more complicated. The standard of living of an average citizen in the socialist camp is several times lower than in highly developed countries. So it is clear that this system is not able to meet social needs, especially the most tangible - material ones. However, the authorities have a wide range of methods at their disposal, thanks to which they are able to maintain order in the state. Generally speaking, they act in two ways. On the one hand, these are repressive forces, prepared to stop social rebellion, and on the other hand, they are actions aimed at weakening the society's inclination to object. The scope and strength of the impact of these two methods change in different situations. Let us list some elements of the government's policy which weaken the tendency to resist:

- attempts to meet the needs of society;

- limiting the impact of the demonstration effect on the part of non-communist countries, while persuading the society that the relationship of the levels of life in both systems is beneficial for communism;

- destroying institutions necessary for a given society, independent of the authorities: religion, customs, social organizations;

- disintegration of society: fueling conflicts between different groups, buying strategic groups, creating a corporate society;

- reducing tensions caused by not satisfying social needs, through manipulative actions - throwing responsibility on the former leaders, in extreme situations replacing them, creating enclaves of imitated criticism.

Of the above-mentioned ways of maintaining the integrity of the system, the most important are the attempts to satisfy the needs of the society. (...)

In a moment of crisis, the so far forbidden word "*reform*" makes its career. The communist economy is, however, unreformable, because any change introduced to heal it violates the essence of the system, i.e. the power of communists. Party leaders promote "reform", perhaps believing in its need. and prosperity, but they do not sacrifice their power for it. The economy is therefore doomed to vegetation. It reached the level of its capabilities as early as the end of the 1960s (in Poland); the 1970s were donated thanks to an exceptionally advantageous international situation (loans from the West). The basic condition for reducing the tendency of society to revolt is therefore not fulfilled.

Communism, therefore, counted on the assets side the communization of society's consciousness, and on the liabilities side, economic stagnation resulting from the very essence of the system. This apparent draw is the cause of events in our country in recent years.

We are dealing, therefore, with the following pattern: aversion to the system + deterioration of the material situation = rebellion; rebellion + communizing the consciousness of society = seeking unrealistic compromises and escaping from reality to symbols = lack of organizational and program preparation = defeat of the rebellion.

However, the vision of rebellion continues to scare us. Unable to meet the basic condition for the pacification of moods - a radical improvement in living standards - the leaders of the socialist countries have at their disposal the means that have already been mentioned: manipulation and repression.

Manipulation tends to disintegrate society. Contemporary communist directors have mastered it better thanks to propaganda. This is especially true in our country, where the range of various shades of propaganda is wider than it used to be. During the 1968 campaign, propaganda was one-track; its direction was given by journalists such as Myslek<sup>8</sup> or Krasicki<sup>9</sup>. Currently, there is a range of shades that give the false impression of a difference of views. Thanks to this, the recipient of propaganda, while escaping from the hardliners ("Reality"<sup>10</sup>, W.Loranc<sup>11</sup>), falls under the influence of moderate, common-sense propaganda ("Politics"<sup>12</sup>, "Here

and Now"<sup>13</sup>, show with M.F.Rakowski<sup>14</sup>).

The use of multiple information channels is also a novelty, including the use of Western mass media (via B.Marguerite<sup>15</sup> of Le Figaro). This makes manipulation much more effective. through official party channels, e.g. the image of factional struggles in which the junta plays the role of a liberal force.

Symbolic actions reduce society's ability to self-organize and formulate real programs. However, they cannot save the regime from the threat of rebellion, because without reversing the trends in the host, there is no pacification of moods. And there will be no improvement in the economy; there can only be stagnation. In this situation, repressions become the regime's main means of influencing society. The development of communist countries is also heading in this direction. Martial law or otherwise exceptional is a natural state to which any regime of this type will approach. The opposite tendency (Poland in the 70's and 80-81, Hungary) is and must be only temporary. After a period of manipulative ("reform") actions, only repression remains for the rulers. Therefore, the question arises whether the apparatus of repression is also subject to pathological phenomena of large organizations. It seems that in this respect the apparatus of violence looks better than the economic one comes from several factors:

- no double hierarchy in the police, thanks to which "professionalism" plays a greater role,

- the possibility of isolating law enforcement agencies from the rest of the system, due to the size difference between the two organizations. Thanks to this, it is possible to pay officers at a much higher level than in the economy, as well as to provide appropriate "technical equipment" (one of the most modern in the world).

This does not mean that the police apparatus will not be subject to erosion, but the phenomenon will be slower than in the economy.

The question is whether there is any minimum threshold of a society's inclination to revolt that would be tantamount to overthrowing the system. The answer to that question is: No! The mere reluctance of society, in the absence of organization and without the erosion of the repressive apparatus, cannot overthrow the system. Difficulties with the organization of society result from the manipulations and repressive actions of the authorities. In the future, therefore, attention should be paid to the phenomenon of the erosion of the repressive apparatus, without which, it seems, an effective rebellion is impossible.

"Independence" № 11-12, November-December 1982, pp. 10, 23-25

## **Symbolic and political actions**

The symbol plays a huge role in mass movements. Actually, one could describe the

entire history of mankind as the formation of symbols, their taking over by groups of people, their impact on consciousness, the evolution of the meaning of symbols to giving them in social consciousness a value opposite to that initially adopted, clash of old and new symbols, etc.

Describing history in this way, we would find that symbols live their own lives and are governed by laws that are sometimes difficult to define. Therefore, the cross, originally a symbol of shameful death, could have become a symbol of human dignity, although it was also a sign of pride and Teutonic arrogance. This ambiguity in the impact of the symbol already indicates that the leaders of mass movements must also take it into account.

A symbol in a social movement plays the following roles:

- is a means of communication; with its help you can communicate, transfer information;
- is a factor integrating the group, with its help you can also mobilize to action;
- is a mental shortcut of the ideology and goals of the movement.

Political actions are aimed at a change in the direction considered desirable by a given movement. Symbolic actions, i.e. those relating to the symbol, are goal in themselves. Of course, by influencing the imagination and their mobilizing function, they can also carry out political tasks. However, there are also actions that do not have any impact on the reality. When we speak of symbolic actions, we will mean the latter.

The faster the course of events, the more agitated the moods, the greater the crowd's influence on the development of the situation, the greater the range of symbolic actions becomes. The reason for this is the particular vulnerability of the poorly politically conscious masses to the symbol. Each revolution provides us with many examples in support of this thesis. Let's follow a few of them from the time of the Paris Commune. Let us also recall that the Commune, considered a typical proletarian revolution (also by Marx), had no chance of victory. The revolted Paris was surrounded by a double ring of enemy forces: counter-revolutionary and German. The latter retained a reluctant attitude towards the revolution, and their actions (the release of French prisoners of war) definitely favored the counter-revolution.

There were no determined people with clear goals among the Commune's leaders. The biggest mistake was the failure of the Commune to take over the Bank of France, even though this might be the only chance for the communards. On the other hand, numerous legal acts and measures were typically symbolic in nature. On April 6, 1871, it was banned from use, and later all religious signs, sacred images, etc. were gradually removed. On April 4, the 137th National Guard Battalion pulled a guillotine into the square and burned it in public amid the cheers of the crowd. On April 12, the Commune decided to demolish the column in Vendôme Square, cast on Napoleon's order after the war of 1809 from the captured

cannons, as a symbol of chauvinism and national hatred. On April 20, night work for bakers was abolished. On May 5, the Commune decided to demolish the chapel, which was built during the restoration, as an expiation for the guillotine of Louis XVI.

Let us consider: encirclement, isolation, a rather hopeless situation and so much unnecessary expenditure of energy on destroying old symbols or creating new ones.

Let us now return to our Polish revolution, which started in August 1980 and suppressed in December 81, has not yet completely died out. I risk the thesis that the vast majority of revolutionary activities before and almost one hundred percent after December were symbolic. The reasons are the same as those presented in the analysis of the Paris Commune. The very creation of "S" was a political fact, as it changed the political situation. After August, it was definitely different than before it. The mere existence of "S" could not, however, remain a sufficient goal. This institution, representing the interests and aspirations of the vast majority of society, had to implement them. With all the heterogeneity of the movement, there could be no doubt as to the overall goals, which were:

- improving the standard of living;
- recovery of the economy;
- liberalization of cultural policy;
- reform of power structure to increase the influence of society.

None of these goals had been achieved before December, and after the December 13<sup>th</sup> here was a clear regression at every point (except perhaps a slight economic improvement, as previously the government had deliberately boycotted the economy). After August<sup>16</sup>, the PZPR did not intend to yield to social referendums. The only real concessions were wage increases and a corresponding reduction in working hours. Although these moves for a short time improved the financial situation, they also led to the breakdown of the economy, which could be blamed on "S" and increase tensions between various social groups and was able to block requests from "S". It was clear that the only real action could be to remove the PZPR from power and create a pluralistic system. This, however, the leaders of "S" and advisers did not have the courage to formulate. All actions necessarily had a symbolic character. Therefore, after August, Poland was flooded with a wave of symbolism. Jadwiga Staniszkis<sup>17</sup> introduced the term "proxy conflict" to describe a conflict of a symbolic nature.

After August, no political slogans were formulated - changes to the system - but partial ones, in no way undermining the communist system. The nomenclature on which it is based has not been attacked, but the officials whose power is derived from this nomenclature have been attacked. The system of financing the repressive forces, which the society does not control, was not fought, and the real expenses in this regard are secret, but there were demands to transfer the administrative buildings of the PZPR or MO<sup>18</sup> for social purposes. The symbolic demands became

more and more radical. It was a favorable situation for the authorities, because the radical manner of expression was easy to discredit by showing its incoherence, and to accuse "S" of extremism. On the real level, however, since the autumn of 1980 (registration of the Union), no concessions were made. Symbolic demands consumed a huge amount of energy, almost all post-August strikes were of this nature. However, when real conflicts occurred, especially those of heavy political weight, "Solidarity" always withdrew. This was the case not only in the Bydgoszcz case, but also in other, less remembered today, for example in the case of LOT director (a conflict not over a person but over the nomenclature in enterprises) or in the case of the local self-government act.

Most of the "S" members had difficulty distinguishing between political and symbolic goals (remember, too, that the masses are fond of symbolism).

Unfortunately, the leaders and advisers of "S" were unable to make the masses aware of this difference, nor did they try to push through the political demands.

Symbolic actions may have political significance, but only when they debunk myths or hit the symbols of the opponent. The August strike in 1980, regardless of the slogans, was of a political nature, as it violated the myth of public support for the authorities. Shipyard named after Lenin became a symbol against the system that Lenin created. The first leaflets and posters massively distributed in public transport were a political fact, as they broke the monopoly of information and showed the range of the movement. However, the symbolic actions themselves must lose their sharpness when duplicated many times; the strikes a year after August passed unnoticed or aroused irritation.

The program adopted at the 1<sup>st</sup> Congress contained very anemic postulates, while the rank and file members and factory level activists used the symbolism. Eagles, crowns and crosses replaced their political slogans. Jan Rulewski<sup>19</sup>, considered to be an extreme extremist, a few days before December 13<sup>th</sup>, proposed to guarantee the majority of seats for the PZPR in the next Sejm<sup>20</sup>, so in the political program, virtually no activist of a bigger caliber crossed the barrier of changing the system. Despite the threat from the eastern direction or home side (PZPR), no document specifying the actions of "S" in the event of an attack was adopted, but almost every paper was full of silly jokes on this subject. December 13<sup>th</sup>, found "S" not prepared to take political action. The attempt of general strike was undertaken under the banner of the return to the situation that had just collapsed. **The leaders were afraid of formulating goals that they thought were impossible to achieve, so they put forward other, also unrealistic, and most often purely symbolic and partial ones. Setting long-term political goals then would not lead to the immediate defeat of Reds, but would initiate irreversible changes in national minds.**

After a brief episode of strikes and fights in December, underground activists recommended a whole range of symbolic actions: wearing "S" badges, crosses, burning candles, boycotting television and newspapers, etc. The more radical forms

of the protest - strikes and demonstrations - were also symbolic, for neither of them had political demands. As always, symbolic actions, even initially spectacular (e.g. TV walks), have lost their focus. The boycotting of television by actors is also dying out. No surprise, as the workers did not undertake a similar boycott in the factories.

It is clear that symbolic slogans today are not able to mobilize most members of the "S" to more radical action. The "S" itself becomes just a symbol. It is probably too early for clear political slogans, given the lack of political infrastructure in society. In this situation, partial slogans remain valid, but only those which have real meaning and are essential for the workers. They can only be economic slogans, which should replace pure symbolism during the strikes in the coming months. They are able to mobilize more followers than symbols. It is clear to us that the economic demands cannot be met in the communist system. For any real reform would have to start with a change of regime. Economic slogans will necessarily evolve in the political direction. It seems appropriate, however, for workers to reach politics through the economy, and not through symbols.

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## FIGHT OVER INTO INDEPENDENCE

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“So what do you think there is a way to overcome this collective paralysis of lying hypnosis? In any case, it cannot be searched for by polemics. For the very fact of the polemic draws us into orbit and takes us to the plane of Bolshevik absurdity.”

Józef Mackiewicz <sup>21</sup>*Road to Nowhere*

### Can Poles fight over into independence?

This was the title of the work that appeared in 1800 in Paris. The work probably written by J.Pawlikowski - Kosciuszko's secretary (published by the Polish People's Republic - 1967, Ministry of National Defense) takes the starting point that was obvious for the entire 19<sup>th</sup> century - Poland is not an independent country. Therefore, it tries to identify those factors that make it difficult to gain independence, both external and internal. First of all, he analyzes the latter, seeing one of the main reasons for failure in the attitude, flaws, and inconsistency of Poles. A number of thoughts and remarks seem to be valid to this day, but nowadays one cannot directly refer to the advice and recommendations of the aforementioned piece. National consciousness has been greatly eroded and complicated at the same time. The question of independence is not a fundamental question in the general consciousness. If we tried to "trace" the factors that lead to the goal of independence, the following stages would have to be developed:

I. The conclusion that Poland is not an independent state (objectively), that this state prevents social, economic, and simply individual development; such a feeling must be well-established in citizens self-consciousness;

II. Only then is it possible to organize the internal factor - that is, the will to regain independence, to take action, to organize demonstrations, and to create programs that may bring this independence;

III. Simultaneously with the second sphere of (internal) activity, there must be an external factor, i.e. international awareness of Poland's lack of sovereignty, the will to restore it, which - unfortunately - must be guided by the own interests of other countries, and actions taken in this direction - war, the threat of war, an economic blockade, etc. At all these stages, the issue of independence should be a value so strong and fundamental that it must prompt the readiness to make all sacrifices for the sake of the set goal.



Provoked by the question constituting the title of the work from 180 years ago, let us examine the present state of these three phases or the factors of the "road to independence".

Ad I. Let us immediately set that for many, very many, the lack of independence of Poland is not obvious. Although we do not have any research on this subject and we rely on intuitive observations, it seems that while at the end of the nineteenth century the common view that there was no independence was not questioned, but only a less common one - that it is important, the most important, there are now critical social areas where there is confusion and lack of clarity about this matter. Despite the autonomous periods in the nineteenth century, no one claimed that Poland- (i.e. the Polish state) existed. It just wasn't there. The periods referred to here as autonomous (eg the Kingdom of Poland) always had a clear key in an unequivocally foreign element (king - Russian tsar, governor).

Striving for independence is nothing else than striving to become a state. The present confusion is due to the fact that - unlike in the nineteenth century - it cannot be said that Poland does not exist. It - the state - apparently exists. And in fact - performs such actions as are attributed to a state entity - accepts and sends ambassadors, signs agreements, and sits in the union of states (UN). There is an incredibly clever play that unfolds, which the tsars could not master, and which deludes and delights. If someone gets a passport, it is a Polish passport; if someone opens the TV, he hears nonsense - but always in Polish; the US ambassador is in Poland because he considers this country to be existing and worthy of being a diplomatic partner; football is played by the representation of the Polish state ... Indeed, breaking through these layers of hallucinations and getting to the heart of the matter, that is, the statement that the Polish state does not exist, it simply does not exist, is very difficult - but necessary.

From the point of view of the rulers in the Kremlin, who were smarter after the experience of the previous partition, i.e. until 1918, it seemed quite easy. It was necessary to withdraw from the occupied country the immediate, sickening manifestations of one's presence: names, language, terminology. In order to maintain the absolute power in the conquered territory, it was necessary to give purely Polish symbols: surnames, names, language, dressed in the form of the state, i.e. the most important symbol, the subject of dreams and aspirations of many Polish generations. It turned out to be effective. Because for many people this symbol - the state, although bad, but their own (!) was the supreme value - and they bought it. Of course, such an operation could be risky and required much more efficient and deeper control than existed under the tsarist regime. A system of such control, devised (perhaps in good faith) by Marx, and experimented in completely bad faith by Lenin, and perfected by Stalin - was ready. We will not describe it here, because we assume that people already know what it is about, thanks to the experience of "Solidarity" and the readings.

Let us only recall that the centralization of the economy and its socialization, or nationalization, made almost every manifestation of biological existence completely dependent on the center in the Kremlin. Which is why the occupier's control is even more complete than before 1918. Let us remember that the tsar's rule was despotic, but not totalitarian. It was still necessary to raise a new man on this structure. Certain successes have been achieved in this matter, some of which have been brought up completely à la Suslov, and a considerable number of people have been perfectly confused. However, this attempt to "*convert the Latin soul into a Mongol*" went broke. We see a very serious failure of occupier' here. He probably hoped that the occupation instruments would fill the recipients with Asian content. The occupant was also favored by the West; as usually preoccupied with his own interests, Hitler and diligently guarding his own "naivety and ignorance", he recognized in Yalta what is not there at all. This causes terrible effects (although it gives the possibility of "rejection of brotherly aid"; the invasion of the Soviets in Poland will formally be a war, it will become an international aggression; openly depriving statehood will be a violation of Yalta and reconciliation of the apparent state with the real - not a punitive expedition inside empire - however, the use of such an eventuality would depend on the attitude of the West.) It makes it impossible to rationally internationalize the Polish cause. on maps or in offices, so it was possible to fight for it. Today it is difficult to pursue what already does exist. So we still act in a play that is not written by ourselves. Like **"Solidarity"** it is **certainly not a trade union, but a "substitute Poland", and martial law**, as an internal affair of the state of Poland, is a joke that obscures its essence - **it is the same martial law introduced on October 14, 1861, by Count Lambert, the Russian governor of the Kingdom of Poland.**

If there is no Poland, and there is Poland, what it is, someone inquisitive will ask. Above all, it is a territory that gathers Poles, which allows them to live a collective life. This area is currently located between the Baltic and the Carpathians, Oder, and Bug. Therefore, Poles do not have to live dispersed in exile. This allows us to state that in someplace there is the Polish nation that stands out from others: language, religion, culture, tradition, custom, memory, a system of values (such a statement does not naturally lead to nationalism, but only to the conclusion of separateness in within the Christian-Latin world). However, someone will aptly notice that we are different - in our communist-Soviet-state existence - from other conquered peoples. Finally, both the cautiousness of repression (compared to Soviet Russia), and the positive scope of freedom (measured both by the position of the Polish Church and by the attitudes of people and the existence of a significant non-state sector and quite independent some associations, and even greater freedom of speech) they prove it conclusively. However, this does not prove greater sovereignty but is primarily the result of this socio-national distinctiveness, the constant struggle with the "state" for its fate.

It is a strange, independent state, the aim of which is to constantly fight with society, interrupted by a change of tactics or short periods of rest to gather strength again!

The greater margin of freedom is, it can be seen as a measure of the greater strength of a society (or "independence" of society), but not proof of the independence of a state!

Let us come back to the main issue; is the public aware of it? Basically not. Perhaps it pushes such a tragic thought into the subconscious. It is often, very often heard that it is all because of these Russians, that if it changes there, it will be good here as well (however, let us not think that, for example, the average German from West Germany or a French, despite seemingly incomplete independence, hopes for improving the life with the results of the US elections!). At the same time, however, the complete and universal inability to think in terms of state and politics leads to an uncritical repetition after the newspapers: "our rulers", "our Sejm", which is bad (or "cares for people" or even "cares badly"). The expression of this division is the very concept of "rulers-society dialogue", "social bargain" or "understanding between rulers and society". Such a clear separation of rulers and society resembles the feudal period, but at that time it was understandable, because it was derived in part from the so-called patrimonial royal power, so it was justified by the fact that the state (i.e. its territory) was legally the property of the monarch, and by the theory of the divine origin of power. at present, it can only come from the outside or inside. Thus, the dealings of "*two high contracting parties*" in Gdansk are nothing more than a peculiar international policy. MKS Gdańsk was getting along with Moscow itself, which was acting on a pro-cura basis. The picture drawn here is obviously drawn with a thick line because there are borderlines, transitional states, when the "rulers" crumbles - some of its representatives, spiritually doubled, try to do something (sincerely) good for society, even if they not turn reversibly over to its side. But society produces hosts of cynics or dark people who turn to the side of the occupant (power) and soak in it. Unfortunately, this attitude is called treason (not in vain, after December 13, 1981, comparisons were quite frequent to Targowica<sup>22</sup>, but Targowica has been going on here since 1944).

In the era of the autonomy of the Congress Kingdom<sup>23</sup>, Prince Adam Czartoryski<sup>24</sup> had a compromise-conciliatory position, but he was neither a traitor nor a collaborator - he was a diplomat on the part of the Polish society (nation). The support of the nation was also enjoyed by Andrzej Zamoyski<sup>25</sup> and Count Malachowski<sup>26</sup>, who on behalf of that nation addressed the Tsar on the eve of the January Uprising<sup>27</sup> (in February 1861). However, the social delegation power (support) was strained by Margrave Wielopolski<sup>28</sup> by starting a collaboration.

Lack of historical and political awareness on a larger scale is the first, fundamental reason for taking action on a substitute plane. We are not against them because they are necessary; only that symbolic activities must be accompanied by

the development of awareness and discovering what is important in our Polish fate: the lack of our own, independent state, the lack of our own rulers.

Ad II. Let us briefly consider the attitudes of Poles and, at the same time, the obstacles in the pursuit of independence. Are the words of prayer accompanied by all of us, or do we repeat after the poet:

Now I am humbly on my knees  
 That I might rise strong to God as a worker,  
 When I get up - my voice will be the voice of the Lord,  
 My shout - will be a shout of the whole motherland,  
 My spirit - an Angel who will overcome everything,  
 So help me Christ Lord God!

No, too much! There is too much pathos here, and if anything, why so much. What about children? And about buying furniture? In general, we want reforms to make things better, and independence is not that important. The independent countries today are only the USA and Russia. And we will not beat the Soviets. That's how you think on average. It can therefore be seen with a close approximation that the main obstacles on the way to independence are:

- lack of awareness of the lack of independence (we have already discussed this point);
- failure to recognize the issue of independence as the most important, or even important;
- lack of faith in the possibility of regaining independence, and thus reluctance to engage in and make sacrifices;
- widespread poverty, with economic dependence on who to fight with;
- laziness, demoralization and mass alcoholism of society, which is connected with the next matter;
- lack of generally positive programs and values that would to some degree answer the question (point 2): what will they get out of it?
- lack of political and organizational experience, inability to take patient actions, compensated by verbalism.

In a nutshell, the most important obstacles nowadays are the lack of pro-independence motivation, the lack of faith in its recovery, the poor "quality" of the people, but it still time for reflection, even if only in the name of these furnitures, children, cars, refrigerators.

These Polish disadvantages are nothing new. The little work mentioned in the introduction, lending us its title, is noticed by many of them: "A nation living in independence needs it to trust in its strength. If he does not have this feeling, if he does not go to his own endeavor to maintain his existence by his own efforts, but by foreign support or grace, it is safe to say that there will be no happiness, no

virtue, no fame. (...) It must be admitted that Poles hate the bondage, they have enthusiasm for freedom and virtue, but their disadvantage is that, as they are quick in starting bold deeds, they are so unstable in their actions and weaker when faced by adversities. But I see that because Poles lack steadfastness in adversity because they thought little, thought little about the course of human fate and activities."

So these are not new allegations. In an order of October 22, 1914, Józef Piłsudski stated: "*Soldiers! Among **the general passivity of our society** (emphasis added by editor), historical events surprised Poles, leaving them without the possibility of uniform and strong action*".

The fight against our shortcomings, against ourselves, is particularly difficult today. In the nineteenth century, the existence of patriotic elements among the gentry and bourgeoisie (i.e. spheres not controlled by the invader) gave activists some chance of shelter and help (not to mention the fact that even organic work in the economy made future Poland wealthier). At present, the total existential dependence on the partitioner makes it partially impossible to realize even the margin of private independence, economic and family existence security. Hence the first tendency to improve one's fate at any cost. Therefore, such postulates, demand reform. This is right; Undoubtedly, it is precisely the programs and changes of the economic system that should be prepared, as well as the political programs, and we should do everything that can alleviate the human slavery existence, especially of the workers'. However, this system - as it is slowly becoming clear to many - cannot be "reformable" other than by acting from the beginning, i.e. building one's own state and power - i.e. regaining independence. It is, after all, a condition for one's own individual freedom, the meaning of life on earth, hope, and even mistakes - but ours, resulting from our own actions, from our empowerment: individual and collective

Woe to those who give the Motherland half a soul,  
And he will keep the other half here for happiness.

God will break both of them with his lightning bolt  
And someday such a head will fall to ashes!

Ad III. Can Poles win independence? Will the world allow them to do so? Or perhaps the world has already departed from the vision of full independence of states, with the exception of superpowers. First of all, it should be said that A. Micewski is only partially right when he writes that it is no longer possible to identify with the line of either Dmowski or Piłsudski because the contemporary world of the communist regime is definitely different from that at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. "*A great change is also caused by the division of the world into two social systems and military-political blocs*" (A.

Micewski<sup>29</sup>, *Still on Polish Political Thought*, "Tygodnik Powszechny", October 3, 1982).

First, there is a clear difference between "absolute" and limited independence. One of these two blocs - the Soviet Union (Comecon<sup>30</sup> and the Warsaw Pact) - is a bloc that deprives all the states it contains sovereignty completely - it is a form of rule by one empire. It does not leave a sphere of freedom, equalizing the lack of independence to outside. Especially, it leaves no chance of shaping the economy, it does not give the possibility to effectively deal with one's own welfare. It is a total system and deliberately leads to the destruction of all forms of human existence. Sovereignty, even with imposed restrictions, leaves, however, tied subjectivity, with vast areas of freedom. Even this famous "Finlandization" gives a state with imposed restrictions, but independent.

Secondly, the world has changed significantly, especially thanks to the breaking of information, economic and social barriers. The manner of these changes resembles, at the same time, very little of the restriction of independence, because on the one hand, it is a manifestation (in the free world) of voluntary international decisions made by independent states, i.e. when the power established by society agrees to such restrictions (EEC, NATO, European Parliament).

Third, the tightening of dependencies of an economic nature takes place not only at the state level but rather at the level of economic organisms. Thus, the transformations of the world do not negate the independence of states.

Will the world allow the international system to change, and, as a result, to Poland's independence? We mean the West, which in fact did everything he could to support the USSR and ensure Poland's Soviet occupation, and it will certainly do nothing to make "*Poland to be Poland*<sup>31</sup>", as the leaders of Western countries sing beautifully. It is certainly hampered by the existence of the "A-bomb", which makes somewhat nonsensical attempts to change which could be effective in relation to the USSR, i.e. war. War, however, is first and foremost a threat of war (and the A-bomb), carefully won psychologically by the Soviets. The experience to date shows, however, that Russia has made changes and revolutions under the influence of blows from outside and defeats. The circle is closed. Nevertheless, the following positive trends and opportunities in the development of the world situation should be taken into account:

- The West can start to take a firm stand when there is self-interest in it. Such tendencies are now visible in the USA and Germany;
- when the public opinion of Western countries starts to depart from the maxim of B. Russell: "better red than dead" - it is better to be red than dead. "Solidarity" did a lot of good in this matter;
- when the USSR, in its arms madness, crosses the threshold which, in confrontation with the efficient economy of the West, will have to withdraw the Soviet people from the phase of building communism to the phase of developed

socialist society, that is, there will be rockets not only instead of butter but also instead of grass;

- when local disasters such as Afghanistan befall the USSR;
- when power fails in this country.

Then, maybe then, external conditions will allow us to try again for another November 11th.

Can Poles achieve independence?

CONCLUSIONS: Yes. But at most, conditions can arise for independence, while independence itself will be only our work, an expression of our readiness. We must, therefore:

- to make everyone aware of the lack of independence, to know why there is no independence;
- to know that it is a condition for the implementation of all our programs and aspirations, including living ones, that is, to want independence very much;
- Be prepared: programmatically, politically, in terms of staff, and partially organizationally for its coming. This preparation should, however, be something more than the existence of pro-independence parties (it was perhaps a flaw in Piłsudski's vision), it should bear fruit in political awareness, with prepared positive programs for solving economic, social, political, legal, and educational problems.

But what if it is only wishful thinking? If that's really unreal? This is nothing else for us, but to be doomed to ... optimism and hope. Only faith and hope need a little help, as he says:

But I implore that the living do not lose hope  
And in front of the nation, they carry a lantern of education  
And when necessary, they go to death one by one  
Like stones thrown by God on a barricade.

*Politicus*

"Independence" № 11-12, November-December 1982, pp. 25-30

## **Was "Solidarity" too radical?**

The official claims of the party and military propaganda suggest that "Solidarity" had a chance to function permanently in the communist system and the possibility of changing it, provided that no political action was taken. Similar statements are made by some Western, especially European, co-respondents.

Immediately after August, many people had an idyllic vision of a society stabilized on the following principles: the power is still governed by the PZPR, but it is no longer totalitarian power, the society functions independently of it and is

concentrated in various organizations, unions, associations that respect the spheres of reserved for the exclusive competence of the communist party. It does not make any claims to such attributes of power as military strength, representation of the state abroad, etc., and the PZPR respects the sovereignty of society in the spheres allowed for it. The economy will gradually move to the "social" sphere, although the interests of the rulers will be guaranteed in it. This vision, reminiscent of Prague's "socialism with a human face", was based on the conviction that such a system was not only possible but also stable. Was it naïve? Today we can say yes, but in the atmosphere of euphoria in the fall of 1980, such views were expressed by Jacek Kuroń himself.

Were there any groups in the government that agreed to such a system? Perhaps, but they certainly did not have the final say. The government used the tactic of stalling and inhibiting the dynamics of the situation. Hundreds of examples showing the bad will of the authorities can be cited. For about a year, the party has used a sort of power strike. Paradoxical but true. In any normal country, the government seeks to strengthen the state. This regularity is valid both in Western democracies, where power is an emanation of society and in dictatorships which, by strengthening the state, strengthen themselves. In Poland, the government made it clear to the people that it would boycott its normal duties if society did not return to the framework outlined by communist orthodoxy. The government's strike was mainly based on the deepening of the economic crisis in the country. Let us recall how much it cost us all to remove the discredited thieves from the provincial cliques: Bielska and Jelenia Góra; how long were the negotiations in Radom on the settlement of the year 1976, still broken by the government side; how long have been the negotiations on the Union's access to television, guaranteed by the August agreements considered *pacta conventa*. There was no excuse that the authorities would not use to postpone or terminate the talks, there was no such error of "Solidarity" that it would not interpret as the bad will of the public, activating for this purpose the heavy artillery of its propaganda; there was no concession to the Union that the party did not would treat them as the opponent's weaknesses.

During the talks between Wałęsa and Obodowski at the beginning of 1981 regarding free Saturdays, the president of the Union made it clear that under various conditions, "Solidarity" could agree to two Saturdays working a month. A few weeks later the government used this as an excuse to unilaterally announce and implement its own working time-variant, thus breaking the August Agreements<sup>32</sup>.

Taking advantage of the mess in "Solidarity" (in the field of negotiations), the authorities increased the price of cigarettes during the second round of Congress, explaining the allegedly earlier arrangements. Similarly, two months later the prices of alcohol were increased. Of course, over alcohol and cigarettes, Solidarity could not go on strike without exposing itself to the fire of official propaganda. At the same time, these moves lead to frustration for the Union,



demonstrating how slim it is to force one's opinion in areas reserved to its competence, such as prices.

There were moments during those 15 and a half months of freedom that were far more dramatic than prices or free Saturdays. Let us just recall: the unilateral change of the Union charter by judge Kościelniak at the Party's request, the case of Narożniak, the Bydgoszcz crisis, blocking a demonstrating car column at the central roundabout in Warsaw, and finally the pacification of striking firefighters. Let us recall with what satisfaction Rakowski prided himself in the presence of the negotiators of "Solidarity" about breaking the demonstration at the roundabout. At what point was the investigation of the Bydgoszcz case discontinued. Was the success of the authorities in these incidents caused by the Union's excessive radicalism?

"Solidarity", apart from the verbal radicalism characteristic of populist movements, was constantly receding. The Bydgoszcz case was never settled; for the authorities it was not a proof of the Union's moderation, but of its weakness. a consequence of a military coup.

Let us consider whether it was a coincidence that the moments of tension coincided with the plenary session of the Central Committee, announced before those conflicts. Let us recall the 6th plenum (the October round), the day after the first warning strike related to the failure to implement the so-called point 8 of the Gdańsk Agreement; 7th plenum after the case of Narożniak - open provocation of the authorities; 8th plenum after the ostentatiously prolonged Bielsko conflict; 9th plenum after the Bydgoszcz conflict. The party factions wanted to heat up the atmosphere, so they provoked conflicts; the alleged radicalism of "Solidarity" had nothing to do with it.

Let us now consider the accusations that "Solidarity" conducts non-union activities. Traditional spheres of interest of trade unions are wages, social and living matters. These problems occur at various levels. union representatives can play a game with him, in which the stake is waged in relation to the cost of living, working time, social and living problems, etc. The matter is clear, everyone can consider this activity as a union in the strict sense of the word. But what is such activity supposed to consist of in a state where the sole owner is the authority that establishes uniform wage systems, social regulations, and prices. The union cannot play a game only with the management of the plant, because it is incompetent. It must be conducted at the level of central authorities, where problems directly affecting trade unions are resolved, and there is always a politics playing a game at the central level.

For communists, any action of society is political. The wave of strikes and demonstrations in the summer of 1981, carried out under the slogans of protest against hunger, was recognized by the PZPR as a political action. The strike of women in Żyrardów protesting against poverty and hunger, the strike of despair of

starving mothers, was considered a political strike. So where is the framework for union activity that is not a politics under communism?

Solidarity waited a long time for the goodwill of the authorities. Although it saw a kind of government strike, it did not try to counteract it, assuming that the structures of power must remain unchanged. It led society to the brink of biological destruction. Only then did the Union begin to operate; the date of the social referendum was set, in which the nation was to say whether it still recognizes the "power on strike" as its own. At this point, the repressive forces stepped in.

*Franciszek Sz.*

"Independence" № 1, January 1982, pp. 9-10

## **Remarks on the political system**

August 1980 showed that Poland is a political desert. Thirty-three years after the opposition was crushed by the communists, there are no old parties and no people who could revive them. There is hardly any political thought that aspires to present society with perspectives in which realism is combined with boldness. Perhaps the only exception in recent years was the KOR-like circle (I mean the so-called secular left, not the entire composition of the KOR). It stemmed from revisionism in 56 and 68, and thus from the conditions of Polish real socialism. The basis of KOR-like thought was the premise of the possibility of building an independent society, functioning in a non-sovereign (dependent on the USSR) and undemocratic state. An independent society could have its own cultural institutions and information circulation, but it would not have its own political institutions. Integration of society would be built "from the bottom" through informal ties and would stop at a certain stage. In this way, a demarcation line would be created between a relatively independent society and a relatively liberal dictatorship. The interests of society and the rulers, and the awareness of its existence was to cause self-limitation: a society that should not create its own political structures that could threaten the communists and the rulers, which, after the experiences of December 70 and June 76, would not want to risk a social conflict.

The situation in the first months after August seemed to confirm the reality of the KOR-like premise; the demarcation line between the rulers and society has acquired a pseudo-legal form, the so-called August Agreements (I write "pseudo-legal" because these agreements did not fit into the current legal system). The society obtained its own institution - "Solidarity". To fully implement the vision of KOR, it was only necessary for both sides to limit themselves. It was impossible

for both the PZPR and society. On December 13, the rulers crossed the demarcation line.

KOR, regardless of its elitism, had the greatest intellectual potential. Its numerous opponents were unable to clearly formulate their program, much less to create a mass movement around it.

Society consists of organized individuals. It can be said that these are individuals plus an organization that makes them able to function together. This organization is made up of a number of social, cultural, political and economic institutions. The state plays a special role among them. The goal of society must be to build its own state. The idea of creating a society organized in a number of institutions, but not in the state, was defeated on December 13<sup>th</sup>.

An own state is indispensable for society and only it can guarantee its free development. Our own state is not an end in itself for us, but it is a condition and at the same time an instrument for shaping democratic and libertarian relations in society. This does not mean that in the present situation the primary and only goal must be the creation of the underground state. Its creation should, however, be a long-term goal, which will be realized only after the earlier establishment of other political institutions. The state cannot function in a political vacuum. It must express the group interests of society, and for this it is necessary to articulate them, which is served by political parties.

The period of relative freedom between August and December did not lead to the establishment of the parties. There were several reasons, let's mention only the most important ones:

- the whole society was fascinated by the legal institution - "Solidarity" - to such an extent that it did not see the need to build other institutions. Such activities were considered suspicious, smelling of provocation;
- the intellectual political potential was mainly at the disposal of KOR, but it was also by definition against the creation of political institutions. The example of the failed Clubs of Social Initiatives, and then the slightly more successful Clubs of the Self-governing Republic of Poland, is very illustrative here;
- the culture of discussion and political action in our society has been and remains extremely low. In this respect, the "bolshevism mind" of the Poles continued their success.

In the post-August period, the greatest career was made by three words: provocation, manipulation, and their opposite - credibility. It is also a testimony to the clumsy baby-crawling of the democratic movement. Verbal shouts at the meetings of the Mazovia Board between "KOR-likers" and "true Poles" still arouse embarrassment today.

The lack of political culture and a broader vision prevented the evolution of the PZPR and satellite parties, despite favorable conditions. Especially the lack of such evolution in ZSL and SD must be surprising. The vast majority of members of

these "parties" are not associated with the apparatus of power, so they cannot even count on the privileges enjoyed by members of the PZPR (nomenclature). They had a chance to change their status from satellite organizations to independent parties, but they not even tried to use it.

The current period should therefore be devoted to building the infrastructure of society. The goal of the movement must be to organize a system of political parties that could function efficiently in free Poland. Only the existence of such a system should be crowned with the creation of an underground state, if necessary. This process will take a long time, but it is essential to be aware of the purpose of the movement. It will be connected with the political struggle waged within the developed political structures. There may then be two dangers that must be avoided:

- camouflaging contradictions and conflicts of interest, as was the case with "Solidarity";
- the danger of a fight aimed at the complete destruction of the opponent ("Bolshevism" of the party), in which the end justifies the means;

Our journal proposes to adopt the following platform for conducting political disputes within the newly emerging political system:

- One should argue with every view with which we disagree, without recognizing any authorities.
- You must clearly present your views on fundamental issues: the economic system, issues of social egalitarianism, international politics. One cannot be afraid of programs that are unpopular in some circles, because there is no program supported by the whole society. If we try to build it, it will be contradictory and worthless. In the present age of creating a political system, it is better to overdo the sharpness of programs than to blur them out.
- We should strive to integrate political groups on the basis of common views on the issues presented. This is because, for example, the social-democratic movement cannot be split into many parties whose programs would be identical and whose leaders would only be united by hatred of each other.
- Politicians must not be attacked for their old views and political connections (the three most prominent political personalities: Kuron, Moczulski, and Bratkowski come from the PZPR).
- You must not discredit any politician with epithets, without substantive discussion and criticism of his views, e.g. Rulewski - extremist, Kurowski – academic dogmatic, Moczulski - provocateur, Kuron - Jewish-commie, Bratkowski - nit.

*Franciszek Sz.*

"Independence" № 4-5, April-May 1982, pp. 1-2

## Tentative outline of a general strike

Let us first consider three general problems related to the conduct of a strike:

1. What is the nature of a strike weapon in the understanding of the originators and ours?
2. Will this tactic always be relevant?
3. What is our goal: what do we want, what can we achieve and what can we lose?

la - general strike as a threat to the communist rule<sup>33</sup> - such reasoning is characteristic of two members of RKW Mazowsze: Zb.Bujak and W. Kulerski, and the supporting them MKK "Wola"<sup>34</sup>. This is evidenced not only by the silence after the announcement of the project, but also by the presence of various "buts", "provided", "if" etc. There was a demand to hold a referendum among the crews on the strike, which in practice means blocking it - a democratic referendum in the conspiracy is already a sign of paranoia. "Wola" initially condemned the idea of a strike (special edition in June).

Since its inception, "S" has specialized in scaring communists. Between August and December, it threatened them with free elections, instead of preparing them. We already know the effect. The police service did not get scared, but prepared better for the December showdown. Now the rulers, left in peace by the warning threats, have time to prepare for ... a general strike. (...)

Ib - general strike as a tool to which we inflict a blow that ends in defeat but not annihilation of the communists - Romaszewski is primarily a supporter of such treatment of the strike, this solution is not excluded by Kuron and we do not reject it either. But adopting this concept in conditions where the overthrow of communism is not yet possible, although it is possible to weaken it, we do not have to give up radical programs, decisive action and building underground structures. (...)

In our opinion, if the strike is to have limited objectives, i.e. not to end with the seizure of power, but to weaken it, it must cause the collapse of the repressive apparatus (slogans are indifferent - actions are important), so that its reconstruction would take a long time for the communists. Then the rulers may go to another temporary truce, because in order to deal with another blow, they will be forced to rebuild the forces of repression. We can use the time obtained in this way to strengthen our own movement. (...)

We believe, however, that in this phase all open actions (communicating with the rulers, etc.) should be treated as secondary - tactical, without giving up the conspiratorial structures in any way. Underground institutions should provide us with a kind of back-up to which we can always go back. In addition, when concluding a temporary truce, you have to have something to give up, and at the

moment "Solidarity" has nothing to offer communists that they would not already have.

1c - general strike as a method of taking power - in our opinion, it should be organized and carried out only when there is a chance of a total victory, i.e.:

- at the end of the world war,
- when the upheavals of the empire caused by its disintegration create a chance that Poland, as the weakest link in the Soviet chain, will be able to free itself first. In our understanding, the strike understood in this way is a continuation of the previous one.

2 - a general strike will always be an up-to date weapon because its goal is in fact to overthrow communism; in the end, it is associated with the fall of the empire. We can imagine two variants:

- the USSR will decide to start a war with the West before 1985 because after that time it will not be able to wage it anymore;

- the USSR can no longer fight the USA, but it can still subdue its subjects, and the West, not threatened by the Soviets, has no incentive for arming and competition, so the reason for possible support for the enslaved nations disappears as well. Europe chooses to consume peacefully, watching the bloody slaughter in the East with avid, as long as it does not threaten its borders. In this situation, Poland should play the role of the weakest link. If we start first, the main burden of the fight will fall on us, but if we wait for others, we will pay with our lives in the crumbling communism, which will bring us even more losses and casualties.

3 - Our goal is to liquidate the communist system. At present, however, we cannot achieve this in a one-off effort due to the still significant power of the USSR on the international arena. The maximum is the implementation of the Ib variant and further preparations for the decisive fight.

In the case of defeat, you have to take into account the terror that will take thousands of casualties, but then the answer would be to start an armed struggle. The war in Poland cannot be indifferent to Western Europe, as we are too close to its borders. Therefore, terror and armed struggle in Poland could become the beginning of a world conflict. In the end, regaining independence would entail huge casualties, as the Soviets would "stumble" over Poland.

If, on the other hand, the USSR did not decide to go to the world war, it would give the order to settle the matter "peacefully" - that is, make an agreement with the conciliatory moderates, and then try to murder radical leaders quietly. Such a solution, however, will give us some long-awaited time.

A precondition for a general strike is the creation of a nationwide federation-based organization, which in practice will function as the Polish Underground State. The name is irrelevant here because it is about establishing a uniform organizational structure that would allow it to prepare and conduct a strike. We must therefore carry out the consolidation action to the end among the unions established on the basis of the broken "Solidarity". I consciously use the term

"unions" because I mean organizations that do not have any political program, i.e.: "We want" Solidarity" to exist and we want people to be released from prisons.

Groups with more specific political views should, on the other hand, establish a political representation that is initially regional and then nationwide. We would therefore be dealing with two structures:

- union and state, covering the entire country, all opponents of the occupation rulers, from KPN members to supporters of Kuroń. (...)
- party and political, established initially at the regional level, and then at the national level, and composed of representatives of groups and circles that after December 13<sup>th</sup> took on an increasingly political character. (...)

## The nature of the strike

A general strike cannot be planned as an armed uprising, because due to the lack of weapons, power disproportion, etc., we would be doomed to lose in advance. On the other hand, it must by no means be allowed to take on a December character, when the only weapons of the tortured workers that the leaders and participants of the strike wanted to use were religious songs. All large enterprises with the right conditions should follow the example of the "Wujek" mine, which was not conquered by ZOMO. Therefore, you should prepare to defend yourself and people to resist. (...)

A general strike should therefore take the form of an intermediary between the usual strike struggle and the riots. We must be prepared for the enemy to use all means at his disposal: machine guns, tanks, helicopter landings, aerial fire. Nevertheless, we can count on success under two conditions:

- if we are ready to make sacrifices, ready to die not so much because of wearing a badge with the Mother of God, but because of activities much more severe for the communists;

- if we use the present time to prepare, instead of calling for nothing to do (because we will not be able to do anything anyway, because "we are not prepared"), we will start propaganda in the army, and during the actions themselves, we will ensure the safety of all who come to our side.

Our propaganda should therefore be directed at encouraging people to refuse to execute an order to shoot at the population, at persuading people to go to their side, i.e. the side of the authority representing this population.

We have a chance to defeat demoralized militia units, and the attitude of the army will be decided by the corporal who will lead his soldiers to our side first. However, he must know that he will not be desertion, which the factory crew will turn-over, as they will prefer capitulation over combat, but that he will become a captain of the National Forces.

Our most important strategic goal is to defeat the ZOMO units, despite the casualties, and to force the occupant to use the army throughout the country. In

practice, therefore, all major provincial cities must strike. We must not wait, for example in Częstochowa, until the rulers pacify Łódź and are able to shift its forces. In the absence of an attack, we have to go on the offensive ourselves and take power in a given area, creating our own troops. (...)

## Decisions

The outbreak of a strike must have nothing to do with spontaneity; must begin on command and stop on command. Therefore, decisions in this matter are taken by the narrowest and highest rulers of the underground, previously authorized by the political representation.

Phase I – „stand-by” - heads of individual departments and services learn about the imminent decision to strike (but it may not be taken). (...)

Phase II - the announcement of the strike - must come as a surprise to the rulers as to the eventual participants of the strike, its beginning will therefore be carried out by the cadre of the conspiracy, which, in the event of its first successes and the control of the revolutionary atmosphere, will receive the support of the majority. If someone is counting on 80% of the crew to start a strike, it means that he or she does not understand anything or wants to block the action and is looking for a convenient excuse for this purpose.

## Date

The strike should not break out either when the shipyard wishes it, or because one-day ZOMO murdered one more child than usual, but in a specific international (favorable East-West relationship) and national situation (end of preparations and the right atmosphere to guarantee the majority's spontaneous support for the strike. (...)

## The course of political actions

A general strike should not be seen as a form of threatening or putting pressure on power, but as a method of taking away that power, partially or entirely.

The National Political Representation (its functions may be performed by the strongest Regional Political Representation) authorizes the national executive rulers (we do not know whether they will be the present TKK or another entity) to decide on a strike. The national executive rulers make the decision to start a strike and give appropriate orders to regional rulers, etc.

When the strike is announced, the strongest RRP, probably Mazovia, takes over the functions of the Sejm until the congress of all regional representations and appoints the National Government based on the expanded composition of the previous national rulers.

Variant I - if the strike is successful and national communication is restored, the meeting of all RRP is transformed into the Council for National Unity - a



temporary nationwide parliament appointed by the Provisional Government; his task will be:

- restore order in the country,
- conduct elections to the Constitutional Assembly. Until these tasks are performed in the country, a temporary constitutional law is in force, adopted at the first session of the RJN and based on The Constitution of 1935, excluding its provisions of an anti-democratic nature.

Variant II - The National Government or the Mazovia's RRP itself, as a result of the international or national situation or the cowardice of the strike leaders, is forced to conclude some kind of agreement - a truce with the communist rulers or the USSR. In this case, the independence parties continue their activities in the underground as long as it proves necessary to win full INDEPENDENCE, FREEDOM, and DEMOCRACY.

*Antoni Wichrzyciel*  
"Independence" № 1, July 1982, pp. 9-13

## **Rebellion or revolution**

The history of Polish revolts against the communist regime is an example of the arduous and long process of gaining independence by the social factor - its evolution from a force supporting changes within the government apparatus (e.g. support for Gomulka) to an independent movement fighting with this authority for rights for the nation. In 1980, "Solidarity" was not (rightly) interested in who was the "liberal" and who was the "hardliner"; who wanted to deprive whom he wanted to oppress our nation on behalf of Russia. treated as instrumental, and therefore none of the party factions may consider it as a tool helpful in playing games inside the apparatus, an instrument that will be disposed of, like Jaruzelski's "Solidarity" in December 1981. Hence the conclusion - the coming confrontation will be a fight for life and death for the communists, a fight for power.

Rebellion is a protest against authority and requires, in principle, nothing but the revocation of the decisions that caused it. A classic example illustrating the above thesis is the pay rise revolts in Poland in the years: 1956, 1970, 1976. Such a movement, devoid of a program (positive goals), is very easy to channel and suppress if no leadership is created and the will to fight expires after the first repressions (Radom 76). Therefore, provoking rebellions is one of the favorite activities of the police, striving to pacify the opposition earlier, before it is ready for action (eg in 1968). It is also often used by party factions preparing to take power as a means of discrediting and overthrowing previous teams, as well as a method of gaining social trust.

After the experiences of August 1980, we no longer have to fear provocation, because the society is politically mature enough to transform a rebellion into a revolution. In other words, it is not important whether the spark that triggers the explosion is a provocation or not, but what comes next.

The procession in front of the Winter Palace in St.Petersburg in January 1905 was organized by an employee of the political police, but the events that followed its bloody dispersal (about 1,000 dead) nearly shattered the Russian Empire and forced the tsar to give his consent to the establishment of a parliament - the Duma. Thus, the provocation of "Bloody Sunday" played a significant role, but in a completely different sense than expected by the originators. In specific circumstances, provocation may even "be of use" to a revolutionary movement, giving a signal for a collective appearance. The effects it brings are more important than it, and it is over them that we must control.

In our situation, revolution and rebellion must essentially differ in three elements:

1. The awareness of the participants in the revolution that the fight is not for the revocation of any regulations, e.g. the illegalization of "S", or for its re-registration; not for the limitation of the existing power, e.g. by some agreement; Jaruzelski against Kania, or finally not to protest against some move, e.g. the abolition of free labor, but to overthrow communist rule and establish a new, Polish and democratic government.

2. Political leadership is capable of directing the struggle, not succumbing to illusions but understanding that the seizure of power is its primary goal. Each revolution creates its own institutions, its own power. However, it would be good if there were already some organizational structures, at least at the regional level, which, being aware of the development of events (the logic of combat), would be able to quickly adapt to a revolutionary situation and use its potential. Let us add that, in general, revolutions surprise everyone, both the future winners and the defeated, with their outbreak. The winner, however, is the one who quickly quits the slogans, not yet realized by the masses, and presents a program accepted by the elite of the movement.

3. The nature of the fight underway must contradict the August strike. Since the main goal of the revolution will be to overthrow the power that still exists, one should strive to disintegrate the apparatus of violence and to isolate, break up and finally remove the existing apparatus of power - the entire apparatus. Therefore, we cannot wait for the party (the army, the police, etc.) to send someone to talks or to send tanks, but to attack the centers of power. The adoption of the August 80 model, on the other hand, means a failure, as it assumes that we expect something from this authority, that we still have some common ground for talks with it, some common interest. While we only want one thing - THAT THE COMMUNIST WILL GO, preferably where they came from - TO THE USSR!

The first stage of the revolution is to create a dual power structure: the existing government and the new institutions, taking power in districts, cities and regions as far as possible. The revolution ends when the old power is shattered and liquidated, and the new regime becomes legitimate. In our case, it must be done through the adoption of a new constitution, drawn up by the National Assembly (Constituent Assembly) elected in free and democratic elections.

In order for the revolution thus outlined to succeed, three conditions must be met:

1. The apparatus of the old power must be sufficiently decomposed, divided into several dispositional centers blocking each other's actions, unable to make decisions and implement them (govern). Such a process has already begun. In practice, apart from dosing society with repression, the communists do not rule, that is, they do not implement any decisions other than repression. They limited the process of managing the state to their use and to the exercise of power (privileges, corruption, theft of national and private property of citizens). This should lead to a complete degeneration and disintegration of power within a few years.

2. People must be convinced of the possibility of change, ie the possibility of winning the fight against the Reds, and the degree of poverty achieved must not be so great that it deprives them of their will altogether. The threat of poverty often caused revolutions, but poverty itself only led to the filthiness of nations.

3. A favorable international situation, ie the greatest possible tension between the USA and the USSR and the threat to the free world by the expansionist aspirations of the Soviets. Only then will the USA and the West, fearing for their own skin, be ready to support Poland in order to check Russia in this way. The conclusion of the agreement, on the other hand, will confirm Yalta to a greater or lesser degree and will become a grave for our cause for the next generation. Only the West, threatened by Russia, will be willing to revise the Yalta agreements.

*Antoni Wichrzyciel*  
"Independence" № 15, March 1983, p. 2

## **"Solidarity" and the democratic opposition**

(...) "Solidarity" was a great and wonderful movement, but to continue acting, we cannot live with myths, so let's look at "S" from the political side. "S" by its very existence undermined the communist system, but at the same time it retreated whenever there was even the slightest suspicion that it could overthrow it, so it

exposed itself to destruction - it was a dead-end street. That was in the area of tactics, and what about in the field of ideology?

"S" constantly gave way to communist propaganda, stating that it was in favor of socialism, agreements, maintaining the power of the PZPR, it distanced itself from the so-called extremists (condemnation of Rulewski), etc. (...)

We understand, that from the tactical point of view, "S" had very little room for maneuver in the area of ideology, but yielding to the pressure of communist propaganda, which was only a prelude to the police strike, the Union got disarmed ideologically. Tactical disarmament - abandoning the March strike - and ideological in the end resulted in the lack of mass resistance in December 1981.

*"If you can feel pity for the extremists, it is for the fact that they dismantled totalitarianism not efficiently enough, that instead of strengthening the Union organizationally and cracking the breach of freedom in the totalitarian wall brick by brick, they often beat themselves blindly, shredded themselves, let the most powerful weapon knock out of their hands., a general strike that was never used consciously and intentionally"* ('Slowo'<sup>35</sup>, 7/22 82). Let us add: it was not the extremists who led the Union, but the moderates who blocked all radical actions.

However, the "S" was needed by the Poles:

- to revive the nation - within a few months we shuddered over thirty years of Sovietization and communist depravity; young people gained role models that should be followed;

- to establish new, democratic relations between the various groups of society and politically enlighten the working masses, both workers' and intelligentsias;

- with its failure to make society aware of the need to overthrow communism and the utopian nature of the program to merge it with the limited democracy.

After December 13<sup>th</sup>, "S" had a chance to step on the broad road, rejecting the union formula and adopting the program of independence, by transforming itself into the Confederation of Organizations for "Independence". Instead, after being hit by the police the activists of the "S" had succumbed to the communist propaganda, even more emphasizing its trade union and not political character. Some even think that if they only distribute pamphlets with the "Solidarity" logo and refrain from political activities, they will get less beating in the dungeons of police stations.

Poor naive ones! For example, *"The Programme Bulletin TKK NSZZ" S 'Regional Silesian-Dabrowski'*<sup>36</sup> № 6 dated 1 July 1982. Poses in front of the "S" as the goal of *"to achieve social peace based (...) on the new agreement - guaranteeing the rulers - power and working people freedom and bread."* (...)

*"The difference between democracy and totalitarianism lies in the fact that the democracy (and only in it there is freedom and prosperity - "N"), the society organizes and arranges the power structure, while in totalitarianism the power-holders organize society"* ('Slowo'). Therefore, either we will create our

own non-communist power structure and we will have freedom and prosperity, or we will leave the power to the communists, and then we will have what we already have: poverty, labor camps, and police truncheons.

The same program line executes the TKK issuing its statements: *“TKK has consistently held that only a social agreement will allow Poland to resolve the crisis. (...) Our goal is to build a self-governing society - Self-Governing Republic ... come to that we can only by the movement of underground society”*. (...) TKK calls for the organization of a general (underground) resistance movement. A further practical tip - make up the movement of underground society groups: professional, neighbourhood areas, social, labor, which operate in areas of self-support, information, self-education, organizing protests, and economic activity. Please note the characteristic lack of political activity in this list. Does it come from the devil, or should the communists still have a political monopoly, otherwise they will be offended by the TKK and will not conclude an accord?

We have criticized the utopian nature of the idea of underground society more than once, so let us only highlight our basic theses:

- emergence of Poland from the crisis, which is a structural crisis of the communist system before its end, is possible only under the condition of liquidation of the present system and the creation of the new economic (market economy) and political (democracy) system. Any other solutions will only prolong the agony of communism, like the credit policy during the Gierek<sup>37</sup>-era was only artificial life-support for socialism, delaying the collapse and introduction of martial law and war communism (rationing, distribution) for 12 years.

- the creation of the Self-Governing Republic is incompatible with holding the power by the Communists in any respect, because:

- a) local democratic authority can not be separated (ea. territorial self-government) from the state-level undemocratic rulers. Termination of "S", which was a kind of the union-run state, is the best example supporting this thesis. The totalitarian and democratic powers will fight with each other as long until one wins, and the successful one will be the one that has the police and the army;

- b) the parliament (Sejm) is in fact the highest level of self-government, would therefore be free elections, in which the communists would get maybe 2% of the votes (the same as obtained fascists in Spain).

- a guarantee of any accord with the communists would have to be democratic control of the army and the police, without the latter the communists did not hang out in power even two days.

- the idea of an underground society is a dangerous utopia, rooted in the promoted by the secular leftist utopian concepts of social movements. The danger is in engaging people in dispersed, pretended actions, for wasting their energy, which can bring temporary relief, although (e.g., support for fired workers), but will not lead to any long-term resolution. Utopian concepts of underground society are due to the fact that the whole society can't live in the underground - has to earn

money, to take care of everyday matters (e.g., buying a washing machine), etc. In the underground can live an individual or organization (political or even for some time – state-like) and only then if the rest of the population lives normally and supports them. The best example of these utopian ideas is the idea according to which society will create the economy independent of the rulers; especially because in communism, it is impossible (laws, distribution, monopoly of trade and production, regulation, laws, and anti-speculations squads), as evidenced by the fate of all cooperatives and just starting round-up of private workshops.

Let us quote the assessment of the TKK's programme declaration published in the journal "CDN - Glos Wolnego Robotnika<sup>38</sup>", which is the body of MRKS's therefore an organization with the word "Solidarity" in its name:

*"About the theses of the program declaration 'Underground Society':*

*We do not think, however, that they indicate any way out of the current political impasse and that on their basis it is possible to build social hopes for a way out of the tragic crisis that is destroying our country and nation. The utopian ideal of an underground society is a smokescreen for the essence of political and social problems. In so far as is feasible, the Poles formed an underground society of a few - ten years now. In the long term, more can not be separated from the state of society than it was in Pol - Rank in the late 60s and 70s. This level of separation because of - them, that the state has to be good, and society are a lot worse. Hopes that by building an underground society we solve any problems are only an illusion. The program theses, we believe, are uninspiring to discuss how Wal - nephrosis for a better future of the nation, but firmly put the issue which should be further structure of the resistance movement in Poland. Editors"* ("CDN-GWR "II, Ed. B, May 18, 1982)

Nothing more nothing less.

Among the flood of solidarity declaration on the settlement, the accord, and the bright future, that awaits the widows of miners from the "Wujek<sup>39</sup>" colliery and from Lubin and murderers from MO and SB, in harmonious accord building communist-democratic Poland, stands out a communique of "Inter Factory Strike Committee" of Lubin, in which we read: "The overriding goal of "S" is to unite efforts for independence and the radical changes to the political and economic system are necessary."

We must sadly admit that the "S" is ideologically disarmed, and program-wise powerless against the communists, which does not make us happy. "For now, the "Crow"<sup>40</sup> has no reason to fear. All opposition programs in circulation are aimed at one purpose - compromise" ("TW" 23). As for the "S", this is true.

The best example illustrating our thesis is the statement of a member of RKW Malopolska, Handzlik, of 29 May: "None of us aims to overthrow the system, which in accordance with its principles, shall be the system of social justice. To be clear, according to the founding principles, the regime is the dictatorship of the proletariat exercised on its behalf by the vanguard of the working class, the communist party, which is to ensure "social justice". If anyone doubted its existence, let him ask the party secretaries, if they are happy with the degree of social justice, which surrounds them.

*"S" - a trade union or independence organization?*

After December 13<sup>th</sup>, the polarization of positions on this issue became apparent. The majority of activists "S", including the TKK, began under pressure from the Communists back down from politics and emphasize the union character "S": "We do not want to be neither the government nor political party. We want to be an independent and self-governing trade union movement "(statement "5 x Yes"). This position is a sign of the weakness of "S" because:

- you can not separate politics from trade union activities run on a country-wide scale,
- making this type of assurance did not placate the communists, but induced confusion and disorientation among their own ranks, and weakened the resolve of the anti-communist resistance.

Touching the issue of the desired transformation of trade unionists into the activists of the political opposition and the conversion of the "S" in a political party, B. Łączycka wrote: "I will be created now as a result of actions of the authorities. This is a historical, determining factor, our only chance. It does not need to be, nor even it should be a centralized organization (in the sense of a decision-making center) ... It is not worth insisting on the fiction of trade union activity and for that reason limit it to workplaces "("Opornik ", April 12, 1982).

The most comprehensive concept of transformation of the "S" in a kind of confederation of independent organizations is presented in the pages of KOS - M. Poleski<sup>41</sup>. Rightly, he believes that it is in principle to appoint a new organization - the Union of Struggle "Solidarity" - acting in the underground, and based on the - new recruiting members, "to make it clear who the "S" works, and who is just a sympathizer. These 10 million today is more than ever a myth. (...) We must now form one independent organization "S", with one domestic and foreign representation, but devoid - hierarchical structure - an organization in which parts is united by the program, the idea of solidarity, and not dispositions passed from one center (...) National Committee "S" and its regional centers should be created as a result of co-opting public figures representing different political orientations" and therefore already belonging to different groups and organizations. "The main task today is the elevation of the Polish case to the international forum. It is necessary to establish the Polish Committee "S" and official representatives of 'S

'abroad. The National Committee of the "S" and the Polish Committee of the "S" should apply for recognition of them by the democratic Governments as the only representative of the Polish society. (...) "S" must question the Yalta order. (...) the main task of Polish Committee "S" would be conducting an active independence policy on the international forum (" KOS "№ 8, May 1982.).

The concept presented by M. Poleski is by all means worthy of support, but completely utopian, because:

- The Coordination Bureau of "S" abroad is unable to take political actions, as evidenced by the lack of logic in its position statements on political issues. For example, after the attack in Bern on the embassy of occupying Poland's regime, the foreign solidarity activists declared that "Solidarity" is a legal organization, and that "is not fighting with the current communist rulers." Now, if the "S" is a legal organization, then illegal are authorities that forced her to the underground, then you should fight them. If, on the other hand, there is no need to fight the current rulers, because they are "legal", then they had the right to do with "S" what they liked.

- the difficulty of our situation lies in the fact that only the "S" has large enough public-wide authority that could pull the whole society towards the pro-independence program. But at the same time, the "S" is now completely unable to become something other than a trade union. Such a holdup of will drag until strong political parties, i.a. new national-wide authorities, emerge. "For this, we need the Union's encouragement to organize political parties in the conspiracy ... to create, formulate their political programs and present them to the public. Only in this way will they become another force for the authorities to deal with" (TW 23).

"Independence" stands for the concentration of all forces on political activities and seeks to set up a political party with a radical and democratic program.

Some underground activists, fearing being cut off from their workplace base, do not want to start organizing political parties, still seeing "S" as a kind of political lever that will lift them up. They even claim that parties would be more exposed to counteracting by secret police than trade unions. We do not agree with this view, for the communists - every opposition organization is a threat and they will fight it to the extent they can.

We need to realize the differences between the trade union and political organization:

1. The party fights for power, and the union fights to limit the extent of communist power.
2. The party unites people of crystallized and similar political views, trade union brings together all those who want to act in it, regardless of their political views.
3. The trade-union bonds all workers in a given workplace, and the parties unite only people with very similar political views.



4. The trade union can be more effective when it comes to organizing a strike in the workplace, and the party then struggle is to overthrow rulers of the state.

*Underground structures of political (state) power or conspiratorial social-action movements?*

After a few months of the war, successive journals and groups began to support the idea of creating an underground state in the future. However, unlike the "N" combine the possible creation of earlier development of an "underground society", whose concept is embedded in theories of "social movements", endorsed in the 70s. The belief that people can operate effectively over long periods of time organized only loosely, without hierarchy and leadership, that spontaneity is able to overcome all difficulties, and the activity of the masses can be maintained indefinitely, while democracy is in contradiction with all hierarchy, etc., they are simply discordant with common sense. After each period of spontaneity must come organization, and the masses, after the outflow of the revolutionary tide, always become apathetic in any system. Then, in a democracy, they are represented by active minorities organized in a democratic manner, and in a dictatorship - in a conspiratorial cadre-organizations. The control over the leadership of a "movement" is lesser than in a democratic "organization", as there is no established and transparent hierarchy and organizational inter-relations. In practice, it also appears that where there is an organization then the struggle is on completely different rules than in the capital, where we have societal-underground, allowing the Red to sleep peacefully.

"N" agrees with the view represented by "CDN" that one should strive to create a representation of society in the conspiracy, something like the Council of National Unity (RZN), acting during the WWII occupation. Obviously, this body would, for the time being, lack a broader public base as well as an effective ability to act. But, by doing so a very important first step would be made as with the activity of RZN would be associated the struggles for long-term goals.

Establishing the Council may be difficult in the current situation, when political directions are only beginning to crystallize, and unevenly, across the country. Therefore, the "N" 7 we have proposed, at the beginning as the easier, the creation of the Regional Political Representation (RRP) of Masovia, because it is the most politicized part of Poland. Such RRP would be not be conducting any specific activity, but its creation would play a very important political role, as it would become the nucleus of dual power - the condition for a successful revolution.

What could the Underground State be in our situation? Well, it would consist of the underground based:

a) political representation of the society - representatives of the political parties operating in the country and recognizing as the minimum common platform -

struggle for an independent parliamentary republic. Representation of this through its statements and declarations negates the validity of the official Sejm, undermines the stability and legitimacy of occupational authorities, it gives the legal character of its executive - the government, which may at any time appoint therefore creating a situation of almost dual-power; may itself or through it conduct the diplomatic operations, create alliances and agreements, and in the favorable international situation may lead to the withdrawal of diplomatic recognition of present occupation authorities;

b) the government, otherwise the executive of the political representation of the society (for tactical and organizational reasons it may have different names), does not have to be appointed immediately after the formation of the RJN. Such a government would only be needed at the moment of the final, decisive confrontation with communism.

While meeting in the RJN (*Council of National Unity*), various organizations and parties could also create common, non-political agenda, collaborating in the organization of intelligence service, legalization, justice, radio communication, and so on. In our opinion, the main enemy is not the diversity and divisions between opposition groups. These differences are large and will be even bigger because that's life - the society itself is and will be divided. Therefore, it is not about the artificial removal of the differences, as they are just reflections of the conflicting interest of each individual group of the society, but about the cooperation of groups with different programs around the minimal common objective - an independent parliamentary republic.

*Antoni Wichrzyciel*<sup>42</sup>

"Independence" № 8-9, August-September 1982, pp. 4-9, 32-42

## Before winter

"I see the chance for an agreement as ever greater"  
Zb. Bujak

The "Solidarity" was not a trade union, but the Polish nation organized in the non-state structures (type of councils) and standing in opposition to the party-state administration, representing the invasive power. The creation of "S" marked the beginning of dual power structure:

- elected by the nation democratic authorities, which took names: The General Assembly of Delegates, National Congress of Delegates, the Factory's Commissions, Regional Boards, and the National Coordinating Commission and

the All-Poland Founding Committee of the "S" of Individual Farmers (13 million members of the "S" and "S" RI constituted the absolute majority of eligible voters);

- the oligarchic rulers were appointed by the occupying state of the USSR to perform administrative functions in one of the empire's colonies, known as the PRL.

It was clear to the communists that if they wanted to retain power, they had to destroy the "S" by smashing it or by subjugating it. Hence Rakowski's complaints that he had not found collaborators, and that Walesa did not want to listen to the Politburo, so they had to jail him.

"S" leaders and advisers had two ways to choose from:

1. Strengthen the system of dual-power, creating an alternative power structure and breaking in March 1981 the occupier's administration possessive (when the nation was ready to fight, and the Communists have not yet), especially their security forces, by prolonging the state of the dual-power, at the right time remove communists. This was associated with the risk of the introduction of martial law, casualties, and maybe confrontation with the USSR;

2. To continue the state of neither peace nor war - of stable instability - counting on that for unknown reasons the communists will not decide to use force this time. Voluntary surrender, of course, was not an option.

Why the second solution was chosen? It must be honestly admitted that attempts were made, although theoretically, to create an alternative structure of power to the communist state. Much has been written about the concept of the active strike, snatching from the hands of the Communist control on the economy. Always avoid the central issue, the most important, and unconditional to the success of all other initiatives – seize of political power. Yet we remember that the National Commission (KK) was the only legal authority in Poland since it was elected in the first democratic elections in more than 50 years.

KK, and especially her team of advisers, came out with the assumption that if they will not contest the political and police power monopoly of the PZPR-KPZR, the communists will allow the existence of "S", thereby slowly weakening their own position. To put it bluntly: it was thought that the Communists will allow being cheated. This line was promoted as long as its supporters start to believe in it themselves. What about communists? They talked as long as they were needed to complete preparations.

The leadership of the Union didn't deceive the communists, but only themselves, by creating a world of fiction and wishful thinking not having anything in common with real aspirations and interests of both sides. Even worse, the propaganda "S" accepted a communist platform of ideological confrontation. When the communists stated: "You are against socialism, you undermine political system and our power!", "S" responded: "Not true, we too are in favor of this system, we do not want to overthrow your power" etc., as if the peak of an insult was a statement that no honest man can support the system and power based on mass

genocide. "Socialism" - it's such a nice sound and a pile of corpses peering out of this slogan no one wanted to see. Please remember all these assurances: "We are only the Union", "we want to act within the framework of the existing system", "recognize socialism" etc. Such a confusion of concepts was introduced that the average trade unionist no longer knew whether "S" should be a trade union, political party, or a new power structure, and how it differed from each other.

You would think that after December 13<sup>th</sup> the situation has to clarify and now the Union leaders will say loud and clear: 'We are against communism because we condemn genocide, slavery, lie and national betrayal'. But № Our leaders did not understand anything; they stopped at the stage of political awareness reached somewhere in April, or even fell back to February 1981. Never "S" did not talk so much about the agreement with the communists, as after the murders and arrests of martial law. The degree of confusion that occurred in the ranks of "S" is well illustrated by the statement of the editorial board of "Druk". Our colleagues casually stated that the fatal victims in Lubin showed that Jaruzelski's junta has not moved to an agreement! It would seem, therefore, that the murders in Poland in the '40s, '50s, '60s, and '70s were committed by Martians or dwarfs, and the PZPR had nothing to do with it. The murder of 12 miners in "Wujek" colliery and hundreds of other victims of war do not interfere with the agreement, it could even create a better platform for it and it was only human hunt in Lubin explained it all to the "Druk's" editors.

So far, the communists around the world have murdered 143 million people (data for 1979). This was largely facilitated by the policy of avoiding casualties in the fight against communism promoted by various authorities. How many more millions of victims it will succumb only because the opponents of communism will "save" people and fool themselves with the words like: "detente", "agreement", "settlement" etc.?

"Tygodnik Wojenny" disarmingly admits that the leadership of "S" hoped until the last moment that the authorities would not dissolve the Union. Gentlemen, "is worse than a crime, it's a mistake!" But will the people responsible for the political defeat suffer the political consequences of their own stupidity? Doubtful. They will still hang around and will continue to nurture the hope.

The leadership of the "S", in order to avoid deadly casualties, martial law, and the formal disbanding of the Union, very quickly brought its own helplessness in preventing the realization is what most they feared the most.

Our revolution lost not a result of an unfavorable balance of forces, but as a result of fearfulness, political stupidity, and immaturity of participants.

The powerlessness of leaders and panic fear of advisors on the one hand, and the power of the communists, on the other hand, result from common to both groups' conviction of omnipotence of the Soviets. The communists believe that the USSR will conquer the world, or at least will not give back what it has already

seized during their lifetime, so they are safe; they can commit any crime because the Kremlin will save them (which does not mean that they will keep their positions). In the worst case, they wait until the intervention in the bunker.

Our leaders believe that no one will be able to overcome the USSR, that the state will continue for many centuries to come. They are afraid more of the national uprising (they have complex nineteenth century) than communism. The greater evil is for them to national destruction as a result of lost uprising than degeneration by Sovietisation. Hence the attempts to look for the third way, which, as we can see, led us so far into a dead end.

The word "independence" appears nevertheless very often, nobody, of course, wants openly admit that does not believe in it. But when someone wants to introduce solutions actually leading towards independence, faces a wall of silence. You can talk about sovereignty, but only as a very distant goal. It appears, therefore, that a better tactic is a waste of paper on leaflets calling for an agreement and wasting human energy and health to fight for it than creating an alternative to the communist-state the political power structures: before December 13<sup>th</sup> - openly and now - in the underground. Structures, which in some time would be able to assume responsibility for the fate of the nation.

The world is now at a turning point, as the structural crisis of the communist system, coupled with reaching the limits of expansion possible without causing a global conflict, leads to the questioning of the Yalta order. In other words: we are facing a change in the balance of power and a new division of the world. In front of all these changes, we can't behave passively, mesmerized by the power of Russia and unable to take our sight away from her. Isn't, by accident, the USSR so strong - by Poles and Europe - weakness? We should prepare Poland to play an active role when the time comes for us.

It is impossible to reach an agreement with the communists or to win significant and permanent concessions from them (they never gave up on the breakdown of the Church, and they keep repeating these attempts); so, let us not deceive ourselves and fool one another, but prepare ourselves to overthrow their power. This does not mean that we are promoting take to the arms tomorrow, there are no arms in any case, but we believe that the radicalism of program concepts is more important than the radicalism in action. You can even seize a few commands posts and committees, but you need to know for what.

In a statement issued by Union leadership after the parliamentary notion disbanding the "S" we can read: that the Sejm lost its representativeness (literally: *"lost any public mandate"*). TKK believes then that, the Sejm elected by Gierak and Babiuch (there was in, PRL a prime-minister of that name), the Sejm, which in violation of the communist constitution approved the martial law, represented (ea. *"held public mandate"*) anybody else than Politburo and eventually the Central Committee of PZPR - and suddenly now it lost its representativeness!

It's time to decide: either this power authority is illegal because it does not come from democratic elections, and thus all of its resolutions, regulations, laws, and actions are illegal and non-binding, or the authority is legal and then must obey its commands: disband itself and report to the prisons, preferably with your own truncheons and barbed wire.

But what could do the poor Union leaders, which insisted, in the hope of an agreement, to recognize the communist administration as legal, as if they had something to lose that they had not already lost? The legion of advisers sat and came with the discovery: a parliamentary resolution is invalid because is in conflict with international conventions ratified by that Sejm. Are there any communist state regulations, laws, etc. compliant with human rights, international conventions, the UN Charter of Rights etc.? The socialist system itself is in contravention with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The "lawyer" play game still continues and will be continued until the militia truncheons will break the neck of the last standing "lawyer".

"Independence" from the beginning recognized the communist rulers as illegal and therefore we proposed the establishment of the Regional Political Representation, for starters – for Mazovia, and in the future, the Council of National Unity, to emphasize the right of our nation to its own political representation of and consequently - to own government and the state.

In our opinion, the RRP should include in the first place, representatives of political organizations. The point is not that the RRP should have the largest possible number of members, but that it could make political decisions reflecting the pluralism of Poles' views. The only political structure can be a competitive alternative to communist power.

RRP shall have the right to adopt political resolutions obligatory to RKW, which means either that the expanded RKW will be the executive arm of RRP or RRP will create its own executive.

October brought a huge disappointment, another lost opportunity. It is expected that thousands of committed unionists will withdraw from activity, disappointed by the lack of effects of to date actions. Therefore, the base of our movement will shrink in the near future. The leadership of the "S", constantly hoping to conclude an agreement "next week", did not develop permanent underground structures. Now all this will affect us. The tragedy is not a formal disbanding of "S" because after December 13<sup>th</sup>, it had to happen (finding collaborators would be worse for us), but the Union's powerlessness in the situation. It is not that we are not able to protest satisfactorily, but that we do not have our own power structure. There are TKK, RKW, and a number of union groups, but there is no national organization.

In the previous issue, we wrote about the diminishing importance of the underground "S" (in the sphere of action, not myth); let's return to this subject.

*"Solidarity" - an underground political organization.*

Proponents of such a Union transformation argue that the "S" should undergo a process of political maturing as a result of which its members and leaders openly will sway into the overthrow of communism. Bujak's "underground society" allows for such a process. The creation of political parties, on the other hand, will only be an artificial activity, inventing labels that will not be supported by any social force, and an example is the buffoons of KPN and Moczulski. Why create new structures when existing ones can be used?

Even if the "S" would be able to take on a political character, it would instantaneously disintegrate due to internal frictions between the different directions of the ideological: nationalists, social-democrats, Christian democrats, etc. Every group would like to take the most important positions in the Union (see the past bickering between Kuron and "True Poles", KOR and KPN). Political directions will arise anyway because they express the needs of groups and individuals: some feel threatened as Poles, others as citizens, and still others as employees (simplifying the whole matter, of course). It's better, therefore, to communicate outside of the Union, or even within its framework, but with maintaining separate organizational structures.

So far, the "S" has demonstrated that it is incapable of any political transformation, on the contrary - with the leaders was the solidification of the trade union mentality (i.e., lack of political awareness.) The arrest of Frasnyniuk, the only one who openly spoke of independence, does not promise well. The "underground society" is not helping to mature, but causes stagnation. The best example was the civic behavior in Warsaw in the first week of October's unrest. The Bujak's "underground society" passed the exam - there was no resistance!

The fact is that KPN was a fictional organization, and by its megalomania - funny. This does not mean, however, that in Poland all parties will always be fiction. Just you must first create a program, next to the structure of the party and then only at the end to announce declarations, and not on the other way around (ea. creation and inaction of Polish Social-Democrat Party). As for the building of new structures, as you can see, the old ones have not passed the exam even once. Of course, inside the political parties will probably be many of union-based groups, some inter-factory coalitions themselves will evolve in this direction. Only system of political parties can create a political threat to the communist regime.

*"Solidarity" - the Committee of the Conciliation of Independence Parties and Organizations.*

This concept we propagated for the first half-year of the martial law state, of course, completely in vain. Perhaps after October 8<sup>th</sup> "S" will see such a prospect, although we are afraid, that firstly, the Union in the current form will not survive to this border date; secondly soon we will read the TKK's communique, which will

be another 495<sup>th</sup> version of the agreement containing the point "1" as a condition for negotiations: "reactivation (registration) of NSZZ "S" ". Therefore, we are for the formation of political parties and political actions at the home front and abroad.

This does not mean that we are opponents of free trade unions, we do not put an alternative: either the Union or political party. Just political parties defend other spheres of human life than trade unions, and besides, no employee is only an employee, no worker is not only a worker. Those being members, very beneficially for themselves, of one trade union, can belong to different political parties. The legal existence and operation of "Solidarity" is not our goal, but only an element of the program.

However, if the problem will confine only to the issue of freedom of action for "S", then we must answer several questions:

1. Can "S" operate freely in communism? - In our opinion, no; only the overthrow of communism will create the conditions for its reactivation.

2. If the "S" can only operate in a democracy, what tactics should be chosen to allow democracy to win? - In our opinion, only political organization and struggle - the struggle for power, not the trade-union platform will be effective in this case.

3. If democracy (independence, etc.) can only be won by political means, what program gives the better guarantee of victory:

- is the underground society program,
- or the program of the underground political system?

You could have a claim to the "N" that constantly criticizes the policy of "S" (not "S" itself), but it is not our political line that has failed on October 8<sup>th</sup>, it is not us who assured that the agreement is coming. However, we will on an equal basis with others, bear the consequence of that defeat - narrowing the base of the movement caused by disappointment, which puts a question mark of the reality of our concept of the underground state.

For now, the time of mass movements has passed, which does not mean that it will never return. The nearest crisis or the sequential phase of a system-wide crisis will come in a few years. (1986 - repayment of deferred loans). If in the policy of the underground there will be no radical change, the task, for time being, will be to survive with minimal losses. This time should be used for the development of the cadre organizations well adapted to fighting in the conspiracy.

But what they are to do? Should they only print "'S' is alive" leaflets? In our opinion, this period of time should be used for the crystallization of the political parties.



## **Is the end of the underground?**

Let us note that the term underground we use as a system of secret organizations, while conspiracy is simply a covered activity like the un-official publishing, self-education groups, etc.

General strike scheduled for November 10<sup>th</sup> ended in the disaster, as indeed we predicted earlier ("N" № 10), let not fool ourselves trying to ease the feeling of losing, but let's find its cause.

In our opinion, the main blame for the defeat lies not with the organizational weakness of the underground, because it is secondary to immaturity and half-measures of undertaken actions and political concepts.

*Underground "S" in the fight for a compromise between December 13<sup>th</sup> and August 31<sup>st</sup>.*

After the defeat of December's general strike the emerging underground had paths to conduct further fight, based on two opposing assumptions:

I. Communism (USSR) will last at least a few more generations, so the strategy of overthrowing is suicidal. The situation of Poland is exceptional, unlike any of the other people-democracies around. Polish solution will therefore be independent of the East-European decisions, and the fate of the Poles depends on themselves. Therefore, it leaves us only some form of negotiating a deal with the rulers, but since it can't be capitulation, you need to exert such pressures, which are not overthrowing the communist system (not creating a political threat) but will be so dangerous for the PZPR, that force them to some concessions.

II. The communist system is going through its last structural crisis from which it will not recover. The only remaining reserve of what is left is the militarization of daily life and a return to war communism. However, the rule by the military leads to war. Even if it does not happen, internal conflicts: power struggles, rebellions, riots, etc. will start the disintegration of the empire. Therefore, the Poles should be politically and organizationally prepared for regaining of independence, at the same recollecting that there will be no free Poland without a free Central Europe. Therefore, we must combine our perspective with the prospect of the neighbors, and already solve all disputes (for now only on paper, of course), to conclude agreements, create joint concepts of the future and be ready to help them politically during the decision time.

Based on the analysis of the economic, political, and military situation of the Soviet empire, the underground "S" chose the first assumption and came up with the concept of "underground society", while "Independence" - based on the same data - came to the conclusion that only the second assumption was the correct and proposed construction of the underground state, expecting in the next 3-5 years the

beginning of the disintegration of the empire ("N" № 3). Whose analysis was the correct one - we will see soon. For now, we can only look at the effects that resulted in the adoption of the "underground society (SP)" program adaptation of "S" tactics accordingly.

It should be loyally stated that if the first assumption were correct, then the concept of "SP" would be more appropriate. For if it would not be possible to overthrow the socialist democracy for many years to come, then obviously one cannot build permanent underground structures whose main purpose (reason for existence) is to prepare for the rise or takeover of power at a convenient political moment. There should be dispersed resistance, limited in practice to the editorial-printing work as the society needs to have the fictitious sense that it resists totally.

The concept of the SP fulfills this last task very well: it supports people's spirits by not involving them in the fight against communism, and thus limits the victims. We must remember that if communism is to last a thousand years, it is better that our generation suffered just as few casualties as necessary to maintain national consciousness and a burning desire for freedom.

But everything indicates that the authors of the concept of "underground society" took it seriously, as a program of popular social opposition and engagement of the whole nation in the fight against the regime, as the idea of the society living underground and resisting the rulers and this is a double mistake: that reasoning because we fall in contradiction with the first assumption, and choose ineffective and suicidal tactics.

Before December 13<sup>th</sup> the tactics of "S" were based on the assumption that in the event of an attack by authorities on the Union, it always will have time to activate its member into defense. The mobilization succeeded in March 1981, during the conflict in Warsaw's center "Rondo" still somehow work out, during the attacks on I KZD "S" the politics was of little interest to anyone, and on December 13<sup>th</sup> "S" was not able to resist. Permanently active can be only a minority, not the entire society. "S" did not draw any conclusion from the defeat, turned out to be an organization that cannot learn. After December 13<sup>th</sup>, adopted the tactics of demonstrating readiness for talks, but forgets that in order to negotiate, you have to have other assets in hand than its own defeat. The communists did not need talks, but capitulation and the advantage were on their side.

After May 3<sup>rd</sup> there was a change of tactics: to continue giving up the creation of permanent underground structures, TKK thought that it will force some concessions by mobilizing the public and renewing attacks on rulers (strikes, street riots), and calling for mass, spontaneous and decentralized resistance (KOS, SP, and other fictions). It was a short-sighted and flawed position.

As shown by comparative studies, a maximum of 2-3% of the population may be involved in active resistance against the occupant, ea. 700K-1,000K Poles, and taking into account the fact of internal occupation, probably no more than half a million. That is why we have put forward the concept of the underground state,

nevertheless modified, because the main focus we put on the creation of underground structures of political power and at the same time resignation from the military organization. The underground state would negate any legitimacy and legality of the communist system

The concept of spontaneous grassroots organizing, instead of top-down direction, only led to the under-utilization and waste of human potential. Repeatedly we pointed out that the grassroots organization is a utopia, and this task should be undertaken in every region by local RKW.

A. Michnik, in a letter from Bialoleka Prison<sup>43</sup>, entitled "The resistance" also put forward the concept of SP, although without using that term. He wrote that is needed: "*a wide underground movement for the reconstruction of civic society*", and continue with the components already known and aligned to the KOR developed strategy such as resistance funds, mutual social support, self-education, publishing. These were very good ideas at the stage of the upper paleolithic phase of the development of the political consciousness of Poles.

A. Michnik authoritatively states: "*Resistance is meaningful only if it can create the forms of action available to every Pole*". In this case, the resistance movement during the Second World War, the January's Uprising (1863), or the labor movement in the Russian partition zone didn't make sense, because proposed forms of action were available only for the boldest or courageous parts of the society. The only form of action "*available to every Pole*" is whispering to his wife under the comforter and after pulling off the phone jack from the wall outlet. The struggle with totalitarianism requires unfortunately courage, which initially has only a few, and the majority joins briefly and only at the last moment. You need to know about it and not demand more, so as not to deceive yourself.

If such prominent oppositionists as Michnik, by self-education and the establishment of resistance funds, wanted to defeat - excuse me - force the communists to make concessions, then why should you be surprised by the attitude of the leadership of the underground "S".

Adam Michnik strongly spoke against the concept of underground state: "*There should not be (underground) the underground state, with its own national government, parliament and with armed forces (...) because there is no national mandate*". If Michnik would write that he sees no prospects for the activities of the underground state due to the everlasting might of the USSR, we would understand, but the argument he used is false and misleading:

1. If the center of creating the state were "S", it would have the mandate;
2. The creation of the underground state requires the agreement of all national forces and, therefore, the very fact of its creation shows to have a public mandate;
3. What was the mandate of the National Government during the January Uprising? Was there a referendum on its appointment? Of course not; The National Government received public support for its actions as it expressed its aspirations. What about the Polish Underground State during WW2?

After the disappointments which brought the July 22<sup>nd</sup>, TKK changed its tactics into offensive, but of course, didn't call to organize self-defences and demonstrations. Therefore, the ranks of suicide entrants quickly decreased and the tactics of the demonstration collapsed.

According to Romaszewski's guidelines, the peaceful radicalism on the streets accompanied political fearfulness (someone may be personally madly brave, but this doesn't have anything to do with the politics). "S", by betting on the agreement did not want and could not ultimately break up with communism, negate its legitimacy, and so on.

The creation of, for example, the Regional Political Representation, not to mention the RJN, would also be a much harder blow for the communists than even a successful strike protest because negating their political power would become a political threat to communism. (...)

*At the Crossroads: August 31<sup>st</sup> - October 8<sup>th</sup> – November 10<sup>th</sup>.*

During this period, the leadership of "S" found itself at the crossroads between the willingness and inability to break with communism, it allowed to float on the wave, unable to finally negate the legality of the system. The disease called "parliamentary or constitutional schizophrenia" appeared again. To invoke the Sejm and the Constitution of People's Republic in times of KOR was a fairly effective tactic, as communists, not threatened by the opposition, accepted the game of legalism: what is and what is not "*compliant with the law*", with "*Constitution of the People's Republic of Poland*" etc. Now, when truncheons reigns, this game became a dangerous illness of the opposition. "Tygodnik Wojenny<sup>44</sup>" proposed e.g. To organize petition action to repeal, "members of parliament" as if we were some kinds of law-abiding monarchy, in which the action of this type could end with success, not with the "*path of health*<sup>45</sup>" for the signatories. Realization of the "TW's" proposal would mean moreover, we consider the "elections" in which such an "MP" has been elected as legal and binding.

In a TKK statement of October 9<sup>th</sup>, we read that "the Sejm forfeit it's all public mandate." Later, we learned to form the union press that banning "S" is invalid because is at odds with the Constitution of PRL arranged by a Bierut<sup>46</sup> and his accomplices from the NKVD. Could TKK did not know how a parliament and the constitution are created, and what is the public mandate? Few of us are interested in the internal contradictions of the communist documents that *en-bloc* are devoid of any legality (together with that constitution), since due to electoral fraud in 1947 the entire system does not have legitimacy. (...)

In the summer, it was widely reported that the response to the ban of "S" would certainly be a general strike. Frightened, frightened, and even conceptually not prepared for such an alternative. In Warsaw, at the end of September, everyone

knew that "S" would be banned, but the TKK instead meeting earlier and determining the response, decided to deliberate simultaneously with the Sejm. For what? Did the people who - called a boycott of the Gierek's elections in 1980, during the "rekindling period" so much befriended the Sejm, that they thought that the "MPs" will not adopt the submitted resolution? Such behavior caused TKK was not even able to take advantage of a spontaneous protest.

In total, by forfeiting the effect of the October 10<sup>th</sup>-11<sup>th</sup> protests and setting a strike for November 10<sup>th</sup>, leadership has contributed to the calming of the mood. Everyone shouted: "We'll wait until the 10<sup>th</sup>!" And what happened next, we already know. "TM" gave the reasons for the defeat of November 10<sup>th</sup> in issue № 34 in small print, after reports from various workplaces. The same assessments could be read in "N" №10, printed a month earlier.

The question remains: had the TKK adopted the line we proposed earlier, would we have been able to achieve more? In the organizational area - probably not, because of the poor ability of contemporary Poles, and the "S" activists, in particular, to act in the conspiracy. In the field of consciousness, we would do the true revolution. If in fact the majority of Poles still feel that the government is "our", and socialism is something that can not be overthrown, or that the nation has no right to overthrow the system in which he lives and which he does not like, you owe it to this year of the struggle between the desire of freedom and inability to take up the fight for her. (...)

In the Gdansk's CDN<sup>47</sup> № 5/6 of October 21<sup>st</sup>, we can read an article by Leszek Nowak assessing the reasons for the defeat: *"No success this time, writes author, because among others, our Union was not aware of its real role in the breakdown of the system's triple-rule (economic power, political, information - "N"), that was deluded about the opponent, that still carried socialist illusions that a Pole with Pole will get along to an agreement. If you believed in it, it's no wonder you got a "blow to the jaw". Next L. Nowak writes that "S" is the only organization that allows the masses to fight for the liberation of society; the Union activists "in practice, in daily operations led the fight for liquidation of the "triple-rule". The author forgets to draw the logical conclusion resulting from his own argument: if some "social tool" -will be "immature" for society is to fulfill the facing tasks, then either it will mature or it will crumble and be replaced by others.*

In the "KOS" №18 of October 17<sup>th</sup> in an article entitled *"On the political desert"* we read that regimes' propaganda was so effective that *"instilled in us the fear of independent political activity ... without which, the proper development of society is impossible"*. Next, we read: *"I am a big enthusiast of 'Solidarity', but I have to admit that we ourselves have contributed to its collapse by political ignorance. We would like to see it as representative of the whole nation, forgetting that he who represents all of this does not represent anyone. Nevertheless, being hypnotic by fear, inhibited by complexes, we all tried to hide behind the formula of union, jolly hoping, those unsuspecting rulers will give us their blessing"*. Well, not

everyone: "N" is probably the only publication, which from the beginning of the war continually stressed that has nothing to do with the Union and is interested only with political activity.

The author signed with the initials FM continues: *“And we wanted more unity. The real one, of course, is not the one from FJN<sup>48</sup>. Unfortunately, this is a utopia. As utopian are present attempts to formulate a program that would be acceptable to the whole society”*. At the end of the FM states: *“So the agreement is out, the uprising in the current situation would be madness. What remains? A lot of work. The significant social groups should establish their parties acting underground. Even the skeleton cadre ones. Let them create their programs, their vision of Independence and propagate them in their publications. Let them jump to their throats learning the methods of political struggle, but in the face of a common enemy let them work in solidarity. Because the 'Solidarity' should be the platform on which we enter into a national agreement, we will develop common tactics and fight the enemy will educate cadres for a future state”*. Between us and FM remains the only difference: when we sign a national agreement, the "S" will remain just a memory. (...)

*Disintegration - pacification - self-liquidation of the Underground "S"*.

With making the allegation to Primate on the tactical steps, no attention is paid to the political meaning of his current line. So let us look at the statements and actions of Abp. Glemp from the point of view of the political effects of his actions. (...)

Emphasizing that after October 8<sup>th</sup> the idea of solidarity is alive, although there is no "Solidarity" means that the primate recognized the legitimacy (but not rightness) of the decision of the communist Sejm, and therefore TKK is no longer for him the representative of "S" pushed into the underground by decision of rulers, but the group of desperate calling for *"desperate acts"*, as strikes and demonstrations. The statement that *"in this way can not be achieved nothing more"* is so right, so that with the demonstrations so weak actually can't be achieved anything. The Primate, however, did not indicate which path to take. With the subsequent call to boycott the TKK invocation for strikes and manifestations on November 10<sup>th</sup>, you can infer that this is the way of *"work and calmness"*, i.e., concessions and renounce (for now) the fight for freedom.

In today's Poland, everyone understands that calmness means to agree to rule of communists, and by obeying the advice to diligent work and lifting of sanctions by the West will not bring a nation any benefits, because saved and produced goods will be expedited to the Soviet Union, converted for the needs of police, ZOMO, LWP, the party apparatus, designated for useless investments, rather than for consumption - and later use these investments for strengthening the system or will be subject to devastation, destruction, lost or be stolen. As a result, all increased effort will be accompanied by increased exploitation and our growth of debt, which will have to repay after the fall of communism.

Call from not taking part in the actions on November 10<sup>th</sup> means cutting off by the Primate from the underground "S" and the recognition of its tactics to be harmful due to the excessive radicalism. Indicating that resistance is a bad thing because it causes repression is quite strange. The fight for freedom always draws more or less terror. The repressions caused either the actions of insurgents and conspirators in the nineteenth century and during the last world war. Does that mean that they should give it up?

The Primate emphasizes that the aim of the Church is to avoid bloodshed. Is it at any cost? If one side - the communists - is ready to spill the blood in any quantity, and the second - obedient to the Church - will be ready to do anything to that there was no bloodshed, then it stays in a completely lost position. The communists will be able to blackmail us at any time and forced us to make concessions.

Most likely, the Primate thinks that accepting communism and renouncing the fight for freedom (though not thinking or wanting it) will bring fewer victims than the continuation of the resistance, which may result in Soviet intervention. Such reasoning does not take into account the degree of degeneration of the nation and moral depravity resulting from the resignation of the fight, and the voiceless victims of communism dying due to lack of medicine, malnutrition, etc., destruction of an elite that would continue resistance.

If the new line of the Primate would become the sole and commonly - accepted as the question arises: why got killed the defenders of the "Wujek" mine, miners in Lubin, B. Wlosik, Krolik and dozens of others, why thousands of people went to jail? So far, Poland has always revered heroes fighting for freedom, now their sacrifice would prove to be ridiculous and unnecessary, which would have caused a moral crisis.

There are generally three arguments in favor of defending the current policy of Fr. Primate:

The Church has different goals and the nature of its mission is different. This approach is, by all means, correct, but it means also that the democratic opposition and underground "S" also have different goals and their activities have a different character than the Church. "S" instead of being offended with the divorce announced by the Primate, should become independent, which in practice means that the Bishops' Council advisers should not be the main advisory to "S", as the one can not simultaneously represent two sides with differing interests (which does not mean that they are contradicting in the long run).

2. In exchange for a new policy of the Primate, the Church is to strengthen its material base and extend the influence – which obviously will be beneficial to the nation, provided, that we won't give up the fight for freedom nor the conspiracy organizations, etc. Total calm and resignation would be in fact a step backward. The government could lock up at any time, for example, catechetical halls, and thinking about freedom sooner or later would lead to action again. All

this would happen, however, at the expense of present various opposition – a lost generation.

3. Primate tries to get anything, any possibility of open societal activities. This is true, but we believe that the counts on Christian trade unions are entirely deceptive. The communists won't be cheated, nor will they be loyal, but will outmaneuver the Church, and when the calming mood and indifference will come, they will destroy also this bastion of independence. Who is going to defend the Primate when there is no more opposition?

What tactics shall we adopt during the times of the pseudo-thaw? We believe that the applied principle should be: "Take it, but sign no receipt", i.e., take and use all the little (there will be no others) concessions, which Primate will obtain for the nation in return for cutting off the opposition and for advocacy of communist normalization, but not to listen to calls abp. Glemp for hard work and calmness, abandoning the desperate (i.e... underground) activities, support for the communist trade union (of course they can be called Christian, but we mean the essence - not the nameplate), the revelation of conspirators, discarding of strikes and demonstrations (when they become possible), support and joining of OKON and PRON (collaboration). (...)

The Primate's tactics are doomed to failure in the long run, and temporarily can benefit only communists, because:

- will weaken the position of the Church in society; the Primate's criticism among the active elite of the nation is very common;
- will divide the nation into those ready to surrender and unyielding; dividing line, which now runs between the nation and the rulers, will be going across the nation;
- many people who place excessive hopes in the Church will be disappointed and give up the fight,
- Primate position will further strengthen apathy and moral collapse after the loss on November 10<sup>th</sup>; the widespread discouragement is already visible. It may also contribute to the petrification of the underground "S". (...)

The democratic opposition must be an independent force, and the stronger will be, the more will be the increase in the bargaining position of the Church – but we shall not listen to him on political issues. (...)

*Antoni Wichrzycki*

"Independence" № 11-12, November-December 1982, pp. 1-10

## **After the surrender of the underground "Solidarity"**

After December's defeat and a whole year of a scuffle, the leadership "S" capitulated. It's not the communists who defeated the underground structures of the



"S", but the same leaders erased themselves from the political map of fighting Poland, even formally and symbolically they can still exist for some time.

But how does this assessment, since TKK exists and promises even publish a "new program"? No serious political leadership starts the new round fight against an opponent from the announcement of their readiness for capitulation as acted TKK by declaring: *"Only Lech Walesa may draw conditions under which the Provisional Coordinating Commission – in compliance with his notion - will decide on its dissolving"*.

Perhaps this declaration was intended to strengthen Lech's position towards the occupant. But its effect was contrary to the intention, as it gave the impression that the TKK was just waiting to dissolve itself, and in practice to stop fighting.

The price of this "dissolution" would be *"the release of all deprived of freedom for political reasons"*. But how the leadership intends to continue the fight for *"the restoration of the trade union and civic freedoms - which, as declared - still remains the main objective of our activities"* (22. XI. 82), when earlier will cease to exist? How to fight for the freedom previously giving up the weapons of this struggle, which are underground structures, even such as TKK? Is the TKK intends to fight in the open? In that case, the former members of the Commission would be left with writing petitions and appealing letters to PRON.

From the second statement, we learn that the condition of the truce which entails the liquidation of the Union's leadership, is not the restoration of union freedoms, but only the release of those arrested. *"The members of the TKK assume - says Zb. Bujak in "TM" №36 - that they will continue their activities under the existing conditions until the release of those arrested and sentenced. Until then, we do not anticipate disclosure or dissolution"*. A similar position took B. Lis in an interview given to the French Radio (12. XII. 82), indicated that the conditions for the disclosure are:

1. release of all prisoners,
2. activating employee self-governments in accordance with the Act adopted in September 1981,
3. the use of the censorship act.

In a statement of November 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1982, the TKK also mentions:

- reinstatement of the dismissed persons to work,
- re-activation of all organizations, associations of creative and scientific. (Which, have not yet been dissolved yet.)

After the disclosure and the truce, i.e., in practice after returning to the pre-August (1980) situation, the fight would continue - as B. Lis said - on a different platform. However, it can only be an open activity. (...)

All the conditions for disclosure are childish ridiculous; such concessions can be undone overnight, and it will be a much easier operation than the imposition of martial law. Would be wrong, however, that anyone thinking all the signs of fawn to the communists does not matter, because the Reds did not take advantage

of them (and rightly so), and *"did not allow"* the members of the Commission to disclose themselves. The political fact, and what those statements are, when once existed, no longer can be erased and the situation after it will never be like before, regardless of the various denials. After one year, it appeared that the silence and tough policy by communists is successful, rather than influence the abandonment of TKK unrealistic hope for the agreement and cause a sober look at communism, it's causing softening of the Union position and political concessions. WRON acted therefore reasonable not accepting the hand outstretched by TKK, because everything indicates that, after several consecutive months the Union's leadership will soften even more and agree to ... conditional surrender.

Let us recall that the solidarity groups began fighting in the underground, not because political prisoners appeared in Poland, but because the whole Union has been relegated to the underground. The overcrowded prisons were only the result of this attitude (this choice), not its cause. If the leadership would call for the surrender on December 13<sup>th</sup> and all will diligently comply with the instruction, today there would be no political prisoners (the interned would be released under pressure from the West). Therefore, we would have a state of truce that is currently postulated by the TKK. In view of the current line of leadership, all the sacrifices made by Poles become unnecessary and grotesque. Any coward and opportunist can now say, *"You can see what you fought for? You had to keep quiet from the beginning, just like me, and you would get an onion or a shoe, and you did, but with a boot! Even your leaders just want to stop the repression, and where's your 'S'?"* How do they feel about this surrender of the families of the murdered and imprisoned?

By resigning from underground activities in the event of the release of prisoners, in practice, the TKK limits its entire program to the postulate of amnesty.

In 1982, the TKK called for resistance in the name of restoring the state from before December 13<sup>th</sup>, this time backed by certain guarantees. We called this objective utopian, and methods of fighting leading to it as insufficient. After a year, the TKK came to the conclusion that the agreement, at least at this stage, is a utopia, but did therefore understand the mistake she made? Has she opted for the overthrow of the regime? Contrary, in the sphere of political solutions TKK went back to the 70s, offering the childish program proposals: *"Awaits us fight for the ability to conduct open activities. We need to find such forms that will this allow .... it may be local self-government or cooperative movement, maybe various kinds of associations and clubs ..."*. Zb. Bujak disclosed a veil of secrecy and said how will look like the result of intellectual effort of TKK and her advisers: *"... It will be an open program, a program for an agreement. (...) It will be an action for economic reform, to put the entire economy on its feet, to extend the freedom of the press and of expression, and to develop charity initiatives. There are activities for which it would be difficult to put in jail without discrediting the system ... (it is) a*

*positive program, a program for the evolution of the system."* What about practical actions? *"I see here also forms such as opinions and boycott of inappropriate management decisions (Italian strike), cooperation with or eventual (workers) factory councils in organizing the production and distribution of profit, modernization of the factories machine parks, etc. (...) For all of this are the rules, and so the road is relatively easy"*. In the end, it turns out that TKK recognized the legitimacy and irrevocability of banning of their own organization, as promises to fight only an amendment to the Trade Union Acts (i.e., partial changes in already existing law) - "TM" 36. Therefore, in Bujak's eyes, the act is legally binding, it only needs to be amended; most likely, it is about more than one union to exist in one workplace.

These few quotes are enough for the entire TKK program. They show not only the detachment of the TKK members from the realities of life but even intellectual powerlessness. Charitable activity, the cooperative and local government movement, cooperation of open communist self-governments (there will be no others) with secret factory commissions in the organization of production, etc., is very naive. The whole reasoning of the TKK and her chosen advisers is based on a misunderstanding of the essence of communism, and especially of its declining phase – the war communism.

All open activities be monitored and controlled by communists (police), in order to discredit it, or to exploit it, eg. to blame responsibility for the state of the economy on local factory-councils, use their authority for blame on the price increases.

In communism, even partial reforms are impossible, because in the conditions of political and economic dictatorship (monopoly) it can not permanently operate any independent entities: local self-government, cooperatives, trade association, etc. The NEP operation was already repeated several times and always ended the same way - the destruction of the liberated sector, i.e., non-state controlled. Without the market economy, the cooperatives, companies, and individual workshops must fall under the weight of taxes or be nationalized or converted into parasitic-like institutions, economically dependent and unhealthy.

The only way to get the economy back on its feet is to abolish the communist regime. Any attempt to reform will only increase the burden on working people; in other words, for the workers in our system, the less severe is the centrally managed economy – typical for this system - than the "self-reliance" of enterprises, derived from a market economy, and in communism limited by necessity (state monopoly) to self-financing only.

The communists are already completely discredited and one disgrace more or less will not hurt or help them, because their power does not come from free elections, but from the Kremlin. If Bujak after the experience of last year, not to mention the earlier history, still says that under communism there is some kind of

activity for which you can't get jailed, we suggest that he will undertake such activity, and soon will find out about the far-sightedness of his own policies.

The ideas of semi-open actions of quasi-secret workers councils were born, most likely, under the influence of reading about the Spanish Workers' Commissions from the era of General Franco. Our "theoretical thinkers" forgot, however, that we do not live in the "liberal" Spanish fascism of the 60s and 70s, but in the Soviet-like communism. Both regimes are based on different principles. In communism, the most important is political power, not the economic effectiveness (political dictatorship joined with an economic monopoly), in Spanish fascism however the political system (dictatorship) was separated from the economy, which was market-driven, so it required effective, profitable business economics. That is why the factory management preferred to conceal from the police the fact of negotiating with unofficial Workers' Commissions and to raise wages in exchange for an increase in labor productivity and the abandonment of strikes. In Spain, there was a certain common interest for workers and factory owners, and in communism, there is no such community. (...)

What is the president of the Union proposing when the TKK comes up with another program fiction? As "Slowo" wrote, L. Walesa is *"first and foremost a politician"*. Unfortunately, he is above all a bad politician. No politician has yet put so much work into weakening his own position and ridiculing himself in the eyes of the thinking part of society. Sending successive letters to the rulers with various proposals must have had just such an effect. We are concerned not so much with their content as with the fact that the occupant is constantly flooded with epistles in a situation that is politically unfavorable for the Union. It was known from the beginning that there will be a no response to these letters. "KOS" N°19 trying at all costs justify Lech's suggestion that: *"these moves may lead to the creation of space for the regime to make a maneuver of withdrawing from the current, lacking of prospects political line, and to allow present the necessary concessions to society as a sign of power and goodwill"*. But the entire reasoning is based on a false premise, that the government would like to withdraw with anything, when in fact the "S" has done everything not to force it to any backing-off. His policy is advantageous for the communists because it brought the weakening of social resistance.

The only platform of unity that can and must be maintained is the boycott of communist structures. Otherwise, the unity of the conciliatory wing (Lech Walesa TKK RKW "M") and the revolutionary wing (eg. WRKS or not-solidarity groups as "N") would not only be impossible to keep and false but also damaging. Pawel Jasienica analyzing reasons of defeat of the January's Uprising showed that *"... the revolution is not an appropriate time to create the coalition cabinets, to leave even the shadow of power to persons politically uncertain can mean a mortal danger for the cause, in the name of which it pushed the nation to the to the uprising "* (Two ways).

The first government cabinet in free Poland will have to have a coalition character because then it will not matter who wanted to fight communism, but what kind of Poland wants, what reforms and laws. For that to happen, you must first free Poland, but unfortunately the leaders of "S" are not able to lead these struggles. (...)

You have to be aware that the TKK does not represent everyone anymore, but only one direction - conciliatory. Such a trend exists inside and outside the conspiracy, so there is no reason why it should not have its own leadership, i.e., TKK, RKW, etc. If TKK is considered, as Bujak testified, as "political leadership" ("TM" № 36), it can not fulfill the role of our leadership. A revolutionary-independence camp must have its own political leadership. The unity which we propose, although limited to the independence wing, will be based on a common tactic (methods of struggle against communism) and strategy (objectives to achieve), not on the fiction of unity of all Poles, which practically is not possible.

Perhaps we are putting the emphasis on the problem of leadership too early, but we do not want to repeat the mistakes of Polish national uprisings. J. Lojek, analyzing the causes of defeat in 1831, wrote: *"it was the disregard of the principal advice of the young Maurice Mochnecki, who demanded to formulate the program of the fight for independence before the start of an uprising, and designate the revolutionary government, even if composed of young and unknown to anyone, as long as ready for action, to assume political responsibility"* (*The public opinion and the genesis the November Uprising, p. 217*).

The post-solidarity organizations of revolutionary and independence type must therefore consider:

- will they continue to recognize the authority of the TKK and therefore change their methods of operation to be in line with the TKK program;
- will they implement a completely differing program still formally recognizing the TKK;
- and finally, breaking with fiction, will they appoint new political leadership, of who's the program will have an influence and who order will want to execute.

However, before a new political leadership is appointed, the groups seeking to overthrow the regime should start cooperating. The beginning of such cooperation could be the "Declaration of Solidarity" published in "KOS".

The first stage of new activities should be to recognize its own program distinctiveness, and the next one the creation of own organizations and joining them into political parties or resistance organizations, and at the end create an inter-party agreement and the creation of political leadership the country and the Polish National Representation abroad. The consolatory wing will not create such representation, as it recognizes the PRL as the Polish state.

We have listed the individual phases of actions that should be taken on the political level in order to prepare the nation's political elite, and through them and

the nation itself, for the next and last revolution. To this sphere of activities belong also fight against the traitors and collaborators and the boycott of communist structures.

There remains one more organizational platform - the creation of conspiracy structures, covering the whole country and all circles, able to take action when developments will again allow for a mass resistance movement. Creating of the whole technical support, communication links, printing shops, etc.

The third and perhaps the most important, it is the platform of influence on the public consciousness through the publishing, libraries, etc. self-learning in the spirit of values of freedom and democracy and the idea of independence. Therefore, what awaits us is not so much about finding various methods of fighting communism available to everyone, but only about creating its instruments.

*Antoni Wichrzyciel*

"Independence" № 13-14, January-February 1983, pp. 1-4, 32

## **Positivism in totalitarianism?**

In the conspiratorial press and in discussions there is a lot of talking about the social, economic, and mutual-help activities, etc. The spirit of the new positivism took into enslavement the characters without political courage and vision, but with a great political experience of losing and concluding unsuccessful compromises with the Reds. It is understandable that many people would like to do something useful without risking anything or risking as little as possible. However, they often forget the system they live in. Let's think if the forms and methods of struggle developed in other times (like previous partitions) or in other, although externally similar systems (ea. Spanish Fascism) may have any real meaning in the struggle against communist totalitarianism. (...)

The extent of liberalism in the authoritarian country (ea. non-democratic) can vary and change depending on time and place. Dictatorial power most often seeks to expand its extent. Usually, however, leaves much freedom to the economic activities, because the lack of economic efficiency is weakening the system. People rebel for economic reasons (low wages) and begin to make political demands - the removal of the dictatorship.

The free economy is also a kind of security flap; the energetic people may, without engaging in politics (what is the essence of dictatorship), at the same time realize their ambitions in the economic field and advance materially. On the other hand, the free economy (i.e., not managed by the state) softens the anti-democratic inclinations and authoritarianism.

An example is the fascist (in fact authoritarian) Spain of General Franco. In the 1940s and 1950s, there was a growing tendency to expand dictatorial power, but then the reverse process began. Again, the starting point was the free economy.

Firstly, it enabled the professional advancement of talented, organizationally proven people and managers (which these capitalists will not do for profit). Grouped in Catholic and in favor of a parliamentary democracy organization Opus Dei, they were the real authors of the Spanish economic miracle of the 60s.

Secondly, private entrepreneurs seeking to increase profits were forced to get along with semi-official representatives of employees – Workers Commissions, which later evolved into nationwide - trade unions, despite the fact that officially could act only the government-sanctioned cooperative unions. The government had to cooperate with Opus Dei and had to tolerate the Workers' Commissions if did not want the economy to collapse.

In Bismarck's Germany, despite many anti-democratic and anti-Polish laws, Poles could resist on the economic level, as there was uniform legislation regulating this area. You could not harass for example of Polish banks or cooperatives because based on the same principles also operated German banks and other enterprises. The assassination on Polish institutions would be a blow to the entire economy, as it would eliminate the free economy, efficiency, etc., and at the same time the state also would turn up from the liberal into a totalitarian. The totalitarian system is one in which the central authorities are seeking to take control and subdue, i.e., the interests of the power center, all areas of life: political, ideological, economic, personal etc. The totalitarian system is therefore the opposite of both the democratic system and liberal system. However, while in a liberal-democratic and authoritarian system there are economic criteria, in totalitarianism they are replaced only by political criteria: it does not need efficiency, but a monopoly. And let the economy collapse, as long as we rule even only the ruins. In turn, thanks to the monopoly, it is possible to continue to rule, despite the lack of effectiveness.

Examples of totalitarian regimes are the systems of Nazi Germany and communism. In both cases, all activities, including economic, were centrally subordinated and state-managed to serve their interests (eg. the conduct of the war), but in the Reich retained the private ownership of the means of production, giving them greater efficiency than in Soviets. Therefore, communism can be called consistent totalitarianism. Hence the conclusion that in this type of system, there is not even the smallest island of freedom (i.e. lack of control center), thus missing the point from which it could start moving towards democratization or even authoritarianism. Allowing a private initiative (the so-called New Economic Policy) is always of a situational nature: it is about temporarily alleviating the shortages and draining the market, i.e., robbery of money accumulated by the population not because of wealth, but because of the total lack of goods. After

some time, the naive NEP-men who believed are destroyed by arbitrary taxes, and in the worst-case scenario jailed, e.g., for speculation corruption, etc. The private sector, if it still continues in spite of persecution, is of a parasitic character - totally controlled by the state, serving it to drain the financial resources of the population (high prices are the results of excessive taxation, and not 'malice' of tradesmen, as customers may think.)<sup>[1]</sup>

Therefore, the totalitarian system remains irreversible, if you replace one of its components (monopoly: political, economic, ideological), the whole system inevitably collapses or returns to the previous state thus restoring the affected monopoly. Let us emphasize once again that it is happening because the totalitarian dictatorship is guided by other principles than ordinary political dictatorship, commonly called right-wing, i.e., authoritarian. This is an important hint for the opponents of communism: any social activism, setting of cooperatives, credit unions, organic work, in a word the positivism in totalitarianism, does not make any sense because it is based on the principles (effectiveness, rule of law - at least in the sphere of economic) unknown in our system, unnecessary and therefore not used.

Only a political struggle against communism makes sense because only these challenges its monopoly of power - a monopoly, whose capture has allowed the communists to dominate other areas of life.

Activity of compromisers and politically lost people, unable to take up the challenge thrown by the communists, constantly referring to positivism, deceiving the public, and causing wasting energy on pointless activity. Its failure causes even deeper disappointment and apathy.

The most important mistake is the misperception of the authoritarian regime with totalitarianism, and proposing forms of fight tried in the past under the Prussian rule, or in India by Gandhi.

Gandhi only politically awakened Indian masses, independence was brought by armed activity (i.e., the mutiny of the sailors of the Indian fleet), with which he had nothing to do. The boycott of English goods was effective as it reduced the profits of British producers. But what would happen in Poland, if we began to produce fabrics for shirts and pants in home-based workshops (the concept of underground society - favorite of "KOS")? We only would make a great gift to communists, as freed from the production to the market, all textiles produced in government-run factories would be given to the apparatus of power and repression, shipped to the USSR or sold below the cost of production in the West to get dollars for truncheons for ZOMO. The resources saved in the consumer goods industry would be directed to the development of heavy and armaments industries. By writing "resources" we do not mean worthless polish currency (zloty), but specific materials: cement, steel, machinery, and so on. In communism, the production of goods for the consumer market is only the burden on the state, a necessary evil, which would be willingly abandoned.



We are opposed to buying vodka because:

- drunk, and therefore primitive society it is easier to rule and manipulate,
- if the funds spent on alcohol would be designated the independence objectives, they would temporarily strengthen the material base of the opposition, and above all would emotionally tie-up with her the larger group of people.

The widespread connection of boycott of the state made vodka with a desire to reduce the source of funding for the apparatus of repression proves, unfortunately, that the opposition cadres do not even have a clue about the communist economy (more self-study dear "KOS"). In this system, there is no single currency – a measure of value. In a free (market) economy, there is one universal measure of value, i.e., the German mark, in which the prices of all goods and services are counted. It is different here. You can have a lot of money and don't get any product or get it for free, or half free, because everything is decided by the position of the buyer in relation to apparatus of power (privileges or lack of them). The function of money fulfills different means of distribution like vouchers, grants, access permits to special shops, etc. In our system there is many types of money that are mutually non-exchangeable, for example, zloty and the "right" to purchase apartments from the pool of the Office of the Council of Ministers (i.e., there is no such sum zloty, for which you can purchase the "right" to buy apartments only available for people in the nomenclature of URM), and none of them fulfills all the functions of money.

The thousand of zloty's that a steelworker spends a month on vodka is not the same thousand that the state spends on the daily sustenance of a ZOMO-man. If anyone has any doubts, they should compare the goods that can be bought for a thousand zlotys in a regular store with those that will be received - also for a thousand zlotys - by a secret policeman or military officer in a special-access store.

A communist state, in order to keep ZOMO-men, does not have to have any zlotys at all, but a must have specific products: fabric for the uniforms from the textile factories, meat from the state-owned farms for food, hotels for accommodation, and so on. These products are not acquired on the market from producers for the zlotys but produce the same ty itself as all those of factories, state-owned farms, hotels they are its property, or requisites from private producers because it does not have to take them into account since the power does not come from free elections (political monopoly).

Refraining from buying vodka will put more pressure on the consumer goods market, thus increasing imbalance, long queues. The state will raise prices and restore the balance, because the frightening society will humbly accept increases, and another article in "KOS" will provide peace of mind.

Let us remember that the source of money for the state in a centrally planned economy comes not from taxes and monopoly revenues, but from printing presses. The communists will print out as many zlotys as they will need. The apparatus of repression is kept, however, due to the fact that the state as the owner

of the whole economy has unlimited resources that can be spent on selected targets, e.g., construction of the steel mills and equipment for **ZOMO riot police**. In order to deprive the communists of control of the economy, political power must first be taken from them. Ideas with vodka are the result of political cowardice and seeking salvation instead of fighting.

In the opposition publishing, it often indicates that everything changes, evolves, so it must also apply to communism. Such an approach to systemic matters results, unfortunately, from the ignorance of the writers. It is not true that every social and political system must evolve over time. From this point of view, we could divide political-social systems into two types:

- subjected to evolution, transformations, i.e., reformable by a more or less peaceful path; these can include, for example, European feudalism and capitalism;
- lacking internal levers of development and only capable of - replicating time-fixed relations and lasting or the external expansion, accompanied by internal decay and lethargy of masses, pacified by skillfully dosed terror; the Asian feudalism and communism fall into this category. These systems fall under external pressure, usually invasions and wars.

It is characteristic that in Asian countries central authorities play a decisive role in both, politics and the economy, but of course, do not have as perfect a monopoly as in totalitarianism. The predominance of the interests of the court means that in most cases the political criteria are winning, not economic, although identification of Asian systems with modern totalitarianism would be a simplification going too far.

Communism - read the USSR - will not collapse without an external stimulus. This could be a lost war: global or colonial, it can also be provided by Poland. But it will not be the Gandhi's Poland.

*Antoni Wichrzyciel*

"Independence" № 18-19, June-July 1983, pp. 22-25

## **January and what next?**

At present "Solidarity" union is fiction. The number of engaged activists steadily decreases as a result of the ongoing police action. The number of associates falls since November 11<sup>th</sup> due to the deterioration of public mood. In such a situation it manages to keep only a portion of previously existing structures, communication channels, initiatives - and even then, mainly by increasing the workload of those who are still active. The reason for the deterioration in mood is the loss of hope for victory in the struggle with to date methods and a lack of new proposals.

Among the main reasons for which the "S" does not have any concept giving a chance to succeed in the struggle are:

- avoidance of explicitly defining the purpose of this struggle,
- incorrect assessment of the enemy.

The concept of exerting limited pressure on rulers to force the limited concessions has failed. It was a wrong main assumption, according to which the rulers sooner or later, will look for a partner in the general population. I would call this: a consensus complex.

The agreement of two forces can take place on the basis of a common negation of something or common goals. As the common enemy for us and the rulers somehow cannot be seen, the latter remains. You can only regret that, there are still people who believe that the rulers would like to share this yoke of eternal destine with anybody. The people's government is a Do-It-Yourself organization and will do it (or not) over our dead bodies without us. As the authorities didn't rush to an agreement, they tried to scare them a little. I think that the effect of such pressure was contrary to the intention: it realized the rulers that any concession on their part would be perceived as a sign of weakness - it will be a stone that moves an avalanche and very fast will cause a violent social explosion. It is a vicious circle: the greater the pressure, the more it cannot yield, because it would mean the greater the weakness and the faster the revolution. And if there is no pressure, it is clear that there is no need to yield. The authorities know perfectly well that the first symptom of their weakness would mean a fight to life and death - not one Radom or Otwock would be on fire, but dozens or hundreds of them. Arises at this point analogy: the rulers - recall from handler closed in a cage with a semi-wild tiger. Everything is fine as long as the handler shoots his whip and the tiger is not hungry. But no one suspects that if the handler will put down his whip and extends his hand to the tiger, he will give him a paw to shake. The tiger will bite off his hand prophylactically and prosaically. Let's not be dumber than a tiger. Until you will not overcome the agreement complex, until will not formulate the goals of struggle, until the underground journalism will be operating with myths ("S" was, is and will be ours, glorious, beautiful), slogans (Polish - Jaruzelski war) and delusions (Red will concede although it won't have to, or because it has to) – as long to be expected that in the circles of the leaders of the "S" and their advisories won't be created any better program than the current one.

"S" is fiction, which we should begin to say goodbye. We must therefore answer two questions: What will be after the "S" and how to go from there to the new structures, to lose as little as possible from what we have so far. One should expect the development of political movements in the near future. Their characteristic features will be:

- clear formulation of the objectives of the action, ea.: overthrow communistic rule, the introduction of a more representative political system, regaining of independence;
- developing one's own vision of the future of Poland;
- having a concept and conducting a foreign policy;

- carrying out a specific policy in relation to the current rulers, ea. the denial of the possibility of an agreement similar to the one in August'80, seeking for partners inside the power apparatus, etc.;
- using the name of a political party, cadre organization, etc.

It would be there, the political parties (plural) the main task will be to prepare the society to carry out the revolution that is to explode more or less spontaneously in a few years, or to obtain a bloodless solution. Activities will be carried out on three levels. Highest – to build secret cadre organizations and train them. It is clear that there will be relatively few people involved in this. The lowest - is the political education of the whole society. The intermediate level will consist of independent social associations: trade union “S”, cultural, educational, environmental. Their tasks also will be training personnel for a future state, the members of political parties will be active within them. Without them, there will be also not possible eventual creation of the underground state. All three levels should be regarded as equally important for the future.

Who will do this? For the most part, it would be done by the middle-level activists of “S”. In the transitional period, "S" should provide assistance to the newly emerging movements, i.e., share the existing channels of communication and information (printing), press distribution network, funds, channels for equipment from abroad. In order for all of this to be shared, it must first be sustained. It's necessary to ensure that these movements do not have to grow up in opposition to the "S", that there was possible to smoothly move from one to the other. This is important because a substantial part of the population still associates hope with "S" and its leadership, without realizing its groundlessness. In the already difficult situation for society, mentally tough, you should save the unnecessary negative spectacles. In the long-term perspective "S" should become an underground trade union, engaged solely in union activities: a collection of dues, care of social issues in the workplace, helping persecuted. Until the creation of another national-level representation, the union should also be a platform for confronting all other movements. Therefore, it would be good for the TKK to pass a resolution formulating a position supporting political movements in general, should they arise. Frankly speaking, it's about to allow TKK to leave the scene in grace (but just in case to be still around behind the stage). It would consider unacceptable blocking by TKK of new movements not helping them and closing the access to its publications.

*Rafal Witkowski*

"Independence" № 15, March 1983, pp. 1-2

## 10 obvious truths ... not for everyone!

I. *"The vision Self-Governing Republic is not conflicting with the idea of socialism, and its implementation must not conflict with the existing international order"*.

If the term "self-governing republic" is meant - speaking the human and understandable to all language – a democratic republic, why it was omitted in the description of one of the basic features - political pluralism in a parliamentary system based on free elections?

Democratic elections do not have to be free at the same time, because the principle of freedom concerns the scope of government and the principle of democracy - the way in which power is exercised in a given area; so, it is not the same. Elections, even to the Sejm may not be free, although they remain democratic. (...)

Democratic elections will not be free if all parties are not allowed to participate in the pre-election campaign, voting, and election commissions. After all, it is possible to organize democratic elections with the participation of only the PZPR, the SD, and the ZSL. Democratic elections were held after the war in Hungary (where the Communists received 17% of votes) and Czecho-Slovakia (38% votes), but were not free, as the occupying power in advance determined which parties can take part in them and set conditions for the establishment after the election (regardless of their outcome) a joint government with the communists, and even assigning them certain ministries. As you might guess, it was about the ministry of state security, internal affairs, and national defense. What happened next does not need to be reminded.

Free elections - elections that among all (not just the "S"), even the smallest groups, even independent candidates, and even among communists.

If the idea of a "self-governing republic" does not presuppose a multi-party system, parliamentary and free elections, then it is another utopia native from the early-Bolshevik system of people's councils.... Such a system can serve the public and only a very short period, at the moment of the revolutionary overthrow of the old rulers, always later is to be replaced by a parliamentarian or by a dictatorship. After the end of World War I, the first solution found its application in Germany, the second one in Bolshevik Russia.

Writing about the ideas of socialism, the term, that does not mean anything, because it does not specify whether it is democratic socialism, and about of the idea of the social-democracy, or about the real socialism, i.e., the idea of communism. Referring to the term socialism resembles the incantation, however, that if they relate to democratic socialism - the rulers are not interested, but if refers to the real socialism – Poles are not interested. Who is the author

addressing? Maybe both sides, hoping that none will catch here what is all about and will adopt a declaration at face value, regardless of its own self-interest.

Shamans believe that by using the appropriate spells they gain power over a deity, who must henceforth follow their orders. Similarly, members of TKK believe that saying the magic spell: "socialism", will gain power over Andropov, who by that cry would have to go to the service of TKK! In the name of socialism, of course! However, the shaman will not cheat communists. They did not let themselves be fooled by KOR nor by "Solidarity" and will not be fooled now. As for society, it is not so in love with the idea of socialism that compliance with it is a condition for accepting a program as its own. According to a survey conducted by "Paris Match" on December 5<sup>th</sup>, 1981 in free elections for the communists would vote the entire 3%, and for the Social Democrats 20% of voters, which means that for the vast majority of the population the idea of socialism (any) is at least indifferent. It's not fitting, therefore, to push this idea in most people. We'd better pass over the idea of socialism in silence.

If there is any idea of socialism and not being in conflict with the model of "Self-Governing Republic", understood as the parliamentary republic, neither the occupants nor the society are not interested in it. If the idea of socialism is now in realization in Poland, it is in total contradiction with the vision of "Self-Governing Republic" understood as a parliamentary republic with developed workers self-management (we would say: "the Democratic Republic"). The appeal to socialism and to the "the existing international order" (presumably the authors refer to the post-Yalta division of Europe) means that the real addressee of TKK's Declaration is USSR because he wants to maintain the existing order.

Little Johnny (Jasio) is sitting and writing political programs; imagine that thousands of kilometers away, in Moscow, Andropov is sitting, reading his thesis and thinking: "Oh, but those Poles want my socialism and my order between-national and I stupidly thought that they want to overthrow the regime. But now they clearly wrote that they meant socialism, then it's a different story - I will exchange Wojciech for Lech! "

## II. *"Poland's alliances cannot prejudice the existence of the dictatorial rule."*

In order to make an alliance with someone, one must first of all exist and have more or less equal relations with each other. A state that does not exist cannot conclude any pacts, alliances or agreements. You have to realize that there is no Polish state! Just as the Congress Kingdom was not a Polish state, it is also not a creation of the Soviet administration in Poland, known as the People's Republic of Poland. The Polish state ceased to exist upon the termination of the national representation Council of National Unity, the liquidation of the administration - Government Delegation in the country, along with subordinate agencies and the withdrawal of international diplomatic recognition to the last legal Polish Republic Government – the exile government of Prime Minister Arciszewski<sup>49</sup>. Since that time Polish territory is ruled indivisibly by the Soviet occupying authorities, which

took the form of the local PRL government. The fact that people sit in it consider themselves as Poles, does not change anything, because local administrations of colonial empires always had a large number of officials of local origin. In the nineteenth century the Congress Kingdom, the police chief was Russian, while his subordinates willingly persecuted the independence movement and the workers were "Poles".

The authorities of the People's Republic of Poland are not Polish, because they represent and defend the interests of the Soviet-Russian, with which they are also tied with their own group interest. Therefore, any agreement they sign with their central rulers:

- are inter-imperial,
- do not apply to the Polish nation, as they have not been concluded by its representatives,
- have a meaning of an alliance only from the point of view of a local interest group, which has more in common with the central oligarchy in Moscow than with their own subjects in Warsaw, and therefore prejudice in advance the dictatorial nature of local government.

Therefore, the Polish state, before concluding any alliance with anyone, must first arise, i.e., Poles must gain independence.

III. *"A totalitarian dictatorship is emerging. Lawlessness has become the law."*

A totalitarian dictatorship is a combination of a political, economic, and information monopoly. Contrary to the authoritarian system (e.g., in Chile), it does not recognize any borders beyond which it would be inadvisable or forbidden to control citizens' lives. The dictatorship, understood as such, was formed in Poland between 1944-1947 and, as far as we know, never disappeared. It only changed forms, and sometimes even weakened in the so-called "periods of renewals" (most recently in 1980-1981). If mass shootings have not been carried out for many years and high sentences have not been passed, the reason was not the disappearance of the totalitarian dictatorship, but the lack of the need to resort to such methods. Totalitarian dictatorship, therefore, does not arise, but only uses their old methods in the face of mortal danger for themselves, which previously was not there.

IV. *"The goal of our struggle is the implementation of the I KZD program."*

The document adopted at I KZD did not have the character of a coherent program. Already in 1981 it was too vague, which resulted from a desire to reconcile all the trends occurring in the "S". The main contradiction was in formulating the two mutually excluding goals - one to bring the permanent settlement with communists, therefore to leave them some power and second to conduct the free elections, i.e., to deprive the communist of the power.

Everyone can refer to the I KZD program, by choosing one fragment, and ignoring the others. This document currently can't fulfill its program role as the political situation changed completely since the days of Congress. The objective of the current struggle cannot, therefore, be the implementation of the I KZD program, but it can be the free elections, which are incidentally and in passing mentioned there. But it must be said clearly and openly.

V. *"The implementation of the program requires the creation of a situation in which the authorities are forced to seek compromise with the society. In order the system would be able to make concessions, there are necessary actions leading to the collapse of the current dictatorship"*.

The current form of totalitarian dictatorship – WRON - is not something external in relation to the totalitarian system of power. WRON-ish form of communist dictatorship – it's exactly the system of Soviet power in its declining phase. The communist system goes through three periods:

1. Building of the system - the power of the police, terror on a mass scale, industrialization, creation of the social subbase for holding the power through mass advancement, indoctrination, destruction of social ties (independent organizations, the Church, the family).

2. Bloom of the system - the power of the party apparatus, full use of the exercised power, the pacified public does not rebel, closure of the paths for social advancement, stagnation.

3. Decay and the collapse of the system - the rule of the military and police, the disintegration of the party apparatus, poverty, hunger, economic meltdown, rebellions, riots, mass terror, war.

The overthrow of the current ruling team is equal to the overthrow of communism. The conviction, that it would be enough to deprive the power of only Jaruzelski's team that it will be possible to come to an agreement with the other communist rulers is based on false premises. Jaruzelski's departure will not solve anything. The collapse of the current dictatorship would lead the rulers (i.e., exactly who? Non-existent party, army, police?) to make concessions and settle a compromise with the society. However, if the rulers will be strong enough, despite the collapse, to continue to defend themselves, they will fight to the end with hope of defeating the society and for the restoration of its domain. If the society would strong enough that for the rulers will remain only the negotiations of surrender (save lives and property stolen from the nation), why shall we agree on the compromise and artificially leave leftovers of the power to communists; maybe to let them catch the breath allow them to strike back? The balance of power between the rulers and society can only be a transitory state in favor of those who break it first. We have no choice - we have to overthrow communism completely and finally. If the authors of the Declaration had in mind a capitulation of the Reds,



then calling it a compromise will not fool the future "prisoners", only confuse the minds of readers.

VI. *"The decision to use force against striking workers will be a great threat to the existence of the dictatorship itself."*

In December 1981, the force was used against striking workers and the dictatorship did not suffer any "threat", on the contrary, strengthened its power by restoring full control over society. Only active defense on a massive scale will carry this "great threat". Let's say it clearly. Do not use dodging, when the truth is difficult to accept. Hiding from Poles that there is a fight and casualties ahead of them is not only naive but also harmful, as it may result in the generals being left without an army. The masses convinced that there is no need to fight and die, will probably capitulate after the first clash, as in December 1981. Then there was no civil defense because the authorities of intellectuals, leaders, etc. were telling all for a year, that this fight is impossible (Pole with even the Soviet Pole will always get an agreement). If you send soldiers to the front then you need to tell them - that they will come there to fight, and that the enemy will not go into disarray on the very first sight of them!

VII. *"The means of production would become real public property."*

Unfortunately, this is the slogan taken alive from the communist language, it does not specify on which conditions the means of production become "the real public property." Instead of describing how well will be in future Poland, it must say what social relationships will be there and let the readers judge their effects. For example, it is not enough to say that it will be justice and public-owned property, but what kind of political system solutions will lead to them.

VIII. *"The mass media, culture, education will serve the society"*

This is another communist slogan. Who is to judge whether they really serve society or not? You must specify how they will operate, not for whom will serve. Whether it would be the censorship, who will control the radio, television, whether teachers will be selected by the state, who will have the right to establish schools, radio stations, newspapers, etc.? The Communists claim that culture, media, and education are already serving society. The view of what serves the public, and what harms it, differs depending on the responder. We want specific solutions.

IX. *"The reforms must be carried out gradually, without disturbing the basic balance of power in Europe ... it (i.e., The Self-Governing Republic of Poland) ...implementation doesn't need to conflict with the existing international order."*

We understand that other than the basic violation of power balance in Europe will not wrangle with the international order. Well, even the smallest disruption of the current power balance clashes with the international order, because it is very

unstable. The communists gradually deprived of power, e.g., one ministry each month, will not consider that the balance of power is “substantially” violated, however, when they lose the power in one stroke, they will feel a “substantial” violation and this will trigger the Russian invasion.

The fight is for power, that is, for holding it, not for its gradual loss. Swearing on the desire to maintain the current international order gets into the void because Moscow is not interested, nor the USA, nor the Poles. America wants to restore the European power balance, which must mean the liquidation of the Russian strategic advantage, and so it must be due to the weakening of Russia or lead to it. Poland's break from communism obviously weakens Russia. For the Soviets, the current balance of power is merely a transitory state until full capture of Europe and before it will come to deal with China. Therefore, the maintenance (long-term) of today's balance of power is not in Russia's interest. She wants to increase the present imbalance even more to its advantage; obviously, Poland is the least interested in preserving the present order (i.e., the rule of the USSR). On the contrary, it is in our interest to overthrow this order as soon as possible (independence and change of the political system).

Communism feeds on expansion, not only territorial but also ideological because it is a kind of religion. Without expansion, it dies. Therefore, the USSR cannot allow the liquidation of communism in Poland. In addition, any essential reforms and political changes from the Soviet point of view would weaken the control of the USSR over Poland - the launching pad area to the West. The full control over the back-end area of the frontline, which is our country, and also the use of its capabilities in the event of war, is guaranteed only by, the passive towards Moscow, communist administration. The overthrow of communism in Poland will be not only a violation of international order but also the beginning of the disintegration of the Soviet empire. So, we are facing a war with Russia ahead of us. We will not conduct it ourselves only nor win it. If we want, however, freedom, democracy, prosperity, and finally independence, are destined to disintegrate the camp, we must conduct politics across the whole Soviet empire, become the weakest link of the chain, that by bursting not only will break it but will also cause cracking of the remaining links. We must become the center of the fight against communism and Russian imperialism.

X. "The prospect of a general strike, which is inevitable in our opinion, does not rule out the evolutionary change in the system, indicates only the way of the collapse of the current dictatorship and the creation of conditions starting on the path of democratic reforms. "

These sentences are clear proof, to put it mildly, of the lack of imagination by members of the TKK. In any way to read it, it is seen the mirage of Second August: tension, shipyard, flowers on the gate, Lech. Rakowski comes instead of Jagielski. Still tension, long negotiations, and finally - hurray! Victory! They got

along! Like a Pole with a Pole! And tomorrow, already well-rested, they will begin the implementation of the "program of evolutionary change of the system", following the "path of democratic reforms". People! Wake up! In contrary to you, the communists learned something during those two and a half years. They know that a general strike is the beginning of a life and death struggle for them: either us or them. You must not fool yourself. August will not happen again. There will be no new agreements as this chapter of history is now closed. How can one be so naive as to believe that the rulers or society will again be tricked into another renewal? A general strike, if successful, will not only destroy the "program of evolutionary system change", but it will be part of the revolutionary change of the system - that is, overthrow it. This is the first "democratic reform" to be done.

You can write programs aimed towards rulers and programs destined -for the struggling society. The first ones are written by people convinced of the omnipotence of the rulers, that no changes to the system without cooperation with the authorities are possible. The second one is written by people who want to overthrow the government. But you can not write a program directed at the same time to the rulers and to the public - the first will not be fooled, and the second will not want to fight. Finally, you have to decide who you want to talk to.

*Antoni Wichrzyciel*

"Independence" № 16, April 1983, pp. 3-6

## **Sick with communism**

The relations of Polish intellectuals to communism reminds the behavior of an abandoned lover to his former mistress: love turns to hate, but the object of affection still remains the point of reference.

The monthly "Vacat<sup>50</sup>" is the magazine of intellectuals. It doesn't have a political character, because it does not present any program or not even a consistent line. In the collection of assorted texts, the only commonality is the relationship to communism, reluctant, sometimes even hostile, and at the same time full of complexes. Let's take a look at some of the articles from issues 8/9 and 10 from 1983.

Number 8/9 opens the text "*Dilemmas of the power elite*". The very title suggests joining the discussion that probably takes place in the apparatus of power - what else? Jan Morawski does not disappoint his readers, dividing precisely and innovative into three groups: supporters of political reforms, dogmatists, and the third one - Jaruzelski. The firsts – are "*pragmatists- pacificators*" who "*realize that you can not bank on only on the people corrupted, discredited with years of opportunism, or finally with radical feats in the months of martial law*". The pragmatists want to act towards "*catching to the nomenclature net of some fish with an expressive personality and a strong backbone.*" It seems (according to J.

Morawski) that reformers are numerously represented in KC and in regional organizations, as evidenced by the fact he described in the article: *"The members of the Central Committee could no longer wonder about the document (talking about the report by Kubiak's Commission – ed. note.), inform about the content their own party basic organization units, or even to keep for themselves a copy of this report. After the conclusion of deliberations, everyone had to return their copies to the functionaries of the apparatus. Why does this happen? First of all, the leadership of the PZPR does not have any intention to implement suggestions for necessary political reforms. On top of that, it does not trust the KC members or at least a large part of them."*

The case is clear. The members of the Central Committee are liberals who want reforms, and would probably like to discuss it with basic organizations, including reformist-minded ones, but the leadership is disturbing, even when elected in secret votes by the same KC. This top echelon, unlike the KC, is dogmatic. I do not quite clear whether Morawski has in mind here is Jaruzelski? Probably not, because, as he writes, *"the more dogmatic and more deeply rooted in the Stalinist tradition groups in the ruling elite would like during the plenum of the KC on the problems of ideology (probably in October 83) to force the Jaruzelski's group to launch an ideological campaign, imposing monopoly of official Marxism Leninism in all the debates about the fundamental ideological values."* We breathed with a sigh of relief - Jaruzelski is not dogmatic. The situation is the better, that *"it does not seem likely that the followers of Kociolek or Olszowski (not to mention bankrupted Grabski<sup>51</sup>) could significantly weaken the Jaruzelski group"*.

The general's attitude to reforms has not been fully explained. I was already told that the party leadership (i.e., Jaruzelski & Co.) is not intending to carry out reforms. On the other hand, Morawski claims that: *"another important question that the power elite must answer during the autumn of 1983 concerns political reforms."* What are these reforms – its unknown, especially if the power elite doesn't intend to carry them out anyway. Perhaps Morawski suggests that the same question about the reform is important, as it's known that a properly formulated question is half of the response. The author gives moreover a hint of what reforms have in mind. He writes: *"Another measure of the intentions of rulers in case of the political reforms is the lack of public discussion on a reform of electoral law to the Sejm and local councils."* The author places great hopes on the elections according to the reformed electoral law, as he writes: *"... this is one of the most contentious issues, which are interested in not only the professional apparatus of power but also thousands of citizens."* It seems to us that the author too pessimistic rated the intentions of the ruling elite. Discussion on the electoral law was held in the end, and the election according to the reformed rules was carried out. This means – the reformists won. Thousands of people who are livelily interested in the election will go to the polls. We had a sigh of relief again. Only I will add from myself. I hope

that millions who are not interested in the election of PRON's candidates will not go to the polls.

The strong point of this issue of "Vacat" is an interview with the comrade Skrzypczak, a former 1<sup>st</sup> secretary in Poznan. The interview is conducted in a very original way, namely, the questioner is the likely - a foreigner and even more encountering with the system of real socialism for the first time. He looks with the eyes of a naive child on the so-called reality and listens to the stories of the comrade secretary. And this one says: *"It turned out, however, that this is a poor standard because in our system the important is loyalty to the higher authorities."* After listening to this our visitor from the faraway land (and maybe from another planet) sighs: *"What you say is terrible."* It's no surprise for the fellow – he learns after all for the first time the top-secret of the Com-Party. Comrade Skrzypczak is an otherwise well-known liberal, who for his views often suffered and finally was banished to the wild and dangerous country - Nigeria. He pays dues to liberalism by saying: *"Questionable is for me a matter of internments on the basis of a single person decision - a police commander."* Unfortunately, we didn't learn how many people's decisions would satisfy the comrade. And further: *"Questionable is a suspension of unions but not the suspension of the party, directing the party during the state of martial law according to unknown instructions. Questionable is the position of state administration, which strengthens."*

Well, for me these are not questionable matters. The good comrade secretary has been kicked-out by the bad hardliners, but that does not regret it today, in fact, he says: *"The turn of events in the country is not aligned with my concept of rescuing the state, and I wondered already for few months, how long I will be able to underwrite the party without risking losing face and own sense of responsibility. I felt that this limit is close."* We recall that Skrzypczak was dismissed from the post at the end of May 1982. So, the limit of moral sensitivity of secretary-liberal was not exceeded either on December 13<sup>th</sup> or December 16<sup>th</sup>, after killings of miners at the 'Wujek' colliery, or after the demonstrations on May 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> 1982. The border was close, but not quite yet. It is obvious that Skrzypczak is more sympathetic to us than Grabski or Barcikowski, but it seems that the intellectuals of "Vacat" were too moved by the secretary's human face.

In the 10<sup>th</sup> issue, his solution Polish dilemmas present Jerzy Surdykowski in the article *"Between agreement and the 'holy alliance'"*. Text author sent initially to weekly 'Polityka', but there it was rejected, so "Vacat" publishes it, of course without author's permission. Surdykowski is an outstanding journalist and in addition a unique dodger. He wants to outwit the Reds and for sure he is to succeed. He convinces commies that he has a prescription for their ills. It is the alliance with the "non-communist leftists". The latter can guarantee peace to the regime because it will have the support of most of the population. According to Surdykowski: *"...our society today is as left-wing as never before, though for the*

*most part non-communist. Left begins with the ruling party and through various currents of non-communist socialism already overtakes non-Marxist, liberal, or rather the Christian-liberal center, which from the traditional left adopted today a large part of the way of thinking, and even the phraseology ".*

According to Surdykowski it is the left that should organize into associations of socio-political character (God forbid not parties!). It would be part of the "great agreement" with the Communists and the Church. Well, Mr. Surdykowski not enough to say "the great majority of the population is left-leaning" - it must be proven. You should rather write: the vast majority of intellectuals divorced from the PZPR is left-leaning. You make the typical mistake of extrapolation of views of your own social circle into the whole society. Your second mistake is the belief that the communists will be moved with the leftist phraseology and fall into the arms of the non-communist left. Reds need power, not ideas. What might your Politburo comrades care that you are a leftist. Never in history has the communist party shared power permanently. If she made alliances, it was only tactical to betray her allies soon. *"The history you need to learn, learn and learn once again ..."* as Lenin said.

The texts of "Vacat" indicate that the current, whose opinion is expressed in this magazine, has not yet crossed the vicious circle of communism. They are still struggling within it, wanting to wear a human face mask, but they simply cannot break it out. This attitude is becoming more and more anachronistic. Given the importance of these opinion-forming circles, it is harmful to the transformation of the political consciousness of society.

*Franciszek Sz.*

"Independence" № 27, March 1984, pp. 13-15

## **In plain words**

Since its inception, our monthly seeks to develop and promote the political concepts related to the current situation in the country as well as for the future solutions of the "Polish stalemate". As the great success, we consider the fact that we became more and more visible, in germinating, independent political life and our views are no longer considered to be provocative, or at best as extremely unrealistic, contrary to the idea of independence, which from the beginning of our activities we considered the as the supreme goal, has been accepted by many of our readers and political activists. I will write immodestly about us yet one thing: we can be accused of a lot, but the regular reader must admit that we have always drawn our political profile with a sharp line, paying great attention to the consistency and uniformity of the views presented.

Unfortunately, the art of synthetically presenting, or perhaps reading a political line, is not an easy matter. We often meet with polemics against "N",

which contain our characteristics, to put it mildly, simplified. This comes, apart from bad will here and there, or not precisely enough on our part formulated thoughts, from a superficial reading of texts, from paying too much attention to symbolism (title page), and with a taste for pigeonholing of political lines according to established schemes. We are trying to develop our political thought, we proclaim the need for shaping it regardless of the communist habits, but schemes injected by an upbringing in the Soviet system still function. The most important seems to be a misunderstanding by our adversaries the position of "N" towards "Solidarity" and the issue of political radicalism.

From the beginning, we did not hide our critical position to the "S". Of course, it was tied with some moral concern, is it appropriate to attack the defeated, take away from millions of members and supporters of the former Union the hope, to break the myth of the perfect organization of underground structures of "S". In the political analysis, being stuck in the circle of myths is deadly. A politician can manipulate with a myth, but when he succumbs to it himself, he ceases to be a politician. For this reason, the moral resistance against the criticism of the myth Solidarity Republic had to disappear. The phenomenon of the "S" was due to the specific circumstances that harmonized in the summer of 1980. Meanwhile, the activists of the underground deem as fundamental the objective of returning to a state that inevitably collapsed. The criticism of the "S" published by our monthly refers primarily to this moment. To paraphrase Heraclitus - we could say that you can not enter twice into the same water, and when the water is boiling - it simply does not make any sense.

If the return to the post-August state is to be the primary goal and if we want this state to be permanent this time, at least the theoretical conditions for stabilization of the hybrid should be determined. You can go two ways: the instability resulting from the excessive position of communism, or on the contrary - too great a role the hybrid played in the independent movement.

In other words, the new social settlement, reactivating the system from before the martial law, it must be concluded on terms more favorable for the "S" than before, or to be more favorable for the rulers. The analysis of conditions for the balance must therefore form the starting point for any programs that aim at restoration of "S". Unfortunately, these programs do not have such an analysis. But the analysis of the conditions for stability (between "S" and PZPR) would lead to one conclusion: the stable balance is impossible without eliminating the identity of one of the parties unless it will be about the temporary balance, but in that case, it can not constitute the most important and final goal. If the proponents of the so-called social agreement are of the opposite view, they should include in their programs the equilibrium conditions, instead of only limiting themselves to slogans of agreement and the reactivation of the Union, and accuse us of lacking realism. At that moment we can start a substantive discussion and assess what is real and what is utopia.

In conclusion, we must state that we are opposed to the main goal of the underground activities of the restoration of "S", not because we are alien to the ideals written on the union's banners, but because we do not see any real chance for a harmonious coexistence of independent organizations with totalitarianism. For this reason, we reject the slogan of social agreement, as unrealistic and serving propaganda purposes only. Does it mean that we are the radicals? In some independent publications, we were even called supporters of the insurgency concept. Nothing could be false more.

Above all, we are realistic, and there is no possibility at the moment to cause, not to mention winning a national uprising. So why do we think it is purposeful to bring now the goal of independence, not a national agreement, leading to reactivation of a relations from before December 13<sup>th</sup>?

Independent political thought is in the initial phase. The underground has at the moment, very limited ability to influence the current, daily affairs of people. The political underground is met with sympathy, but it cannot effectively shape the mass movement. The calls for symbolic actions, such as refraining from purchases, not using public transport, wearing emblems, etc., are ignored even by the sympathizers of the underground structures. Fewer and fewer supporters have the active resistance action: strikes and demonstrations. This time of apparent apathy should be used to shape the consciousness of political activists and uncommitted people. The slogan of independence serves this revolution of consciousness. The goal is not for today, and perhaps it is not for tomorrow, but setting it forces people to reject the myths in which communism raised them: the myth of a wise group of reformers who fight hardliners in the party, the myth of the patriotic attitudes of officers and deputies to the Sejm, the myth of success "of the Hungarian reform," or about the possibility of introducing a "Spanish road" to democracy.

Independence is a strategic goal. In our articles, we stress this very goal at the expense of the current, tactical objectives, primarily keeping in mind the shaping of consciousness.

What are the consequences of setting a goal national agreement and reactivating the Union? The "Programs of agreement" treat them as a goal in itself, and therefore a strategic one. However, as has already been mentioned in the first part of the article, the permanent consensus is impossible. You can imagine at the most a temporary agreement. It can't be a strategic goal but only a tactical objective. The earlier mentioned programs do not include the strategic goal, for this reason, are lacking the base, foundation. They also mislead the receivers, claiming that it is possible to return to the relations as before December 13<sup>th</sup>. They do not carry with them the revolution of consciousness, on the contrary, petrify the consciousness at August 80<sup>th</sup> level, while the current conditions are completely different. They also strengthen the erroneous logic, based on the axiom adopted without proof, that minimal changes are more real than larger, so minimalism is realism. This logic has failed in 1956<sup>th</sup>, 1970<sup>th</sup>, after August 1980, but the so-called



"moderate politicians" stubbornly insist that socialism must be reformed, explain to those at the top that it is necessary for the good of the nation. The adoption of our policy: Poland is not independent, the government is not acting in the name of the nation, but executes policies of its principals, instead of allowing avoid the pitfalls of the political logic of "moderates".

We do not reject a compromise with communism for doctrinal reasons. On the contrary, we can imagine a situation where a compromise with communism could create a new, better situation. Such a possibility shall be considered at the appropriate moment. However, such a compromise will never be permanent, so it cannot be a goal in itself, but only a tactical objective. Besides, it is not worth putting up in every situation. "National Accord" could become possible only when serious problems of the current system of power will arise. It might be worth it then to strike a compromise with some parts of the communist system to improve own position, but stating it as the main goal of the political action is nonsense. Even at present moment, this is wrong in the tactical sense, because the position of underground structures "S" is so weak that the communists don't have to make any, even small gestures in her direction. Unfortunately, since December 13<sup>th</sup>, the positions have significantly deteriorated and only spectacular victories can improve it. As its known, you cannot win a war by losing all battles. Moving ahead with slogans of agreement with communists and in effect restoration of "S" at the moment of such a fall of the importance further worsens the position of the underground structures, and at the same time narrows the field of the political thinking of activists and sympathizers of independent movements. The Polish case has not been closed on December 13<sup>th</sup>. The period from August to December history will judge as an interesting experiment. It can't narrow the political thinking down to the dark tunnel at the end of which is the dreamed-up, idealized "Solidarity".

*Franciszek Sz.*

"Independence" № 21-22, September-October 1983, pp. 4-5

## **The May Crisis (excerpt)**

What is Walesa and Bujak program at present?

After December 13<sup>th</sup> solidarity-men demanded unsuspend "S" and restore the situation from the renewal period. We claimed at the time, that such a program is unrealistic and in fact, will mean surrender. Later we could read that the TKK requires re-legalization, and will comply with communist laws. Now the text of

Walesa's "Appeal" says that evil is in the implementation of the Act of October 8<sup>th</sup>, not the law delegating "S" itself because it guarantees the union's pluralism, i.e., pluralism new unions. Zb. Bujak, when asked about the timing of his emergence from conspiracy says: *"When you allow the registration of other unions in the plants. The union's pluralism is a fundamental objective of "S", even in the underground. So, when it becomes possible, it will be necessary to consider whether it is not time to end the phase of underground activity"*. It is not about "S" but about new unions, in which Bujak and Walesa will be able act on the conditions set by communists i.a., according to the Act of October 8<sup>th</sup>. So, is it full steam backward or not?!

It is an incomprehensible situation in which the leader, as he himself claims, of a powerful underground organization declares that it is fighting for the possibility of acting on the basis of the law delegating this organization. And one more thing: reach, the Reader, to the old issues of "TM", and you will find that only its members had the right to dissolve the "S".

So, what was the meaning of the declaration "Solidarity Today"? We criticized it for internal contradictions, resulting from non-renunciation lingering, hidden dreams of compromise with communists. Many people pointed out that this is a step ahead, made under influence of (among others) our critique and now TKK will show what it can do. And Bujak showed it!

The publication of the Declaration was only a maneuver used to appease the critics and scare the authorities: fear us, because we already have a program, we may start implementing it, so invite us to the table!

Once the "S" scared communists with the general strike, later with declarations, what threats will use in 2-3 months. Maybe will use the moral rations or the vision of hell?

Solidarity activists did not take up the challenge thrown by the communists, did not deny the legitimacy of their power, even after December 13<sup>th</sup>, so they had to end up as capitulators.

May crisis brought a solstice. Once again, it turned out that the solidarity-opposition, regardless of the form in which exists ("TM" or "KOS"), is unable to take the fight against communism. They turned full steam backward, both at the level of the struggle for an independent political consciousness of society and at the level of the confrontation with the communists. The platform of struggle offered by the authorities has not been abandoned. A year and half of conspiracy were wasted on a bogus activity, and after a moment of situational hesitation (declaration "Solidarity Today") to return to them under pressure from forces as diverse as the Church and the regime.

The leaders of the "S" got so accustomed during the renewal to sit and talk with the occupants, as they lost the ability to address the society. Each of the statements and the declaration is, in fact, directed to the rulers.

The coming months will bring the answer to the most important problem of Polish conspiracy: are the most talented and most conscious individuals began to move from the old union structures to the new political; is the conspiracy to break the umbilical cord connecting it with communism and will become of independence character?

*Antoni Wichrzyciel*  
"Independence" № 18-19, June-July 1983, pp. 4-5

## **M. Poleski's thoughts about the program and organization**

Regaining independence by overthrowing the communist regime in Poland and shared with the other nations of Eastern Europe liquidation of the Soviet empire, and building of the solidarity of all the barracks of the camp and worked out today of the future European order are the goals of M. Poleski and "N". It brings us together and differs from cardinal Glemp, catholic activists, Walesa, TKK, RKW 'M', Bujak and the 'KOS' concepts counting on regaining the independence shortly less than in a thousand years. Among the lasting one-and-a-half-year flood of solidarity's pamphlets on the "closing-in of the terms of the agreement" ("TW") and resulting from the understanding of real love for the USSR (A. Michnik), the voice of Poleski stands out favorably. Between us remain, however, two major differences:

- the concept of the role of political programs,
- the concept of the underground political system.

Let us emphasize that the differences are not in terms of slogans but in concepts.

I. Program. "Independent and democratic Poland is that vision of the extreme "S" shared by the majority of society."

By forcibly persuading society that it has political awareness, we will not achieve faster politicization, but we will only plunge into the world of opposition unreality. The majority of the population during the renewal period had, however, at most a vision of a happy life with communism. If the thought of independence and democracy would be there, the December 13<sup>th</sup> would not be a shock but a signal to fight.

To try to change reality, you first need to describe it. And the truth is, most of society has no political views, much fewer visions; all this does not interest them: *"Now we have to think about ourselves because they throwing to jail"*.

The depoliticization of society by the communists meant that it lost (if it ever had) sensitivity to political concepts. It is however very susceptible to slogans and symbols, in which it seeks the remedy for its own weakness. And it is found,

among others in the slogan: we want the program. A prescription program, but not the comprehensive political concept.

Poleski, rightly outraged with putting forward the request for prescription-program, which will solve all the problems and issues, so that tomorrow, as if after a touch of the magic baton, we wake up in a free Poland without special effort on our part, and of course without sacrifices or casualties, however, to the other extreme - instead of the program he throws slogans (Solidarity, Independence) and attempts to exploit myths (symbol of "S") which, moreover, better voices to the imagination of the masses than any concept there. For us, however, slogans only are not enough. We want not even a program, but programs (many) because we believe that Poland should create a new political tradition, i.e., normal political life, which already the second generation is missing. This is why we attach so great importance to political polemics and programs, but we set them a different role from the commonly adopted. With our approach, the program will not have an operational role (in 1983 we set the party, in 1984 we establish contacts with Reagan) but the awareness one. Because society, not only after August but up to now, is still unaware of their political goals.

Perhaps the overthrow of communism with catchy slogans is even easier, but then a problem arises - what after communism? What to do with society and what do the society that no longer lives in communism, but I still think using a communist-schemes, and the old system of values, because earlier its leaders opted out from the planned combating of Bolshevik-like consciousness to more easily direct the masses in the fight with the system.

Russia itself provides an example. The Bolsheviks seized power by using exclusively slogans, not even their own. They corresponded to primitive-minded masses, that in the absence of political awareness initially supported Lenin, and later were not able to resist him. What's going to happen? It is easy to answer this: we will be hanged on the same tree-branch with M. Poleski, although we will be hanged earlier, as we are not from "Solidarity".

Our goal is clear - we not only want independence but also build an efficient system of parliamentary democracy. Its foundation you need to create today, for the beginning – in the human minds, hence the need for programs.

Poleski rightly criticizes the reasoning: give us a program and we will implement it. Such an attitude most often results from a lack of courage to start an activity or a lack of perseverance, which people are afraid to admit to themselves. Whoever wants to act, will act, with or without the program. But to act sensibly, you need to have a concept. You need to understand why you should act one way or another way in order to be consistent and faithful to your values. After all, we want to educate future political and statehood cadre for independent Poland.

Neither the people of underground, nor for starting to conspire is not indifferent, whether a person will act in independence organization, or it will along with the "TW", "bringing closer the terms of the agreement," or it will print and

distribute the program of liquidation of communism a 'block with the Soviet Union in the front, or sequential, 495 version of conditions for agreement and of life with the Red.

The conspirators must have arguments and a certain vision of the development of events and their own behavior in order to be able to act and convince others. Not the activity itself, but the action with a specific program is our objective.

Poleski claims that we already have a vision of the program, but we lack an organization (singular) capable of achieving political goals. It is clear that we lack organizations (plural), but do we have a vision and a program? In our opinion, not! In the area of program awareness, the deficiencies are even greater than the organizational ones. In our opinion, the vast majority of underground groups, and so the political elite of society has neither the vision nor the program, as evidenced by moving around only between the concepts of compromise – settlement - agreement, and continually treats communists as rulers, admittedly bad, but our own, not occupiers (e.g., the tonnes of letters to the Seim).

Poleski lists, for example, a number of actions ready to take today: the organization of communications networks, minor sabotage, self-education circles, libraries, intelligence cells, psychological diversion, support for the opposition in the army and in police, preparation for active self-defense of factories, training of the conspiracy professional cadre, workshops, staff training professional conspirators, conducting the current independence policy towards neighboring countries and enemies of our enemies, etc. Will they be undertaken? According to Poleski, the answer lies in the sphere of organization. In other words, if we organize ourselves to a sufficient extent, we will undertake them. However, this is a half-truth. This is not enough to be organized; for this to happen, a specific concept of the struggle against communism must push away all previous conciliatory calculations. Whoever wants a compromise will not organize sabotage. One, who wants a compromise, is not to organize sabotage. One, who wants an agreement with the Soviet Union will not actively support the opposition in people-democracy countries. One, who considers PRL as a Polish state, will not conduct independence policy on the international forum (an example is BK of 'S'), etc. We need the psychological and intellectual stimulus to break with the present platform of struggle and to undertake specific organizational measures.

The National Commission ("S"), or more precisely Walesa, had an organization at its disposal in March 1981, and yet it resigned from carrying out the strike. After all, that was not prevented by a lack of organizational preparations, but by scarcity, or rather a false political mindset of the leaders, advisers, and parts of the member masses. To give an organization into the hands of such people - it means to waste it.

Poleski writes: *"The chance to fight over into independence will not bring the cunctator's, the search for a compromise in the negotiations, attempts of civic*

*settlement with communism. As in the November Uprising, only a preventive war gives a chance", and further that the communists "cannot be opposed by the positivist conception of the years 76-80".* Agreed. For a year and a half, we have been preaching the same. But it is not enough to say that you are against the conciliation concept, you still have to point to what are these concepts and who is promoting them. This operation is politically inconvenient, but it is necessary, because of the de-politicization of the civic society. However, Poleski doesn't do it.

The existence of a single political program for the entire opposition, even for its independence current only, is impossible. Because there are as many programs, as many are ideologies in alive in a given society. Only some slogans may be common to the pro-independence opposition. M. Poleski seems to intuitively sense this, and therefore the postulate of political programs reduces to a single program, and this in turn to a few slogans. Consciously or not, it must do it, because of the current (not long-term) tactics reasons he is in favor of the existence of a single pro-independence organization.

## II. Organization.

Poleski understands that "S" is incapable in its present form (agreed) of achieving the political goals since he writes: *"We must build an organization that corresponds to our goals"*. We would say, that we have to create organizations (plural) corresponding to our programs and cooperate in achieving the objectives, which are common.

According to Poleski, the lack of cadres is also a major premise to postulate the creation of the single organization and attribute to the concepts of "N", the character of dreamy illusions. We agree that the need to *"emerge the cadre of politicians in action"*, but this could be done only by teams, which are allied by more than just two slogans, even if they are: Solidarity and Independence. But if they (i.e., those teams) are to be linked by something more: the idea - a vision of Poland - program, then it must be as many as the socially carrying ideas.

Poleski further writes: *"If "S" is to survive ... let transform it into the cadre pro-independence organization"*. But the cadre organization with the word "Solidarity" in its name, already exists. It is "Fighting Solidarity". Why, didn't Poleski join it then? There are two answers: either Poleski wants to have its own organization named "Solidarity", or he thinks, that all post-solidarity organizations including TKK, should be transformed into pro-independence ones, and be named "Solidarity", which can only take place with the consent of, among others, official leadership groups: TKK, RKW, RKK, and others. These authorities, however, have views completely different from the postulates of Poleski. For example, Zb. Bujak boasted in "TM" N°53 that the RKW successfully defended itself against attempts of centralization and hierarchization, and thus against the formation of an organization. Let consider, whether it is possible at all the existence of a single

political organization. Let's mark right away, that social, civic organizations do not pursue political objectives, and therefore there is a need for political organizations, that is parties.

In every society, there are always conflicts of interests, therefore, resulting from political differences. In our opinion, instead of pretending that there are no conflicts of interests, they should be given a programmatic and organizational framework, a structure.

Naming things with their own names will allow one to overcome the differences, i.e., without giving them up, cooperate to achieve the objectives that are common (hence the idea of converting "S" into the confederation). Otherwise, we misrepresent reality, and suppressed political differences, i.e., differences of interest are surfacing in form of personnel games, libels, and slanders. This was during the time of "S" (see. the situation in KOR and later in the Warsaw MKZ) and will happen always until there will be a dogma of political and organizational unity. "*Solidarity society*" is a myth. It is a beautiful myth and therefore I feel sorry for it, but every myth falsifies the reality. We see the power of a myth, we know that it can be used in many ways, but we must remember that it is only a myth that cannot replace real actions or specific programs. Moreover, the myth can be harmful to the cause, when by their intense effect prevents specific activity, it creates a wide field for splurging with the sham actions. This slowly happens to the myth of the "S". We see his importance for the millions of members, it's almost sacred character, so we are as far as possible from disregarding the "S". We are afraid, however, that cultivating a myth will harm our actions ("N" N°8/9, p. 31). Our fears, from a year before, unfortunately, come true. The symbol of "S", and the symbolic action of "S" (the last call for a two-hour boycott of public transport on August 31st) are obstructing the development of political life. M. Poleski tries to evade this difficulty by resigning from the development of political life at all, until the time of free Poland. (...)

*Antoni Wichrzyciel*

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## **The political landscape of '83**

(...) Structural anti-communism

The vast majority of Polish society has adopted a new social system of hostile or at least reluctant. This thesis agrees with the majority of historians, also the party ones. The causes of anti-communism were quite evident: the new system did not

guarantee the independence of the nation and the state. It also did not meet the political aspirations, especially the very attached to pluralism intelligentsia. The peasants opposed it the most. The 1944-48 civil war had all the features of a peasant war. We must remember that the rural population constituted the majority of the society at the dawn of the PRL. Others, in the end, the important causes of anti-communism were specific Polish Catholicism and clericalism and anti-Russian re-resentments, and therefore anti-Soviet. This cluster of rational reasons gave, in consequence, the lasting for the Polish political landscape phenomenon of "structural anti-communism". Structural, and therefore non-situational, not temporary, rooted in the consciousness of all the layers of society. That structural anticommunism underwent of course evolution in over nearly 40-year history of communist Poland but never ceased to exist as an important phenomenon of political consciousness of the Poles. The characteristic trait of his are:

- The irrational nature of the phenomenon. This does not mean that there are not actually reasons for the reluctance of society to communism, but the real causes are poorly aware. Anticommunism lies primarily in the subconscious. This phenomenon includes also part of the party apparatus, and certainly a significant part of the rank and file of the PZPR, which is expressed, among others, by in distancing by part of the apparatus and party members from the decisions of the Center, in a specific dichotomy: us, society - them, the rulers; also finds expression in the *schadenfreude* felt by the majority of society, including members of PZPR, in moments of crisis of authority.
- Anti-Sovietism and corresponding nationalism and anti-Semitism. Traditional Polish anti-Semitism was reinforced and integrated with anti-communism in the 1950s. The reason was the relatively high proportion of Jews in the ranks of communist rulers in the 50's, especially in positions of "*socially visible*" - propaganda and secret police. Anti-Sovietism is often visible on the power apparatus, among party functionaries, the army, and even the police. Let recall the even known instance of Rajski's speech, explaining the collapse of the Polish economy by Soviet dominance<sup>1</sup>. It was distributed via party channels.
- Low ability to manifest anticommunism in political actions. Reluctance to rulers, although it is a permanent phenomenon, manifests primarily in the private views, it does not prevent from cooperating with the communist rule, or even participating in them. The structural anticommunism explodes with collective actions at times of power crises. Let have a look at two examples.

In 1956, Wladyslaw Gomulka received social support that exceeded the importance that popular politicians in democratic countries share. The support didn't come from his personality, nor the below the average talents as the speaker, nor from an attractive program, which he didn't have. The momentary enthusiasm

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<sup>1</sup> Romania is not allowing to be used the same way as Poland, and despite this its economy is in even bigger troubles; the reason of the failure is the communist system, tributes paid to Soviet Union are only the side effects.



for this communist leader resulted from the fact that he was released from prison surrounded by the myth of a victim of the system, i.e., it's opponent. The autumn of 1956 demonstrates not only anticommunism rooted in the mentality of the Poles but also suggests to which extent, this resentment is politically naive.

The second outbreak of open anti-communism comes after August. People joining "S" were looking not only for a trade union in it, but above all an anti-communist organization. The 10 million members (minus tens of thousands of different kinds of agents) are after all over 80% of the active workforce outside agriculture. To this must be added few percent of the people who remained outside the "S" for personal reasons, often because they were at odds with forming a new union. In total, more than 90% of adult citizens showed anti-communist resentment.

It shows a misunderstanding here, due to the fascination with the impressive quantity of opponents of the system. Anti-communism may temporarily unite the vast majority of society in one organization, but this organization will not be able to operate effectively. In a democratic country, there are no political organizations having ever the support of such a majority. This comes from the pluralism of views and from the principle of "*large numbers*". An organization as numerous as "S" had to be organizationally weak; although its members linked the structural anti-communism, as we have indicated it is not capable of creating strong, and unified political institutions.

Two examples of these allow us to generalize the conditions in which anticommunism manifests in collective actions:

- a power crisis combined with strong factional struggles within the apparatus;
- the ability to manifest their views in a safe manner and legal, from the point of view of rulers, manner. This second feature explains the support of the anti-communist majority for the communist leader in 1956, as well as the relative popularity of "patriot" Jaruzelski before December 1981., which confirmed the then OBS pools.

If the anti-communist resentment does not create effective forms of organization, does not mean that it is irrelevant to the discussion of the political choices of Polish society. The communist politicians usually understood it well. In many memories of Gomulka, persons from his closest circle quoted facts, which showed that the politician has never had illusions about the anti-communist attitude of the Polish society. This was one of the main motives for his actions. Gomulka believed, that even the smallest experiments with political pluralism must end in disaster for the rulers, he was also an ardent advocate of Soviet intervention in Poland after August. Of course, this had no political significance then.

The structural anti-communism of Polish society means that the communists have limited room for maneuver; they can not rely on the governance of any significant civic group and are pushed to the "*against the society*" positions. The basic strategy of action in this situation is preventing the situation of rulers vs.

society polarization. For this strategy always been applied appropriate social engineering methods:

1. Social advancement of large groups, mainly from rural population, related to industrialization and urbanization.
2. The creation by the communists their own intellectual elite.
3. Instilling with the help of propaganda and the school system some of the communist ideas not covered by anti-communist resentment.

Accelerated advancement took place, especially in the 1950s. Development of industry starting from a very low level allowed bringing to the cities millions of young people, who perceived this move as an advancement. On this occasion, the traditional rural structures were destroyed, which were strongly averse to communism and had organizational experience. This was accompanied by an increase in administration, so thousands of people were drawn into the orbit of power. In this process, the promotion of young people obtained through education, i.e., in a socially healthy manner, seems to be particularly important. Compared to the pre-war period, access to education became much easier, and those who achieved advancement owed it to the new system. It is also a considerable matter the ideological indoctrination which accompanied the education and falling on the fertile soil. This type of advancement ended in the mid-1960s; occurred a slowdown in social mobility, the career paths through education were blocked. Until then, the mechanism of education and advancement worked to the benefit of the rulers, as it did not allow social stresses and integrated the promoted groups around the authorities. In the mid-60s, however, the situation has changed, the communists either didn't notice or were not able to react accordingly. The proper response at this moment should be the acceleration of horizontal advancement - increased wellbeing and achievement of career satisfaction without changing the social position. The barrier was the inefficient economy, unable to provide a sufficient level of living standards. Since the mid-60's we have to deal with the situation of permanent social and political crisis in Poland. It can even risk saying assertion, that the initial success of attraction of certain social groups, later became the cause of the disaster. The accelerated advancement of the 1950s was a stark contrast to the impossibility into which vicious circle, we fell in the late 1960s.

Instead of accelerated vertical or horizontal advancement, the rulers used the tactic of buying strategic groups. Gierk and his team used it for 10 years and his final defeat showed the limited usefulness of this tactic. It relies on the sharing of scarce material goods according to the hierarchy of importance of particular groups, defined by the ability of their effective protest. The weakness of this tactic lies in the fact that even small deterioration of the material situation of strategic groups is replied by them with protest.

At the time of capture of the power, the communists almost did not have their own intellectual elite. Its creation was an important activity, consistent with the overall strategy of opposing structural anticommunism. By the mid-1950s,

these activities were a complete success. The authentic elite, and above all the writers, enjoying traditional prestige in Poland, supported the government in mass. This story has been repeatedly described and analyzed, starting from "*The captive mind*" by Milosz, and ending with newspaper columns and articles alleging ingratitude of writers and published after the imposition of martial law. So, there is no need to come back to it more closely. It is also known as the epilogue of the honeymoon of relations of intellectuals with the rulers. Communism did not turn out to be a sufficiently attractive system for people who, by virtue of their profession, are more attached to pluralism than anyone else. In 1956, intellectuals began to retreat from communism. From that moment on, and especially after 1968, the intellectual elite cooperating with the communists was subject to a negative selection process. Most of them are strongly anti-communist. Pro-government intellectuals were tasked with the function of reducing the gap between the rulers and society. This tactic has failed because the intellectuals are definitely enemies of rulers and they deepen the abyss.

The structural anti-communism is primarily a resentment, containing irrational elements. It can perfectly coexist with a lot of myths from the range of communist ideology. Some of them have been even accepted by the majority of society, producing a paradoxical situation of the communization of minds of the anti-communist-minded majority! This apparent paradox is the cause of the misdiagnosis of the political choices in many polls. This is because a slight change in the wording of the survey questions radically changes the results. The communist ideas accepted by the majority of society are:

1. The existence of the communist economic order. The free-market economy is treated by the majority as evil more serious than the socialist mess and waste. The boldest ideas of change are reaching usually up to "socialization of the economy", and thus the existence of strong employee-councils in the state-owned enterprises. As far as the private sector is concerned, the bravest representatives of the opposition stay on the basis of a decree (nationalization) from the year 1946.
2. Welfare functions of the state, even at the cost of totalizing it. The majority of people do not realize that excessive welfare leads to totalitarianism, especially when is a lack of democratic institutions, which counterbalances the state apparatus. In other words, the greater the care, the less freedom. Elements of communist social policy, such as full employment, "free" health care and education, universal retirement pensions, are considered indispensable. Neither low wages, the indirect result of full employment, nor the low quality of social services is discouraging this.
3. Egalitarianism; wider income spreads are accepted very reluctantly (so that no one has more than me).
4. The unique role of the working class that predisposes it to political infallibility.

Apart from those mentioned above, society accepted a number of other slogans of communist propaganda. A fairly common way of thinking is to compare reality with the image of socialism shaped by propaganda and to ask the question: Should it be like that in socialism? It is meaningless because socialism is the reality surrounding our system, not a propaganda creation. The fact that many people, probably the majority, ask this question proves the communist nature of the anti-communist majority<sup>2</sup>.

Ideological indoctrination by Communists succeeded far more than any other tactical move aimed at neutralizing the reluctance of society. Its result is a lack of demands for political sovereignty of nation by majority of opposition activists, especially post-solidarity once. They want to control the state, limit its omnipotence, but not replace it. Consequently, the "S" was a destructive movement, striking the rulers, but not forming a new government. "S" was not able to build new institutions, limited only the existing ones. This was the cause of her defeat.

## Political landscape

The dominant element is the phenomenon that we will call the "political province". It means a total lack of orientation on the political map of the country, seeing on it at most two sides of the conflict and the inability to express their own political choices. There have been no studies to determine the extent of the problem political province, but on the basis of the indirect data, we can assess the extent of its occurrence. It covers the vast majority of the population. In the West it used to be called as the "silent majority." It is not the same as the political province, although of course, it corresponds to it. Let us quote a few examples of the discussed phenomenon.

In the fall of 1981, in a survey conducted by OBOP were, among others, two questions: 1. Are you in favor of increasing authority's control over society? 2. Are you in favor of increasing society's control over authorities?

The first question is answered positively by more than 50% of respondents, and the second by 90%. In this way, about half responded positively to the two mutually exclusive questions.

In the study conducted by OBS on the degree of confidence to the various institutions consistently over 50% of respondents signaled their confidence Sejm, at the same time only a few percent expressed them at the PZPR, although everyone is aware that Poland does not have real elections.

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<sup>2</sup> In similarity to the "S" members, the slaves and peasants fought initially not for abolishment of slavery and feudal system, but for reduction of compulsory obligations, because if some had only 3 days of work for the landlord and now is forced to work 4 days – it is an injustice! To the admirers of "the socialism with human face" we may say, that in theory the slavery is very good and humanly system; just read the Aristotle.

Which social groups are covered by the phenomenon of the political province? It includes almost the entire rural population and the “county-Poland<sup>52</sup>”, the real backcountry. The turbulent years of 1980-1981 did not change much there. Anyway, all political storms over Poland missed the counties and communes. The cautious liberalization of the Gierek era concerned only the capital and the biggest cities. Little has changed in the province. In Warsaw, the government reached an agreement with the Church, and in the counties, teachers were fired for attending the church. In Warsaw, the personal intervention of Gierek’s caused the release of dissidents from jail and in the province, the party and police clique ruled supreme. The post-August movement arrived there late, and almost nowhere was strong, so the state of martial law didn’t cause a shock. Opposition activities are concentrated in large industrial and academic centers, but most people live in the province. Opposition activists usually do not realize that the majority of them know little or nothing about the opposition. The only form of contact with the independent political life is by Western radio stations, primarily by Free Europe. It is geared towards the provinces and often dazzles the more politically aware audiences with its naive arguments and comments.

The phenomenon of the political province only partially overlaps with the province in the everyday sense, as it is range-wider. It also covers a significant part of the inhabitants of large centers. At this point, we need to hold at the workers.

Communism persuaded the workers for nearly 40 years that they play a special role, which does not mean, of course, lest they received in communist Poland privileges. The poverty repeatedly drove the workers into desperate outbursts. The myth their specific role in the historical development, being a form of compensation, the easier it was accepted by them. A further consequence was antagonism towards other social groups, especially the intelligentsia. The workers also succumbed to other communist myths; especially they are very attached to the idea of egalitarianism, and as a result, are easier to manipulate by the populist propaganda<sup>3</sup>.

The Polish society is rooted with class thinking, and therefore treats classes in the Marxist sense, as a structure capable of action. This is yet another myth unconsciously accepted by the majority. The class is never able to conduct a strategic game, and therefore also the working class is not able to conduct their own policies, also the interest of the working class does not exist either, nor any of its strategic action. The opposition, especially its left-wing factions, succumbed to the myth of working-class struggle, which is said to be the driving force behind the

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<sup>3</sup> The reflection of this state of mind of leaders, advisers and rank and file of “S” membership is common demand that the rules be ruling rightly, but the not that the rulers be from the free elections; the government to be good, caring, giving, providing etc. It could be not our own, but shall be wise and good. The point is that it has to be own to be good. And this is beyond understanding either by the weaver from Lodz and by the respectable professor from Warsaw as well.

development of the situation in Poland. The proletariat as a whole does not conduct the fighting, because it is not capable of such activities; from the point of view of the political game, there is no - working-class category. This does not mean that we negate the importance of this social group in the Polish political landscape. But we should approach the problem of the role of the working class without ideological incense. Most of the workers are subject to the political province phenomenon. While there is a large diversity of political attitudes in this social group – from the light approval of system and much of attachment to the socialist symbols by elders to the extreme anti-communism and displaying national symbols and religious symbols by younger workers from big industrial centers.

The periods of post-August and martial law demonstrated two characteristics of major-centers industrial workers (workers in small towns and plants with a high percentage of peasant-workers are politically entirely passive):

- the tendency to symbolic actions,
- high predisposition to economic stimuli.

Both features have greatly facilitated the pacification of large industrial plants after December 13<sup>th</sup>. The tendency to symbolic actions is in contradiction with political actions.

Susceptibility to economic stimuli has enabled the authorities to bribe strategic groups at large workplaces. It is characteristic that the fastest normalization was achieved in mining, despite the fact that it was there that the conflicts (usually symbolic in nature) were the strongest during the “Solidarity” time and the introduction of martial law was the most severe. Before December 13<sup>th</sup>, the opposition's politicians argued that you can't put a policeman behind each worker, so brute force can not force people to work and thus martial law will not give the rulers anything. The reality was different. The stream of money connected with strong repressions helped to achieve an increase in coal production, even at the cost of losing health in the mines.

The importance of workers lies in the fact that they constitute the majority of the active population, and because of the high concentration in the large industrial complexes can be transformed into disciplined groups, used for both: either for production and in political activities. A low level of political consciousness, despite the structural anti-communism and attachment to the “S” symbols, leads to thinking, that the next rebellion of workers will have primarily an economic basis.

The deliberations about political province can be accused, that the similar phenomenon also occurs in other countries, including democracies, Undoubtedly, it is so, but it is not connected with a total aversion to rulers, the political province - or, if you like, the silent majority - is a stabilizing factor in this situation. Here, on the other hand, this is the element of a vicious circle of impossibility. As long as this phenomenon will occur, we will not be able to liquidate totalitarianism. We simply can't afford the universal passivity. It should be added, however, that the

post–August period brought nevertheless significant progress in the development of political consciousness.

### **System of power**

The system of power exercised by the present team can be described as a soft tyranny, which is based on soft collaboration. So far, the institution structuring the system of power in Poland was PZPR. After August and December 13<sup>th</sup>, she was broken to such an extent that is not capable to create the framework of power. What does that mean?

The system of power in communism is never a monolithic organization. It is based on informal groups, operating at different levels of management, and tied to each other with all kinds of related connections. The system was squeezed into the framework of the communist party and therefore, the party game rules defined the rules of the political game. Now the situation has changed. The reason is the breakdown, at least partial, of the party structures. Formally, they were rebuilt, but the real connections, that determined the political game, were not restored. In this way, the party has become to some extent a dummy, though there are attempts to resuscitate her. Moscow will probably strive for this, as the traditional communist system, is able to guarantee the certainty of exercising her control over Poland. The current system is an undefined ephemerid and is not raising anyone's trust. It is based on the domination of one person - the general and his subordinate officers. They have mastered the most important sections of the central committee of PZPR and form the backbone of staff at the level of voivodships. An important issue would be a sociological analysis of the military-civil hybrid at a specific level of power. It would allow us to show the degree of integration of this hybrid; is there one information flow or several; what are the interactions between civilians and the military. Such an analysis does not exist and therefore we are reliant on individual observations.

As a rule, officers are not competent in matters entrusted to their control. The substantive governance they replace with the formal one, so often just annoying for civilians, from whom, in turn, are dependent themselves, just in the field of professional expertise. The civil-military system has a chance to evolve toward civilian communism, with the gradual elimination of military or through the process of "*civilizing*".

Another new group next to the army playing a role in the central institutions are civilian experts or intellectuals, not yet connected with the party apparatus. They are generally members of the PZPR, but their career does not come from working in the apparatus. For this reason, they do not have their own groups, the same type as the apparatchiks in the pre-August times. People of the Rakowski, Urban, Krasieński, and Obodowski type, although they may play a large role in the current political game, do not constitute a center of power group in

themselves, and usually do not represent anyone but themselves. Their position is due to the fact that they are convenient for the General.

Contrary to the assumptions from the beginning of martial law, the military authorities have proved so far, not to be decisively bloody and repressive. The reason for this is probably their ephemeral nature, and on the other hand, the unprecedented extent of the conspiracy. Mass repression and the police system would strengthen the security apparatus and related party apparatus groups. This would lead to a weakening of the powerful military because they are not able to use repressions without the help of police due to the lack of competence; to the elimination of a group of "experts" (Rakowski, Obodowski, etc.), and didn't guarantee a quick stabilization. The start of mass repressions could trigger a mechanism difficult to stop for a pre-set level. Therefore, the current ruling system is called a soft tyranny. It is surrounded by "soft collaboration", as if with a body fluid. Most of the society is more or less willing to collaborate with the regime, just only because it works in state-owned enterprises. The consent for collaboration is conditioned to, at least in part, by a low degree of repression and although verbal declaration by junta the will of reform and reaching of the national accord. Let's follow it on the example of the scientist-economist community. Its part, including people with some authority, supported the new team. The main reason, apart from the evident personal perks, was the lack of other alternatives. They have no predisposition for conspiracy, besides that, the populism of "S" generally discouraged people with economic education. These circles granted their moral and intellectual support to the junta by entering into the Economic Council, Governmental Commission for Reform, as well as to the government. This support, however, would be withdrawn by the part of the current collaborators, if instead of talking about reforms and consultations, the General would start talking about extermination. This is the mechanism of soft collaboration. This phenomenon is widespread and, like the others described in this article, not uniform. The support of "soft collaborators" is necessary for the regime if he wants to keep a low level of repressions.

The last phenomenon of the Polish political scene discussed will be the *"opposition"*. It grows in the vast majority from the former "S", it's a mistake, however, to take as the opposition 10 million people. The union ceased to exist on December 13<sup>th</sup> and will never revive in its former form. "S" plays today, both positive and negative role in the creation of the independent opposition movement. The myth and symbolism of "S" are playing a large integrating role. The impact of the myth is so strong that none of the independent political groups is not cutting off from it. This, however, hides the negative side, because the myth limits the political horizon, and many slogans outside a symbol do not carry any real content.

We can divide the phenomenon of opposition into three groups (we do not mean three structures, but only three areas of occurrence):



A. Post-Solidarity opposition. It is the largest in number and derives from the former structures of the Union. It has two weaknesses:

- it has no program other than the slogan of returning to "S",
- it is easy to penetrate by the security services, as it gathers people active before December 13<sup>th</sup> and operates on the premises of workplaces.

Post-Solidarity opposition was not able to create one organization, and the activities of its central executives - TKK - is largely a fiction. This opposition may have a role in the outbreak of the new rebellion of the workers, however, but is not able to prepare it, which is proven by unsuccessful attempts to strike in October and November 1982. If in the near future there will be no spontaneous explosion, the post-Solidarity groups will undergo degeneration, dealing with purely symbolic activities (e.g., production of badges, celebrating anniversaries) and will be more deeply penetrated by the security forces.

B. Legal Catholic opposition. It's numerically small, however, it has a colossal asset in the form of support of the Church, so that it can operate legally, even has, although limited and subjected to the state censorship, its own media. Activists in kind of Stomma, Micewski, Kisielewski<sup>53</sup> are guided in their policy by one premise - only the international détente, relaxation of relations between the regime and the Church in the country, and cooperation with the authorities can bring the improvement of conditions in Poland. In the perspective they are setting as the goal the real socialism, but with a more human face, controlled by legal democratic institutions. They refer in the program to slogans from year 1956 and coordinating their actions with the Vatican and the Church in Poland. Consider themselves as realists because of their minimalism, but in a year and a half after the introduction of martial law they can't claim to be any closer to the goal, even though they propose even further-reaching compromise.

C. Political organizations are not derived from the "S". They are in the process of creation and declare their intention to transform into political parties. Independent research has shown that the idea of political parties is gaining in opposition more and more support. But while many people today declare their support for the intentions of creating parties, only a few declare that they would join them. It is a long way to go for the creation of lasting pro-independence political parties.

We would like to emphasize again, that the most important phenomenon of the Polish political arena is low political consciousness combined with a chronic aversion to the rulers, while aversion to communism, that would bring the effective forms and methods of fight with it, must come from the rational premises: their own thoughts, adopted system of values, not from the subconscious resentment – this is not enough. This situation makes us a society suffering from schizophrenia. In this state of affairs, we cannot take part in the civilization race taking place at the threshold of the new century. This will cause the build-up of

internal tensions, which will be discharged in an irrational way. The Polish nation has to go a long way to transform from a political province into a political civic society.

*Franciszek Sz.*

"Independence" nr 21-22, September-October 1983, pp. 15-21

## **Ursus ... and what next?**

The Polish Church is first and foremost a community of believers, although it is diverse in its mass, closely connected to the smallest administrative units, which are parishes. For the average Polish Catholic what happens in such a parish is much more important than what takes place in the Bishop's Curia, the Metropolitan one, or in the Palace at Miodowa<sup>54</sup> street. Therefore, parish priests are the same as the faithful "*the people of first contact*" with the institution of the Church. To fulfill its apostolic mission and teaching well, they must in the first place to establish intellectual and psychological contact with the faithful. And will make this only when they become the really needed by the people, by expressing their needs and worries in the most honest and open manner, also the social one, because it is difficult to separate them from the other important moral values. Actually, more than ever, the reaction of the Church for the moral and social needs of Poles must lead also to the voicing of the truth about the situation of an individual in an enslaved nation. The silence of the Church in these matters would undermine the legitimacy of its apostolic role on Earth, which after all is not limited only to voice the truths of faith, but also to transfer patterns and principles of worthy life in temporality. Although the Church should not only proclaim only what the faithful wish to hear, he must not remain silent when are happening things, which, because of the teaching function of the Church have to be clearly stigmatized.

This is how many parish priests in our country have interpreted their pastoral role. We will not list the most active ones - they are known to almost everyone. However, it is worth focusing on one name - Fr. M. Nowak, a vicar of the parochial church in Ursus. By the decision of the Primate, with a clear pressure of the rulers, father Nowak was moved to the tiny rural parish. In a similar situation will probably find themselves most of the priests from the famous list of "69<sup>th</sup> Defiant". Parishioners of Ursus, not agreeing with the decision of Primate of Poland, after a protest during a meeting with the Dean, took to protest hunger strike.

The whole incident might not even be worth analyzing if it had happened in a political situation other than today. Because of the decision of Card. Glemp was undertaken for purely political reasons, so its consequences should also be considered in a political context. From our (i.e., Group "Independence") point of view, the manner of solving the issue of the "worker's priest" in Ursus is a

consequence of the policy pursued by part of the Church hierarchy towards the communist rulers of PRL. They did not want deliberate broader on this, but we must say that the compromise between the two parties cease to be one altogether if one of them - the communists - uses only a policy of blackmail and extortion, and the second - the Church – only the tactics of concessions.

We must look at the incident that took place in Ursus from two sides.

First of all: From the beginning of the communist state in Poland, the red government did everything in its power to internally divide the institution of the Church on the one hand, and to embroil the church hierarchy with the masses of the faithful on the other. For this purpose, they established after the post-war years the circles of “priests-patriots” at ZBoWiD<sup>55</sup>, seized the Caritas, and established PAX and CHSS<sup>56</sup> (i.e., decorative Catholics). These attempts have failed largely for nothing, but the methodological remained. Therefore, whatever took place in Ursus is very satisfactory for the rulers of PRL. It is even more important, they didn’t do it with their own hands, but with the help of recently very praised “partner” of bilateral talks.

In this context, the protest of faithful in Ursus is certainly dangerous, especially when it comes to integration in the struggle for the civic society, although it is hard to blame the workers of the tractor factory for their spontaneous reaction to the decision of the Cardinal Glemp.

Secondly: We have repeatedly written in the pages of "N" about the extremely important role of the Catholic Church in the national life of Poles. In these matters, we were in agreement with similar theses put forward by the opposition from "S". Although we were never opposed to the dialogue between the Church and the communist state, although we came from the assumption that with Reds we should fight not talk, from the beginning we opposed the role assumed by the Church, to act in these talks as a political representative of the Polish nation.

The proper role of the Church we have seen in its activities for the benefit of integration of Polish society around the elementary moral principles such as dignity, justice, truth, interpersonal solidarity, and the like. These are universal values that should be respected in every political system. We expected also that the Church will, in an uncompromising way, condemn human rights violations in Poland as not-permissible, not only from the political point of view (anti-communist) but as contrary to the ethics and Christian teaching. Unfortunately, the Polish Church, moreover, under the pressure of the naive part of the opposition, with the passage of time allowed itself to impose a political role, more convenient for the rulers indeed. Then it began speaking to the faithful with the language of diplomacy, full of nuances and ambiguities. The honesty in the judgment of the evil that every Sunday voiced Fr. Nowak, was no longer included in that language.

The assumption by the Church of the role of the political representative of the Polish nation was associated with the lack of secular equivalent in this respect. Since 1980, the "S", and later its underground leadership ceded with relief

the responsibilities of representation of society to the Church, being satisfied with the symbolism of its own existence. It is a solution probably comfortable, though naive and illusory because no one in their right mind could have imagined that the Church in its mediation mission could bring about the restoration of the "S" and far-reaching concessions from rulers. The communists needed dialogue with the Church primarily to pacify the social mood. While the Church has managed to ease the repressions to some extent, the results of its concessions in other matters are slim.

As a political group we fully accept the moral leadership of the nation by the Catholic Church, but we state emphatically that Polish politics, i.e., the formulation of political demands shall be left the responsibility of the secular opposition. The organized political opposition should not count on a settlement with the Reds, but to undertake the fight political fight leading up to the overthrow of the regime and take the power. We have perfectly realized, as should understand the Church, that the neutralization of anti-communist opposition will expose the Church directly to the attempts of "normalization" by the rulers. The aim of the communists is, after all, the elimination of the Church, or its "Pimen-isation"<sup>57</sup> - just read the classics of Marxism Leninism!

So, the Ursus incident may also play a positive role, but only if all the interested parties, and above all, the cardinal Glemp and the secular underground opposition will be able to draw reasonable conclusions.

Shock therapy can become a factor that stimulates thought processes. That is why it is good to live through it some time to understand that no one, not even the Church, will take care of our matters for us.

*Waclaw Wojenny*

"Independence" № 27, March 1984, pp. 9-11

## **Vatican-Moscow game**

Poles, successfully Sovietised already through the second generation, has lost in the '40s and 50's not only the political elite (ea. own leaders and cadres) but also the ability of political thinking; it was replaced by the emotional reactions, symbolic and magical thinking. It got all this easier because our national feelings are full of various complexes and schematics. The nation constantly seeking compensation, which may counterbalance often subconscious resentment of injustice and inferiority towards other societies can not reason in terms of political interest, since it requires a cold analysis and calculation of each move. Hence the search for authorities, who would see better what to do and will do everything for the nation, to make it good, and idealization of distinguished Poles. Their greatness is the cure for national humiliations, which causes, that desired visions are

replacing the picture of the real political situation. There would be no wonder if the indicated phenomenon would concern only the ordinary subjects, but unfortunately, it has become also part of the social (not political) elite forming again in the second half of the 70s. Most people involved in politics in Poland know that society is fed with myths, living in apathy and illusion. They do not want to break myths (they reinforce them all the time), so as not to deprive the nation of an illusory, but always hope. I believe that the breaking of myths is a very painful, but a necessary precondition for undertaking the rational political activity.

One of a number of issues, which in Poland can not write without risking of being lynched, as it overthrows in this way another myth, which feeds the politically weak society, is the issue of relations between Moscow - Vatican - Primate and the Polish Episcopate - catholic circles (Primate Council, KIK) - L. Walesa. Although, a lot is written lately about the support of cardinal Glemp for communist normalization ("Wola"<sup>58</sup>'s" publication: "Idee" in an article written by Mr. Szary demands even resignation of "Comrade Primate", but he seems to forget whom the nomination came from); silently assuming that he has no superiors or does he not execute the instructions sent from Rome.

In the opinion of the writer, it is quite the opposite. To understand Archbishop Glemp's policy, one must first answer a question about Vatican politics. The first problem that arises, is the question: "Do we have to deal with the Polish politics in the Vatican or Vatican politics in Poland?" Everyone will just shout: "But in the Vatican is the Polish pope! The Holy Father will not forget about us". Of course, he will not forget, only that cardinal Karol Wojtyła, since he became the successor of St. Peter is: first - the shepherd of all Catholics, and secondly - the head of the Vatican State, and therefore the superior of catholic hierarchy around the world, and only as of the third - Polish cardinal and a Pole. Thus, he is first and foremost the Holy Father, and this means that he must take care of the entire Catholic world, its interests, and the interests of the Vatican.

The most important goal of the Vatican (from its point of view) must be to strengthen the world's Catholic community and expand its influence (converting pagans). In the long-term plan, this goal also coincides with our national interest. The stronger is the Catholic world (which is to be understood in the East), the weaker the communists are. This does not mean that the automatic opposition becomes stronger, but it creates favorable conditions for its development. In the short-term plan, however, in the practice of actions and politics, the efforts to strengthen Catholicism in the East and to strengthen the opposition in Poland may lead to conflicting situations.

The Pope as a Pole, and perhaps even more so as a Central European, influences the Vatican's policy and the appointment of positions in the hierarchy to take into account the position of Catholics in the Soviet camp. The paradox is, that this leads to tensions in the Polish aspects of the Church policy.

Strengthening Catholicism in the East, and more specifically reducing the persecution of the Church in Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine, and granting the local population any rights in the field of religion in the long-term plan (the moral revival in the Soviets) would, of course, be very beneficial for the perspective of the resistance movement in Poland. Unfortunately, for the concessions in the East, you have to “pay” the Kremlin with something. Well, what may have to offer to the Soviets Roman Catholic Church? Only its policy in Poland, because only here is strong. In addition, the Poles, regardless of the circumstances, will not stop being Catholics. Similar, to in the XIX century, despite the condemnation of Polish national uprisings, the threat of the fall of Poland from the Church of Rome doesn't exist, but it may gain something in the East. (...)

Obtaining the support (from the Church) for Jaruzelski has the triple advantage for the communists:

- it weakens the opposition, which so far, without the support of the Church is very weak, lost, and unable to act independently;

- it neutralizes the society, which although it does not support the communists, also does not support the opposition, which is what the Reds are all about;

- weakens the position of the Church, especially when cardinal Glemp begins to use the language of "Trybuna Ludu<sup>59</sup>" and people connected with the Episcopate attack pre-December "S" for (attention!) - excessive radicalism and reluctance to a settlement with communists. Communists have always tried to ensure, that their temporary allies are not too strong, i.e., to be able to remove them at the right time (i.e., after use).

Critics of the political line of Archbishop Glemp silently assume that he does not fully understand or mistakenly interpret instructions coming from Rome. But if it were so, Archbishop Glemp would not have been nominated cardinal. Is he, however, from the point of view of global politics of the Vatican, an ideal candidate for the position of the Polish Primate. Any other bishop would be more independent, which means that would put Rome in front of certain accomplished facts and tried to influence its policy in a manner much more corresponding with the mood and the situation in Poland. It is difficult to imagine a greater degree of disregard to the voice of public opinion than shows Cardinal Glemp. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the statements of the Episcopate differ definitely from the statements of the Primate, in favor of people resisting the communist lawlessness.

Even the unique awkwardness of Archbishop Glemp is his asset. In case of political failure, it always could be said, that was the fault of Primate, who did not understand what he was told to do.

Now, let's think about what possibilities of shaping views and attitudes have the supporters of the Primate's line of support for communist normalization. Apart from the public statements, interviews, etc., of the archbishop himself, remains the

influence by the Primate Council, circle of former advisors to "S" connected with the Church (red. Mazowiecki, dr. Wielowieyski, activists of KiK-s), and by Walesa, over whom the takes Rev. Jankowski, dr. Wielowieyski and adv. Sila-Nowicki. Let's compare, in the beginning, the statements of these persons, and see if they are followers of the same political concept.

During his stay in Rome and after talks with the Pope in the spring of 1983, card. Glemp gave an interview to the Catholic magazine "Il Sabato", in which he attacked Bujak for conducting underground activities that were unrealistic and harmful. He then stated that demonstrations and protests could only disturb the atmosphere of waiting for the Pope's visit, but if there would be no clashes in Poland and there will be peace, in two years it will be possible to start union pluralism (according to the BBC).

During the April press conference, L. Walesa made another offer to the communist rulers. The price for starting talks would be Walesa's acceptance of delegalization of "Solidarity". The Chairman even said that in the initial period the unions could function on the basis of a new union act, i.e., the one of the October 8<sup>th</sup>, outlawing the "S", and being condemned by the entire society and TKK, although the union pluralism remains its goal. What is going on here?

One of the points of the anti-union act states that in two years' time the factory crews will be able to decide which union will operate on the premises of their plant. And with this point are related hopes for establishing of Christian Trade Unions. They would not have any real authority and would be manipulated by rulers if they had acted under the Act of October 8<sup>th</sup>. But in communism more important for all the laws is the current structure of power. Please recall yourself the story of the censorship law and prospects of its benefits, spread by the compromisers before December 13<sup>th</sup>. The balance of power changed and the censorship law went to the garbage can, where it belongs, but before the 13<sup>th</sup> a lot of civic energy was wasted on pointless discussions and disputes about the law, instead of devoting this time and enthusiasm to the fight against the system. The whole thing, instead of serving to mobilize social forces to fight, through the action of conciliatory-minded leaders of creative associations served only to discharge social tensions.

Currently, the communists would have two years to prepare for these ChZZ, even with Walesa at the helm. The offer of the Chairman "S" says straightforwardly: *"Let's start the talks, let us act openly, and in return, we will come out of the underground and we will not question your rule anymore"*. It's just that Jaruzelski does not have to talk, and even without that, the offers of surrender are less and less demanding every month (see previous offers before and after November 10<sup>th</sup>).

In an interview published in "Tygodnik Wojenny" № 54/55 red. T. Mazowiecki lamented on the excessive radicalism of the pre-war "S" (we regret that the Union was too conciliatory at that time, to which T. Mazowiecki greatly

contributed): "*We never wanted to knock down our opponent, we wanted to get along. (...) ... there was a chance, it would take time (...) for many things to boil off. (...) ... correction would occur.*" And then the editor poured his grievances to the communists who turned out to be unpolite and severe for the hotspurs of " S ".

Walesa echoes the editor, telling journalists that "*part of the responsibility for December 13<sup>th</sup> falls on Solidarity*" (the statement given during the trial in Kwidzyn). So, the Chairman and former advisor of the Union put on one level the national movement opposing communism and the Soviet agents fighting for the privilege to oppress the Polish nation, in the interests of foreign powers and their own. What's more, they indicate that it was our fault that we too vigorously rebelled against the dictatorship. In a sense, they are right, because if the "S" submits to communists ("boiled away"), then they would not have to call on the assistance of the army. Odd, but persons so eagerly defending "S" from the political accusations of "N", in this case somehow silenced or even began to admire the depth of thought contained in the interview (review of the press "TM").

After Walesa's meeting with the TKK, it was rightly pointed out that Lech thus strengthened the authority of the TKK and supported its underground activities. But the message issued by TKK on "*agreed common positions*" with Walesa also has a second meaning, suggests namely, that the declaration of Lech's readiness to talk with the occupant, his efforts to settle and the offer of surrender take place with the knowledge and consent of the TKK. How, therefore, shall we believe in declaration "Solidarity Today" of an uncompromising fight against the regime, when at the same time, after the meeting and "*agreed on common positions*" with the authors of the declaration, L. Walesa declares its willingness to recognize the anti-solidarity Act of October 8<sup>th</sup>. Sitting astride on the barricade has turned out to be good for no one yet!

L. Walesa has recently made several more radical speeches. Unfortunately, each statement of this type was accompanied by denial in the next sentence. For example, he called for more severe forms of resistance, i.e., for strikes, but then added that these strikes can not harm the economy. So, who is to go on strike? Maybe students or toilet attendances? Well, the first sentence was intended for the public and would enhance the already sagging authority of Lech (just as the announcement of his participation in the May Day rally along with workers), and the addressee of the second were communists (on May 1<sup>st</sup> they could also be calm, Lech despite many earlier announcements locked himself at home). If Walesa is to realize the concepts of his guardians, he can't compromise himself too much, on the other hand, can't be genuinely radical. And here lies the source of the contradiction in all his statements.

To understand of realization of what concept goes the battle here we must return to the interview given by the Chairman of Primate Council, former MP Mr. Stomma to "Tygodnik Powszechny<sup>60</sup>". The admiration of Mr. Stomma over Prussians and Bismarck had obviously nothing to do with the Kaiser Germany a



century ago, but it referred to Poland in 1983. The real addressee of the interview was not the readers of "Tyg. Pow.", but Jaruzelski. What was Stomma trying to tell the rulers? Well, he wanted to convince them that they do not lose their real power if agree to lose economic monopoly and allow the creation of regional self-government. To put it in a nutshell simplification: the government of Prussia was able to wield power, despite the fact that did not have a majority in parliament, thanks to the use of various legal loopholes, which allowed, the imposed in advance, constitution. The economic system was based on the free market, although the state helped greatly in the development of the national industry. Such limited democracy has nothing to do with the reality of the totalitarian system and can not be alluring for the communists, because their aim is not to increase the might of the state economic development of the country, prosperity, advancement of civilization population, etc., but the expansion and strengthening the exercised power at any price. If its costs are to be paid by society or the economy, of which the positivists of the year 1983 are so concerned, the communists will not hesitate. They do not have to get out of the economic crisis, they have to get out of the political crisis i.e., to re-enslave and filth or to murder the disobedient part of society, but not play in getting their support.

To the concepts of Stomma refers Micewski on the pages of the same "Tyg. Pow." and convinces the rulers: *"The second task facing the Polish political thought, namely to focus the interests of the public on the issues of civilizational and economic development, is to a great degree hampered by the state of the mass media."* And further: *"Digging the gap between the rulers of the country and a large and representative part of the intellectual elite does not serve for anything or anyone."*

Digging of that gap is very beneficial for the nation (though not -beneficial for intellectuals: Reds will not call: "chirp, chirp, chicks", will not spread seeds), because it prevents dictatorial and an agential power from putting down roots in the nation again, as it has already taken place after the 1945 year when in exchange for a significant part of the social advancement the naïve and ambitious young intelligentsia supported the communists. Today, however, "the dig divide" is undoubtedly embarrassing for the part of the intelligentsia, which can't imagine life without cooperation with the occupiers. To what does Micewski's proposal come down to?

Give us access to the propaganda, and we, instead of condemning the profiteers and millionaires (tradesman, artisans), will urge the public to take to the economy; give us opportunities, and we will develop economy instead of politicking. It is immediately clear that Micewski himself has never tried to establish any workshop in Polish (more strictly - Soviet) conditions, so he can write this nonsense with a clear conscience. But even if the independent economic activity would be possible, it would strengthen only the communist system, which with its economic ineffectiveness, would only parasitize on the liberated sector.

Similarly, proposed by the Church the project of the Agriculture Bank - which under the supervision of the Episcopal system, in a market economy would lead quickly to the formation of the whole sector of the economy independent of the state (e.g., cooperatives activity in Wielkopolska<sup>61</sup> in the nineteenth century.). But precisely for this reason, Communists can't agree on the implementation of this project, despite the fact that it would put on its feet Polish agriculture. The project of creation of the Agricultural Bank should therefore be used to discredit the communist economic system and policy of the rulers, who are ready to starve the population, as long as not to give the opportunity of independent development to Polish peasants.

The concept forced by Catholics associated with the Primate's Council is:

1. Unrealistic - because it does not take as a starting point an analysis of the totalitarian system, which cannot give up or even limit its economic, propaganda and political monopoly, and, moreover, it ignores the interests of the rulers, assign to them the aspirations and goals that they do not have, e.g., care for the country. The goals of rulers are opposite to those attributed to them by the Church.

2. Harmful - because on the one hand it creates illusions to society and pulls it away from the constructive i.e., political conspiracy, on the other hand is a school of conducting politics over the heads of the nation and without its conscious participation. The politically immature society becomes an object of manipulation, of which is not aware, even more, that in the implementation of these concepts are involved people with considerable authority in the past.

3. Capitular - because trying to persuade the rulers to make economic concessions, at the same time withdraws not only from the demands made by the underground "S" after December 13<sup>th</sup> but even from such small political achievements as the legal "S" gained after the August. This means returning the political consciousness of the nation to the early KOR-times, and the demands to 1956 (liberalization of the system). (...)

The above concepts that Fr. Blachnicki rejects already on the ethical level, as inconsistent with Catholic social teaching, we fight on the political platform as highly harmful from the point of view of our goal - regaining an independent Polish state.

Apparently, it would seem that the author's hidden intention was to point to Rome as the source of "all evil of settlement." But it is not so, because - all the links in the Rome-Walesa chain have a great deal of independence, which can be used in proportion to their political abilities. The misfortune lies in the fact that among these links, only the first is able to pursue a large-format policy. In other words, what for the Vatican, especially the Pope, was only a tool, a tactic aimed at obtaining from the Kremlin concessions for the East (reduction of persecution) and Poland (amnesty), became a goal for cardinal Glemp and his advisers. And in this

sense, those who accuse the Primate of not understanding what is said to him in Rome are right.

Let us put the question again, whether the above-outlined policy, even under conditions of poor domestic execution, can bring us any benefits. According to the writer the game Vatican - Moscow can be advantageous for us, however, under two conditions:

1. If it succeeds, i.e., if the concessions in the East will become reality, e.g., the Pope's visit to the USSR, even at the cost of the conciliatory policy in Poland. However, this seems doubtful, since the Kremlin is perfectly aware of what is at stake. In the nineteenth century, Rome conducted a similar game; however, this policy ended not with the conversion of the Russians, but with the forced conversion of the Greek-Catholics to Orthodoxy.

2. If the opposition in Poland will be strong without the Church and will be able to distance themselves from it on the political platform and if will conduct political fight with concepts promoted by groups associated with the conciliatory line of cardinal Glemp, despite the fact that it is not proper to attack such well-known people, who, in addition, are spit on and put away (quite rarely) by the communists.

Covering up with the Church and Walesa due to the lack of its own authority, or identifying with the Primate's political line, will only lead to finding new justifications for the "do nothing" policy - we do not support the Red, but we also do nothing except passive resistance and moral improvement.

How to benefit from the Vatican's policy, if it were successful, and how not to suffer losses, if, as we predicted, it ended in failure? On this question, the opposition will be able to find the answer only as a political entity, and therefore the independent force, having its authority, not watching the other powers. The authority will come when the opposition will undertake the political challenge to communists and consequently negate the legitimacy of their rule.

*Antoni Wichrzyciel*

"Independence" № 18-19, June-July 1983, pp. 16-22

## **Reagan's anti-Polish sanctions?**

(...) The financial assistance of Western countries could achieve a positive effect if it would be fed to the economic structures of a completely different management style and production processes. In other words, the increase in the welfare of the nation may only be the result of the reorientation of the Polish economy towards the market model, with full autonomy and a strictly delineated border of state interference.

The speech of L. Walesa, in addition to proposing to the United States to grant the PRL financial aid, which, if they are successful, would help the ruling bureaucracy and the army to strengthen control over society (more people can be bought, because the reservoir of funds will be much bigger), have also the political dimension.

And it's probably the most important now. It is difficult, without comprehensive data, to realize in all the motives that led the head of the "S" to bring such a case, but one thing is clear - the time and the form in which it was all delivered must raise deep concerns.

To give someone a disservice you don't need to be farsighted. Just to be stubborn and change your mind from time to time is enough. Walesa did such a disservice to the Polish opposition. In this case, it was not even about the unfortunate sanctions - even reversed, with the unchanged model of economic management will not bring an increase in living standards - but of the political time, which appeal fell. Price increases announced not in the name of balancing with the cost of production, but to repeated drainage of the market, without looking at the huge enclaves of Polish poverty; paranoid attitude of Polish propaganda to the American people; continuation of the state of emergency, reinforced patrols of the riot police on the streets, with dogs specially trained against humans - and suddenly appear at the same time calls on the heads of KOK and Solidarity!!! What could hope Walesa and his - advisers, in delivering such a pro-government message? We do not believe that he got scared by Jaruzelski's words delivered in Zabrze that every citizen of the PRL should be loyal to the government. Let us add, in the face of not own government! It is not difficult to guess what political motives were lying down at the base of this, unfortunate, appeal. It was the hope that the Red, after receiving such favors, can agree to negotiations with Leech. The naivety that accompanies many western politicians in their relations with Eastern Europe, made itself felt from the mouth of Polish leaders of workers. The experience of recent years, as you can see, did not teach much of this widely respected man. In order not to have any understatement, not to leave Walesa with any shadow of illusions, as usual, confident Urban few hours after the call had distanced himself from any current and future discussions with the author of the appeal.

If the United States really abolish sanctions and launch the credits, the regime will be able to boast an authentic and perhaps the first political victory in two years. The more valuable it will be because it has been achieved for free. The prisons are full, the state of emergency continues, people are still thrown out of work, the degree of enslavement of the nation increases, "Solidarity" and its leader are spat in the most monstrous way, and the West will pay for all of this. Well, the communists did not expect such a tasty bite.

And the opposition? We believe that, in the name of maintaining the mythical unity, it will put the ears back and will accept what happened with

embarrassment and silence. The fact that this appeal coincided with a call for the protest marches by TKK (though in a badly chosen term), will also impact on the motivation to go out into the street. Unfortunately, we must conclude that our predictions about the attitude of political leaders and their advisers are working out.

Good intentions are not enough, you also have to think in terms of profitability of moves taken in the name of a good cause, for the cause itself. Every word is important, every ill-chosen moment for saying it sometimes brings difficult to mitigate consequences. In order to be allowed to be imprisoned, be bitten on the street with truncheons, you need to know why for whom, and for what. Such a goal is a FREE and INDEPENDENT POLAND, and not a search for an agreement with the communists when they feel to be the masters of the situation. It's too early to make spectacular compromises with them. In order to possibly talk to us, they must be afraid of us. Unfortunately, political ideas such as an appeal to lift the sanction will not scare communists, at best it will encourage them to make even more shameless mockeries. And we, if we can't harm them - at least won't help them, because then we only harm ourselves.

*Editors*

"Independence" № 26, February 1984, pp. 1-3

## Leadership crisis

"But I was always going for victory"

L. Walesa, December 11, 1981

Since the beginning of the war, we observe the leadership crisis in the Polish opposition. This understands the majority of society, since in the response to the question: "Who would you like to see as Jaruzelski's successor? - 53% responded that such someone does not exist (poll by "Paris Match" published in "KOS"). Our leaders do not prove themselves, even more, apparently, they did not raise up to tasks that history set before them, and new leaders can not be seen.

The most known opposition politician is Lech Walesa. Despite persistent claims by Urban, despite our criticism, Lech Walesa is, thanks to the media, the Polish public figure № 1. Every interview with him, even by phone, is immediately copied in Western radio stations and known to many people in Poland, as well as Western opinion-forming centers. The views of the underground press (including the "N") are rarely so widely propagated. A public person shall remember about the weight of the word, indeed - even the gesture. Also, one shall remember, that silence is often better, especially when there is nothing to say. We all know that since December 13<sup>th</sup>, we don't have a positive program of action. Lech Walesa behaves as if he didn't know this. It causes disastrous results for the Polish opposition.

The first allegation, we put on Lech Walesa, is to constantly "jerking" of the people, announcing and calling for action, mobilization, and next the rapid retreat, demobilization, and pacification of the moods. Walesa, by practicing this policy also "jerks" the communists, but much more tires the Polish society, causing discouragement, apathy, retreat from opposition and breakdown of the spirit of resistance.

At the anniversary of the WZZ in Silesia Walesa announced his visit on the invitation of K. Switon. Officially supported his initiative - the dedicated Holly Mass and manifestation - then Mr. Mietek declared that "*the car broke down and Lech could not go*", and all pretended that it is fully justified explanation, forgetting about trains that still sometimes run in Poland. Similarly, Lech Walesa behaved May 1<sup>st</sup> 1983 year: first loudly assured that it will be with the workers, and then he went to the morning's Holly Mass at seven, and ... locked himself in the house. The decision of TKK to commemorate the anniversary of August, L. Walesa considered as too weak and announced his speech at the Shipyard Worker's Monument on August 22<sup>nd</sup>. But when it was time, he said that he resigns from the speech, because at the moment, this would put him at risk of being arrested! In this country, a lot of people are doing things for which the threat is much more than a few days' arrests. Let us imagine what would have happened if Pilsudski had declared in 1916 that he would take an oath of allegiance to the (German) Emperor because he did not want to go to prison!

Walesa constantly mobilizes people, creates an atmosphere of waiting for a call to fight, and ... leaves the shipyard through a side gate. If he doesn't want to come forward with this slogan, why is he mobilizing people? And why is it constantly withdrawing?

Giving a speech at the Monument would put the communists in a losing position. Both, the lack of reaction and detaining of Walesa would be a political defeat. Only Walesa's resignation from his speech left the Reds as the masters of the battlefield.

If the Communists still attacking Walesa, of course, not because of his political concepts that are extremely beneficial, but because in the person of the Chairman they want to destroy a symbol of the independent trade union movement and the myth of "Solidarity". That myth and symbol are, because of the present situation, still dangerous to communism. Does it mean that we are to uphold this symbol and myth at all costs and in contradiction with the truth, only because the communists are still afraid of it?

In our opinion - no! - because in the long run they are not threats to communism and will not destroy it. Reds conduct policy of waiting out, extinguishing fires, and patching holes, fighting mainly with everything that today seems to them the most dangerous, giving us some time that we should use to create various independent political programs - tools for liquidation of communism and for the building of the independent and democratic state.

In our opinion, the authority alone, without the concept will collapse sooner or later. If, however, we abandon earlier the creation of new authorities, based on the real action, and not on the previous deeds, the living symbols retreating from the battlefield they will leave a void. This is not what we want, but the communists.

With different assumptions comes out TKK, considering as the most important criterion of forwarded slogans and formulating the objectives of the combat, their compatibility with the political line of Walesa, and not accidentally run into the political conflict with him.

Yet in a TKK statement of April 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1982 we still could read: *"It is a moral and statutory duty of the members of NSZZ 'Solidarity' the uncompromising struggle for the right to existence and action of the Union"*. In a statement of October 9<sup>th</sup> issued after outlawing the "S" TKK said: *"The Sejm, with these Acts, deprived itself of any public mandate ... NSZZ "S" can only be dissolved by decision of its members"*. While the question arises, when the communist Sejm acquired public mandate since not been chosen in free elections but in the so-called vote, boycotted in 1980 by all independent political groups, from the KSS KOR till KPN? Leaving aside, however, this political system issue, the attitude to the Act has been expressed accurately and clearly. Even on October 20<sup>th</sup>, 1982 the members of the TKK emphatically stated: *"By carrying out the order to outlaw "S", the Sejm committed a lawless act. It is an illegal act and we do not recognize it. We continue to fight for our goals - for full rights for union NSZZ "S" ..."* and at this moment happen a breakthrough. In a statement on November 22, the TKK announces: *"Only Lech Walesa may define the conditions under which the TKK - in accordance with his motion - will decide on its dissolution."*

In an interview on December 1<sup>st</sup> 1982 Zb. Bujak said: *"The members of TKK assume that its activities will continue under the existing rules until the release of all prisoners. Until then, we do not accept the disclosure or self-dissolution ... The struggle for the amendment to the Act is, on the one hand, the boycott of official and functioning of independent of the union structures, on the other hand - the struggle in the international arena ... from there must flow the strong pressure on the amendment"*.

It is therefore apparent that the bill, as *"illegal act"* was not acknowledged, but after a month it was adopted, demanding only modification of this *"lawlessness"*.

A few months later - May 26<sup>th</sup>, 1983 - Zb. Bujak said in another interview, in response to a question on the timing of disclosure: *"When they will allow the registration of other unions in the plants. Trade union pluralism is the primary goal of "S" even in the underground. When it becomes possible, one has to consider whether it is not time to end the stage of underground activity"*. And that there would be no doubts - on July 14<sup>th</sup>, 1983, Bujak confirmed his position. When asked: *"Will ... the leaders of "S" disclose only after re-legalization of the Union?"* - he replied: *"It would be enough, that the continuation of union activities"*

*will not be punished with imprisonment, which is connected with the full amnesty for imprisoned and persecuted and the abolition for all persecuted for the social-political activity. Until this happens, we will remain in hiding ... perhaps there will be conditions in which it will be beneficial for us to create our own trade unions from the beginning, even on the basis of the law currently in force".* One and a half years earlier, on February 25<sup>th</sup>, 1982., Zb. Bujak claimed: *"The shape of trade unions proposed by the government ... (is) unacceptable. The only way left for us is to fight for the resumption of the activities of NSZZ 'Solidarity' "*.

Lawlessness, illegal act, etc. turned out to be acceptable. This contradicts the basic requirement of an independent trade union movement, i.e., its independence from political organizations (PZPR - the local section of the KPZR). In November 1982, Temida OBA wrote: *"One could speak of independence only if formal, real guarantees of non-interference by political organizations were created. (...) The activity of the union will bring only marginal effects. (...) The unions do not have, according to the law, any possibility of effectively questioning the decisions of the state and economic administration"*.

It only remains to identify the author of the "new" concepts. Card. Glemp, in an interview on March 26<sup>th</sup>, 1983 to *"Il Sabato"* said openly: *"... the law (outlawing the" S "- ed."N") provides that in the two years it will be possible changes in the present trade unions towards a certain pluralism. If peace remains in the country, if fighting is avoided, there are opportunities for a revival of pluralist unions"* (quoted from *"Ojczyzna"*, Catholic workers' journal).

January 1983 brought the declaration "Solidarity Today", which was probably to calm down a group of resistance in workplaces and shut the mouths of TKK critics. It contained the statement: *"In order for the ruling system in Poland to be able to make concessions, ... are necessary actions leading to the collapse of the current dictatorship".* But when TKZ of Shipyard declared: *"We urge the communist rulers to undertake, until August 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1983, negotiation with a reliable public authority, Lech Walesa and his advisers"*, TKK issued an August 22<sup>nd</sup> message, which read: *"We support the initiative of the TKZ Shipyard. Despite calls and appeals ... the rulers did not start talks"*. But on May 26<sup>th</sup>, Zb. Bujak said: *"Such rulers cannot be our partners"*. So why did he feel sorry for the occupant for not joining the talks, since the goal was previously defined as *"breaking the current dictatorship"*, and not negotiations! Well, because the Declaration ("Solidarity Today"), like other more sensible statements, was not the first step in the evolution of the TKK itself in the desired direction, but only a scarecrow for the rulers. And since they didn't get scared and ran away to Moscow – the TKK yielded.

By the way, after a year and a half of the war, one could realize that the Reds would not have any talks, except with PRON, maybe.

In conclusion, the statement TKK April 22<sup>nd</sup>, the new version should sound like - a moral and statutory duty of members of the "S" is the struggle for the



realization of the illegal act whose enactment was lawless item - entertaining Sejm of the mandate of the public; the law, according to which the unions have no ability to effectively challenge decisions – of state and economic administration, nor real guarantees of non-interference by political organizations.

Please forgive the demagogy and cynicism, but did the defenders of "Wujek" colliery, Bogdan Wlosik and so many others, die for this implementation of the right to associate in trade unions.

Unfortunately, the diagnosis we made in November 1982 proved to be correct: *"... the Reds can sleep soundly. Underground "S" dominated by the prophets of an agreement with the communists, unable to complete break-up with them (the negation of the legitimacy of the socialist system, constitution, legislation etc., as being not from the will of the people but ZSRR), will now be completely overwhelmed by the proponents of settlement and capitulation. "S" sunk to the dead end and will not become, unfortunately, the center of crystallization of ideas and attitudes against the communist ideology".* The movements, which will be maturing in terms of programs, or what communists are afraid of, will act completely independently of ideologically pacified (after the release of Lech) "S".

There is still the question of the reason for the surrender. The prominent French Sovietologist, A. Besancon, when asked about the "S", biggest mistake replied: *"It seems that intending to make a revolution not to mention it, intending to push the state of dialectical materialism not calling him by name, not indicating nothingness of socialism, take the risk of introducing confusion in minds. The risk of dis-orientation for the masses to which referred to".* From the fear of contesting communism, they validated it, treated the Soviet installed rulers as partners, as a normal authority, and not as an essential evil and lies, and the current system, in principle, as a good thing, and not as the worst of the systems. In this way, participated in a lie. Prior to December 13<sup>th</sup>, it was only one of the trends in the "S". After this date it became the only one. After December 13<sup>th</sup> the leaders of the "S", which survived the carnage, came to the conclusion that the criterion for requests being put forward should be their realism. Realistic and is just what the communist may accept. So, the more these demands, the more minimalist the goals, the more realistic. The Communists used such reasoning and are waiting, by dosing the repressions and making it clear each time that the position of TKK is not really quite yet. Communists to convinced counselors and members of the TKK, and many, too many Poles that their rule, once established, can not be overthrown. And if can't be overthrown, what remains, is to put some pressure for modification and adapt yourself to communism. And our leaders adapted. Putting forward the call to overthrow the communist regime and the liquidation of the Soviet serfdom - initially would be as unrealistic as the program of agreement, but would create prospects for the future by making a revolution in the communized minds of Poles. How common is this communization, i.e., the belief that it is

impossible to overthrow the Soviet system, is proved by the broadcasts of the Radio Free Europe?

An example of political propaganda harmful to the cause of independence may be the so-called round table discussions. On September 8<sup>th</sup>, 1983, after the assurances by dir. Najder that debaters are differing in their views, we could a few politically "bold" remarks: T. Nowakowski said revealingly: *"an agreement is necessary"*, P. Jarecki sharply disagreed and firmly stated that: *"a compromise must be found"* and W. Wroblewski added: *"it would be good if we will choose the variant od appealing to the rulers"*. What a difference of views! And what a rich and diversified, full array of attitudes! And how many contentious issues: agreement, appeal, compromise, and maybe self-whipping?

And what makes Mr. Nowakowski and Mr. Najder happy the most? Well, it's that the "noisy" supporters of slogans of overthrowing of communism *"is a very small group, and deprived of influence on the shaping of public opinion"* and that *"now they seem to silenced"*.

Well gentlemen, it is not nice to persuade the society, which is 85% against the agreement with communists, that their views are represented by people whose ideas of compromise are supported by only 5.5% (see questionnaire "N" № 21/22). RFE shall include to this noisy group, for example, TKZ "S" Ursus, as the leaflet of August 5<sup>th</sup>, 1983. reads: *"we do not recognize the imposed on us rulers and their ideology we consider hostile,"* and - *" We will support all movements favoring the liberation of our Fatherland from foreign domination"*, so of these *"noisy groups"*. In a similar manner would expose itself to the "Slowo Podziemne"<sup>62</sup> of August 19<sup>th</sup>, 1983, if the journalists from Munich knew them. Let us quote a fragment: *"If we want, as a society, to save and revive our cultural and economic development opportunities we must say clearly and distinctly that neither trade unions (including Solidarity) nor the Church can permanently replace Poles with normal political representations. Today has come the time of their birth, the time of formation of specific parties, movements, and programs, the creation of outlines for future legislation and plans for political reforms, economic and social. "*

"Solidarity" has long been a thing of the past as the effective tool for fighting against communism, but the future belongs to the solidarity of all shades of pro-independence political currents. And this is - in our opinion – sought after by all, the way out of the impasse.

*Antoni Wichrzyciel*

"Independence" № 21-22, September-October 1983, pp. 3-4; № 24, December 1983, pp. 1-3

## **Political thought instead of terror - in response to a letter**

(...) Undoubtedly terror actually would put a strong mark on the self-consciousness either, of communists, or on the whole society. However, would it be a positive process, and therefore whether the changes would really take the direction that was obvious to the author of the letter - I dare to doubt. An example of many countries indicates that terrorism raises concerns in large parts of society, pushing it in the direction of the hard central ruling. Is this variant impossible in Poland? It may, however, consider such eventuality, before will call for armed terror? It is not only this doubt that makes our writing firmly opposed to this type of combat method. Lest there be any misunderstandings, our opposition does not come from moral reasons - but from pragmatism.

First argument. As in the old anecdote - first, there are no cannons. Poland is full of terrorists-storytellers who, like our author of the letter, shout: we must shoot at communists! Every now and then you hear the news: someone stole a truck of rifles, somewhere a police station was disarmed; it always turns out to be a rumor. There is no shortage of willing to cheer terrorists, however, much worse is (thank God) with the performers. The example of Grodzisk is pathetic.

The second argument. Terrorism requires appropriate training and technical equipment. In Western countries, where control over society is much lesser, and borders are easy to cross, there is no big problem with this. However, terrorism is often there inspired by foreign countries. Terrorist camps are in some Arab countries, in North Korea, and perhaps also in some of the European communist countries. The totalitarian state has at its disposal possibilities of control incomparably greater than Western democracies. So far, no broader terrorist activity has ever developed in any totalitarian country. The fight against Nazi Germany can't be considered as a precedent. The anti-Nazi terror was an extension of the war waged by Europe against Germany it also had a supporting base in free countries. Similar conditions in any case can't be repeated in Poland AD 83. When speaking of terrorism, one usually means the browning gun from 1905. Contemporary terrorism, in order to fight the state, uses technical means that are absolutely unavailable in Poland.

Third argument. History knows very few examples of the success of the individual terror tactic. This method has been used for 200 years by various radical social movements, but very rarely brings results in line with expectations. One of the few positive examples is to obtain independence for Algeria. The main method of the National Liberation Army was terrorist attacks. After nearly 10 years of action, the French relented and entered into the Evian peace agreements, granting Algeria independence. Honestly, it would be difficult to find a second example of terrorism being crowned with such success. Analyzing it, it is easy to see the difference between those situations and the present in Poland. French democracy

was not prepared to escalate actions directed against Algerian terrorism, which threatened their transformation into a dictatorship. On the other hand, the loss of Algeria, albeit painful, didn't mean the end of France nor its Gaullist government. De Gaulle could have agreed to sign a peace treaty and survived. The communists in Poland are playing for everything, so their determination will be incomparably greater. It wasn't the terrorists who liberated Algiers, but the French just concluded that staying in North Africa was costing them too much. For communists, no price is too high for the exercised power.

Fourth argument. Terrorism, due to its specific organization, easily degenerates. It can't be controlled by the representative of civic bodies, as it has the means to kill. So, it's threatened by - provocation by the rulers and conversion into banditry.

These pathologies were present even during World War II. Later, as the awareness of hopelessness of an armed conspiracy and loss of the public base, the phenomenon of the disease in the armed underground has become common. UB penetrated the partisan units in forests, and these often came close to the common banditry. The terrorist movement knows many similar examples in its history.

Summing up our considerations on terrorism, we must say: terrorism is an ineffective means in the fight for political goals. Only partial objectives can be achieved thank to it (e.g., the Palestinian terrorism caused that the so-called Palestinian issue is not leaving pages of newspapers, it is also an international problem incomparably greater, than the number of Palestinians), very rarely, however, allows achieving the definitive objectives, which terrorists put for themselves.

Conducting an effective action requires state-of-the-art technical equipment. Terrorism strikes are more painful in democracies than in totalitarian countries. Moreover, the less realistic the movement's goals are, the smaller the public base and the greater the risk of pathology.

Poland needs a wise political thought instead of an unreasonable act. No military movement can replace her. The action, indeed, must be preceded by conscious reflection, a program that will set the direction. The latter is not as obvious as the author of the letter thinks, and with it probably many of our other readers. The present moment makes it impossible to carry out decisive, spectacular anti-regime actions. No underground group does have enough strength to lead the workers even to a larger strike, not to mention of armed demonstration. However, it is not, what is depressing. The apathy of people and their political indeterminacy are really dangerous. It is our journal that wants to change this. We believe that the problem of recognition of the independence of the central political question will allow changing the awareness in the direction of our planning. We want to be made a political structuring, initially of the underground and later of the major social groups. We want the development of political thought independent of the communists. Therefore, we publish our monthly journal, so we act politically. The

development of political thought can't be done in quiet and safe offices of scientists, but only on the move, in close connection with practice, through the disputes within the underground, through mistakes and failures. It must bring the results, as August was the result of independent thoughts and actions of the 70s. We are richer on the experiences of those years: August, December, and 20 months after it. This baggage must not be underestimated. One must not return to concepts that have already failed many times. The most important - you have to be patient and understand the meaning of what you are doing. For the impatient, I recommend a psycho-game: are your political views, your knowledge of recent history, your understanding of the present world the same as 5 years ago? Think about what has changed in it and what factors influenced it. You will have an answer to the question of whether all activities independent of Red made any sense or not.

If we believe that an independent Poland is real, that we will live to see it, we have to think about how to arrange it. We must at the same time take into account the experience, including negative, which was probably more in the history of the last hundred years, if the anachronistic disputes wouldn't expose us to the subsequent defeats and be a laughing stock of Europe. It is also necessary to prepare the political cadres for the country. In 1918, the cadres were recruited from among independent politicians active in the legal and democratic parliaments of the partitioning countries. It is known that there will never be a vacuum. I have no doubts that at the moment of regaining independence, many people will feel God's will as a statesman within themselves. But the point is that they would be not the accidental people, they should have on the top of recognized names and credentials of years spent in communist prisons, also the political programs, so the public could identify itself with their programs (plural), not only with symbols worn by these politicians. Today's activity is also needed for that. It is going for the thing much more important than the assassination in a dark corner of a ZOMO-men, it goes of inclusion of Poles into the civilized countries.

*Franciszek Sz.*

"Independence" № 23, November 1983, pp. 21-23

## **Phenomenon**

(...) Before there is any confrontation, the seeds of the national authority must first arise. For this, we need political pluralism, consisting of the pluralism of political parties and programs. To established parties, it is necessary to discuss the political and ideological disputes about future Poland. Then Wacek and Franek<sup>63</sup> will find these ideas and values (most likely - each will find different), for which they will be ready to go to prisons and on barricades.

Thus, the first and fundamental platform of confrontation with communism is the struggle for political consciousness and the revival of political life. And in this sense, we are in favor of immediate confrontation with communism! We got rid of the communist consciousness a long time ago. We openly and clearly define our attitude to the occupant and the idea for which we want to fight with him. We do not hide that we are about the overthrow of communism, because we do not have the mentality of the deceitful slave who wants to cheat his master (can we have an agreement or an armistice?) or change him for the better one (let turn directly to the Kremlin), but we are free human beings and for this, we formulate our goals clearly and openly.

As for the demonstrations, even if in the future were to fulfill their task of tearing the rulers, it had to turn into a riot first. The condition, however, is that their potential participants will gain political awareness and find the idea for which they are ready to fight and die. The idea - "*that Solidarity is to be*", or - "*there would be no communists*", is only a misleading guise.

*Antoni Wichrzyciel*  
"Independence" № 20, August 1983, pp. 6-7

## **My moderate opinion - a reply to the letter**

Firstly, it is not true that the dividing line of the opposition into the solidarity-based and pro-independence is set out by answering the question: "To fight or not to fight?", but if fight (and die) at all, then for what? Is this for the right to carry the badge, or maybe for something more? The dividing line is set by formulating the goal for struggle: any agreement on any terms, or the struggle for an independent and democratic Polish Republic?

Secondly, we would like to know how successful the solidarity-based opposition has been? That it survived - the pro-independence did as well. Only the first one is in much worse condition. The allegation that the pro-independence opposition "*withdraws only from the concepts of wrong paths*" leading to independence, is simply not true. Unless the author of the letter to editors had in mind out the concept of transformation of underground "S" into a multiparty alliance for independence. Only we did not withdraw from it. This concept was rejected in practice (completely ignored) by the solidarity-based faction. Fact, that after two years the solidarity opposition gave up lighting candles and wearing badges in public as basic forms of fighting and begins to think about conducting a political struggle it proves that the pro-independence opposition, with organizing admittedly fewer manifestations and no cooperative, has had a significant impact on the development of independent consciousness.

Thirdly, it is not true that the pro-independence opposition didn't undertake the actions. Printing the publications, their distribution, creating the

organizational network, etc. is a more important action than collecting membership dues and running the "secret" kindergartens, which of course does not mean that the latter are not of use. The general view that the issuance of any underground journals has the same value in the struggle with Reds is wrong. The value depends, evidently, on the content of these writings, i.e., propounded by their views, concepts, values. Is the Author believing that '*Biuletyn Informacyjny Regionu Ziemi Lodzkiej*', in the № 52 issue, convincing its readers that the junta compromised itself because did not introduce in Poland true socialism, has the same value for the development of political consciousness, as "N" does?

We are still in the first stage of politicizing society, and until we end it, i.e., before a pluralistic system of political parties is created, so that people know what to fight for, our activities will necessarily be limited to producing of underground publications<sup>[1]</sup>.

Fourth, many roads certainly lead toward independence, but there are also roads, that lead nowhere – the compromiser's so-called realists (they were called loyalists under the Tsar) can at best be *poputchikas* - companions of the occupant and do not offer a different, alternative concept aimed at a free Poland.

Fifthly, we believe that the accusation of cowardice, the fear of taking the responsibility for certain decisions, or fear of being more exposed in front of Reds, is well-founded.

Sixth, life is not the greatest value. If it were, Poles would never defend themselves against any invasion. Primate came up with the theory of life as the highest value because he needed some moral foundation and cover for its policy pacts with the Reds (formerly used to say - with the devil). This theory is taken over and juggled by people who are weak, stupid, or naturally silly. We have never been supporters of an uprising tomorrow. We only constantly emphasize that if the demonstrations are to make sense, then it cannot be accepted as a rule to give up self and others' defense. We just condemn the resignation of the defense – coming out with own ass to the front - arising from the conviction, that if we let them to beat us, they will beat us less than if we would not defend ourselves and beat them back. What awaits us is "the learning of conducting politics under conditions of the use of force" - as M. Poleski wrote. We agree with him and we try to prepare people for this teaching.

Seventh, so far practice has shown that the solidarity opposition is rocking in the clouds, because no their concept has proven of value. Independentists, however, are laboriously but constantly growing the political life. It is now our most important task, because otherwise, not the Poles may live to reach free Poland, but only Polish-Soviets.

*Editors*

"Independence" № 20, August 1983, pp. 25-26

## What to do?

Many people are now going through a period of confusion and self-doubt. Do not know what to do, since many forms of action, symbolic and mock (60 second strike, strike in a secret - that no one knew that we are on strike etc.) has been compromised. This time we want to offer "something to do" for the present time. We believe simply that this "doing" of today involves thinking - discussing - criticism - writing. We will try to explain our proposal below.

In 1956, the slogan of the opposition was the repair of socialism, which "has deformed" (those millions murdered), a form of action was the creation of workers' councils in workplaces, the battle of "true" socialists' factions, namely reformers, for positions within the party, and taking limited cooperation with the system by independent Catholics. Obviously, within the ranks of the opposition groups, were found, who consider that the aim should be the fight to overthrow communism. But they were marginal and were quickly shouted down. At that time, the repression of non-communists was widely accepted. Most of the opposition fought for the right to liberty for groups advocating that basically the system is fundamentally good. And what happened next?

Well, for the next 14 years (1956-1970) socialism was being repaired. In 1966 – the lesson got the Church, which with the mouth of Primate Wyszyński called in 1957 to vote without deletions, in 1968 - the socialist-reformist intelligentsia, and in 1970 - the workers.

What slogans did the workers of the Coast put forward in 1970, what did they want, what were they striving for? Banner hung in the Warski's Shipyard said: "*Our strike is the economic strike, not political*". After 14 years, it was the same slogan as in 1956; again, they wanted to improve socialism and life in socialism. For 14 years the society has not taken independent actions on the political plane. Why? Because during these 14 years time was wasted on discussions: "Is socialism reformable, what can be reformed in it, and what needs to be reformed?"

All the time, therefore, the elite – the significant and heard in the country and abroad - accepted as a starting point the current regime. So, it could only move within this framework and speculate on the party's internal infights.

If the workers' rebellion of 1970 was politically incapacitated, it was because the people attacking the tanks and party committees didn't put forward the slogan of fighting the communism. And they couldn't do this, because earlier - during those 14 years - no one realized this to the public, no one preached and discussed it.

In 1970., as in 1956, the party had full control over the movement; what's more, many people giving direction to rebellion (1970) acted in agreement with the party factions. No wonder that in view of this state of mind and thanks to the



capitalists' money, Gierk managed to bribe the society. After five years (1976), however, sobriety came.

Let us now compare how the views of Poles changed, and with them the goals they pursued in 1956-70 and 1976-80. While in the first period, there were virtually no changes, and mental stagnation celebrated the triumph, then within four years of action of open opposition we made an enormous jump. If in the 1980 striking Poland did not put forward the slogan of fixing the communist party, but to create an organization by definition independent of the system (just under the name of Free Trade Unions), and only later, after forcing the communists for concessions, get some agreement with them - we owe this, to intensive thinking, discussions, and writing in the years 1976-1980. What was written then decided what was fought for in 1980.

However, the political development of society did not end on the thought (settlement - compromise), and organizational forms ("Solidarity") of 1980, similarly as previously stopped on the achievements of 1956 (reformism in the party and the workers' councils). The events of October and August, should be viewed from a historical perspective and treated as a certain, already closed, phase of political maturing - gathering experience in the fight against communism. For people of 1956 that experience were the workers councils. Does this mean that we had to fight for their creation until the end of communism? When councils became an ineffective tool to fight the system, they were forgotten, and in 1980 no one referred to them anymore. Let us recall how reluctantly was moving the issue of employee-self management, after all modeled on councils. In 1980 a much better instrument was created - "Solidarity". But with time, it was no longer effective in the fight to overthrow the regime, although it may still harm. Does it mean that we have forever to remain on the stage of 1980 and resign from the building of the next one, but rather another, even better tool capable of liquidation of communism? Of course, for the average Pole, who, thanks to the "Solidarity" felt like a citizen, a person with the same rights as everyone else, the valuable individual, this organisation has become a symbol of the best of everything. He sees "Solidarity" as Poland, not as one of the tools to fight for it. The politician, however, can not be stuck in the myths, because his field of battle is the reality – communism, not a social mythology.

Along with the changes in the organizational platform, it was some progress albeit slow, with the evolution of political thought. In the years 1956-70, they wanted to repair socialism. In 1980-81, they wanted to undermine it, but unfortunately only partially, in order to conclude a settlement with the weakened ones. Do we again have to stop thinking and for the next one hundred years talk nonsense about the dialogue and settlement? RWE may prefer to appeal to the communists because it broadcasts from Munich, but we live in Poland and we may not survive the next 40 years of the leading system. Here we come to the heart of the matter. We do not know whether the next confrontation with the occupant will

take place in 1986 or 1996, but we will now decide what its goals and organizational forms will be. Whether we will break the mental stagnation in solidarity papers depends, if the year, say 1986 will be a repeat of the 1980s, in the sense in which 1970 was a repeat of 1956 or to become something new, like new was August of 1980.

At this point it seems necessary to define again our position to the acquis of KOR-like thoughts and its peak achievement - the concept of underground society. We emphasize that we support all self-help activities (e.g., collecting dues, donations and granting benefits). The basis of the durability of the communist government is the destruction of social ties, leading to a situation in which everyone is afraid of everyone (ea. USSR), and thus it is impossible to prepare collective resistance. For example, in Czechoslovakia almost everyone listens to Voice of America, but no one will admit to it in front of a friend or neighbor, does not provide any information, and at most cite the "Rude Pravo"<sup>64</sup>. Opponents of communism who can not make contact with each other are not dangerous for the system. It does not follow, however, that restoring social ties is synonymous with the overthrow of the system, as it seems to the theorists of social groups and self-help actions. Social bond allows building and functioning of channels of information and communication within the society, but it will create only conditions in which only it will be possible to undertake political activity. Previously, you could not do it because it is difficult to imagine the circulation of ideas among subjects who do not have any communication with each other. Only political activity is preparing the society with consciousness, and the opposition elite organizationally to eliminate the current system.

In Poland, however, thanks to the "Solidarity" the social ties were to the large extent, rebuilt. Therefore, a misunderstanding, or even a serious mistake, is:

1. Stop at the stage of civic activities and treat social activities as the best way morally, politically and tactically to fight against communism, the way having the superiority over the political action, and fully satisfying all the needs of society and the opposition.

2. Conscious proclamation of slogan to replace political actions with civic ones.

3. Treatment of civic action not as a means of helping to create social ties, but as an actual and effective method of solving the current problems. For example, the arrangement of private holiday packages for 200 families of workers at the 200 peasant families will serve to establish contacts, exchange of views and experiences, but the organization of holiday packages in communism will not solve the problem of recreation for workers' families. This requires a change in the fundamentals of the system - breaking the state monopoly, therefore the elimination of communism.

Unfortunately, it seems that the above-mentioned mistakes are an incurable disease of solidarity-based opposition. It wasted two years on refreshing the old

ideas, some even went back to the years of their youth - to 1956! Let us emphasize once again: this is not the way! That's what we will think about, discuss, write in 1983-85, and decide about how and for what we will fight in 1986.

Another problem we can formulate as follows: What are we going to think about? With whom and how to discuss?

We should think about free Poland. This is a bigger value than the "Solidarity", workers' councils, the local government law, censorship or high education act in its pre-December wording. In the sphere of thinking it's much to be done, because future goals, political solutions, economic, social, the shape of future domestic and international relations, must be created in the minds first, i.e., need to be conscious.

Rakowski's sneers about the fight for Kiev should be answered by capturing Kiev and the devastation of Moscow - but with a mind, by a head. What has the Polish opposition done so far to make Poles aware of the need for an alliance with Ukraine, to learn about its history and problems? Literally nothing. And what have the Poles realized the need and necessity of an independent Belarus? What about Lithuanian, Czech and Slovak matters? How are we going to build a program of dismembering of the Soviet empire, if we are not touching at all so important, and yet still the initial issues, but complaining on, that Reds do not observe the law on censorship! And it would be enough just a little courage to write on topics that others are afraid to talk about.

And what did the Polish opposition do to make Poles aware of what economic, political and social relations should look like in normal, i.e., capitalist, Poland? Why does Polish society have to fight for a free Poland, since they don't know what she would be like or would imagine that it would be a good communism (Walesa instead of communists); a state that will solve all problems: it will give, provide, secure, free of, etc.

But with whom to discuss all of this? One thing is certain: whoever wants a free Poland - does not discuss with the communists, because they have nothing to say about it. What topics are raised in the most opposition writings? First of all, continual complaints about the treachery (liquidated "S" and not reinstated as promised on December 13, do not comply with the censorship law, and local self-government, etc.), bad faith (unrealized Gdansk accords, poor implementation of the law on the new trade unions), incompetence (primarily economic), dishonesty (they talk about the settlement, but don't want to communicate with us), etc., etc. and it's called the criticism of communism.

About what, shall discuss with Reds someone for whom communism is the only exhibit in the Museum of Crime? Well, the pro-independence person will discuss only with another pro-independence person; after all, it is difficult to argue about the model of free Poland with its enemies. He will also not waste time criticizing, for example, paragraph 125 of the ordinance 594 of the occupation rulers, since he flatly rejects the entire system. Simply, communism cannot be a

partner for us. Therefore, what is left are still disputes and discussions in our own circles. But the others of the democratic opposition, to be able to discuss with them, must have their own views. Most of the opposition doesn't have such views, because its goal is not free Poland, but only Poland with a settlement with the communists. This second perspective, of course, relieves the need to develop definite ideas relating to the economy or international politics.

But many ask the question, "*Why should we argue with each other when the communists are attacking us? We need to unite, not divide*" rightly, but the consolidation does not mean abandoning the disputes or discussion. We have to be united against the communists, i.e., e.g., not joining the PRON-cells, not create new trade unions based on the act of October 8<sup>th</sup>, do not appear on TV, do not enter into any relations with the occupant. If, however, there would be no of such disputes, discussions and internal critics inside the opposition, society would never gain the political consciousness. For example, we are pleased with the Nobel prize for Lech Walesa, we consider it a big success and his and Poland. Lech Walesa deserved the Nobel Prize a long time ago. But does it mean that we have to hide political differences that divide us, stop speaking and writing about them, and start to hide them in our midst? But we live with the discussion about politics. Cessation of political disputes would mean the closure of the only this type of journal in Poland and resignation from politicisation of the democratic opposition. For publishing of collaborators lists and declarations of peace are other publications, every reader has the right to choose.

Besides, why should we, in the name of false unity, be silent? Perhaps the supporters of a settlement and compromise would silence? After all, they too - like us - violate the unity.

The practical consequence of the lack of political discussion within the opposition is a failure to emerge of the political leadership of the underground (the TKK does not even pretend to be). It would have to arise as a result of an alliance of various pro-independence groups. For these to fully define, previously must develop the political thought. For this you need to have: thinking - discussing, criticizing - writing. And we came back to square one.

How should you discuss and criticize? Democrats can be recognized not by the fact that they do not criticize anyone, especially they do not criticize the TKK and Walesa, but by the fact that they do it, even harshly, but only on paper. To put it bluntly, you can (but better not) even "spitting", but openly and not behind; if some concepts we consider to be stupid and/or harmful, then we write that they are stupid and/or harmful - but not gossip in the workplaces of their authors secret police connections. That's why - we also have the right to call ourselves democrats, even though we don't agree with the majority of the opposition.

In conclusion, we answer the question posed in the title of the article: think about freedom, look for ideas and conduct disputes about them.

*Antoni Wichrzyciel*

## Union syndrome

There is a discussion in the Polish underground press. Its participants, after conducting analysis of the current political situation, formulate strategy and tactics of the underground at this stage of the fight against the Reds. More and more followers seem to gain the concept of its politicization, which has long been proposed by the "Independence". Interestingly, the opponents of this concept no longer ignore it, and finally have a substantive discussion with us.

Recently, a publicist of "Robotnik"<sup>[1]</sup> Paul Witkowski in the article "Independence Syndrome" totally criticized our point of view. He believes that we propose an *"alternative"* to the current *"way of political thinking"*. It consists in *"a firm negation of what has happened so far. It is not a negation of the achievements of individual opposition groups. It is not even a negation of the output of "S". It is a negation of the whole political philosophy created before August, and embodied into force after August"*. It leads to the rejection of the activities set *"on building of independent of the state structures of civic activity, treated as an intrinsic value, unsubordinated to the current, practical political goals"*. *"The philosophy of 'N' "boils down" to the two – basic objectives: first, to 'focus on the political fight', and secondly to 'subordinate to tasks of this struggle all independent social activities' "*.

The above claims are based on a misunderstanding. Indeed, we consider it is necessary to *"focus on the political struggle"*, we aim *"to subordinate all independent civic activity to the objectives of this struggle"*. To subordinate but not to abandon. This trend is so visible in our journalism, that e.g., in the opinion of the editor of Paris' *"Information Bulletin "S"*, Seweryn Blumsztajn<sup>65</sup>, discussing on the waves of "Voice of America" and deeply and honestly - №21/22 issue of our journal, *"beyond the putting forward the postulate of formation of political parties, the proposals from 'Independence' do not differ from one coming out of from TKK"*.

Seweryn Blumsztajn doesn't notice, however, that there is a fundamental difference between the TKK and solidarity oriented current, and the "N" orientation. It expresses itself primarily not in what we propose ("forming political parties"), but in what we do not propose. Well, we do not propose to fight with the Red by lighting candles, one-second lasting strikes and, most importantly, do not propose the settlement with communists. We propose, however, a political struggle, certainly a long and difficult one, but with the prospect of an independent and democratic Poland.

Well, just the concept of political struggle (*"Philosophy 'N'"*) the publicist of "Robotnik" considers as a simple one, but he is of the opinion that *"the basic goal of all opposition activities for today and for tomorrow must be, in the social*

*dimension, the struggle for reconstruction of society, its awareness and activity, material and cultural. The only method leading to this is the long-term struggle to create, strengthen and expand independent civic structures".*

Such a struggle - the pursuit of social self-organization -, in the opinion of Pawel Witkowski, we reject. We argue, however, that an exit from the conceptual impasse of the underground would be a direct political struggle opening the far-reaching perspective, giving the feeling of a kind of superiority over *'the plain and un-politicized crowd'*", allowing *escape from the dilemmas of not always clear reality towards the bright, but of necessity simplified, solutions"*. This philosophy – claims Pawel Witkowski - *"is simple and it is not difficult to come up with it. The pre-August opposition simply resigned from it, considering it ineffective both politically and socially. And it still should be treated as such."*

One would like to remind here the author of these words, that the pre-August opposition, in large part consciously gave up on the philosophy of creation of an independent trade union movement. One of the major oppositionists discarded the proposal of organizing the Free Trade Unions (by answering to Kazimierz Switon: *"Sooner the cactus will grow up on my hand, Mr. Kazimierz"*) so effectively, that even the intelligentsia adviser to dissuade shipyard workers sticking to this postulate (see *T. Kowalik memories in № 2 of Paris 'Zeszyty Literqckie'*", domestic reprint by *"Oficyna Wydawnicza": N°2, 1983*). Meanwhile, unexpectedly for everyone, this postulate not only turned out to be realistic, but the independent structures created as a result of its implementation ("Solidarity") dominated the activities of Poles for at least three years. However, they dominated so effectively that despite two years of disappointment and continuous disappointments (people don't want strike, demonstrate, disperse placards; Reds don't want talk), the opposition of the post-December didn't manage to break free from the TRADE UNION SYNDROME, falsifying the reality and limiting political reflection. A good example of limitations resulting from this syndrome is the reasoning of Pawel Witkowski.

Columnist of "Robotnik" fails to recognize that the demand for politicization of the underground is not contrary to the struggle for the *"reconstruction of society, its consciousness and activities ..."* Bah! In our opinion, political awareness is an inalienable attribute of a *"reconstructed society"*. On the other hand, underground activities carried out in order to reach an agreement with the Red, talks *"like a Pole with a Pole"* or, according to today's customs, *"like a doctor with a doctor"* do not serve the purpose of rebuilding society and its awareness.

The conviction that *"creating, strengthening and expanding civic structures"* is to be the goal of the opposition activity anno 1984 proves of not reaching conclusions from the not-so-distant past. The independent structures – let be open, we mean primarily "Solidarity" – can't exist in the totalitarian system, at the best case, they are barely tolerated ... and liquidated, as soon as the situation allows it.

Therefore, we recognized that of the two currently unrealistic policy options, i.e., the fight for the re-legalization of the "S" and the fight for a free Poland, more purposeful is political activity, affecting for now, least for public awareness and bringing together people around the second choice. At this stage of the struggle against communism, our objective is to inspire the pan-society political discussion, which would teach us thinking in categories of the restoration of an independent Polish state, democratic election and governance and conduct an effective liberal economic policy. Achieving this state of consciousness by Polish society we consider as an essential and initial condition for the success of the future Polish revolution. *"Creation, strengthening and expanding independent civic structures"* should be only the means leading to the goal, which should be an independent and democratic Poland. Without this awareness, even the largest Polish sacrifices made to expand freedom and rebuild society in the framework of the communist system will bring closer this desired goal. The path to its implementation includes, among others, *"creating, strengthening and expanding"* such *"independent civic structures"* as political parties.

The proposals of the trade union opposition should be regarded as extremely important, but only a stage, that facilitates us to organize ourselves in order to regain independence and the entry into the independence as somehow prepared society. Therefore, the negation of legality of communist rule in Poland, has become a political necessity. From this task the opposition should start deliberations on the strategy and fighting tactics. In our opinion, it should be based on questioning the legitimacy of the communist government in our country by creating an underground political system capable of taking power under favorable circumstances - for example through free elections.

The more conscious and organized (Pawel Witkowski would say: rebuilt) society - even in the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy - the better for our cause. Our point is, that the goal for attaining which society would be organized should be a real one, though difficult to come true, and not an illusory mirage.

*Arkady Akwedukt*

"Independence" № 26, February 1984, pp. 4-6

## **The Gentlemen's Voice**

"Tygodnik Mazowsze" N°71 of December 8, 1983, publishes an interview with the head of the inter-factory information network of "TM". We can read there: *"Q.: From what you are saying, it looks that the typical union activity is very limited. Ans.: Activists "S" are interested primarily in politics, not union affairs. They shout to form parties. I still ask them, why they don't undertake the variety of tangible actions. They should throw slogans to people that you need to*

*write this and that on the wall, that you have to fight, for example, to fix the ventilation, for things that would catch on".* The view of the head of the information network seems to be a direct extension of the views of leaders of "Solidarity" from a higher level. A little earlier, we could read interviews with Wiktor Kulerski and Zbigniew Bujak, members of the Warsaw RKW:

*"Ed.: What is the attitude of the union leadership and your personal towards various political initiatives within the Union or sometimes beyond its structure? To what extent can these initiatives help "Solidarity" activities as a trade union?*

*Victor Kulerski: Each group and each structure and acting for the Self-Governing Republic are useful and can relieve the Union when their existence does not end on empty words only. If you ask about the political groups, let me ask you what have they done so far? What programs did they introduce, what methods of their implementation did they propose, what actions did they take to make their plans a reality, and what is the result of this? Only when I receive the answer to these questions will I be able to answer your question. With signboards, declarations, and slogans nothing will be done. What is needed is a work". ("Wola" № 37/39 dated November 21, 1983., the newspaper of Warsaw's MKK).*

*"Ed.: All these points to the politicization of 'Solidarity'. So, is it not time to form political parties?*

*Zbigniew Bujak: By existing and acting in the present conditions in the underground, the Union is much more identified with the form of organization of the whole nation, than it was before martial law. Now is the time of unified action, unified goals. It is no coincidence that no significant political parties were formed, at most the program declarations only. It is conceivable that in the future, different political directions will concentrate in different parties. It will be the time of divisions because there are various trends within the Union" ("TM "№ 69 dated 11/24/1983).*

Gents Zb. Bujak and W. Kulerski, although trade unionists differ a lot from their colleagues in other countries even encourage the frontline members to get interested in politics. After all, unions are generally tied to specific political parties. The most venture out gent W. Kulerski - unless he doesn't read at all the underground press (except "KOS" and "TM"), as he did not notice even a strong politicization of the whole Lower Silesia Region of "S". Issued by the "press consortium Solidarity" of this region ("*Solidarnosc Walczaca*") publications are highly politicized. "Solidarność Walcząca" presented its first program (rather social democratic) over a year ago and develops it in discussions with readers and the underground press (including our journal), it also has branches in other cities (Katowice, Częstochowa, Łódź) and gains new supporters not thanks to names, but



thanks to an attractive program, with a visible but not accentuated opposition to the TKK, and with a good organization. Thanks to the "SW" movement, based on the Frasyński's line, the Lower Silesia is the liveliest region of the union movement. Mr. W. Kulerski doesn't notice it. Could it be, because the province can do better? Let him become a politician himself and show that he can do better.

Mr. Zbigniew Bujak's statement is easier to interpret. For completely unjustified reasons, he is afraid that the time of the formation of political parties will be a period of disintegration of "Solidarity". After all, the "S" unity has always been illusionary. The various view clashed with the different views and fledging groupings (some even caricatured as the so-called "*True Poles*"). Presently, "S" should simply be the union headquarter, uniting all trade unionists in Poland, regardless of their political views; would unite everyone to whom the so-called Neo-Unions do not fit. "S" is also a continuation of the will of the 10 million members, who never denied its legality after December 13<sup>th</sup>, 1981.

By creating our liberal-democratic program and grouping around it our supporters, we do not want to pull away anyone from the "S" – the trade union. When we are asked about the union affiliation, we answer "Solidarity". Mr. Zb. Bujak says that because at the moment there are no divisions, the "S" is identified with the whole nation. We don't have the ambition to speak on behalf of the entire nation - we speak only for ourselves. We think that if Zb. Bujak wants to speak on behalf of the whole nation in purely union matters, he has an obvious right to do so but unfortunately, the line between what is purely a union matter and the rest is not clear.

In the interview given by Zb. Bujak, the word "politics" appears many times. It is discussed, for example, how to behave during the upcoming elections to the so-called national councils<sup>66</sup> and the Sejm. This is obviously a political issue, not a union one. We know many cases from the history of individuals proclaiming: "*I know best what is best for my nation*"; that says almost every politician, but the tragedy is when it usurps the right to speak on every issue in the name of the nation, and the worst, if in that case, he doesn't allow others to speak.

Many times, we have heard the opinions that the political groupings (although most - frequently - as the worst – its mentioned "Independence") – are a small group of jealous and megalomaniacs, who would like that the TKK would step down and to take power (!?) over the underground by the anonymous coterie. Nothing is more untrue: "S" exists in Poland and must exist TKK, RKW, inter-factory coalitions, Secret Factory Commissions, and even the Foreign Office of "S". Exists should also the political parties, and altogether only, we can create with our own political programs and with the union activities the opposition against the communists. the cooperation model we describe in the article *Unity in diversity* proposes the formation of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy. Only restoration of democracy will guarantee political freedoms and create the conditions for the union members to improve their material

situation. Such movement can be led by TKK, Chairman "S" Lech Walesa, or someone else; the point is to act together, and not see ourselves as competitors. Groupings around "N" for example are not a trade union organization, and "S" doesn't claim that it's the political party either! Besides, various underground political parties should also establish, within the framework of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy agreements on ways to fight the communists.

Expressing oneself in the name of the entire nation, without trying to seek its opinion, is the second national defect of Poles. In the case of the leaders of the PZPR, it was called as being "cut-off from the masses". We regret to notice that recently, apart from TKK, also commonly practiced this Mr. Lech Walesa (or rather those who write his speeches). It is glaring with Mr. Walesa that he stated on a multitude of occasions: *"we are all for socialism"* and *"we do not want to overthrow the rulers"* (statement at the shipyard during the meeting with Rakowski, speeches in Oslo, numerous interviews). These are probably the tactical maneuvers, but it would be better when you do not have the honest results from the public opinion pools, to begin such sentences with the word "I".

Let us return, however, to the statement of the "TM" chief of information network. He is certainly responsible for informing the "top" of the moods within the union's membership base. Probably he also knows that after two years of war, hardships of conspiracy, the general lack of interest in the activities of the underground – the Secret Factory Commissions (TKZ) are just groups of friends who meet from time to time. The opportunities for pure union action are getting smaller and smaller every day. Generally, they deal with the distribution of underground news press and during the meetings talking about politics. The Chief (of the inter factory information network "TM") appears and after hearing the opinion (*"they shout that parties should be formed..."*), and says: *"you need write on the wall this and that, you have to fight for fixing of ventilation ..."*. Let's consider whether it is just naivety or arrogance like: *"get to the fork ..."*. We hope that only the earlier, although a friend of ours, working in one TKZ, assessed the Chief as follows: *"He talked like a gent with a peasant"* (hence the title of the article). The Chief probably wrote the slogans: "Your winter - our spring", "Free Lech - jail Wojciech", "New trade unions go to graveyards", etc. The Chief (gent) is undeniably the author of the new concept for "S" - underground "Invisible Hand". So soon, when the ventilation goes out, the director's chair breaks down, or some co-operation element is missing in the tank factory - everything will be quickly repaired or delivered, and the "Invisible Hand" sign and the inscription "This is us - Solidarity" will appear. This all will be done by folks of TKZ, they will risk, for such a noble act, to be kicked out of work or thrown into prison!!! We do not criticize the Chief for the fact that he proposes purely trade union activities, not political ones. Contrary to this, we often called the activists of "S" to conduct it actively. We understand it above all as the economic struggle with the communists,

and not painting slogans (even witty), or other symbolic activities. How pathetic is that people like Chief are informing the "top" (RKW TKK) about the mood of the base. Based on such information, the leaders of the "S" tell (to foreigners), on behalf of "the whole nation", about the love of the Poles to socialism, etc. Unless hoping to cheat communists, they deliberately falsify the reality ... Oh naive!

*Józef Kisielewski*

"Independence" № 26, February 1984, pp. 6-8

## **The union, the party, or a social movement?**

Our journal clearly stated our position with respect to "Solidarity" from the beginning - we are outside of its structures, we recognize the merits of the Union, but organisationally and ideologically we are something completely different. Despite the critical approach to the "S", we allow ourselves sometimes propose new conceptual solutions, hoping that it will help the underground activists to develop a better strategy and tactics of the Union.

"Solidarity" had never been able to define its objectives and character of the activity. This applies to the period before and after December 13<sup>th</sup> as well. Disregard here the reasons for the inability to self-determination, which resulted in an enigmatic definition: *"Solidarity is a social movement"*; but you need to state that this was detrimental to the effectiveness of the Union activity. After December 13<sup>th</sup>, the views of "S" activists oscillated around two concepts: the underground state i.e., the taking over of *strictly* political functions by "S" structures, and a free trade union, for which "Solidarity" is considered in the West (not without significance). These two concepts tried, perhaps, to "reconcile" Kulerski, by giving a new label of *"underground society"*, with its precision rivaling that of the words of *"social movement"*.

Organizational weakness of underground structures "S" and the lack of perseverance and the reluctance of the leaders have decided to defeat the *"underground state"* concept. In the spring of 1982, there was, perhaps, a chance of converting the dispersed organizations "S" into the agencies of the underground state, and TKK into the alternative to the communist power center - nowadays it is not. Abandoning attempts at creating an underground state does not mean that among the "S" activists prevailed the trade-union concept. The crisis of indeterminacy continues along with the disintegration of underground organizations.

The distinction between what is political and what is not, in the totalitarian system is not a simple matter. Never less, it must precede the process of creation of the concept. For the communist, the political significance may also have the Association of Small Animals Breeders, not to mention the millionth trade union.

However, a political or trade union activist must be aware of this difference. It is based on a different strategic goal of the operation. For independent political programs, it must be the changes in the power structure in Poland. Their general direction is obvious; however, different programs can recognize different minimums for changes as sufficient. The “*minimum minimorum*” of different, even conflicting programs is one thing - the recognition by the official authorities of the right to exist of the independent group putting forward the program. Of course, the program cannot be reduced to this postulate alone.

The purpose of the trade union movement is to improve the material situation of the group which interests it has to defend. Political changes are never neutral to the trade unions, but they are not an objective in itself.

Failure by the underground leadership with the work on the creation of a political movement with a clearly formulated strategic goal did not cause the evolution of the Union into the direction of a free trade union. The underground "S" seeks to combine the functions of trade unions and politics, but without formulating neither the political program nor the union one. It does not show to the society the solutions to be pursued, does not affect the political consciousness of supporters by presenting such possible solutions, and on the other hand does not defend the economic interests of its members. The myth of unity and moral coercion to recognize the superiority of "S" impede the crystallization of independent political groups. On the other hand, not putting forward by the leadership of the "S" of hard economical demands prevents the spontaneous outburst similar to December 1970. The underground activists are occupied almost exclusively with the fate of the Union, not remembering that it can not be an end goal in itself.

Workers, idealized by the intelligentsia, especially those with an influence on opinion-forming centers, are primarily driven by economic motivation. They did not boycott work immediately after the imposition of martial law (*see* miners), and the slogan of the work slowdown in August also found a weak response. Lech Walesa himself noted that the slowing down of the pace of work does not have to include piecework workers, as they would lose money. This factor decided on the failure of the strike actions after December 13<sup>th</sup> (before that, the strikes did not directly affect the earnings of the strikers). Strikes, political or *quasi*-political in the current situation may have the following characteristics:

- unlimited strike until the system is overthrown; would be part of a national uprising;
- a strike to force talks with the rulers; strikers and rulers recognize each other and negotiate;
- a strike limited in time and symbolic in nature; it serves to emphasize its existence and protest.

All the above forms of strike the underground "S" tried to use after December 13<sup>th</sup> and all attempts ended in failure. Also, in the near future, you can

not expect the success of similar actions. The strike as part of a national uprising does not seem currently possible to win. Weighs here both the international situation and organizational weakness of the "S". The slogan "The Last Fight" will not find an echo among the workers, who would be the main force of strikers. Similar reservations apply to other forms of strike. The rulers clearly signal that there will not be a repetition of August. The weakness of the "S" does not predict moreover, much chance of success. Knowing these limitations, the Union's activists usually force pseudo-political - symbolic strikes. They have little resonance in society too. There are two reasons: the aim of the strike is symbolic unclear workers (common question: what will it bring?), while the costs, especially of losing jobs – are more than they were willing to pay. The symbolic strikes are objectively harmful also for other reasons:

- they are never tied to presenting the public with a clear political vision, but rather are looking back;

- they direct attention to marginal matters, for example, will they allow flowers to be placed at the monument, or will not?

- they divert attention from the real goals - political and economic; they constitute a safety valve through which relieve the pressure caused by severe living conditions, without giving in return any solutions at the political level.

"Solidarity" should definitely evolve into a free trade union. The actions of the union must, however, be decisive. The concept of taking social activities in the workplace is utopian. Social action (recreation, living allowances, etc.) is needed funds, and with these is a serious problem. Of course, support for the imprisoned, thrown out of work, or low-income earners is necessary. However, this may not be the core of the union program. "S" will never outbid the social action capabilities on the part of the government agencies. If, for example, the statutory benefit is intended as a basic factor, determining the attractiveness of the underground "S", it's, of course, clear that a government-sponsored union could offer benefits far greater. On the scale of the state budget, it will be a minor expense, and in the end, after all it prints the money. If "S" wants to compete with the government in this respect, then the platform of competition is extremely poorly chosen. Trade union activity must rely on the defense of living standards for society and, above all, its basic component - real wages. The previous year saw it drop -as per the government date, most likely faked, by 25%. The first half of the year further deepened it by a further 1%. It should be remembered that the decline did not apply to all wage earners. The strategic groups of large-scale-factories workers were able to defend their earning status, which means that real wages for the remaining majority of society fell much more than 25% - an event without precedent for the country in the civilized world. From the new year, the government has been announcing further price increases, supposedly to a lesser extent, but almost without any compensations.

If the "S" does not want to lose the authority it must oppose this operation. The symbolic strike to commemorate one of the many national anniversaries will not bring any success. The economic strike, purely economic, in defense of impoverished workers, will have a much greater chance of success, thanks to real and clearly defined objectives (repeal of increases or full compensation, calculated by reliable centers), close to every worker, also to those, interesting very little in politics. The government, through the mouths of its propagandists, with minister Krasinski at the front, says that further price increases and the reduction of real wages are unavoidable and that this is due to an objective economic situation. Prior to December 13<sup>th</sup>, "Solidarity" wanted to take responsibility for the state of the economy. After that date, we are exempt from it. The Union recovery demands do not have to be self-restrained by buying-in of government propaganda arguments. If the communists want to have a monopoly on power, they need to pay for it. We are not interested in their internal difficulties. A free trade union is to defend the interests of its members, not of the communists. The struggle to raise the tragically low living standards - is one example of the evolution of the "S" in the direction of the free trade union. If this will happen, it can have many positive consequences for independent movement:

1. Demystification and de-politicization of the Union will allow removing barriers inhibiting the development of political pluralism of independent groupings.

2. Increase the activity of "S" on the basis of real and short-term objectives. Revindication demands of the free trade union do not have to be limited to the payroll issues only, they may have different addresses and deal with the problems of diverse extents.

3. Due to the fact that the addressees of revindication demands will be different levels of government (central, local, enterprises), the Union will exert uneven pressure on the ruling structure, which may lead to cracks in it.

4. Activated Union, of course, would be a natural ally for independent political movements, without interfering too much in the shape of political programs and not limiting their thought horizons with the myth of the sacred organization of "Solidarity" social movement.

5. In the future independent state the existence of free trade unions is obvious. However, it should be pluralistic unions and separated from *purely* political matters. It will be easier to come to this type of trade-unions through the Free Trade Union "Solidarity" than the Social Movement "Solidarity".

*Franciszek Sz.*

"Independence" № 23, November 1983, pp. 5-8

## Unity in diversity

An excellent article from № 11 paper "Wolna Trybuna" of 2.XI.83 r., published by the "Międzyzakładowe Porozumienie Solidarnosci - UNIA<sup>67</sup>" in Warsaw brought us to serious thoughts. The editorials article "In Our Opinion" "WT" draws attention to the possibility of connecting movements (organizations) of political, social, and trade union in something of a *"coalition of the political system, even though the figure as a wise political strategy only, and not the result of a real alliance"*. "WT" indicates that the "S" cells are well positioned in the workplace and can prepare the base (their membership) for political activities, and only they are capable of fighting with the Reds at the economic platform.

There is no place here for reprinting all rightful "WT" comments, but thinking about its proposal, we found that in the addition to political and trade-union there is one more element of the opposition in Poland, which should be a part of that alliance. They are the persons acting openly, that as a result of held authority, or simply age, maybe critically speaking of the Red's doings.

Reflecting on the "WT" proposals, we pointed out to methods of struggle used by the opposition in other countries ruled by military dictatorships (Chile, Turkey, Pakistan), and so we propose the creation of an alliance under the name MOVEMENT FOR THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY!

Members of the Movement can be underground organizations, political, social, and unions, and individuals with high authority acting openly. The Movement is not an organization but a loose alliance. The name "Movement" clearly specifies the purpose of its action. We are convinced that within the "Movement" could meet almost all factions of the Polish opposition. In the restoration of democracy, the trade union organizations would see a guarantee for respecting workers' rights and a prerequisite for improving the Polish economic situation, and political organizations - the condition for the realization of their political, social, and economic programs. In "TM" №64 Zbigniew Bujak stated that now is the time of unity and all divisions, including organizational ones, weaken the underground. One can agree with this thesis only partially:

- The existing ideological and program divisions are an objective fact. Squeezing the entire underground into the "S" frame, as Bujak wants, is now impossible. The months before December have shown that this type of organization is ineffective.

- Organizationally, there is no possibility of creating a single, hierarchical and disciplined structure - so huge, that was the "S". In the underground, many groups, structures, alliances, etc., which use symbolics of "S", because of the weakness of communication are completely separate organizations.

- Since over a year are formed the seeds of political organizations, not using the "S" symbols, not calling themselves the trade unions, but clearly aimed in the direction of political parties. This is a correct and promising process, so there is no reason for these particular groups (frequently originating from ex-activists of "S") to be forced back into the trade union framework.

- There is a need for various organizations and currents to cooperate with each other so that they do not direct their spades primarily against other opposition groups, but against the enemy. The name "Movement for the Restoration of Democracy" is itself a semantic compromise, reflecting the views of moderate groups, as the word "independence" is not used here.

Such a platform would include organizations using the name "S" - the "S" structure as such (TKK, RKW, etc.), inter-company alliances, and outstanding former activists. They would meet there with organizations and not-solidarity activists. After all, it is clear that we share a common goal and divide us the views on how to achieve it. We would see as the underground organizations issuing papers would indicate in the headers that are part of the Movement. Proposals for joint actions (e.g., reaction to "elections") would be discussed in the underground press. The ideal solution would be for the movement's spokesman in the country to be someone acting openly, but not exposed to arrest because of his authority or age. The spokesmen of the Movement would have the right to speak abroad on behalf of the part of society aligned with the Movement.

We understand that this proposal meet may be negatively received, especially by those who function Movement attribute only to "S" and in presented concept may see the competition or even a diversion to the structures of the Union. The movement platform, in fact, does not constitute competition, because it goes on a loose alliance, not excluding open disputes (along with as on the merit) and not of the new hierarchy. We hope that this proposal will be considered by all opposition groups to which arrives. Let us remind you that - the goal is common.

*Editors*

"Independence" № 25, January 1984, pp. 8-9



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## EUROPE OF THE FUTURE

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"Eastern Europe, so she could defy its neighbors, has to be organized differently."

Juliusz Mieroszewski

### Poles on the German question

- I. We can't put aside forever development of the Polish policies:
- eastern - towards the Ukrainians, Belarusians, Balts;
  - southern - towards the Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Romanians, and Balkan nations;
  - German - towards the German nation as a whole.
- We can not give way in fear of counteraction of communist propaganda and Polish national prejudices. We cannot remain silent in the country on the issues of nations of Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe for fear of losing popularity among readers and a decline in the number of our supporters. Because we do not share, and we never shared the naive faith that the USSR will "forgive" us if we will forget about our real neighbors. We thought, that is directed by this motive is stupid and weakened our political position.
- II. It is impossible to win independence for Poland if Poles do not have their own diplomatic service and their own foreign policy. Let us remind you that during the partition period, this role was played by the Czartoryski's Hotel Lambert, and only after 1945 it was decided, it is not known why, that representation of Polish national interests can be entrusted to communists, or more precisely the USSR.
- III. The implementation of the second point, in our opinion, should be sought in three phases:
- a. Start the discussion in the opposition press over the direction of Polish foreign policy and the selection of the most favorable solutions for Poland, but not for the PRL. Individual political movements should develop their own agendas on this issue, and citizens should get their own views. The main opponent at this time will be the chauvinist, muddling communist propaganda and inherited by us prejudices and national schematics. If the society will succumb to them, it will stay longer in captivity, and we will with it as well;
  - b. To reach a consensus of main political movements and to work out a common position on these issues;
  - c. Begin diplomatic action in accordance with commonly accepted position.

While each party may, of course, have its own contacts, programs, and agreements on these issues, the common position would reflect the views and aspirations of society as a whole.

IV. Based on these preliminary assumptions, we started a discussion on foreign policy. We do not hide that we represent a position favorable to Germans.

*"Over a thousand years of history united many Poles and Germans, not only the war but most of all mutual cultural influences, cooperation, etc. Suffice it to recall how many outstanding Poles came from German families and how many famous Germans have Polish ancestors. We see no reason why we should not continue with this tradition, not forgetting of course, about Katyn and Auschwitz, Majdanek and Vorkuta as symbols of totalitarianism, which can threaten both our nations. Incidentally, let us add that the Poles and the Germans, being deported together to Kazakhstan, persecuted and denatured, understood this"*<sup>4</sup>.

We believe that Poles and Germans should understand each other and cooperate because our national interests (unification, independence) coincide. Both nations lost the war; Germany lost rightfully because together with the USSR it was guilty of unleashing it and of the crimes of Nazism, but it was unfairly divided into two countries, one of which - the GDR - was incorporated into a foreign empire; Poland, on the other hand, lost the war and lost its independence as a result of the balance of power that emerged after the defeat of Germany. Both nations are therefore interested in overthrowing the post-Yalta order, which does not have to mean, and in our opinion cannot mean a return to the situation from before 1939.

Pomerania and Silesia were not granted to Poland because at these areas, thousand years before, lived the Slavs (and not the Poles), but as compensation for war losses and territorial equivalent for areas in the east, ceded to the only winner - the USSR. There is nothing to talk about the resignation of the border on the Oder-Neisse line, although this does not mean that we have nothing to offer. We do not get the permanent recognition of our borders (after the German reunification the current pacts will require a new sign-off) if:

- we will wait without conducting any German policy,
- we will fall into irreversible dependence on the USSR, which at any opportunity will conclude an agreement with Germany anyway at our expense,
- we will not make any concessions, constantly emphasizing only what divides us,
- we will become, for the West, a troublesome reserve of nineteenth-century prejudices in the middle of Europe at the end of the twentieth century.

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<sup>4</sup> M.Morfeusz, *Hamburg is not voting for Brezhnev anymore*, Independence №7 1982, p.20.

"Poland has two options to choose from:

- establish political and economic cooperation with Germany; for their support and help in the work of the unification of Germany and agree to certain concessions (e.g., return back to Poland a number of Germans and granting them full rights in force in the country democratic - cal, even those that are Poles in Germany), to ensure recognition of the democratic and independent Polish state within the present borders ...

OR:

- to recognize the Soviet serfdom, give up freedom, independence, and prosperity and constantly live in fear that the USSR, behind our backs, will get into agreement with the Germans on their own, and the costs of that will be paid of course by Poland. We are in favor of the first choice"<sup>5</sup>.\*\*

Germany will unite sooner or later anyway. They can do this with the backing of the West, and therefore against the USSR and at the expense of its interests, which will be beneficial for us, or on the backing of the East, i.e., with help and acceptance of the USSR, which would negate ultimately the possibility of regaining independence by Poland and would include most likely territorial losses.

The Brezhnev-Brandt Pacts marked the legally recognized new frontier of the USSR in Europe; part of this territory is called the PRL<sup>68</sup> (Private Ranch of Leonid - as it was once said) and, of course, it can become the victim of some major transaction of its owner at any time. The partner of Russia in the new division of Poland can only be a pro-Soviet group of politicians from SPD (Brandt, Bahr, Wehner, Schmidt, et al.), striving for the closest possible cooperation with the USSR and in "bargaining" in this way of the GDR. These politicians are the greatest enemies of Poland in Germany. The resistance we put up against the communists keeps them awake at night because it forces them to tighten their course towards Russia. Recall that Brandt did not want to condemn the coup d'état and the crimes of Jaruzelski. Even during the martial law, the planning staff at the Federal Chancellery in Germany has developed guidelines for the Schmidt's government, according to which it should pursue a policy of cooperation, not only economic but also *political* with the USSR, even if it meant - to the risk of conflict with the United States. This is not surprising, since a friend of the USSR in the SPD, Egon Bahr said that in the way of détente "*stand principles and operation of the USA*". It turns out that the genocide in Afghanistan and murders in Poland helps in detente, but disturb it the imperialist Reagan!

E. Bahr is for "*developing a comprehensive relationship with the Soviet Union*" and for moving away from the American "*doctrine of deterrence*".

SPD likes martial law in Poland, one of the deputies of the party in the Bundestag named Polken, after a visit to Poland, declared that the communist

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<sup>5</sup> Ibidem (4)

government implements the "*policy of dialogue and agreement*". Fear even to think about what would happen with Poland and Germany, if SPD would still remain in power in Bonn. The opposite concept of German foreign policy has the Christian Democracy. Helmut Kohl stood up for tightening relations with the United States. (...)

V. Many people believe that the theory of the two enemies is still valid today. Let's take a look, but realistically. Poland fell victim to the aggression of two states. Since then, one of them has not changed significantly, it murdered about one million Poles, and constantly oppresses us in the field of economy, politics, and culture. The second state ceased to exist. On its ruins was created democratic and bourgeois German Federal Republic, formed a new civil society that only wants to live in prosperity and peace. So far, even that part of it is ready to surrender to the Soviet Union (the pacifist movements). If it can pose a threat to us, it is only because of its disgust with the army. Here's the paradox: the disappearance of an essentially hostile to Poland the Prussian militarism is beneficial for us, but common among young Germans aversion towards the army, it can only help USSR in march to the West.

We often forget that, after all, Germans currently also live in Alsace and Lorraine, which belongs to France. And what? Is anyone in Germany demanding that they be joined to Germany? Well! But Germany in France enjoys all economic, political, and national rights, and is free to cross borders (in practice there are no borders in the West) at any time of the day or night. The Germans and the French are free to settle in France and West Germany. In the border districts people are often working in the neighboring country, and no one seemed to mind. Preserved is also the loyalty of the citizens in relation to their own country. Such a model of relations should, in our opinion, become a model for the Poles and the Germans.

The communists must have an enemy, and with the hatred towards it integrate around themselves its own slaves. The more we will succumb to the communist view of the world - through the prism of hate, the longer we will be slaves of Moscow and Jaruzelski.

It must be admitted, that the only aggressive and anti-Polish Germans who still remained in the world are the GDR communists - the best students of Stalin. Let us hope, however, that the Protestant Church, which already spoke in defense of the Poles will have a greater impact on the Germans from the GDR than petty politicians.

In real terms, for a few years after the reunification of Germany, even if some imperialist claims come to the fore among the Germans, they will not have the time and resources for its implementation. The main concern for Germans will re-development of ruined by the communist GDR - the assimilation of its inhabitants, who are thirsty of the western level of consumption but accustomed to life under socialism.

The lingering view among Poles is that the weak and defeated Germany would be the best Polish neighbor. West Germany is currently the only serious barrier to the takeover of Europe by communism. In the future, they will become the most important country in Europe, so for this reason we should come to an agreement with them, settle the conflicting issues and conduct a suitable Eastern policy before that will happen. As long as Germany is divided, Russia will rule over the Elbe and the Vistula. If we want to break out of captivity, we have not only to fight Polish independence, but also to help the Germans in the struggle for unification (and therefore in the fight against Russia), and other nations in their struggle against communism. It is in fact our greatest enemy, to which all disputes should go down to the second plan. If we will not liberate ourselves from the rule of the Soviets, we will not have even the occasion to argue with their neighbors, and at most Moscow will send our soldiers to Afghanistan, as it did with obedient GDRs and Bulgarians. To put it bluntly - the reunification of Germany against Russia is more beneficial for Poland than its division because it pushes the USSR away from Europe. The consequence of this reunification will be, over time, an increase of the power of Germany, but on the border with independent Poland, and not with the Soviet republic.

VI. After the liberation of Eastern Europe, the relations with the West will fundamentally change, and will also transform our relations with our neighbors. If we are to be a democratic country, we will have to consider, e.g., the right of all to choose their residence, and this means not only trips of Poles to rich America and Germany, but also the arrival to Poland guest workers from countries poorer than us. Such processes did not harm the West, and they will not harm us either. The one hundred percent nation-state myth is harmful - the effect of the communist policy of isolation. And further, if we are to be a democratic society, caring for the rights of citizens in relation to our compatriots residing e.g., in Germany, Lithuania, Ukraine, etc., we will have to grant the same rights to our minority groups. And if in this situation it happens that a German wants to come to Poland and settle here, we will not be able to forbid him. Larger-scale emigration is questionable because of the ruin left in Poland by the communists. Over 300 thousand Poles live permanently in Germany already, and in the future, this number will increase even more and no one is going to expel them from there. If in the West there are any restrictions in this area, it is only because of economic reasons. Everyone is happy to see the immigration of wealthy people who will invest (new jobs), and spend, or are highly qualified. After the liberation, the same processes will take place in Poland. Moreover, we will be directly interested in foreign investments, and for geographical reasons, these will most likely be German and/or international capital. New investments – these are new jobs, orders, modern technical solutions; finally, the whole world is seeking foreign investment, and our post-communist economy will not kick in without them. It should be emphasized once again that we do not see anything wrong and abnormal in the

possible settlement of Germans (and representatives of other nationalities) in Poland, as long as it does not infringe the interests of Polish citizens. We will be happy to see all the foreign investments, provided only that portion of the profits will be reinvested in Poland. We also want to regulate on these principles our Polish-German relations

*Mieszek Morfeusz*

"Independence" № 10, October 1982, pp. 16-17

## **Europe of the future**

Foreign policy in Polish opposition activities has never gained much recognition. The main reason for such a state of affairs was turning to the issues of current struggle and winning single skirmishes, e.g., with regime legislation. As a whole, the vision of the character of future Poland has been postponed into an undefined future. However, it is obvious that it is impossible to conduct any action at the political level without any detailed clarification of the foreign aspects of this policy. Only then you can present a comprehensive program of political solutions and, depending on this seek supporters. Our liberal-democrat group has the paramount goal of conducting the activities for regaining Poland the political independence. Without it, there can be no question of respecting human rights, the influence of the citizen on the system of governance, self-government, and the wealth of the society. And the only way that can bring this goal closer, is directing the efforts leading to eliminating the provisions of the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam agreements. A chance to serve this cause well is the re-evaluation of the consciousness of Poles themselves, as well as their neighbors and other countries in the East and West. To do this for the benefit of the same independence, it must present a political program, that would be acceptable to all concerned.

In a word, a model of the Polish state's foreign policy should be created, which currently propagated would combine efficiently our efforts for the liberation, and later, implemented in free Poland, would constitute a joint guarantee of not repeating of the colonial dependency. The case is of great importance, because in the Polish nation, as in neighboring nations, the historical knowledge on common subjects is reduced in many cases to stereotypes that have their source in centuries-old biases.

So, there is even a necessity of conducting the Polish foreign policy right now, in the interests of the nation, for which remained the only one way out – the fight-out for independence. To do this, however, it must fulfill the basic condition - the creation of a political representation of the nation, composed of all pro-independence political parties, representing a diverse range of views and political

attitudes of their supporters. As long as the Polish opposition, here in the country, does not realize this, it will be doomed to the prospect of short-term objectives and operating with categories of wishful thinking. In our understanding, it is necessary to create in Western Europe the representation of the Polish resistance movement: political parties and groupings. We gave it the name of the Polish National Representation - PRN<sup>69</sup>. Its main task would be, at least in the first stage, the political influence on the governments and parliaments of Western Europe, by presenting the true interests of the Polish nation, and especially its unequivocal negative attitude to the resolutions of Yalta. It seems that the Polish National Representation, serving as an expression of the national interest of the Polish nation, has some chance of getting recognition from Western governments, especially now when the Soviet threat became more real than ever before. Regardless of what the political fate of PRN would be, its formation would be a big step forward, reflecting the political changes taking place in Polish society. Not excluded is that after a certain time, similar political representations would be emerging from other conquered countries of the Soviet camp. Their possible joint action would be an important step towards future co-operation of the free by then countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Inevitably, before the appointment of PRN, it should be as precise as possible to agree on Polish political interests, that will determine the outlines of an independent Polish foreign policy.

Presenting below some comments on this subject we mark, that we do not pretend to the role of the only exponent of the needs of the Polish nation and represent only the views of our liberal-democratic grouping. Like other thoughts, we also submit these to the judgment of the readers, hoping for a thorough discussion with people standing on the right and to the left of us.

We are and will remain in the sphere of influence of both East and West, because we will not change our geographic location, and similarly, will not change this the other nations living in Europe. In our part of the continent, for centuries, the most important issue was to solve the political problems arising from the German-Russian neighborhoods. To avert once and for all the threats to our independence and freedom, coming from these two neighbors, our group is in favor of ensuring the basic principle of equality of the independent Polish state with all other countries, including its closest neighbors as well. However, securing Poland's interests cannot be limited only to international pacts and international agreements. As we know, they are very unstable if they are not followed by actions of political practice. The Jagiellonian understood this well when they realized that Poland could defend itself against the attempts of the Teutonic Knights and the Habsburgs only in a coalition with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The Polish-Lithuanian Union was created for two centuries, ensuring the security and development of the Republic for a long period of time. Of course, if we give this example, it is not in order to promote, for example, the polonisation program of other nations, but only to realize the readers that Poland left alone in the center of

Europe will always be a tasty morsel for much more powerful neighbors. That is why today you must take steps for the creation of an alliance of enslaved nations of Eastern and Central Europe, transformed in the future - after defeating the Soviet imperialism - into the more or less loose form of federation or confederation. Therefore, Poland must now also act for the liberation of Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, not only for its own freedom but also for the freedom of peoples with whom it should be bound by a political and economic alliance in the future.

In practice, in addition to the countries already mentioned, we would also see Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and possibly Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania in the composition of the Central and Eastern European Community. The creation of the new European Community would create - after Russia and the Western European Union - the third economic power, political and military defending joint interests of these nations, so badly experienced in past, and besides being a factor of order, freedom, and peace in this region of the world.

The countries of Central and Eastern Europe would have concluded agreements with one another and formed an economic and passport union, would guarantee the political and cultural freedoms for minorities, would create the possibility to settle freely in any country chosen by the citizens. If such cooperation would happen, the Poles - the strongest and practically most numerous in this region couldn't create danger for its potential federal or confederal partners. As wrote one of our correspondents in a discussion of the program principles, in our part of Europe there are no equitable borders. Each specific solution hurts one of the parties. That is why we call for the recognition of the current borders by Poles, i.e., leaving of the former Polish eastern borderlands with independent Lithuania, independent Belarus, and independent Ukraine, in particular the vicinity of Vilnius and Lviv, on the basis of a sovereign Polish decision, and not as a result of the Yalta dictate of the Big Three. This would eliminate the hotbed of disputes - between the Poles and their eastern neighbors and significantly weaken - as we hope - their fear of Polish domination within the postulated confederation.

An important factor in Polish foreign policy should be to work out the position with respect to the Russian nation and to the future Russian state, founded on the ruins of the Russian Empire. In our opinion, it should be based on the principles of equality, partnership, and mutual non-interference in internal affairs. The national interests of the independent Polish state and liberated from the yoke of communism, the Russian state does not have to be conflicting or mutually exclusive. Poland, however, should be a champion of the final liquidation of the Russian imperialism hanging over the history of this country at least since the time of Peter I. We recognize the Russian nation as the captive by the communists and deprived of its rights. We believe that this nation, like every other, also has the right to live in freedom and liberty. Therefore, we postulate that the Polish political groups would grant their support to the Russians, who dedicate their actions for



the liberation of the Russian people from the rule of communism and the rebirth of political, social, and cultural life who struggle with rooted in this nation Great-Russian chauvinism and nationalism, being the nourishment for despotism and imperialism.

With Russia free and independent, covering *only* their ethnic territories (Asian and Caucasian republics also need to get independence), Poland should maintain friendly relations and conduct bi-lateral business. Poles in these areas must have the right to return to their homeland or to full cultural autonomy. Solving the problem of national minorities in European countries of central and eastern Europe would certainly facilitate the signing by all interested parties to the convention on common citizenship.

As for the other neighbor - Germany - we are in the position - of inviolability of the Polish-German border on the Oder and Neisse. Its legal temporariness, emphasized by some political circles in Germany, must be confirmed by a future peace treaty or by other international legal acts. An Oder-Neisse border is primarily a form of compensation for material damage and territorial losses that Poland suffered as a result of World War II. The clock of history can not be turned back. Therefore, bearing in mind the German crimes, as well as the Soviet crimes, we must turn to the future, proposing an order in Europe that would protect Poland and other countries against the war for changing the borders. Note, however, that in a free Germany they are born and raised two generations, that did not see Nazism. In general, the German society is friendly towards Poland, and the so-called vengeance tendencies are political margin artificially blown out by the communist propaganda in order to fall out the Poles and the Germans and to divert attention from the main enemy of Poland today, which is the Soviet Union.

In accordance with the principle of self-determination, the Germans have the right to live in unity - like every nation. We are in favor of German unification and the creation of a free, independent German state. This evolution should contribute to good neighborly relations between our nations. Of course, there should be mutual guarantees for the rights of national minorities in both countries.

And finally, not having our own statehood, actually occupied, we count on understanding and help from Western Europe and other free and democratic countries in the world. We do not mean it, *"that there is no just Europe without independent Poland"* because politics is never guided by sentiments or moral rations, but about the understanding of the basic principle that only the weakening of the communist empire of the USSR is efficient protection of the political independence of the Free World.

There will be lasting peace in Europe, when it becomes a continent of democratic states and free nations, working together for the freedom and prosperity of its citizens; a continent, where will be no place for the anachronistic reserves of *"socialist democracy"*, *"communist prosperity"* and *"limited sovereignty"*.

To achieve such a state, you must resign from the policy of short-term gains (e.g., Siberian gas, trade with the USSR) in favor of the perspective actions, to make it easier for societies (nations) of Central and Eastern Europe to fight for the implementation of the principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human and Citizen Rights

*Wojtek Wojskowy*  
"Independence" № 26, February 1984, pp. 10-12

## **Polish national representation**

Currently, the whole foreign propaganda for the "S" directs the Coordination Bureau (BK) "S"<sup>70</sup> in Brussels. The political line represented by BK "S" is not only unsatisfactory but even harmful from the point of view of the independence stream of our opposition. This is happening for six reasons:

1. BK "S" must avoid any more specific accent of its political identity because of the institutions that finance the Office, and among the trade unions, political parties, and social organizations of the political orientation from the extreme left to extreme right. In the West, trade unions are associated with various political parties and therefore have different orientations. If BK "S" would name itself as headquarters of trade unions of various orientations, it could receive help from all of them. However, since it represents a single union, it must emphasize its apolitical nature. While doing this, it can't in turn, act as national representation, which by its essence must be purely political. This internal contradiction is irreconcilable.

Different organizations through their contacts with the TKK and BK "S" force them to make decisions that go far beyond the framework of a trade union, often purely political, which again contradicts the proclaimed political neutrality and the absence of authorization from the political organizations, which are being formed in the country.

2. BK "S", as the legal and recognized (including the ILO -International Labour Organization) representative of the "Solidarity", can realize, regardless of its will, only a line, which currently accepts Provisional Coordinating Commission (TKK) at home, i.e., conciliatory one. Officially, members of BK "S" must the whole world only that the purpose of the struggle waged underground is an agreement and compromise with the communists, the legal operation of the trade unions (not necessarily "Solidarity") within the framework defined by the communists and Poland stay in the Soviet block. This may be satisfactory from the point of view of TKK, but not from the stand of the pro-independence camp.

3. BK "S" because of the official recognition by the ILO can hold only the trade union platform, which is not sufficient for the pro-independence faction, but for the ILO is the only acceptable solution, because this organization brings together representatives of trade unions, employers and state authorities. BK "S", considered to be a representation of "Solidarity", which is considered (though completely unjustifiably) as a trade union and in this character acting after August, can maneuver only on this platform if it doesn't want to lose the support of the ILO. At the same time the West believe that BK "S" is not a representation of the trade but the nation, to which of course BK "S" has no right, as has been nominated only by the conciliatory TKK, and not by all political directions of Polish democratic opposition.

4. BK "S", as a trade union representative office, is subject to the same limitations as "S" in Poland. Only transformation in an official way of "S" from the trade union into the organization or political organizations would allow the Bureau to take action on the political level. And this is not possible because TKK does not want and can not define itself as a political organization.

5. People working in the Bureau left Poland before December 13<sup>th</sup> and stop in the development of political awareness on the stage of the social activities of KOR, and on the policy of agreements and compromises led by a legitimate "S" in the period of renewal ("*talk like a Pole to Pole*"). These people, also privately, still adhere to the conciliatory policy.

6. Position of the Bureau is dependent on maintaining the myth of "Solidarity" – the 10 million people acting at the command of the TKK. Therefore BK "S" will never notice the pro-independence faction, which criticizes the TKK for agreeableness.

BK "S" must proclaim that it remains representative of the only force of opposition to communism in Poland. Otherwise, it will lose part of donations. And we must remember that keeping the Bureau apparatus is very expensive. It does not mean, of course, out of malice or greed the Bureau workers, but from the simple fact that the maintenance of any official representations is expensive. The appearance of any other force than the underground "S" will lower the position and prestige of BK "S" because it will lose its monopoly, will become the "one of" and not "the only" one. For example, someone may want to give money to the campaign for independence, not for TKK, and this sum will reach the hands of the people, whose BK "S" has recognized as not worthy of support.

TKW and RKW of Mazovia represent the conciliatory line, but no longer have the monopoly on the struggle against communism, because apart of supporters of compromise in Polish democratic opposition slowly and painstakingly are standing apart of pro-independence groupings; being formed the

foundations of the independence movement based on both the structures grown on the basis of the "S" and outside of it. The West doesn't know anything about this. It does not know that the Polish opposition is differentiated, does not know that part of it is struggling already not for an agreement, but for the independence of Poland and the liquidation of the Soviet empire. Without knowing it, it cannot help. This situation results from the monopolistic position of BK "S" and its use of strict censorship. The most important is the fact that it's not indifferent to the independence movement, of what views and programs will be proclaimed by the Poles in the West.

What I wrote should not be interpreted as strikethrough the sense of existence and operation of the Bureau of Coordination of "Solidarity". Our objective is not the criticism BK "S" for what it can't be and won't be, but an indication of the need to supplement the foreign representation of "S" with the institution, which would operate only at the political level and would be the representation of pro-independence political parties operating at home. Without being restrained by the union-like limitations, it could lead the Polish foreign policy, promoting the political objectives of the pro-independence o the opposition at home. The independence movement can not give up its own representation in the name of supporting of fictitious unity of all opposition, held by force in the trade-union straitjacket because it would mean giving up on driving the pro-independence propaganda in the free world.

We have nothing against the fact that the union compromisers, forming part - but only part – of the "solidarity movement", had their agencies in the West. This does not mean that we are to resign from forming our own center. (...)

*Mieszek Morfeusz*

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## **Can Poland be independent by itself?**

Let us consider the problem of the directions of foreign policy that should be chosen to ensure our country's lasting independence.

Interwar period showed that while under favorable circumstances (the weakening of Russia), we can regain and maintain independence (1920 - Battle of Warsaw), it constantly threatens it the agreements of Russia and the West (with Germany - Pact Molotov- Ribbentrop, Brezhnev-Brandt accords, or with the USA and Western Europe - Yalta and Potsdam Agreements). To prevent this from happening, two conditions must be met:

- leading to the emergence of new forces east of the Oder, which will become the partners, in place of Russia, and a counterbalance to Europe, and a better ally for the USA than the EEC<sup>71,\*</sup>

- lead to the permanent weakening of Russian statehood, presently in the form of the Soviet form, through the creation of independent national states in the lands seized by Russia or the Soviet Union (and thus the reunification of Germany).

The creation of an independent and permanently sovereign Polish state is therefore related to the reconstruction of geopolitical relations in Central and Eastern Europe.

Russia has always been and will continue to be a threat to our statehood, while Germany can threaten us in the future economically only. That is why our cooperation with them should be based on our own political strength (even long after the liberation, we will be bankrupt economically and we will not be the serious player in his area) and on the major alliances, especially with the US. However, in order to be a worthwhile partner in such an alliance, we must represent this considerable political force, which puts us at the starting point and forces us to create a counterweight to a united Germany based on a new eastern and southern policy.

Strong political Poland can not be imagined in the late twentieth century as a state-of hegemony, which leads subordinate to its power smaller countries, but as a democratic state, which itself resigns of certain short-term or even illusory benefits for the far-sighted policy agreements and alliance with countries and neighboring nations, gravitating equally with us to Western culture than to the Eastern whip. Polish political force should result from the attractiveness of cooperation with it, mutual security guarantees, and economic and cultural benefits.

Until now, the nations and states of Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe have lived in constant disputes; caught up in mutual hatred they become the subjects of political maneuvers first, and subsequently colonies of the USSR. This situation should end with the formation of the Confederation, i.e., the Union of Central, Eastern, and the Southern European States. Let me recall that it was Russia that blocked the creation of the Polish-Czechoslovak federation (pact Sikorski-Benes) and prevented an attempt to form the Balkan federation (Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania). Only the Confederation, whose members comprised of the western colonies of the USSR and the "*people's democracies*" countries could ensure the lasting independence of Poland, and the struggle for the creation of this Union would be synonymous with the struggle for liberation of Europe from the Soviet shackles. Our foreign policy should therefore be subordinated to the creation of this Confederation in the future. This assumes:

- the need for immediate and unequivocal recognition by democratic opposition, on behalf of the Polish nation, the right to self-determination e.a., the establishment of their own independent state, for all the nations subjugated by the Soviet Union, and earlier by Russia, without looking back for the possible wrath of Brezhnev;

- the necessity to immediately and unequivocally recognize the present eastern and southern border of Poland as the final one; leaving Vilnius to the Lithuanians, not the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic, Lviv to Ukrainians, not USSR and Belarusian territories – to Belarusians, but not BSRS, and finally Zaolzie – to the independent and democratic federation of Czechs and Slovaks.

"Independence" for its part, gives unconditional support to the democratic and independent Baltic states, Belarus and Ukraine, recognizing the current Polish border with them (i.e., Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine) as western borders and recognizing the current border with Czechoslovakia, and expresses its after-pressure for all democratic forces fighting for the independence of the so-called "people's democracy" countries.

The recognition of current borders in no case means the abandonment of even one Pole living outside the country. Because we think - I know that it is much more important than the struggle for extending the boundaries of the struggle for the right of Poles to Polishness. Therefore, we will fight with full determination to grant the full rights to all citizens of Polish minorities (national, political, and religious), while mutually recognizing the same reciprocal rights of all minorities living in or are likely to live in our country. This means, for example giving the Ukrainians living in Poland the right to return to the Bieszczady Mountains and conduct of their business, political and national activity or to emigrate to the West or to an independent Ukraine.

It should also be noted that in the case of the creation of the Confederation there will take place significant migration moves, which we will not counteract. They will result from the recognition of the right to freedom of choice of residence and due to transfer to the industrial centers of the workers from the non-industrial areas, for example, an influx of Romanians to Poland, Poles to into the Czech Republic, etc. In this situation, the existence of a strong Polish colony in Lviv, and Ukrainian in the Bieszczady, Krakow, or Warsaw and enjoying all rights, will be completely normal, more forthcoming than dividing our peoples.

The beginning of the perspective presented here should be:

1. Establishment of cooperation by the Polish pro-independence opposition with national minorities living in Poland, with democratic groups in neighboring countries, and with democratic organizations of these nations in exile.

2. Helping the organizationally weaker societies and conducting of joint actions within and outside the (socialist) camp.

3. Creating agreements and accords of a perspective character.

At the same time, we must be prepared for the fact that the Polish opposition, as the most developed, can "escape forward" and leave far behind other democratic groupings and therefore isolate itself. We also need to be aware that in the event of the collapse of the Soviet empire there will be a need to give political support to weaker partners.

*Mieszek Morfeusz*

## Independence

Independence for us is not just an intrinsic value, but also the condition enabling the creation of a libertarian and democratic political system for Poland. But in order that this free and democratic Poland would not be a temporary creation between one captivity and the other, its independence must have a solid base in the new balance of power in Eastern Europe, must be based on a new relationship, not on the chimeric treaties, which the stronger can always break. And here we come to the center of the issue: the Polish interests - independence - is completely contrary to the interests of Russia – the domination over Eastern Europe, at least over the lands of the former Polish Republic, enabling access to Europe. Such is the interest of any state that exists on the Russian plains with its center in Moscow, regardless of its more or less slave political system. Therefore, all attempts to "get along", coming from A. Michnik or S. Kisielewski, who perceives somewhere the possible commonality of interests between Poland and Russia, lead to the voluntary acceptance of eastern serfdom.

The fact of being currently in the Kremlin's serfdom does not necessarily mean that when the opportunity arises to shed the slavery, instead of doing so, we will start to bargain for better conditions. The final dropping of captivity must cost. The sacrifices will be made also with the Polish prejudices and dreams of returning to the former lands

The fights between the elites in the USSR (and only on the second plan popular riots) can lead to a temporary weakening of that superpower, and even the emergence of warring communist power centers, e.g., in Kiev, Moscow, Kazakhstan. In the event of a lost war, this process would occur very quickly. Before the Poles there would be the possibility of regaining independence and a choice between the policy that aims to achieve the status of Finland, and the desire for permanent disintegration of Russia (support for centrifugal movements, even the communist one).

We are supporters of the second concept, because we are only interested in the lasted independence, i.e., to create such conditions in Eastern Europe, in which Russia will not be able to pursue their interests here and turn the imperial and state aspirations to the East. What are these conditions?

The liquidation of communism in the "*people's democracy*" countries and disintegration of the USSR – self-empowerment of the western republics (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Belarus, Ukraine) remaining under the communist rule or not. It is in our interest to create these countries, so we must provide them with political aid at some point, should it be needed. In the case of "*people's*

*democracies*”, it will be support for the overthrow of the communist system, and in the case of the Soviet republics - support primarily for centrifugal tendencies, even communist ones, and only in second place, to influence their evolution towards democracy. This may mean, for example, an alliance with the communist Ukraine against Russia, where the communists would be already replaced by some generals.

The free and permanently independent Poland, in our opinion, may arise only in free-from Russia (and only in the second stage free of communism) Eastern Europe. Joint fight against Russia, however, faces two obstacles:

- the quarrel between nations of Eastern Europe on a platform of very complicated ethnic relations, which allows Russia to manipulate with conflicts;
- unregulated and conflicting relations between Poles and neighboring nations.

Therefore, if we could solve our disputes with neighbors, we could be, to everyone's and our own benefit, function a mediator in conflicts between other nations for example Romanians and Hungarians, Slovaks and Hungarians, Lithuanians, and Belarusians.

We will successfully deal with Russia only if we unite the efforts of all our nations. We are therefore interested in the implementation of this work in the same way, as in the survival of Poland. There is no doubt that the further duration of communism creates a grave danger to our national existence; we are threatened by biological, national, and moral liquidation.

How do we imagine the resolution of our conflicts? We do believe, that absolutely and unconditionally, we must recognize the current borders as inviolable (mutual minor adjustments to the section with Lithuania and Slovakia do not deny this principle), and therefore once and for all renounce the rights to Vilnius and Lviv, however under conditions:

- that they will belong to the independent states of Lithuania and Ukraine, and not to some form of the Russian Federation,
- that the Polish minority living in these areas will obtain all civil rights (economic, political, cultural, national, and religion), which for our part are guaranteed to all minorities already residing and that could even settle in Poland.

We want to arrange relations with our neighbors on completely different principles than the current ones. The right to choose their residence and freedom of movement (virtually borders will be abolished) mean that not only Poles will be able to easily leave the country; others will certainly do so in search of better living conditions. The workers from even poorer regions in eastern Europe may arrive in Poland as well.

Practical elimination of borders and freedom of movement will mean that the Poles wishing to settle permanently or temporarily, for example in the Ukraine, Belarus, or Lithuania, will be able to do so subject to compliance with local laws and at the same time taking advantage of the privileges of ethnic minorities. The principle of dual citizenship in these cases should be settled as a result of separate



interstate negotiations. It will not be so uncommon a Pole in Vilnius and Lviv, but in Vilnius administratively belonging to the independent Republic of Lithuania and Lviv belonging to the independent Republic of Ukraine (our motto is: Ukrainian-Polish Lviv one of the main cities of the independent Ukraine allied with independent Poland).

Let us remember all the time that in practice this will mean an increase in the number of ethnic minorities in Poland and an expansion of the reach of the Polish diaspora. In the more distant future, we should therefore expect that the states of our region will transform themselves into a multinational by choice, and can even come in the perspective of two-three generations to move beyond the historical borders of most of that nation, although maintaining ethnic ties: freedom of contacts, maintaining one's own culture, language, etc.

If, therefore, by creating new conditions we could base it on the principle of mutual tolerance and cooperation, our region could in a completely natural way create a confederation (i.e., the union of sovereign states). These are also our pursuits.

Dear Reader, you need to consider and today answer yourself the question: do you want a Poland that is strong in spirit, radiates culture and absorbs all the best in its surroundings, free and enjoying prosperity, though be a small by area, or do you prefer a Poland that is as equally small, as nobody won't let us take anything from others anyway, quarreling with its neighbors, isolated and sealed in itself. We have already chosen.

Today we offer to other organizations of the democratic opposition to set up a joint committee to develop tasks and principles of Polish foreign policy, then the actions in three directions: the start of wide publishing activities, establish cooperation with the opposition groupings in the "*people's democracy*" countries (previously each group made it on its own, now it would be our common initiative - not in the name of this or that grouping, but the Poles as a nation) and the creation of representative outlets abroad with the task of establishing official relations with the emigrant groupings. The up-to-date actions such as joint meetings or scientific conferences did not have such a political impact.

*Mieszek Morfeusz*

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## **The solution of the Soviet question**

Writing about the future solution to the issue of the Soviet question, i.e., the disintegration of the Soviet empire, many people consider as the time wasted on dreaming of fantastic dreams. However, we should look at this problem not so much in terms of proximity of the disintegration, but for the development of the political course, which will remain in line with the long-term interests of Poland, regardless of the time when it could be realized.

Russia is faced with a choice: internal or external war. There can be no question of any type of reforms because they would have to mean a reduction of the communist rule done with the hands of communists themselves. Everything that has been written about unsuccessful reforms in “*people's democracies*” countries applies even more to the USSR. Possible are, however, partial changes, sham movements, etc. Changes in the structure of power - for example, the replacement of the party by the army and the police - are not considered as reforms, as it does not transform the very structure and nature of power from the point of view of the subjects of the empire. It will be the same communist rule.

The party apparatus has lost its ability to enforce the efficiency of production and is no longer able to act as its organizer. The only proficient institutions remaining are the police and military structures. They will therefore replace the party. In this situation, the external war may be the easiest way to consolidate power within the state.

The easiest way out of the communist crisis is the conquest of new areas. However, it is not about the ordinary conquest, which is a manifestation of the existence of this system (e.g., Afghanistan), but about the seizure of Western Europe, which would facilitate the material survival of the Soviets and postpone the fall of the empire by two or three generations. The outbreak of a war with the West should not be treated either as impossible or as the end of the world. That possibility exists, and therefore we should prepare ourselves conceptually and programmatically for this eventuality. Polish National Representation, negating the Polish character of the PRL – the state form of Soviet and Russian rule over our country - in the event of conflict would be for Western countries a real alternative to the Soviet government of PRL.

If the Soviet Union will not decide, in a short time, to conquer the West, then later will be able to do so (we do not write about war with China, as it's very unlikely for a long time). This does not mean that such a development of the situation will be beneficial for Poland. It will come to the complete self-isolation of the empire for two reasons:

1. political (the desire of the USSR to hold at all costs the possessions and the reluctance of the West to fight with Russia, which is no longer is a danger for it);
2. economic (complete break all trade ties due to the electronic revolution in the West. East will have nothing to offer, similarly to Cambodia, with the possible exception of some raw resources and folk art).

In this situation, the Soviet empire will fall into poverty (widespread hunger), jerked off by rebellions and riots, by fights inside a ruling class: the party against the military, and later individual military fraction against each other, the disintegration of the provinces and the struggle between communist generals, etc. Always, however, the rulers will have enough strength to crush local revolts and revolutions. Russia, having lost hope to conquer the West and remaining

outside its zone of interests (the electronic revolution will cause massive unemployment, and Europe will have enough its own problems), will get a free hand in their colonies, perhaps only for the price of the resignation from the GDR.

Under these conditions, it may also appear the possibility of regaining the independence, but it will no longer depend on the international balance of power, but above all on the situation in the empire itself. Various ideas of taming Russia and breeding here and there of disgusting Russophile, promoting the thesis that for the price of some concessions we could get permanently anything from the USSR, and reluctance to make sacrifices - can then stand on the way towards independence. When the favorable period will pass, we immerse ourselves in captivity only because at the front of the nation were standing the "peace-loving" people. Polish history is full of such missed opportunities. Let quote of J. Lojek that mentions one of them: *"Restoration of the Polish Republic, however, did not depend on Napoleon, who could only give the Polish people a chance to fully unravel the effects of the three sequential partitions. It was not in his power to impose on Europe the reconstruction of great Poland, and assistance in the similar reconstruction would depend on the size of short-term political and military gains, which France could get in exchange. The reconstruction of the Republic could be only the work of Polish population itself. The fact is that given the chance in the years 1806-1812 the Polish society took very little advantage of it, being sluggish and reluctant"*. (J.Łojek, *Public opinion and the genesis of the November Uprising*).

Experience should be drawn from national history, yet the Russophile movement has learned nothing from the mistakes of the past. Its reasoning is based on a fundamental error not to see that our interests and the interests of each nation subjugated by Russia are contrary to their interest. From here it is easy to conclude that the nations with a common interest (at least on the platform of the fight for freedom) should unite their efforts. Therefore, we formulate our thesis as follows: we cannot escape from Russia, so she must be defeated, but this is impossible as long as Moscow has only individual nations against herself, not their political coalition.

Three factors will influence the regaining of independence:

1. The struggle in Poland and the existence of leadership capable and willing to take advantage of a favorable situation, the maturity of the society to regain independence i.e., such behavior, which will allow us, at the critical time to direct all the energy in the struggle with Moscow, and not, for example with own neighbors. In addition, indirectly, the situation in the whole Soviet empire and the international balance of power affects the scale of the pro-independence work. Western countries must know whether they can count on us in their political game with Russia.

2. The joint struggle of Poles and other nations of the empire for freedom against Russia. This is not about the export of the Polish revolution, but rather the export of hope, thoughts, and stimulus for action.

3. The international situation and the activities of the Polish National Representation for regaining of independence, and in favorable circumstances, also supporting struggles of other nations of the Soviet block.

There is only one conclusion for today: we must do everything possible to establish regular and close contacts with our potential allies in the empire itself and in exile, and to consider joint action. Poles have a huge role to play here because of their experiences. We must make Poland the weakest link of the communist chain, which will trigger a revolution and entail others. Without Poland, our neighbors would not cope, but without them, we also will not regain our country.

*Mieszek Morfeusz*

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## Poles towards the eastern question

We can only realize the eastern program, because due to the eastern program Poland stands and falls.

Julian Mieroszewski

The publishing at home <sup>72</sup>a selection of articles of J. Mieroszewski went almost unnoticed. No wonder, since the home-based publicists get used to excite themselves with elaborates about finlandization, not reaching neither by the thoughts nor by the spirit beyond the programs outlined in the first, the infancy period, of the formation of the Polish democratic opposition. In Mieroszewski's writings, you will not find the scholarly deliberations on the subject of settlement with the Reds, neither with the Moscow one, nor the local. There is also nothing about social movements and charitable activities, but it is a lot, almost exclusively - horror of horrors – about politics and liquidation of the Soviet Union. Since the undersigned also belongs to not numerous and cursed by the national opposition group of liquidators, I will allow myself to report to the Readers the Mieroszewski's views and discuss them.

Let us begin by looking at the positions represented by the opposition; we can distinguish four different attitudes here:

The first group, represented by A. Michnik, S. Bratkowski, S. Kisielewski, and J. Kuśmierk, reduces relations with Soviet Russia to the implementation of the Yalta resolutions in a more favorable for us form. A. Michnik writes: *"Everyone who is working to change the 'unfair' Yalta agreements, coming from total irresponsibility or stupidity, exposes to jeopardy the fundamental interests of*

*the Polish people ... we do not fight for some abstract independence, but for sovereignty within the framework of the Eastern bloc". The Russians "will come to terms with a government that does not fully satisfy them, if it gives them peace and military control, they will not allow disorder in the back of their troops. "*

Apparently, the fundamental interest of the Polish nation is an alliance with Soviet Russia! A. Michnik does not understand that within the framework of the Eastern bloc – we can only “do more time” and that he is already “doing his time” exactly “within the block framework”.

A. Michnik is a recognized oppositionist, so his views are unquestionable. I will, however, risk being accused of right-wing nationalism and secret-police inspiration, claiming that I personally consider the recognition of the Yalta treaties as an act of treason.

Of course, the mentioned group is not homogeneous: there were supporters of democratic socialism (Michnik), democratic communism (Kuśmierek) and capitalism (S. Kisielewski). There are supporters of direct dealing with Moscow (Kisielewski), through "ours" reds (Michnik), or even in conjunction with "our liberals" (Bratkowski). From the position of the first group, we will not be discussing, because it is contrary to the adopted by the "N" system of values. The limited sovereignty within the block belongs to the unrealistic and harmful ideas while putting such a goal before the opposition becomes the cause of its ideological weakness, the starting point to wander astray of the settlement. "*Only reforms, never revolution*" - writes A. Michnik, and since the reforms only, then the fight for an agreement, a compromise, an accord.

The other approach, represented, generally speaking, by the signatories of the "Declaration of Solidarity", expresses support for the liberation movements in the empire, and recognizes the right of peoples to self-determination. However, this is not so much a political current but rather an idea trend, a way of thinking which sees the regaining of independence by Poland in the liquidation of the Soviet camp. It is difficult to say whether its followers attach greater importance to the independence movements - fighting with Russia - or to the social movements - the struggle against communism. So what is their relation to the main groups of the Russian opposition and, say, Ukrainian; are they expect to a greater degree the disintegration of the USSR into the independent states, or its transformation into the federal democratic state? What would make them happier?

The third point of view is represented by Mieroszewski, who believes that the most important goal is to overthrow communism (Stalinism) in the USSR and in Russia itself, as this is a condition for us to regain independence. Mieroszewski allows, as beneficial for Poland both, the disintegration of the USSR into the independent states, and its transformation into a democratic union of states. It is opposed to giving support to national movements, fearing that the fight against Russia will cause the Russians themselves will not to abandon communism. Mieroszewski sees the main goal in the social revolution i.e., the

defeat of communism by all nations of the empire. The task of the Poles would be to start a revolution and transfer its ideas to Russia (ethnic) itself. Therefore, he is a supporter of the Polish-Russian alliance and, for example, and the Polish-Ukrainian alliance in the fight against communism, but not in the struggle for an independent Ukraine or ethnic Russia; although he recognizes and supports the right of Ukrainians to independence, it does not consider this field of confrontation as the main one. Independence will come after communism is overthrown, not the other way around. This position will be further discussed in detail.

The fourth group is "Independence", which also considers that Poland regains independence as a result of the liquidation of the Soviet empire, hence the warrant of an alliance with all opponents of the USSR. Of course, we advocate the overthrow of communism in the whole block, but we attach more weight to national revolutions than social ones. Therefore, we support primarily the independence aspirations of our neighbors. We are not interested in the transformation of the USSR into a federation (should I say - confederation) of democratic states, but in disintegration into completely sovereign, democratic states, some of which would bind with Poland on the principles of the confederation (vide EEC).

Sorry, but we are not interested in bringing the anti-communist, i.e., libertarian revolution to Moscow (though to Kiev - yes). The Russians will have to deal with it by themselves. However, we can work with them, provided, however, that immediately and unconditionally (no any future referendums) will recognize the right of all nations to self-determination, i.e., to an independent statehood within the ethnic boundaries, regardless of the number of Russian immigrant population.

Mieroszewski writes that *"Poland can not be truly independent if Russia will retain the imperial status in Europe"*. Let us assume that in the east is created a democratic Russian state, let suppose even that the Russians renounced the Soviet-Czarist chauvinism, imperialism, and all territorial gains of past times, i.e., that Russia has ceased to be Russia. Mieroszewski writes: *"People who say that Russia will not change ... want de facto say, that a democratic and anti-imperialist Russia cease to be Russian"*. However, this was so because *"victorious nations almost never change their historical models"*. *The mother of a 'great change' is usually a defeat. The defeat had (to) convince the majority of Russians, that the autocratic and imperialist model of Russia in any form is anachronistic and therefore does not function efficiently. (...) ... based on the historical (indeed) model of great-Russian autocratic imperialism it was not possible to transform Russia into a modern, democratic state ... the revolution in Russia had to mean not only the collapse of the Soviet system but also the collapse of the historical myth, which blocked the way for Russia into progress more evident than Sovietism"*.

Let us assume that we are past the *"great transformation"*. The American occupation and social revolution (Mieroszewski' writes only about the latter)

instilled democracy in Russia. Thanks to this the Russian state is developing very successfully and very fast; at the beginning mainly economically. Well, what happens next? Does it renounce its leading role in eastern Europe? Does it agree to the closure of their way to Europe via the Baltic States, Belarus, Ukraine, and Poland? Doesn't start to be an attractive center, initially economically and culturally, for the former colonies? In our opinion - yes! The former colonies, unless in the phase of liberation from Soviet Russia will not make ties with Poland, will be later leaned towards Russia, at least Belarus and Ukraine. The peaceful expansion will start and Poland will end up, not like France alongside the USA, but like Panama. Russia has to do all of this, after all, it will not be a masochist, it will not give way to Poland, because of her conscience will haunt her perpetually. Russia, even democratic, or perhaps most of all democratic, will be too powerful for us, albeit in a different way than to date, for us to allow ourselves to be our direct neighbor. Therefore, we cannot allow the Russian Confederation to be established in any form. It is us who must bind the border countries, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania with Poland. Of course, the term "bind" doesn't mean to subordinate, but to ally itself on equal terms. The conflict of Polish-Russian interest is the struggle for leadership in eastern and southern Europe, the possibility for the Russians to completely and voluntarily withdraw from Europe, and therefore consciously decide to be an Asian nation, you should be put in a fairy tale.

And as Mieroszewski himself writes: *"Russia, which is dominant in these areas, is an insurmountable rival. From the hands of the victorious rival, you can not expect anything other than slavery"*. This today's truth is not to lose its validity also in relation to democratic Russia. *"From the point of view of the Russian incorporation of areas of Ukraine, Lithuania, and Belarus to the Russian empire are a necessary condition for reducing Poland to the satellite status. From the Moscow perspective, Poland must be a satellite in one form or another. The history teaches Russians that a truly independent Poland has always reached for Vilnius and Kiev and tried to establish its advantage in the areas of the ULB<sup>73</sup>".* And here it is; the advantage does not apply, however to ULB itself, but to the Russian influence in that area (we have to be stronger not than the Ukrainians, but stronger than Russians in Ukraine).

At this point, let us consider the Mieroszewski statement in the German question (and he is, like the "N", a supporter of Germany, but opposed to close cooperation with them): *"We are the gateway ... evenly for Germany against Russia and for Russia against Germany ... Hence the tendency of both our neighbors to either seize the entire Polish foreground - or to divide it between the two interested powers. (...) The enemy can be defeated or come to an agreement with it. If ever would be a German-Russian agreement, Poland would not only lose the Western Lands but would lose the possibility of economic and political development. In contrast, the Russians, in agreement with Germany, would dominate over the entire continent of Europe. (...) The fifth partition of Poland is historically inevitable if*

*this scheme will not be broken (...) The pursuit of Polish policy in any form must be the creation of a scheme that would exclude the Russian-German agreement, by making it redundant".* (We would say - impossible). Poland between the two economic and political powers - united Germany and the democratic Russian Federation - would be something like Liechtenstein or Luxembourg. Elsewhere in the same Mieroszewski states that *"Eastern Europe to be able to oppose his neighbors, must be differently organized"*. And that's why the thought of the possibility of the Russian Federation does not fill us with optimism and makes us seek allies primarily not among Russians, though against them we do not feel any prejudices.

Since the main goal is to lead to the creation of independent ULB countries, not associated in any way with democratic Russia, we must, first of all, promote the independence aspirations of our neighbors and the local development of national consciousness, opposing a widely understood Russianness. Does this mean that we refuse any dialogue with the Russians? No, let us remember, however, that the period of formation of the Russian nation and the Russian national consciousness occurred in the times of Ivan the Terrible. The unification of the nation and the Russian lands happened, therefore, for a period of an exceptionally cruel dictatorship and lawlessness. It was different in Poland, where the process of shaping the nation took place along with the building of noble democracy, and in Russia, it took place simultaneously with the laying of the foundations of tsarist autocracy. Hence the frequent identification by Russians of freedom with anarchy and with disintegration of the state: after all, Ivan the Terrible built the foundation of Russian statehood on the fight with that freedom.

Russian democrats-federalists may be for us only an opportunistic ally in the fight against the USSR, but a true partnership connects us will only groups unconditionally recognizing the right of all nations to self-determination, immediately separate from any kind of Russia and the creation of their own state. Any attempts to postpone this fact into the future (for example, after the referendum, which will take place after the fall of communism, as General Vlasov wanted), is a manipulation for us. Nor do we consider granting national autonomy as a sufficient concession.

At this point there is still a problem, what will be more effective in the fight against communism: national movement, social movement, or general all-Soviet movement, joining all the nations, including the Russians, in the fight against the regime. Demands for freedom and democracy we can skip in advance as having little support in the societies that they never knew, and therefore also do not know what these may bring indeed. Mieroszewski writes: *"Priority must be given to the overthrow of Stalinism. The main goal is to reform the system. Solving the problem of ethnic is one of the derivatives of this process (i.e., 'Restore meaning to provisions in the Constitution') - Putting the matter in this way, we expect to attract*



*progressive Russian circles, showing them that there is a close correlation between our goals. "*

*First*, the so-called progressive Russian intelligentsia is sparse and even today shows nationalist tendencies. In Radio Swoboda I have recently heard, for example, that the peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia, after parting away from Russia, will, according to the Russian Democrat, miss her! At this point, we can only ensure that we "*will not miss*" that! It is easy, however, to predict what trends will prevail in Russia after the overthrow of communism.

*Second*, if the main emphasis will be placed on social issues and we will wake up fully the national consciousness of Belarusians and Ukrainians they can settle for a fairly broad national autonomy granted to them in the first place and remain in the relationship with Russia. Such an operation had already been successful with the Bolsheviks. And then, as Mieroszewski wrote himself: "*if Ukraine will have its own independent government, its own diplomatic representation abroad, etc., Can not be excluded that it might not bother to step out of the reformed Commonwealth*". It depends to us that for Ukraine it would be of value to ally with Poland, and we can offer only help in the struggle for the full development of national consciousness.

*Thirdly*, the adoption of social confrontation platforms will open wide gates for manipulation on an unprecedented scale with the politically unconscious masses. If in Poland, in the second year of the war, there are ongoing discussions in the underground about the incompatibility of real socialism with true socialism, which is to constitute the crown proof of the thesis about the need to overthrow the Jaruzelski's team, it is easy to imagine what will happen in the USSR. The fight for the so-called true socialism will only serve to lead the movement astray and the survival of communism.

*"The alternative to the (social) revolution are the national uprisings. Imagine a chessboard of nationalist states waging war with each other over Lviv or Vilnius, or dozens of other cities. Russia, even if it is involved in the Far East conflict, would still have enough strength to win one against the other (agree!), striving for the complete balkanization of Eastern Europe. Moscow would have a legitimate hope that, once it had dealt with China, it would regain control over the quarreling Eastern Europe. (...) The uprising would be aimed against Russia - the revolution would be aimed not against Russia, but against Stalinism. The Russian intelligentsia and Russian nationalists would support the revolution, but they would not support the nationalistic (rather pro-independence - "N") uprising. The aim of the revolution would be to take the Soviet Union and help the progressive circles of Russian society in giving Russian socialism a human face. The reconstruction of the Soviet Union in the commonwealth of independent states would only be achieved as a consequence of the revolution".* For Poles, the creation of such a community, however, creates the risk in the future, so why to encourage it.

It is true that the consequence of national uprisings will be mutual quarrels. To avoid this, the idea of returning to the homeland should be promoted. In this way, for example, the Ukrainians and Belarusians, who are currently contributing to the Russification of Latvia and denationalize themselves by the way, would voluntarily return to their countries to places abandoned by the Russians. There is no doubt that the incoming Russian population will have to leave the liberated territories, despite the fact that, for example, in Ukraine, they constitute over 20% of the population. The adoption of the concept of the national community would also mitigate ethnic disputes.

The census of 1979 showed that 25% of Belarusians and 17% Ukrainians have given Russian as their native language. This means an increase in the comparison with the year 1959 by 10 and 5%. Denationalization, or rather the acquisition of Russian national consciousness by Belarusians and Ukrainians, is deadly for Poles because it simply means an increase in the number of Russians and an expansion of their ethnic area. In our long-term interest is, however, that between the Poland and Russia there would be culturally vibrant and numerous Belarusian and Ukrainian nations, and at the best, enjoying the independent statehood. For this, it is necessary to obtain by the nations the full national consciousness. Even if it would be true, the malicious assertion, that the Belarusian nation was artificially created, is still in our deepest interest. Simply put it- if there would be no Belarusians, the Poles should create them. Unless someone wants to have a Polish border outside Grodno, and only Russia behind it. Belarusian and Ukrainian national consciousness can develop in opposition to Polishness and Russianness. Of course, we prefer the latter. But it does mean that Poles cannot in any way show any assimilationist tendencies. Belarusians should feel connected with Western culture and be friendly inclined to Polish culture, and be hostile to the Russian one, but they must remain Belarusians.

Since we care about the development of national consciousness in the eastern territories - not in opposition to Polishness - then we should try to preserve the national identity of "our" Belarusians and Ukrainians, who may in the future play a significant role in building independent states in the East, and give up Vilnius, Grodno, and Lviv. *"Territory, only to a certain extent is an element of power. In my opinion, if the Poles in favorable conditions would take away the Vilnius from Lithuanians and Lviv from Ukrainians – the positions of Poland against Russia would significantly be weakened. The cities do not count, only nations do count. It's not about conquering Vilnius and Lviv, but about gaining the trust and friendship of Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Belarusians. In fact, compared to the past we are in a privileged position now, because Ukraine, Lithuania, and Belarus hate Russia. The wise Polish policy at the time of good political situation should take advantage of this fact. However, if we will put ourselves in the shoes of our ancestors from the 17<sup>th</sup> century - we may regain Vilnius and Lviv, but we will not restore a healthy proportion between Poland and*

*Russia. And in the end, this is the only thing that matters, not one city more or one city less. (...) Russia will never recognize us as an equal partner until it recognizes us as a rival in Eastern Europe. (...) ... whether or not we will be an equal partner of Russia - it will be decided not by the Russians, but by the Ukrainians, Belarusians, and the Balts. If we manage to convince these nations in a favorable situation that Poland has something more to offer them than Moscow, that our policy has nothing to do with imperialism or annexation - then we will almost automatically regain our lost position in relation to Russia".*

The idea of the nation-state was founded in the nineteenth century, during the formation of modern national consciousness. At that time, the creation of such a state or its substitutes (see the importance of Galician autonomy for Ukrainians) was a condition for the formation of each nation. But nations already exist today. So, we can adopt a different concept - recognize the need for the existence of both: national community and its native independent state. This does not mean, however, that each national community must necessarily live only in one country. Contemporary migrations mean, that a growing part of the different nations, lives permanently outside their home country. These processes will intensify, so it is possible that, for example, in two or three generations, most Poles will live outside Poland. It must therefore be recognized the right for self-determination equally to the right of free national development regardless of the country of residence. This principle could be the basis of the arrangement of neighborly relations not only between the Poles and their neighbors but for the entire area of Eastern Europe liberated from the Soviet and Russian imperialism. The native country and at the same time the cultural center for all Poles would be in the present Polish Republic within current borders, with which they would have an unlimited right to contact, or even to participate in certain decisions of state; on the other hand, in their countries of residence (e.g., in Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, France, etc.) they would enjoy the complete freedom of national, political and economic development. Of course, the same rights would be enjoyed by representatives of other national communities living in the Republic of Poland. Only in the case of adoption of this concept, we will be able to avoid mutual discord, which the Soviets will try to awake and use, and to create a common front to fight Russian imperialism. Only this experience of joint struggle and cooperation can create a strong foundation for the future Confederation, which will put a forever lasting barrier against Russia, i.e., it will consolidate Poland's independence.

Any boundary changes would constitute a precedent and lead to an avalanche-like increase of disputes throughout liberated Europe, and this would give Russia time needed to recover.

Poland should be able to create a pattern for the fight against the USSR, which could then be used by the opposition in other barracks of communist camp because she first entered the decomposition phase of communism. So far, however,

the KOR-like opposition has only copied the models of the Russian movement to defend human and civil rights. While the communists developed an efficient pattern of combating the civic opposition.

The agreement accord can not be the goal that would find resonance in the “*peoples-democracies*”, because in these countries, people have concluded agreements a long time ago – submission in exchange for bearable living conditions. But when in two or three years the neighbors will find that the new agreement means the submission – in exchange for life in moderate poverty - such an objective would be detrimental to our point of view, because of the geopolitical changes, that could create favorable conditions for regaining of independence by Poland. The slogan of independence of all the nations of the Soviet empire, although it may now be rejected (especially in the “*peoples-democracies*”), just as it is rejected by the conciliatory majority of the Solidarity opposition in Poland, it sets out the prospects of struggle if it is adopted by us and promoted in the world; when the “*peoples-democracies*” societies mature to rebellion, they will have ready not only an ideological but also an organizational model. All hopes for any particular solution to the problems of one of our nations are illusory. *Neither we nor the Hungarians and Czechs can not be independent because granting us independence would lead to the bankruptcy of the current ethnic policy of Moscow inside the Soviet Union. Moscow does not see us as partners, but as guardians of the Soviet "order of nations". To have a peace in Kiev – the peace must be in Warsaw and Prague. The tanks on the streets of Prague defended the Soviet Kiev and Soviet ethnic policy. (...) The Soviet Union can not buy the loyalty and friendship of satellite nations for the price of risking its internal state-security*. Meanwhile, the elites of these nations learn from Poles, for example, the Hungarian opposition is a perfect copy of the KOR movement of the years 76-80 and it can be said today that it will not be spared going through the barren stages of social opposition oriented towards agreement and “*renouncing*” politics. Poles should care that their friends do not repeat our mistakes. That's why they have to learn that in addition to compromisers and capitulators there is pro-independence opposition, our neighbors can not be one-sided informed about the situation in Poland, as it has place so far.

The communist economic system, whatever the country, shows with amazing accuracy the same symptoms of disintegration. There is no doubt that it must entail political consequences similar to Polish, but of course with some delay and local variations. It consists of two causes: a deterrent effect of December 13<sup>th</sup> and the lack of meaningful purposes of the subsequent conspiracy and local conditions, e.g., in Romania's extremely harsh repressions, in the USSR the lowest level consciousness and expectations. (...)

Being taught by the experience of Polish communists with "Solidarity", the ruling elite in other barracks may not try to use civic movements in their own

games, which means that each rebellion will be bloodily suppressed, not fueled, as during our August.

How can different political directions in Poland behave in the event of a weakening of Russia?

The first group will immediately hurry with proposals to come to an agreement, and this time it will be accepted by Moscow, used, and finally - after the crisis is over - discarded. They will be telling to the nation: "*And you see, that without the casualties we can get along with Russia and on the basis of the mutual benefits.*"

The second group will meet, will discuss for three weeks, will pass a stack of declarations, and will spread into homes, where together with other intellectuals will spin philosophical reflections on morality, necessity, and impossibility.

Supporters of Mieroszewski's theory will expose themselves to all: Polish conciliators, independentists from the USSR, and opponents of Russia in Poland. Their actions will lead in practice to grant the primacy of relations with revolutionary Russia, at the expense of the independence movement of our neighbors.

Representatives of our direction, aiming to provide absolute support to independence movements in the USSR and to take advantage of the of weakened Moscow's to take it down, will end up quickly ... in internment camps. The conciliatory government and this current has presently the most support, will explain, that it had to use exceptional measures in order not to expose Poland, not to say, the whole world, from the involvement in the bloody conflicts in the USSR. So, in the interests of the nation, humanism, freedom, and humanity, it must ... .

For a long time, Polish political thought has been divided into two main currents: the first sees Poland's future within a free and democratic Central and Eastern Europe; the second - Poland, skimming to Russia and, for this reason, being endowed with autonomy, in exchange for faithful service in the interests of the empire. M. Mochnacki<sup>74</sup>, one of the radical leaders of the November Uprising, wrote about Russia in the *Uprising of the Polish Nation*:

Incorporated with our provinces in this part of the world, from which our nation has always separated it, at one time it began to exert its influence on the East and the West, there the conquest of European Turkey (i.e., the Balkans - "N"), here the whole Slavic region up to the river Oder.

All agree that on undivided and independent Poland, hung the future of the Slavs, the fate of European civilization, and at the end the freedom inside of Western Europe, but as far as I know, no one said with precision, that on such Poland depend also the interests of Eastern Europe, commercial, material, linked with higher political and moral interests.

Mochnacki describes the opponents of the fight for independence as follows:

... under the influence of ideas and the relationship of brotherhood was created a quite branched, and for these days lasting, school of journalists-dissidents, who in what at the Czartoryski special luck ordained, and to which the coercion (force) have seen an example and theory, who now from the theory and own choice not another Poland imagine themselves, not the other Poland desire, only on behalf of Moscow, under the joint scepter with her, who finally remembered the thought that equally as Czartoryski service for the Moscow, they could reconcile it with the dignity of their own character, and even with certain benefits for Poland.

It's been 150 years passed and species of these publicists, unfortunately, did not extinct, but took a prominent place in our opposition and destroy the pro-independence thought with eagerness worthy of a better cause. We can only dedicate to them the words of Mieroszewski: *"Most Poles do not believe in this system, do not believe that we could ever gain an advantage over Russia. THE CHILD OF THIS UNBELIEF IS SATELLITE MENTALITY AND SERVILISM. "*

*Mieszek Morfeusz*

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## IN FREE POLAND

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"Poles are born 'libertarians'. You can say that freedom is our profession. (...) At the same time, in the majority, we are not liberals. For this reason, our love of freedom can not be identified with the love of democracy. Poles for freedom understand the independence and nothing more. (...)

You must be a liberal if you want to be a democrat, because the anti-liberal democracy doesn't exist in the world. As soon as a democracy ceases to be liberal, it ceases to be a democracy at the same time. (...) A liberal is a man who subscribes to Toynbee's words, that there is no single truth and there is no chosen nation."

Juliusz Mieroszewski

### Why freedom?

Democracy and freedom - these are the two pillars on which the modern, civilized society and the state are based. Of these two values, democracy is better known and mentioned more often in the political aspirations of Poles. In fact, the two concepts are often confused with each other or are brought down to the same. Democracy is commonly understood as a representative system that elects state institutions. We can determine the quality of the election by plenty of adjectives, but this knowledge is not needed to intuitively grasp the difference between the democratic

elections and a farce staged by totalitarian governments. If we can already ensure the functioning of democracy, a representative system of authentic elections, why do we still prefer to add a slogan of freedom? It's not resulting just out of democracy?

The representative system emerges from the society, so the creation of a democratic state is derived from society and constantly being controlled by it. Similar reasoning is rooted in Poland. It originates from the deliberation of eighteenth-century philosophers, from the social utopias, there is also no stranger to Marxism. The latter admittedly fights hard the concepts of civil society, but uses the present reasoning to the party, as an institution elected by the working class; the party is democratic because it was chosen by the working class = the representative system is democratic because it was elected by society.

Freedom - as a principle for functioning of society - means freedom of action as long as they do not pose a threat to others or are clearly not maladjusted to social needs. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, adopted in France in 1789, let's put it simply - the only limitation of an individual is the freedom of others.

Totalitarian propagandists, justifying the lack of freedom and democracy in their own countries, argue that real freedom and democracy do not exist, and since there is no real one, then there is none, so there is no difference between Western democracies and totalitarianism. In rejecting a similar sophism should we of course be aware that the ideal models of society exist only in theory? When writing about democracy and freedom, we will reason on the level of the values of social philosophy, not specificities.

Is the freedom defined by us previously reducible to democracy, in other words, does it result from democracy? Contrary to the previous reasoning, the answer is negative. There are several reasons for this; let's discuss the two most important.

Society does not always strive for freedom; the result of individual choices does not always give wise decisions and does not guarantee freedom values. More specifically, the majority of society can be and often is intolerant (I would ... to the quarries and let them ...), fighting strongly, also using coercion, views, customs, religions, races, nations, ethnic groups that they consider themselves hostile or simply different and incomprehensible due to this otherness. The mechanism totalitarian trends of society E. Fromm described in the *"Escape from freedom"*. Democracy, as the choice of the majority, also could be intolerant for minorities, despite the fact that it does not jeopardize either the laws or the existence of the majority. Let us look at ourselves objectively - Poles. How many nonsenses, unfounded fears, unwillingness to others lies in our civil society: antisemitism (*Let them be jailed! They just the Jews.*), intolerance of other races and nations (all the neighbors), aversion to outstanding individuals, traditional Polish envy (how he had to contrive to set himself so well), aversion to the rural

population (these peasants are doing too well, they even want to have cars), etc. The latter has been strongly revealed in recent years; it is likely that a referendum on obligatory supplies would bring success to the supporters of this feudal form of relations between the countryside and the city (that also no one invented the city's obligatory supplies for the countryside, e.g., hardware, textiles, etc.). So, will democracy always ensure freedom? Of course, the better is the domination of the majority over the minority than the other way around, but to the enslaved individual does not make much difference if he is oppressed on the will of the majority or the minority. The limitation of rights remains a fact.

Social progress, technical, scientific, economic is done by individuals opposing traditional views recognized by the majority. If we decided about social innovation in a democratic vote, we would probably still live on the trees.

The above arguments can blow the wind into the sails of totalitarians. After all, it is in their propaganda arsenal that the majority is stupid and politically immature, and must therefore be ruled by an elite. However, this is not the direction in which our reasoning goes. Anti-freedom tendencies, represented by the ruling majority or minority, should be opposed by freedom, as the first principle before social views and choices. Freedom to do everything that does not threaten the freedom of others must be a higher principle than the choice of the majority of society. The majority can not, therefore, discriminate against minorities or individuals for their otherness. An individual has the right to carry out any activity on the political, social, philosophical, and economic level, as long as it does not endanger freedom or the existence of others.

Let us move on to the second argument. Democracy is only the form in which proper governance is achieved. The latter is a strategy game of various influence groups, not the resultant outcome of the individual choices. Previously, we have shown the inability to realize freedom only on the basis of democracy, now we will have to look even more critically at the latter. Again, we are exposed to the accusation that we are reaching for the propaganda arsenal of enemies of democracy. To counter it, we note that we are not indifferent to whether there is a democracy based on free elections, even if imperfect, or not at all. However, one should not fetishize democracy. It is possible to improve it; there are finally different systems of democratic power, at the very end the real power is being exercised by informal structures. The formal exterior described by the law democratic system to a large extent influences the governing policies, but the real ruling is determined by the balance of power in a strategic game carried out by the political lobby groups. A perfect example of this is the American democratic system.

Most public functions, both central and local, are subject to democratic elections there. There is a clear separation of powers outlined by Montesquieu's rule, but the system does not provide the institution of the local boss. In fact, the boss, the local leader, exercises informal and uncontrolled power. He is able to



control all its areas, as well as the so-called fourth power - local media. At the central level, there is a tendency for many years to replace the government, the members of which shall be approved and controlled by Congress with the private staff of the President, i.e., by the advisers selected only by him over whom no one has control.

Let us emphasize once again that all of this does not mean that we equate democracy with the absence of it. You just have to be realistic and not expect what it cannot deliver. That is why the philosophy of democracy must be strengthened by the philosophy of freedom. You can not allow, that the state, even a democratic one, to interfere too much in the lives of individuals. The principle of the individual's autonomy and freedom must be a barrier to the totalitarian attempts of each state.

The tendency of the totalitarian state, even proclaiming the words freedom, as manifested in the slogan of the French Jacobins: *"There is no freedom for enemies of freedom"*. We need to oppose this need through a different slogan from the same era: *"Freedom is a natural good for each human!"*

*Franciszek Sz.*

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## **Liberalism - the political thought of freedom**

The motive to write the following article became the suggestions raised primarily in the letters of our readers, demanding clarifications of philosophical and political principles, which our group draws inspiration for reflection on the liberal model of the future Polish state. A further motive inclining us to address this topic was the preliminary evaluation of the "N" survey results, suggesting that our Readers and respondents are not able to clearly to distinguish between ideological assumptions of main political currents. This problem is clearly shown in making choices between political parties proposed in the questionnaire. The respondents found it very difficult to unequivocally support the program of the Polish National Democratic, Christian-Democratic or Peasant Party, because they are not familiar, as they admit, with their programs and ideological assumptions.

For 20 years of the communist Polish People's Republic, no one in our country didn't even try to conduct genuine political education work. Perhaps Stanislaw Mikolajczyk's PSL<sup>75</sup> did it for a short time, but it was an activity focused on survival rather than on integrating its members on the basis of an original political program.

The Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) has never even attempted to conduct political activity, neither in the aspect of domestic policy nor foreign

policy. It was and still is, policy oriented to a greater or lesser extent, at imitating the political mood prevailing in Moscow. The role of PZPR is therefore reduced to assuming the function of a vassal, fulfilling the task of administering a country inhabited by Poles. A similar function in the past fulfilled, for example, the Imperial Majesty's governors residing in Warsaw. To undertake any political activity, you must have at least limited organizational autonomy and intellectual capabilities for this type of action. The first and second is missing from the PZPR. This gap was not filled also by political groupings of opposition created in the 70's. KOR, KPN, and later the "S" in their assumptions considered the political activity as not very important, or even detrimental to the interests of Poland and the Polish people. So as a civil society we need to learn the rules of political activity almost from zero. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the extent of knowledge concerning the ideological foundations of the political movements is as we noted in the example of the polled, more than modest.

Today, we want to fill this gap, not only through the presentation of an ideological basis for liberal-democratic political thought but also by wondering, what are the similarities and differences in relation to other political currents prevailing in the modern (free) world. We will not mention communists, because, in our opinion, even Western Marxist parties, officially cut-off from the Kremlin mafia do not develop the original political thought, but remain in the rigid corset of ideology, which does not allow them to go beyond all known platitudes and generalities. The proclaimed views on democratic communism (to gain power by parliamentary elections) should be treated with great skepticism, because of the likelihood of departure from the principles of freedom after obtaining a parliamentary majority. Fortunately, in any Western country Reds did not convince voters of the attractiveness of their program to such extent as to sit by themselves in ministerial offices. We believe that the example of the socialist-communist coalition in France will cure for many years to come of this infection not only the French people but also potential supporters in other European countries.

Having been proclaiming liberal-democratic political thought for over two years, it was not without reason that we called our grouping liberal-democratic - preferring the word "liberalism" to the term "democracy". And it is not an ordinary wordplay, consisting in changing them freely.

Liberalism as a political and social doctrine has a long history, dating back to the beginnings of conscious organization of people in a political community. In terms of economic thought, the flowering of liberal thought falls on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as a counterweight to feudalism and absolutism.

Generally, you can define liberalism as an ideology of freedom, taking its essential premises from human nature, which is born free, and as such is destined for freedom. Therefore, robbing him of the natural freedom of being a free man by organizing of slavery political system constitutes a rape on given human nature and on the libertarian conception of life. The history of liberal thought has well-known

theorists. The most famous, whose grandeur is measured by the contribution made to world liberal thought, include Montesquieu, David Hume, Adam Smith, Adam Fergusson, Alexis de Tocqueville, Benjamin Constant, Friedrich von Hayek, and Milton Friedman. The last two are contemporary thinkers.

Now we will try to answer the question of why liberalism should be close to all those who recognize the principle of human freedom as the most important value.

Poles, just like other peoples of Central and Eastern Europe, for many decades are forced to live in a system of political-police, that its concept of the political system founded not on the right to freedom of the individual, but chose the path of developing state-sanctioned slavery. This process involves the engagement of all available resources at the disposal of the state apparatus. To keep the slave monopoly in governing society, it was used in the economic field total planning of manufacturing operations and the extension of state competence to all areas of civic life. The base and condition for the lasting communist slavery is the nationalization of the means of production and the creation of a monopoly in the sphere of human labor. Already in 1937 Trotsky wrote: *"In a country where the state is the sole employer the opposition to the injustice of its power structures means for an oppositionist a slow death by starvation."* And then he says: *"The old rule, who does not work shall not eat, they have been replaced by the new - whoever does not obey does not eat"*. No wonder the Liberals, considering the fundamental principle of freedom of the individual in the system of economic management, claim that most fully this principle can be realized by introducing markets mechanisms as the sole regulator of economic life. The market mechanism, in practice, boils down to coordination and reconciliation of private interests, which allows in a more or less seamless manner, combine the individual freedom with the needs of other people and social groups.

Libertarian economic system plays in liberal political doctrine dual role. On the one hand, as says George Gilder, capitalism and free competition are so successful because their rules remain in complete alignment with the common mindset and are based on faith in the human goodwill work, expansion, and competition. On the other hand, as Milton Friedman adds, the freedom to conduct a business is an inalienable component of broadly understood freedom and a prelude to the formation of the principles of political freedom. Private ownership of the means of production, should in the understanding of supporters of liberalism, ensure not only the opportunity to choose a platform, where you can freely pursue your own necessities of life but primarily intended to protect the individual against the political interference of the state power. So, the ability to conduct, within previously agreed rules, free-market activities can be considered not so much as an essential economic activity, but also as means of guaranteeing protection of the supreme values of social life - citizenship freedom.

Private ownership of the means of production allows the individual to enter into contracts of employment with several employers, thus freeing it from one – the state, who usually prefers in the economic field - the ideology of the ruling group, e.g., a communist one. The free market in no way eliminates the need for a strong state government and efficient administration. Liberals always stress that government is necessary both to determine the rules of market competition (the sphere of economic rights) or as a mediator interpreting these rules and ensuring compliance with them. Its most important function must be to defend freedom against internal and external enemies and to secure law and order in accordance with generally accepted norms. In addition, the government should enable individuals to jointly carry out tasks that are either too expensive or too difficult to accomplish individually.

However, the existence of a strong, well-organized market eliminates the direct government influence on its functioning. Having in mind the freedom of the citizens, which one of the guarantors is the freedom of economic management, liberals categorically reject any form of monopolization of power in the state. It must always end with the use of violence against people who are against the officially professed ideology. Monopolization of state power is also completely at odds with the observance of principles of human freedom, understood as a specific social condition, in which coercion used by some individuals against others is extremely limited. Freedom, as Hayek argues, is independence from the arbitrary actions of other people. Individual freedom is important not only for the individual, but it is necessary to condition for the development of thought and progress – and more broadly, of human civilization. In the *Constitution of Liberty*, Hayek writes: "*A society of free people is creative because it facilitates various applications of knowledge that even the wisest planner could not plan*". Therefore, the author continues, societies deprived of civil liberties are forced in an ineffective way to draw from the achievements of free societies. Same itself, inevitably, have to endure regression in these areas. A prime example of this is the communist states that, by imposing monopoly on economy, ideology and information squandered once and for all a chance to for its own development.

So understood freedom – let's repeat it - as maximum personal freedom according to the principle: what exactly is not forbidden is allowed (not as in communism: what exactly is not permitted is prohibited) - liberals distinguish from political freedom. Private ownership of means of production is true as an indispensable condition for the existence of political freedom, but not the only one. It is enough to recall countries with a free-market economic system, ruled, however, by right-wing dictatorships (Chile, until recently Argentina, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey). So civil liberties, in addition to respecting the state system based on free competition, must firm libertarian system of forming of political power, i.e., free elections to legislative bodies. Freedom to choose the appropriate government, pluralism of political doctrines, extensive activities of political parties

with competing programs are next, after free economic activity, conditions for the realization of human freedom. According to liberals, they are a necessary condition but not a sufficient one. Although there is no country in the world that would ensure civil liberties without a libertarian ordination to elect political power, were the governments that have been chosen by the majority of the votes, and introduced the totalitarian system. Let us recall the German 3<sup>rd</sup> Reich: in 1933 Hitler's party gained the support of most voters. The country carried out free elections, the private economy flourished, and instead of freedom was born extreme intolerance, chauvinism, imperialism, and crime. Thus, the principle of political majority, the necessary to exercise power, is a necessary condition, but again not enough for the libertarian philosophy of governing society.

State in which a follower of the doctrine of liberalism he would like to live, beyond guaranteeing citizens unfettered business freedom, beyond acceptance of the decentralization of power, both at the levels of central and local, beyond challenging the majority formula of exercising political power must be guided in all its dealings by the rule of individual freedom. This is the inalienable principle, which if not respected, even by the most democratically elected government makes social life a degrading nightmare of bondage, coercion, and deception. This principle can not be violated in any case, since this may result in undermining the entire freedom system.

If the word "democracy" answers the question, who is currently exercising power, and the word "liberalism" sets its limits, if democracy means majority character of governance, liberalism means the philosophy of human freedom, then the followers of liberal thought will always put in the first place right of personal freedom of the citizen, even in front of arguments of the angry majority. Of course, such distancing the two concepts is purely theoretical, as the democratically elected government, guided in practice with principles of democracy, is able in a satisfactory manner reconcile the will of the majority with libertarian rations of opposition minority (often 48% of the population). We make the above distinction to show in an extreme way that liberalism will always put the principle of human freedom before any other.

(...) The differences in the political thought of liberals and social democrats are very clear. Disputes between them focus primarily on the limit of state interference in the social and personal lives of citizens. Conservatives in many places identify themselves with the liberal program. What unites conservatives and liberals most, is the conviction of the necessity of the existence and development of the economy based on market principles, founded on the unfettered initiative of individuals. The firsts, however, do not treat this economic necessity as the barrier limiting the greed of state power, but as a result of the natural rights of the individual, sanctioned by tradition, religion, and customs. Chief principles cultivated by the philosophy of conservatives are religion, authority, tradition, morality, and ethics. In particular, authority is the value to which the conservatives

relate in moments of crisis of their own identity. For this reason, that political orientation shows more mistrust towards novelties than anybody else, being afraid even of peaceful and evolutionary changes of the system. Conservatives see with them the danger of disorganization of formula governance and national tradition. Therefore, in moments of upheaval in public mood (e.g., student revolts) conservative government does not hesitate to exercise their competency for the protection of peace and the old conservative values.

Conservatives in total are more interested in who governs, and not what prerogatives of power must be controlled - the government of wise men, experts with broad powers, satisfies them very much.

Both conservatives and liberals derive the concept of human freedom directly from its nature. Everyone is born free and therefore should be given freedom also in social life. For liberals, this is an undisputed issue, and conservatives, while not denying the principle of freedom in social life, would like to correlate it with the system of traditional values they profess. Therefore, while liberals preach tolerance total towards the beliefs of other people, conservatives will be happy if this would be possible, to impose their system of values on people thinking differently. To a large extent, however, this remains wishful thinking, because against the invasion of conservative ideology society is defended equally by the legal system, private ownership of the means of production, as well as commonly acceptable and respected parliamentary system of political governance.

Conservatism - contrary to what some people think of it - is by no means reactionary, or, as is the case in communism, a defense of the *status quo* at all costs. Conservative, believer and preacher of traditional values organizing social life in peace and order, although it is difficult to adapt, but never - even in times biggest threats - will not reach for a weapon of totalization. Liberal, respecting traditional national and state values derived from the conservative political thought, will want to combine them as best he can with the principle - of freedom for all people so that he could have a historical tradition well interacting with the radical initiative. Both trends oppose the overreaching role of the welfare state, coming from the assumption that it may cause excessive socialization of citizens, weakening the social activity of individuals, while not resolving any significant human problems. Of course, the liberals much further than the Conservatives intend to limit the intervention prerogatives of state power.

The basic difference between a conservative and a liberal, however, lies in the different understanding of the relationship between the individual and the state. For liberal society is a collection of individuals, and for the conservative primary is a society that shapes individuals; it is subject to common history and its bonds are sanctified by a transcendent being. For a liberal, what matters is the individual and his selfish interest. Out of the sum of individual egoisms a society is born. According to the conservative, society survives thanks to imponderabilia, and religion is its basic bond. During the nineteenth century, the liberal-conservatism

opposition softened to the point of a complete convergence of these two directions, a political manifestation of which was, for example, the decline in the influence of the liberal party in Great Britain, as its voters switched to the conservative party.

Our grouping, which describes itself as a liberal-democratic, recognizing in practice liberal political thought to be the one that speaks best to a free man, is also going to use the acquis of conservative thought, above all with those values by which conservative and liberal, can offer modern and a stable system of government, based on respect for the freedom of every human being.

*Wacław Wojenny*

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## Liberal state

In political journalism, a lot of understandable doggedness is raised by the views about the role of the state, especially on its place in the overall relationship between the institution and the citizen.

Speaking about the state, I have in mind the role of political institutions and administrative structures, which should be created after Poland will regain its independence. (...)

The main objective is - according to us - not only the state's independence but most of all a maximum of civic freedom in the own political structures. We will not set the direction for actions, nor will motivate people to the maximum effort, if we will not indicate to goals of struggle and will not identify our supporters with the program. In other words, if they do not recognize the system we propose as their own, worthy of struggle, resistance, and sacrifice.

In our opinion, society is a product of compromises made between citizens, and the state as a form of collective organization of community life and a judge and guardian of private agreements, even though the drafting of the laws derived from this group compromise.

The state should, therefore, act as a servant to society and be in a position to verify the rules of that unstable compromise. This is why the state organization should be on guard of private contracts between citizens, and not alone to shape their terms? The reason for this state of matters is straightforward. In practice, the state is not only a representative system of political power but also the people creating bureaucratic apparatus, as a rule very closely associated with the currently valid interpretation of economic and administrative measures. This cadre creates a system of their own inter-grouping interests, which usually identify with the interests of the state. The threat of this group, arbitrarily establishing the terms and conditions of any collective and private agreements, inevitably may result in the use of all the power of the state to protect the position of its functionaries. A classic

example was the introduction of martial law in Poland in the name of squashing the "S" - an organization that wanted independently, without the guardianship of political and administrative bureaucracy, to establish rules of social and private activities.

Hence is the conclusion: the state should not under any circumstances conduct alone social, economic, cultural, and information activities. Monopolization of activities e.g., business, solely in his hands, of the party and state (PRL) bureaucracy, cause every social attempt to carry out even the most reasonable economic reforms is treated as an attack on the "constitutional", acting, due to the Soviet grace, government. The basis for such understanding is irrational and constantly propagated the belief that the state can better and more efficiently resolve any problems, with the omission of the most interested parties, and that a person in authority must be *de facto* smarter than the others. We are convinced that it can't be democracy and freedom without respect for the genuine autonomy of individuals and social groups. Its base is legal and by constitutional principles guarantees, among others, of the unfettered economic initiative of all citizens, or otherwise - of private property. It makes no sense to undertake a discussion on repairing the statist political and social system, but we should direct your attention to creating a model of the state, that to the minimum extent keeps its citizens dependent on itself.

Therefore, it's quite an irrational idea of throwing slogans (fortunately recently rarely) motivating people to work, which makes us economically and thus politically, dependent on the state-employer. We write: irrational because we realize that the existence of business organizations such as cooperatives, private workshops, etc., as dictated by the current goodwill of the state, which at any time, without giving a compelling reason, may it revoke. In addition, an independent, residual economic initiative in a totalitarian system depends on state energy, state supplies of raw materials, and the state-controlled market. We are not opposed to this form of activity, which would lead to minimal self-reliance of man from the omnipotence of the communist state, but we are opposed to defining this path as an important form of struggle against the regime. Poland of the 80s is not the Posen Region at the end of the 90s last century, when the Prussian government, stifling pro-independence initiatives, allowed the functioning of Polish economic enterprises.

Therefore, *"the longest war of modern Europe"* in these areas focused on the sanctioned by the Prussian regulations the economical race between the two nationalities. Our longest war on communism is not a fight for economic autonomy within it, because this is doomed to fail, but the fight for a new economic system, in which the business activity will be the goal in itself, rather than a means of defense against totalitarian control.

Healthy, i.e., independent and based on the principles of the market national economy have private characteristics with its all consequences (free competition,



controlled unemployment, etc.). The principle of full employment – which was also favored by the teams of "The Network<sup>76</sup>" was an attempt to reconcile the dogmatism of the communist economy and reformist thinking. Let us add: such thinking, which would satisfy both authors of the project, as well as its implementers. The Self-Governing Republic, i.e., republic based on only the local government system of managing the economy (we are not talking about self-government system of local administration in the country with which most of us agree), it is a new utopia, an experiment even more dangerous as its negative effects have already been felt by several European countries.

And let nobody to accuse us that we are supporters of a weak state, in which strong private-public structures will dominate the continuously weakening state authority. This is the reasoning taken literally from the communist dictionary, where, on the basis of dogma, the inviolability of the privilege of governing was assumed in advance. By limiting to the necessary minimum, the state power interference in the private affairs of citizens will not leave it only in the role of the night watchman, who only has to look after the safety of rulers. The state must leave legally regulated freedom of personal and social initiative and intervene only when a citizen will cross the earlier set legal standards. Furthermore, the state must be the initiator of various activities (e.g., the creation of new jobs, synchronization of various economic areas, initiatives in the area of legal and social regulations, etc.), but not the direct doer and supervisor. Should it also interfere with the assistance in those cases where the initiative of individuals or groups is not sufficient to initiate and implement the universally needed action (e.g., in the absence of sufficient funds on to set the enterprise) as well as to pave the way for foreign markets, fighting social pathology, supporting charity funds or providing aid to the poorest. The state should also set the development prospects for society, e.g., to initiate the development of scientific and technological programs (need for large funds, uncertainty of profit), create the demographic policy, etc.

We stay on the platform of the civil society, the stability of which can only provide the representation of the interests of the majority of citizens, on the assumption that the minority opposition will enjoy all the freedoms, especially the freedom of taking over the power through the parliamentary process. The state intervening without the apparent need, but only to document its power and strength, is a terrorist state, which is even more dangerous, if does it with impunity, destroying along the way everything, which is missing its gracious stamp of approval. Therefore, in our deliberations we consider in the future to build our own state primarily with a liberal political system, i.e., with strictly delineated and only the necessary competencies to interfere in the life of a citizen.

*Waclaw Wojenny*

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## What kind of independence?

Creating two years ago, our journal, we named it "Independence". We have not seen the need for closer clarification of this slogan, recognizing above all its symbolic meaning. However, it is time today, when the pace of current political events slowed down, slightly retract and define the term comprising of the word "independence". To do this, we need to investigate the relationship between the three values: nation, state, and freedom.

Most generally, independence is the right of a nation to create its own state and live in freedom. The three values (considering the case on the ideological level and we are not interested at the moment in the legal status of these categories) do not have to influence to the same degree on the contents of independence, and their mutual relations are the basis of various ideologies.

1. *Nation's Independence*. This type of ideology (nationalism) recognizes the nation as the highest value. But it is not understood as a collection of individuals and the interests of the nation are not the result of individual interests. On the contrary, the nation is a real being, an independent living organism, to which the individual interests must be subordinated to. Principles of Polish nationalism were laid 80 years ago by Roman Dmowski in a well-known work: *Thoughts of a modern Pole*. If we refer to the so distant document, we do it because it played an important role in shaping Polish national thought, and from the moment of writing, no prominent ideologist of nationalism has not reformulated problems posed by Dmowski. This also applies to recent years. Social and political movements formed in Poland by the end of the 70s and after August 1980 have largely the nationalistic subbase, using the national symbolism. However, should be added here, that Dmowski wanted to derive its nationalist ideology out of rational principles, while the nationalism majority of Poles (which was visible in the "Solidarity") is irrational, subconscious. This allows combining nationalism with the recognition of other values remaining *de facto* in contradictions with it.

Dmowski wrote: *"I am him (a Pole) not only because I speak Polish, that others speaking the same language are spiritually closer to me and understandable, that some of my personal matters bind me closer to them than to strangers, but also because besides the sphere of personal and individual life, I know the collective life of the nation of which I am a part, that apart from my own affairs and personal interests, I know national matters, the interests of Poland as a whole, the highest interests, for which one should sacrifice what cannot be sacrificed for personal matters"*. (*Thoughts modern Pole*, ed. 1933, p. 2). *"I'm Polish - therefore have Polish duties. They are the larger and the more strongly feel them, the higher type of man I am"* (*ibid.*, p.4). *"From the same source are born duties relative to other nations, relative to humanity. How does a man, in his*

*own name, feel his duties toward today's Poland, how feels toward the past and the future in the name of his generation, and towards humanity in the name of his nation" (ibid., p.6).*

Let note, that the majority of Poles would certainly have agreed with the wording contained in the above quotations, which obviously does not mean - whether they act according to them. They are also not in conflict with the government propaganda; could be a worthy decoration of school academies, provided, however, that they were not signed.

From the supremacy of the nation comes obviously, the demand for the creation of a national state: independence = national state. If the nation is a phenomenon irreducible to the individual and its rights take precedence over the rights of the individual members of a nation, is also a state that is a form of existence of the nation, is more valuable than the value of the individual human being. The nation-state is not a civic state, does not need to perform servant function to the citizens, but to the nation. For this formation of thought is therefore not relevant whether the state would be democratic, just, will observe human rights or will allow human development. They are not important indeed, but the rights of the nation are. Dmowski bristles at those who think differently: *"How many times I happen to hear sentences like: 'I prefer that we would not regain independence than we were forced to create disgusting state institutions and conduct despicable policy with harm to others'" (ibid, p. 24).* The citizen rights are not only stopping to play an important role, but become almost redundant interference in achieving the main goal - the affirmation of the nation: *"The subject of patriotism, or strictly speaking, nationalism is not a set of freedoms, which formerly was called a homeland, but the nation itself as living social organism, having its own, based on race and history, developed spiritual individuality, its culture, its needs and interests" (ibid, p.151).* *"Individual is not there as fighting for freedom only - its main aim is to extend the scope of national life, multiplying the material and spiritual good of the nation, to win for the whole community, to which he belongs, the highest possible status among other nations"(ibid, p. 151).* Nationalism, elevating its own nation, is also opposed to the implementation of the rights of other nations. *"And we continue to sell Poland humanely. Our Ruthenic policy in Galicia is an example in this respect. Is there a better example of generosity in politics, such as when county council, comprised in the vast majority of Poles unanimously adopts a resolution of the need to establish Ruthenic gymnasium in the city"(ibid, p. 92).*

40 years of communist rule in Poland, paradoxically, strengthened the nationalist tendencies. It came from two sources. On the one hand opposition of society to the domination of other nations over the Polish, mainly Jews (inside Poland) and Russians (outside). On the other hand, official propaganda tried to use national values for its own ends. The exceptional benefits allegedly resulting from the national uniformity of the People's Republic of Poland were emphasized. This

was contrasted with the national mosaic of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Polish Republic, which was supposed to be the main cause of the weakness of the Polish state. It is not without significance for the consolidation of nationalism in Poland to keep the anti-German phobia. It should be noted that communism only in its virginal period (before 1917) was an internationalist movement, transnational, rejecting the national values. Rosa Luxemburg had used against the socialist from PPS exceptionally insulting invective: "*patriots*", while those instead of "*buy-in*" into the epithet, often explained that they are not patriots. However, just after the conquest of power in Russia communists boldly used the propaganda arsenal of nationalism to strengthen more and more the faded ethos of communism, especially after the elimination of Jew-Trotsky, having decisively transnational horizons.

This bizarre coincidence of traditional nationalism with communism proves the ambiguity of national values. In the organization, "Grunwald<sup>77</sup>" met the pre-war antisemites, like Studentowicz (it seems that he is there now), and the communists close to the so-called hardliners as Poreba or Filipski. The latter in a television speech claimed, that there in the world no other culture does exist beyond national one - an almost literal quotation from Dmowski. The enigmatic of national values is due to the fact that you can not clearly define what is good for the nation as a self-existing being. Its interest is a concept that means very little. This lack of precision leaves a wide field of demagoguery - the phenomenon described by Erich Fromm and Karl Mannheim. Rulers, unable to offer its subjects real values, primarily material - high living standards - give them as compensation symbolic values: pride in the power of the nation or the state, the conviction of superiority resulting from belonging to a group - nation.

Needless to say, the Polish Republic has developed over hundreds of years as a multinational state. The history of Poland was created by many nations, not just one (e.g., cities in the Middle Ages were populated almost entirely by Germans). A modern nation and nationalism emerged only with the development of capitalism in Poland at the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. The wave of nationalism that emerged in central and eastern Europe after the collapse of the Treaty of Vienna system has led to the emergence of numerous nation-states. Was independence such an important value? In any case? We'll see it in the example of Lithuania.

Lithuanian nationalism was directed against Poles, and to a lesser extent against Russia, which ruled Vilnius from the end of the 18th century. At the beginning of World War I, Germany, which drove Russians from Lithuania, decided to create an independent kingdom there. They considered candidacy of Ulrich Wilhelm of Württemberg, who was to take the name of the Lithuanian Mindaugas II. Eventually, a republic was created, ruled in a dictatorial manner by Smetona, and later by Waldemaras. The defeat of Germany caused, that this "independent" Lithuania was not in the full sense of a German colony; if, however, could meet the needs of its citizens? Pilsudski proposed to Lithuania in 1919 city of

Vilnius, in exchange for the creation of a cantonal system (canton of Kaunas, Vilnius, and Belarusian), which would, of course, be a preparation for a federation with Poland. Lithuanians (not citizens, but the ruling elite) preferred the nation-state. Fighting for 20 of interwar years with the alleged Polish threat, they soon fell into slavery a hundred times worse, destroying not only the state but also the most important elementary civil rights.

Today, in most countries of the third world national ambitions are represented by a narrow elite of educated people. They speak on behalf of the supposed nation, create state structures. Obtaining independence by these countries (especially Africa) rarely improved the situation of the population. In many cases, one can speak of a regression both in the standard of living (permanent poverty and hunger in the Sahel countries) and in political relations (the bloody dictatorship of Bokassa or Amin).

2. *State independence.* This ideology recognizes the state as the supreme value, regardless of its character. This may or may not be related to the affirmation of the nation. From the previous ideology it differs, that in the hierarchy of values, the state is above the nation. This may result from:

A. Non-existence of modern nation, which would be susceptible to national symbols; in the pre-national phase, the psychological bond felt by people has a local dimension, one can speak of Kashubian, Silesian, or Gascon patriotism, but not Polish or French.

B. State multi-nationality. In the case of the USSR, Czechoslovakia, or Yugoslavia, official propaganda cannot always openly promote the nationalism of the dominant nation (Russians, Czechs, Serbs) without arousing the nationalisms of the dominated nations.

C. Fears of nationalism in countries *de jure* independent, but *de facto* non-sovereign, e.g., like in Poland.

Chronologically, the relationship between the state and the nation may be twofold: the existence of the nation is a decisive factor in the creation of the national state, or the existence of a state is a nation-creating factor. At the moment these subtleties are not interesting for us, but let's look at the relation of communists to the state. The position of the classics is known. Engels gave his most classic interpretation of the *Anti-Dühring*: in socialism - "*instead of governing people is the administration of things and management of the production processes. The state is not abolished, but dies*" (1943 edition, p. 276). The attitude of Lenin-practitioner to the state was already different. He dedicated the whole work "*State and Revolution*" (regrettably not finished as the last chapter supposed to consider the experiences of the Russian revolution) to prove that Marx and Engels's thoughts concerning the state are always alive, but its death applies only to the bourgeois form of the state: "*we will go for a split with the opportunists and the aware proletariat is on our side in the struggle not for 'shift the balance of forces' but to overthrow the bourgeoisie, for the destruction of bourgeois parliamentarism,*

*for a democratic republic type Paris Commune or Republic of Soviets of Workers and Soldiers, for a revolutionary dictatorship of proletariat”* (works, Vol. 25, pp. 528 ). There exists already a "democratic Republic of Councils"<sup>78</sup> and so far, unfortunately, does not want to die.

Like nationalism, state ideology was adopted by communist propaganda, especially in Poland. The Marxist ideology doesn't have appeal for a long time, hence its enrichment by flowers from a completely different garden. It is interesting that the communist ideologists (propagandists) are divided into enriching communism with nationalism (from Natolin group, Moczar admirers and ending with Grunwald group and journal "Rzeczpospolita") and preferring exposing the statehood (now "Polityka" "Tu i Teraz", "Przegląd Tygodniowy"). Even similarly to nationalism, the communists are supported by pre-war rightists (Hrabyk!). The reasoning of ideologists such as Rakowski, Koźniewski and Toeplitz is as follows: Poles fought for an independent Polish state from the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. This state ceased to exist, i.e., Poles lost their independence because it was weak. The whole ethos of the nineteenth-century national liberation struggles was the striving for the own Polish state. The state is the highest value, having the sacredness of three uprisings. It must be strong: the stronger – the fullest is the independence. The strength of the state is, of course, equated there with repressiveness, while democracy with anarchy. Now it is enough to prove that the Polish People's Republic is that strong Polish state, i.e., the dream of the insurgents of 1830 and 1863, for the theodicy of communism to be complete. But what is the Polishness of the People's Republic of Poland supposed to be about? On Polish as the official language, white and red symbols, white eagle, and four-horned military caps<sup>79</sup>? Sure, it's better than the fate of Lithuanians, but for us it is a bit too little. Amazingly, for both the "nationalists" and "state-likes", affirming the national or state values is not bothering the subordination - to the foreign nation and foreign state. If we argue with these types of "thinkers," it is not because we fear their ideology. It is as dead as "pure" internationalist Marxism. The "nationalism" of Poreba or "state ideology" of Koźniewski has appealed to a few people only. However, it goes to avoid the false paths of similar ideologies by independent groupings.

Among discussed by us categories, the most defined status in international law definitely has the state. Independence in the juristic sense means the state. Perhaps this is the only way out, certainly the simplest, but it carries a lot of contradictions. States are equal (e.g., in the UN), so are treated equally such as France or the United States and Rwanda or Mongolia. Genocidal Pol Pot clique is treated (at - least *de jure*) as seriously as the most democratically elected government. Based on a state-legal interpretation of independence exists many puppet states. The first satellite country of the USSR - Mongolia - was recognized in April 1941 by Japan in exchange for the analogical steps of the Soviet Union in relation to the equally country as Manchukuo (Manchuria Japanese). Today

Manchukuo is forgotten by all, at most serves as a symbol of the puppet country. Mongolia and its European equivalents, on the other hand, enjoy unflinching international prestige. To what absurdities the formal and legal treatment of states can lead to, shows the following example: on May 1, 1945, the president of Ireland (neutral during the war) sent a condolence message to the new president of the Third Reich, Donitz, because of Hitler's death. The next day, the Reich did not exist, even formally, but it obviously did not matter much to the sender.

3. *Civic independence.* Discussion of this interpretation of independence we will begin with a citation: "... on the 50th anniversary of independence we arranged with friends a small gathering and I was asked to speak on this matter, and then I recalled the jubilee of Limanowski. I express a reflection: 'the wish of free Warsaw came true, but when it comes to freedom, then Limanowski could see that in there was more freedom in 1910 Lviv than in 1930 Warsaw. Although Lviv was the capital of the partitioned region and there was no independence, it was freedom in a sense in it was not here in 1930. This freedom of 1910 was the civil rights which were won in Austro-Hungary but rather Prelitavia, namely Austria (because in Hungary was less freedom)'" (Henryk Wereszycki, *I wish you Comrade Limanowski free Warsaw*, Znak № 325, 1981).

So, another paradox of the concept of independence. You may be a citizen of an independent country, feel a member of the nation creating an independent state, and in addition to the use of civil liberties of a democratic country: the situation is ideal. What, however, when one has to choose their own repressive national state or a state that is not subject to national values, moreover, does not realize aspirations of nations living in the country, but guarantees civil liberties. In these freedoms included are also rights of ethnic and national minorities to develop their culture, language, education. They also mean freedom of emigration and unhampered travel. Is it not enough? Enough for us. If someone wants more, I refer him to the Constitution of the USSR, guaranteeing that these nations and republics have broad freedom to self-determination and separation from the rest of the Union.

We are brought up in the ethos of national liberation struggles. Both the pre-war generation and younger people grew up, educated, and raised in the mythology of the Polish state - national and independent. Even today, such a state seems to be the most important goal. But let us emphasize strongly: this cannot be an end in itself. The individual should be guaranteed all the freedoms, including the development of national or ethnic culture. These rights are something material, something necessary for the development of a person who does not want to run away from freedom. They are in line with our understanding of freedom as the freedom to do anything that does not endanger other individuals. Creating the own state is only a means to achieve a higher purpose - freedom. In the present situation of Poland, the struggle for independence is an obvious goal. The People's Republic

of Poland is only a form of managing Polish lands in the interests and on behalf of the Soviets.

We are not only talking about the Polish state, it is about something more. For a state that will guarantee civil liberties, including the rights to develop our national culture. There is no point in discussing whether the current junta is Polish or not. For us, it is more important than the national origin of this or another member of the team is the fact of abolishing of civil liberties by those rulers. We know that the main obstacle to this is the domination of the eastern empire. Hence, we treat independence as an instrument serving the achievement of the overriding goal - the creation of a civic state that guarantees freedom regardless of the ethnic and national composition of such a state.

Since the end of World War II, several dozen countries have appeared in the world, the existence of which was not even suspected before. Obviously, these "nations" cannot be compared to Poland. We do not speak here of selfishness, but an objective assessment of the situation of the historical nation - Poles and the "Chadian" or "Botswana" pseudo-nation. Leftist political thought used to recognize the creation of independent states as an unconditionally positive fact, regardless of their form of government. We dare not admit to leftism, we do not feel also obliged to agree with this view. Much more we like in this respect opinion of Jean Revel: *"Rights ethnic (or 'national'), provided, that is consistent with human rights, must be guaranteed or respected in the same way as individual rights. But similarly, as individual freedom does not consist in the fact that each builds itself mini-fortress or arranges arsenal, the ethnic rights do not necessarily and always mean the creation of new, sovereign and armed states. This obvious naivety in the way of understanding cultural autonomy may only contribute to our poor planet of anarchy and make available means of destruction to petty, local political pimps, willing to conquer, young or slightly older countries to fulfill their desire for dictatorship."* (Jean Francois Revel, *La Tentation totalitaire*, Paris 1978, 8-17).

The future world, as long as will still exist, must be much more integrated than the current one. Frankly, we would not have anything against the gradual withering away of states. It is also one of the few arguments of classics Marxism, which we eagerly applaud. Obviously, this is an utopia. However, it feels to us much closer and more sympathetic than various "Platonic" utopias, which precisely describe the functioning of the state and the society of universal happiness.

In today's world, the state is necessary to protect the freedom of individuals. For it is threatened not only by the state institutions but also by the actions of different interest groups. The state must act as an arbiter among them. It has to ensure that competition of public and interest groups has not led to its destruction, that in the society wouldn't prevail the "escape from freedom" and "desire to totalitarianism". After all, it has to protect society from the external enemy. In a well-organized liberal state must therefore be preserved the delicate balance between the strength of the institutions necessary for the protection of civil



liberties, and the tendency of these institutions to sprawl and control growing areas of social life, which stems out of the tendency of the autonomous mechanisms of functioning bureaucracy. There is no and can't be a fixed recipe for the achievement of this balance, as evidenced by periodic shocks in Western democracies, seemingly excellently governed. Undoubtedly, the political culture of citizens is of key importance there.

Critics of our concept of freedom argue that excessive freedom leads to anarchy, and to prevent it, it is necessary a strong state which represents the interests of the general population, and therefore superior to the individual. The concept of "strong power" is as ambiguous as many of the categories discussed above. Power is understood as both coercion and, more broadly, determination of behavior. In the first interpretation, the strong power is repressive power, poorly controlled, or - as Ossowski wrote - "*the power of unconditional violence*". In the second - strong power (or more broadly - a strong state) is one that is able to create conditions for rational, functional behavior citizens.

A strong state must have authority resulting not from fear, but from support given to it by citizens who are also aware of the weakness of democracy, but above all, indispensability; democratic institutions and rules of the game in a law-abiding state. The strong state must have authority coming not from fear, but from the support provided to it by the citizens who are also aware of the weakness of democracy but above all of the irrevocability of democratic institutions and rules of the game in the rule of law state.

*Franciszek Sz.*  
"Independence" № 27, March 1984, pp. 1-5

## **The system of free Poland**

### 1. A few words of introduction

Some readers accuse us of practicing too much of political futurology. This term is defined by our considerations regarding the shape of Poland for which we want to fight. We have explained many times that by organizing our supporters into what we euphemistically call "*the grouping 'N'*", we must explain to them not only why? and how? but also what we have to fight for. As it can be seen from the review of letters sent to us, many Readers are interested in political system issues; they propose various solutions, even drafts of the Basic Law (the Constitution). This problem also appears in the pages of some opposition journals and thus allows the public opinion to evaluate the group issuing the given publication. It must be said that Readers of the underground press are now highly politicized and probably for the first time they assess the publication or the issuing it grouping on the basis

of their own opinion about the articles presented, not on the basis of past credentials of authors.

In the *"Assumptions for the Program"*, we present our vision of the political system of future Poland. We base it both on the experience of (pre-war) 20 years, and on the knowledge of political systems of democratic states of the modern world. We want to develop our vision through the discussion with our supporters and groups of other ideological bases: national, social-democrat, Christian-democratic, etc.

## 2. The tripartite division of powers

According to the classical principles of West European constitutionalism, formulated in the 17th and 18th centuries by J. Locke, Ch. L. Montesquieu, J. S. Mill, power in a well-governed country should consist of three parts: legislative (e.g., Parliament), executive (President, Government) and judiciary. These three members should be legally equal, independent of each other, but controlling each other mutually complementary. The principle is the principle only but the consistent separation of powers occurs only in the US, as the country has a constitution adopted 200 years ago. In the US, executive power belongs to the president who is elected by popular vote, and to the cabinet appointed by him. Legislative power is exercised by the House of Representatives and the Senate, controlling the President mainly by passing the budget. In exceptional circumstances, the President may be held politically liable by the Senate and forced to resign. The judiciary is independent of the legislature and the executive. The political system of the USA is different even from systems of other countries in that citizens have the opportunity to exert direct influence on the current government policy through numerous in this country pressure groups called lobbies, representing various interest groups, e.g., industrial, ethnic, local like. The result of the pressure groups is meandering US policy, i.e., frequent change in its directions and priorities. In the short run, it is for the outside observer symptom of the weakness of this great democracy and is difficult to understand, but in the long term provides the best way to pursue the objectives of conflicting interest groups, otherwise society.

So, we are advocates of the libertarian model of American democracy and the US Constitution. We know, however, that the model of the US political system has lasted 200 years, and that the Americans are characterized by an exceptional sense of rule of law and personal freedom. But as late as 50 years ago, when the same constitution was in force, full power was in the hands of a small group of influential citizens. In the same model of the system, depending on the degree of politicization of citizens, an oligarchy or full democracy may rule. Thus, the classic system of separation of powers is not automatically ensuring

justice and good governance - because these depend on the traditions of a nation and the degree of participation of citizens in the democratic execution of power. It is worth recalling at this point the fate of countries in which the system modeled on the US constitution was introduced, for example, Liberia and the Philippines. After a period of rule by the oligarchy, on the wave of popular discontent, there have been coups d'état and dictatorship were introduced.

### 3. Constitutional crises

When designing a political system, we set the following objectives for it:

- allowing the fullest possible representation of the population in co-deciding (as fullest democracy);
- creating conditions for optimal decision-making by political bodies;
- stability of the political system.

These three objectives do not need to contradict each other but are rarely identical. Therefore, we have to recognize that there is no perfect political system. The application of even the best systemic principles, as we can see, does not always give full democracy and may lead to the domination of the executive branch over the legislature. However, are cases when maintaining the balance of power between these branches (e.g., the president and parliament) come to mutual blocking, inhibition of the function of government – and a situation called a constitutional crisis because it follows from the consistent application of the provisions of the Constitution. The easiest way to explain the essence of the model on the example of the French political system, especially that soon we may become its witnesses. Imagine - we realized that the days of the left-wing president, elected by the whole nation by universal vote for a 7-year term, there will be elected right-wing parliament, as a result of a negative public response to the leftist course of the previous government. The constitution does not provide for the president's resignation in such a case. It will be difficult to imagine a sudden wave of universal accord and harmony, where the leftist president appoints a right-wing government that will pursue a policy contrary to the to-date line of the head of state! It seems impossible to obtain the consent of the right-wing parliament to continue the leftist policies by President. France will have a crisis that could be resolved by the new presidential elections. The problem, however, is that the president is elected by the whole nation and responsible before it, he despises single deputies, as each represents only one constituency. In such a situation usually appear voices of talkativeness and brawl of MPs (the famous "seymocracy"). President, at the same time, mentions sometimes responsibility before God, Nation, and History, few pay attention to the fact that this nation has chosen the opposition Parliament due to disappointment with the policy of the president. Make no mistake, that in our Polish conditions, the president elected in a

popular vote will recon at all with the parliament. Not so long ago someone said, *"Let the National Commission decide whatever she wants, I have the shipyard behind me"*.

The entry of a country into such a constitutional crisis is generally unpleasant for the further fate of its democracy. After May's coup d'état (1926), until the adoption of a new, authoritarian Constitution (the so-called April Constitution in 1935), Poland experienced such a crisis. With this in mind, we came to the conclusion reflecting on the future shape of the Polish political system, that the separation of the executive from the legislative, and with adopting of rules of the election of the President by popular vote carries with it the seeds of the constitutional crisis, paralyzing functioning of the state. So, we are in favor of such a model system in which the executive power would be exercised by the government chosen by the parliamentary majority and responsible to the parliament (Sejm).

Here it should be noted, that until recently we were proponents of separation of the executive from the legislature, the choice of the President by the whole nation in the popular vote, and to entrust the helm of the government. After a series of discussions, disputes, and thoughts in our group we changed our minds. By voting for president in general elections, you choose the man rather than the program. At the same time, the lower the political culture of voters, the truer this statement is. Polish recent history shows that we are very susceptible to the personalities and easily fall into euphoria, later to wake up with a hand in the potty (example - Gomulka in 1956.). Voting for the parties, and therefore parliamentary, will allow exposing a much better political program, not a person, thus positively affecting the development of political society. We believe that the present state of political consciousness of Poles, where hardly anyone understands what in practice is a democracy, but we all want a very strong central authority, but carefully controlled, would fit better a system of strong parliamentary government and closeness of the executive and legislative branches. For this reason, many times in this article we refer to the text of the *'March Constitution'*, the content of which is perhaps little known, but functions in the minds of many as an extremely democratic and fair.

#### 4. President

Our project does not differ in terms of the office of the president from the provisions of the March Constitution. Both houses of parliament were to be combined in the National Assembly and chose a president who would be the titular head of state and head of executive power. His decisions could be only in writing and to obtain validity require a signature (countersignature) of the Prime Minister or the respective minister. We believe that many of the activities of the modern

country require the preservation of the office of the head of state, as sometimes happens (e.g., Italy), even with its limited prerogatives President may, thanks to his prestige prevent many crises. If you are interested in the details of our proposal, please refer to the text of the March Constitution. However, it did not guarantee a stable majority in parliament, and that was its main disadvantage. Therefore, we propose a modification of the electoral law contained therein.

## 5. Strong parliament - 4 or 5 adjectival elections?

Many of our readers have noticed this weakness when reading our "Program Assumptions" and we have received many letters instructing us about the ruin to which "seymocracy" is leading. It can be seen, that the anti-democratic remarks of Pilsudski from sixty years ago are still alive, even in the youngest minds. Perhaps, there is added the influence of communist propaganda, disgusting western democracy. We too are very well aware of the weaknesses of the classical parliamentary democracy, e.g., In countries such as Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark. We think, however, that a strong executive power is not a suitable remedy for the weaknesses of democracy for Poles.

The weakness of the parliamentary system in Poland before May 1926 and for example in contemporary Italy, results from the fact that the historical process did not form two strong political groupings, which could interchange (according to the wishes of voters, expressed in voting) in forming a parliamentary majority. If there are no such dominant groupings, then in the parliament we have a number of medium and small parties forming unstable alliances. The result of this state of affairs is the constant collapse of the cabinets and the lack of strong authority, i.e., the classic "seymocracy" (according to Piłsudski). In Italy it does not have special significance, because the society has become very accustomed to this state of affairs and the economy, social life runs peacefully nobody notices the lack of an efficient government, either. In Italy, however, nobody exclaims, "Will someone finally take it all with a firm grip?!" There is, however, a reason to fear that in an analogous situation in Poland, it would not take long to have a coup d'état. So, how do you achieve strong parliamentary rule without the tradition of a two-party system?

It is known that the multiplicity of parties in parliament results from the use of five-adjective elections, which, according to the wording of the March Constitution, to elect deputies in the "universal election, secret, direct, equal, and the relative" (i.e., Proportional). Due to the fifth adjective elections, the composition of parliament exactly mirrors the electoral sympathies occurring in society. This is a fair principle, but not applied in all political systems. There are many countries e.g., England, France, West Germany, where the ancient principle is used, according to which constituencies choosing only one member of the

parliament are created. The vote is for the person not for the list of the party, deputy represents, however, only a majority of voters, while a minority do not have a representative. This system has two advantages. Firstly, it favors the majority and eliminates small groups. This allows the most popular party attaining of the parliamentary majority and the formation of a stable government. Secondly, the electorate from the particular riding is aware that is represented by a particular person, not a list. However, the system of single-member constituencies has been found in many countries to be unfair because the minority in a given constituency has no representative at all. Hence, in the nineteenth century, a fairer project of proportional elections emerged. Such a system has introduced the March Constitution and unfortunately the application of this principle brought to the mess and "seymocracy", so criticized by Pilsudski. Our group, adopting many of the principles of the March Constitution, opts however for the four-adjective (single-mandate ridings) elections, as allowing the creation of an efficient parliamentary majority.

There are, however, several types of elections in single-member constituencies. The most extreme ("anti-democratic") model is the British model, in which the MP becomes the candidate who has received more votes in a given constituency than his competitors. In theory, with the six candidates, out of each five receives 16% votes each (total 80%), and the sixth get 20%, the MP becomes the last one, despite the fact that up to 80% of the voters preferred others. We can imagine the frustration of the opposition, because in extreme cases the popularity of the party may have little to do with the number of seats in parliament won. The more "fair" seems to be the French system, where more than 50% of the valid votes in the constituency are required to be elected. If any group of candidates does not receive this number of votes, then the second round of voting is carried out and two candidates from the first round, who won the most votes are allowed. Thus, a deputy from a given constituency formally represents over half of the voters. It is therefore a much fairer system than the British, and besides encourages political parties to create alliances generally lasting during the parliamentary term.

In West Germany, the voter has two votes. The first will be cast on the list of names of the corresponding political party. If it receives over 5% of the votes nationwide, it obtains the right to proportional representation in the Bundestag. In the second vote, the voter casts for one of the several named candidates. In this way, as per normal majority rule, is elected the deputy represents the constituency, regardless of the party affiliation.

In our Assumptions, we proposed a choice between the German and the French system, but it seems to us that the former is not consistent as it is a mixture of a single-seat and proportional system. While the second would probably be the easiest to get accepted by the Poles, not least because of widespread use of the clause of 50% of received votes in the elections to the various bodies of "Solidarity".

## 6. Executive power

It seems to us that holding elections in Poland according to the majority model would allow for the election of a government by the parliamentary majority. We also propose adopting the principle that the prime minister and his ministers must be compulsorily deputies to parliament as well. This will force them to take care of their popularity among voters and facilitate talk in the parliament as equal to other deputies. We are generally opposed to establishing the so-called "Expert-Government". It is difficult to determine in advance, after all, who is and who is not an expert. The politicians should govern and the selection of proper advisers from among potential experts should be left to their political instinct.

The concentration of full executive and legislative power in parliament carries with it a certain risk. It is easy to imagine a situation in which the ruling party, using the majority advantage in parliament, carried out a series of laws amending the Constitution, writes anti-democratic amendments, e.g., restricting the opposition. We presented already our proposal for the "federalization" of Poland as a medicine to prevent a rapid implementation of changes to the Constitution by the parliamentary majority. It has for us also another dimension, we already clearly signaled – this should prevent the development of the non-parliamentary opposition and ensure minorities with the opportunities to present their views on any issue.

## 7. Non-parliamentary opposition

The scourge of contemporary democracies is groups of demonstrators, especially young people, who more or less violently disrupt traffic on the streets, around military bases, public buildings, etc. These are congregations numbering even tens of thousands of people demonstrating under a certain slogan. They want to achieve its implementation not by influencing the composition of the parliament (i.e., elections), but by direct pressure on deputies and public opinion, exerted from outside the parliament. In extreme cases, the demonstrations are aimed at the resignation of the government and handing over power to the leaders of the movements organizing the demonstration - many of such movements were known in interwar Europe (e.g., the French *Action Francaise*). The splinters from the non-parliamentary opposition are groups conducting terrorism against the society, for example, Red Army Fraction in Germany (Baader - Meinhof).

The phenomenon of non-parliamentary opposition should not be underestimated, because it does not disappear, but only slogans, under which young people gather to protest are changing. Once this happens to be slogans for protection of the environment, whales, sometimes opposition to the road construction project, airports, or nuclear power plant. Recently was very popular

the slogan: "*Down with Pershing's and cruise missiles*". We also remember demonstrations against the war in Vietnam, Korea, or in support of the Palestinians. The fact of demonstrating under the slogans staged by the left or even by communists is not enough, however, to consider the whole issue as the plot by spies and Soviet agents and downplay it. Do not assume, that from the simple truth of anticommunism of Polish youth, it implies the axiom that in free Poland there will be no supporters of such demonstrations.

A common feature of most of the movements of the non-parliamentary opposition is bringing at any given time a single slogan, hence the use of the defined term of "single-issue movement" (movement of one slogan). But such a slogan is able to mobilize thousands for a short time. It should be remembered that for example in Germany giant demonstration involving a million people is maybe an event of paramount importance, but even one million votes cast in the elections on the list of "Missile Opponents" movement will not give them a single seat in parliament (Bundestag), because it is still less than the five percent barrier. The non-parliamentary opposition is well aware of this, and therefore, tries to disrupt the functioning of the state as much as possible through demonstrations.

Taking all this into account, so it is extremely important, to provide for the potential supporters of non-parliamentary movements (especially with the adoption of the four-adjective election rules!) a way to participate in the democratically elected assemblies and provide a platform for normal proclaiming their views. We propose, therefore, that Poland was a federal country that is divided into provinces (lands, voivodships, regions?) And the Provincial Assemblies were elected on the basis of a five-adjective (proportional) system, so even small groups (local, or "moves of one slogan") were there represented. The responsibility of such gatherings would only be the local issues, therefore not to hinder the effective rule of the country. Provincial Assemblies (Territorial Councils) would be a school of future politicians operating on a larger scale (Members of Parliament) and allowing implementation of local self-governance.

We are by no means proposing a regional breakdown in Poland! We aim only, that the way of electing the representatives was different in the case of the Parliament (Sejm) than in the case of Provincial Assemblies (territorial councils, regional councils).

## 8. The upper house of parliament

The need to ensure smaller groupings a space to express publicly their opinion motivates our plan to establish a parliamentary upper house -parliament (Senate, House of Lands). Its composition would reflect the proportional sum of Provincial Assemblies, which would be proportional to the popularity of the various political groups. The Chamber of Lands would discuss parliamentary bills, but it would not



be able to block them for a long time, as this would prevent the efficient governance of the country by the parliamentary majority. This would, however, allow the views of even small opposition groups to be presented to the public and perhaps minimize the organization of a large and vocal non-parliamentary opposition.

## 9. Constitutional changes

The real misfortune for democratic societies is of course the coup d'état and as a result, the introduction of a new political system, in general, a distant from democracy. There is no effective defense against the coup d'état, which only complicates it durability of the democratic institutions and the high political consciousness of citizens. The tragedy, however, is entrusting by the society in democratic elections the rule to the party proclaiming openly undemocratic program or voting in a referendum to change the Constitution, limiting freedom and civil liberties. Such cases have occurred in the history of many countries, they explain the overall vulnerability of people on populist and demagogic slogans. The only positive thing is that such "enchantment" of the population does not last long.

We consider it necessary to incorporate into the Constitution the brakes against this type of madness. Therefore, we propose that it should not be changed, but only add amendments. They should first be approved by e.g., 4/5 of Provincial Assemblies and the House of Lands; as a result of a different electoral system, they should have a different composition than the Parliament, it is expected that they will constitute an effective barrier against the amendments limiting civil liberties. We also propose that in matters of the political system, bills should be passed only after reaching a qualified majority in voting, e.g., 3/5 votes in the presence of 2/3 of the deputies.

## 10. Freedom and democracy

The proposed by us the shape of the political system of free Poland is democratic - we want good governance by the majority. As a liberal-democratic group we are also for the recognition of the principle of freedom, so the basic human rights, including the right to opposition. Hence, therefore, our fears of entrusting a strong, uncontrolled power to someone who, at a given moment, would even be considered the best of Poles. Such adventures of various nations with authoritarian power did not end generally good for anyone!

We recommend our thoughts to all supporters and opponents of the introduction of a strong presidential type of power in Poland. We invite both our readers and opposition papers to participate in the discussion.

*Józef Kisielewski*

"Independence" № 26, February 1984, pp. 13-18

## Work on the program

(...) Let's show our pathway. For two years now, we have been publishing a journal that has a definite and, we hope, cohesive ideological image. The community grouped around the journal had enough time to define its program through numerous ideological discussions, confronting it with the readers' response to various problems raised in "N".

Public (more correctly: quasi-public) discussion will enable us to publish the revised version of the *Assumptions*, more precisely expressing our thoughts. Only on such a basis, we will try to gather wider circles of our supporters and popularize our ideology. (...)

What to do to participate in the operation of this community? If you consider our framework of principles as similar to your views, you should promote them in your own community and for now individually or collectively keep correspondence with the journal. The "Independence", if someone considers they as its own can be supported:

1. programmatically - by correspondents,
2. propaganda - spreading liberal-democratic thought in your community,
3. financially - by contributions to the journal's Fund.

In some feedback comments about our program assumptions, we find instead of discussions rows only. And the fact that "*(we) devise names for the future of the body, which would be the agreement platform*" (political movements - different - "N"), "*building a roof without foundations*", "*do not expose our ideological roots*". Such comments are, in a sense, off-topic, because the political party's program must be for today and for tomorrow. So, we have to present to potential supporters, in our program, why and for what we want to fight. The names of the constitutional bodies do not have any significance, just about their place in the structure of political system design. However, you have to name them - we think with words. As far as possible, we try to reach for traditional names used in our past, and if they are missing - we create new ones in the simplest possible way, e.g., Underground Political Alliance. The alleged pre-earliness of constructing the roof (ideology) before forming foundations (political consciousness of the masses) is, to put it mildly, a misunderstanding. Do we have to gather our supporters around the demagogic or populist slogans type of "*We want that all true Poles be well off and that Poland is a truly Christian country?*" These are after all the slogans under which you can bring almost any content. We want to develop the political consciousness of our Readers by evoking a feeling of consent or objection.

It is therefore absolutely necessary to discuss the shape of the vision of free Poland, and it is not premature at all, even less humorous. After all, you have to see

what you are striving for, not just that you have to strive. We think also that it is more important shaping contemporary Polish political thought, and not just dwell on achievements of pre-war PPS. Our times are completely different.

How difficult it is to write a program is shown by the reaction of our Readers to this point of our assumptions, in which we postulate that the future Polish state should have a federal structure. Some readers teach us about the Krzywousty mistake, others see in our reverie in West Germany system (traditions of the "Lands", which we did not have in recent times), and others (which surprises us!) see in our fascination with "Solidarity" Regions.

Well, first of all, we want in a free Poland it was real territorial self-government and that a number of local issues were in the responsibilities of the local parliaments (Sejmics<sup>80</sup>?) and their executive bodies. In proposing a strong parliamentary government, eliminating from the national parliament smaller groupings, we realize that there is a danger of organizing small groupings in non-parliamentary opposition. We want all political groupings to be represented primarily in the Provincial Assemblies and the Second House of Parliament (Senate? House of Lands?) On the basis of proportionality.

Second, federalism can effectively defend democracy against sudden and not fully thought-out modifications. (...)

We believe that due to the poor experience of contemporary Poles and destructive communist propaganda, for many people the system of parliamentary democracy appears to be a synonym of anarchy, disorder, chaos, and instability. Almost no one notices that with all its flaws, no one has invented a more efficient and easier to modify. We can therefore easily imagine that in a free Poland as a result of the initial failures of democracy or, at worse, fascination with an individual, would be almost universal agreement (expressed in the referendum) on the introduction of coercive rule by the President (Head of the State, Chairman) responsible to God and History. Examples of such enchantments, history, even in recent years, provides many (including Europe!). The conclusion from these historical adventures comes that after initial success dictatorship quickly degenerates (often destroying many citizens), and the chance for its democratic removal is negligible.

The general consensus on the strong hand rule is unfortunately an entrance into a dead-end road, which usually ends badly: economical chaos, war, or revolution. In order to prevent this, the draft of the Constitution should be arranged and sanctified in such a way that its changes could consist only in adding amendments, which would require many discussions and overcome formal obstacles.

As you may have already guessed, our proposal to "federalize" Poland does not result from our perception of Krzywousty or the "Solidarity" Regions. The proposal is the result of reflection on the stability of parliamentary government and citizens appearing desire to introduce the rule of a strong hand. We want the

government was chosen by the parliament to be strong and the Provincial Assemblies, in addition to dealing with local affairs, could block the actions of the majority in terms of amendments to the Constitution.

We were inspired by the role of the US State Congresses, which effectively block the possibility of making quick changes to the US Constitution, even if the temporary majority is in favor of their introduction. Primarily thank the state congresses, the majority of which must ratify each amendment before the deadline, Americans owe that in the 200-year history of the Constitution has been added so few amendments, and none had to be removed<sup>81</sup>.

Ending digression, it should be noted that the long discussion proposition of changes in the Constitution in Provincial Assemblies would give a chance for "cooling down" of the moods.

It is so in Poland that more attention is paid to the form than to the content. Recently, for example, we could read about ourselves, that our *Program Assumptions* we provided with rude and arrogant comments. The point is probably about our suggestion to Readers, that if their comments are resulting from the adoption of other ideological assumptions than the liberal-democratic, they should direct them not to us, but to the ideologically relevant papers, e.g., social-democratic, national, peasant, or Christian-democratic.

Dear polemist! Such a comment had an underlying purpose. So far, apart from "N", there are no other journals with a definite ideological profile! We would like that our potential supporters could compare our program with the programs of other contemporary Polish groupings, and only then made an ideological choice. That's why we would like, that the aware followers of different ideologies (peasant, social-democratic, national or Christian democratic) led to the organization of appropriate groupings and to formulate programs. We look forward to seeing them ...

We could also read about our program: *"Consistent omission in the Assumptions of socio-political forces as significant the Church and 'Solidarity'."* This is again a misunderstanding. We do not feel, after all, entitled to determine the role of the Church and the "S" in the liberal state. These institutions will enjoy full freedom of (after all, it results clearly from the libertarian character of the *Assumptions*) social, political, economic, and religious action, and their role will be the result of their real influence on citizens.

Once again, we would like to remind you that we do not create a universal program (like the "Program of the Self-governing Republic" and KZD "S"). We want to have a coherent liberal-democratic program, because this direction we chose deliberately, not by accident!

*Józef Kisielewski*

"Independence" № 25, January 1984, pp. 23-26

## Dear Readers,

You have written many letters to us. Thank you very much for them. Wide response to our program proposal, contrasting with a spread in the part of the underground press, comments about "political futurology" confirms our belief about the purpose and need for such activities. We are also happy with the fact, that many of our proposals have been accepted as self-evident. The thematic scope and temper of discussion are for us the proof of the rapid political maturation of Polish society.

Our primary thesis - the rejection of the agreement with the Reds (in our opinion unreal), and focus on the building of a system of underground political parties, which could in the long term at least put in question the legality of communist rule in Poland, and in favorable conditions, even lead to the regaining of independence - has been widely accepted.

However, the method of implementing the proposed by us strategy raises serious doubts. This applies especially to our critical approach in respect to actions of the underground "Solidarity". This approach stems from the fact that the consistently renouncing of politics "S" (even by the declarations of TKK), at the same time is practicing politics. By doing it, considers itself to be mandated to speak on behalf of the whole society.

Referring to the mandate resulting from the first post-war free elections, it assures, for example (through the mouth of Lech Walesa), that we all want socialism.

Well, we don't want to. We recognize the mandate of the leaders of the "S" within the limits of union activity. However, no one represents the Polish nation politically today. No one has the right to speak on his behalf!

So, we can not agree that TKK speaks on behalf of all entities (political, trade union, social) existing in the Polish opposition. We can not agree to the practice by the leaders of Underground (or rather by a small group of advisers of TKK and Lech Walesa) on political and ideological monopoly, based on anachronic interpretation of reality and on the apparent pragmatism of the so-called national agreement. We have already spoken about it and we are still loudly speaking about it.

The strategy of Underground: diversity in unity - diversity of strategic goals (from Finland-like or Yalta-like to start with, to full independence), the unity of tactics (agreements, or will let it be - a truce with the Reds), we counter-propose another one: unity in diversity (not just a game words), i.e., a broad alliance of various opposition groupings in the form of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy; for the unity of the strategic goal, which should be made aware of the society of the necessity of fighting for a free and democratic Poland - in the

diversity of tactics, the choice of methods for implementation, the autonomous choice made by each participant of the alliance proposed by us.

"Solidarity" is the most significant force in the proposed alliance, the critical force because without its consent the Movement will not emerge. It should, however, join the Movement, re-orient itself to the trade union. Defense of workers' interests, especially economic, jerking Communists with strikes, self-educational activities, are an extremely important element of resistance, distorting the work of economic and political administration. The political problems should be a domain of organizations set up for this purpose (parties). Both parts of such alliance (union and political) are necessary and complementary. Political activists will not organize strikes in the workplaces, labor leaders of trade unions will fail to provide necessary for the continuation of resistance political motivation. It must be done by organizations established on different principles (union - a commonplace of work, political - common beliefs), but made part of the same people and connected by a common goal of struggle: a free and democratic - Poland.

In order to accelerate this struggle, Readers demand efficient and effective recipes for it. Hence the cry for "*mischief of the flesh*" or for "*some beatings*", and at the same time with patronizing treatment of "*few people having the most primitive printing equipment*". Meanwhile, the groups of such people have become the centers for the crystallization of contemporary Polish political parties, formulating and promoting independent political thought. Without this we will get fooled into another agreement (there will be no alternatives) or we will believe in a providential man with the only rightful program for all Poles (and who would not believe – is bad Pole).

That is why we prefer political activity, so far mainly in the sphere of consciousness, devoting little space - both in our writings and in *the Assumptions* - to the current struggles.

We believe that it should be carried out as a kind of "torn war", where the participants themselves have the necessary creativity and initiative, at most, taking care of minimizing losses (primarily human), setting realistic goals, and using measures commensurate to obtained effects. It is difficult, however, that for example the "*Swidnica tv-walks*" were included in the program of political grouping. However, the general principles could be written there. It is worth mentioning the necessity of not allowing to the so-called self-service of the totalitarian system, which is the fulfilling of the expectations of rulers under the pressure of potentially possible reprisals (you have to sit quietly - because we will get disbanded, you need to elect their candidate - because he will be pushed-in anyway).

At the same time, it is advisable to reject the positivist tendencies (so characteristic for the oppositionist intelligentsia). The only sensible action of quasi-positivists for today is to prepare comprehensive programs of solutions for tomorrow. Our readers pointed-out on the imprecision of many points of

our *Assumptions* (organization of the judiciary, the parliamentary rules). We did this fully consciously. Firstly, for discussions about matters of less importance (even on the principles of exemptions to the general rule voidability of the decision of the authorities) we have no time today, secondly, it is the domain of specialists. They should (now is the time for this) develop solutions to this type of issue in detail. Now, for example, could even propose and discuss ways to organize the system of social welfare. Ways, not a single way - it is about presenting the point of view on this problem of a socialist, peasant, Christian democrat, or liberal. Experience of the pre-August opposition, which did not prepare such programs should be a warning.

Today, for example, the vast majority of journalists in the underground press are referring to the social doctrine of the Church. What does that mean? How does it translate into Polish conditions? What would be its consequences for the Polish economy? – Nothing can be heard.

However, in our opinion, the most important thing is to clearly define the principles and ideological beliefs and to discuss them.

In the first version of *the Program Assumptions*, our proposals for systemic solutions for free Poland turned out to be the most controversial. Objections (probably as a result of a misunderstanding) were raised by our postulate of the federalization of Poland. Perhaps if we had written about the far-reaching system of local government (in the end, really, this comes down in our concepts), it would not arouse so many protests.

However, the ways of appointing and powers of the executive branch were the most discussed. A significant portion of readers clearly feared "seymokracja" and weak, unstable executive power. Therefore, demands strong prerogatives for the president. Our views of the mutual interrelation between the executive and legislative branches and proposals for protection against "seymokracja" we concluded in an article published in the 26<sup>th</sup> issue of "N". Unfortunately, we do not know the reaction of the Readers yet.

The discussion, less than expected, also caused "*the eastern question*". We have already written about it many times, even in the 26<sup>th</sup> issue "N", and we will continue. We consider its solution to be crucial for the maintenance of independence by the Polish state. We are pleased to state, that the revindication program was formulated on in few letters and definitely in the shy manner. More often we received either full or partial support. Readers also tossed us some neat phrases that we will use more than once. There also appeared, sometimes formulated categorically, federalist program – particularly with Eastern Europe, but also showed up supporters of strong ties with Czechoslovakia.

More interestingly, there were no voices pointing to a German danger, despite our firm support for German reunification.

In general, we can say that the *Program Assumptions*, published in "N" a half year ago, had done their job and were really *an element ordering*

*discussion*. This is our new version of *Assumptions*, published below. This time we have the ambition to expand the discussion to all, either to actively participating in the activities of the opposition as well as toward more active "observers".

The new form of our *Assumptions* results from some suggestions of Readers, who drew our attention to the fact that only certain points of *Assumptions*, of proposed by us in the Free Poland economic and social relations have a trait of liberal-democratic philosophy (doctrine, ideology). Most of the other hand, is so formulated, or relates to such issues and is such presented that it could be accepted by the followers of other political options, and even by the underground activists of free trade-union "Solidarity", who is not interested in the political system of the future, free from communists Poland, and considers such actions to be harmful, or even unnecessary "*political futurology*". Would be a socialist, for example, interested in a discussion of the problem of the constitution of free Poland, trade unionist however would like to participate, even with 'political futurologists' in the economic struggle against the communists in the workplace.

In order to facilitate (i.e., better organization) discussion, we divided *assumptions* into 4 parts, assuming that some Readers and debaters will be interested in its fragment (fragments) only.

The first part, *Unity in Diversity*, specifies our formula for the common front of the Polish opposition, united in the MOVEMENT TO RESTORE DEMOCRACY. This part of the *Assumptions* is addressed to all who understand the need for an evolutionary or revolutionary overthrow (change) the communist regime in Poland. It seems to us that this proposal could be the basis for discussion also for those who are not personally interested in political activities, although they see the sense of such activities carried out by others.

The second part -*Poland of Tomorrow* - is our proposal for discussion of the shape of future Poland among supporters of various political directions. If we consider as deliberate to organize the UNDERGROUND POLITICAL ALLIANCE, the purpose of which in the future, after the overthrow of the communist system in Poland, will be the emergence of the National Government, we should already start a discussion on what can be described as the foundations of the CONSTITUTION. It is quite understandable that with detailed decisions, and perhaps with the definition of some general rules, we will have to wait until the first free CONSTITUTIONAL SEJM is elected. Nothing, however, should prevent us from committing fairly capacious columns of underground press and part of our intellect for such a discussion. The communists destroyed in Polish society, apart from a very important element of social stability which is the sense of rule of law, also the idea of the shape of democratic rule in the country.

The third part is the *Assumptions of the Program of the Liberal-Democratic Party "Independence"*. We present here the ideological foundations of our party's doctrine. Based on the *Assumptions*, we want to develop a discussion with both their opponents and supporters. The result of it will be (we hope, still in 1984)



clarifications not of *assumptions* but simply of the *Program*, which will allow organizing our conscious supporters in the political party.

The fourth part - the *Annex* - describes our view on the transition from the economic system of real socialism (the source of our backwardness and poverty) to the liberal economy. The problem of "*transition*", or "*time zero*", interests many of our readers, regardless of their political sympathy. We emphasize: *this is not a program of REFORM of the economy while maintaining the political power of the communists!!!*

Therefore, we invite everyone, including those who commented on the first version of "*Program Assumptions*", to a discussion in the underground press or in letters sent to "Independence" through the distribution network.

*Editors of "Independence"*

## Program Assumptions

### I. UNITY IN DIVERSITY

A proposal for a cooperation platform for the Polish opposition

We accept as a starting point, that in civilized countries at the end of the twentieth century there shall be no institution of "reconciliation" of the nation with the rulers and agreements can only be about the term of transferring the power by dictators to legally elected government.

1. The Polish independent state does not exist. PRL is only the form of administrating of the present Polish territory by the Soviet Union and by a set of institutions established to exploit politically and economically and to Sovietize the Polish society.
2. Winning of independence shall become our most important goal, the condition for sovereignty, the establishment of a democratic system ensuring freedom, respect for human dignity, and prosperity. The communist system is unreformable and only efforts to overthrow it can motivate people to independent activities.
3. Independent groups: trade union ("Solidarity"), educational, professional, and political recognizing the common goal of achieving independence by Poland and democracy should unite in a loose alliance called: Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MfRoD).
4. A huge role will be played by the emerging underground political parties. Because of them depends on whether we will succeed in creating the foundations of a democratic society, comprehensively educated politically - society from which, will emerge the new representatives and leaders, future politicians and efficient administrators of the country. Only such a society will become the foundation of the future Polish democracy.
5. Political parties should be established within the RNRPD Underground Political Alliance (PPP), and if needed - regional political alliances.
6. PPP would represent Polish political groupings at home and abroad.
7. In order to combine the activities of the Country, Emigration, and the Polish diaspora, PPP will try to combine them based on the symbol of Polish statehood - the Polish Government in London. If it would be possible, create on this basis Free Poland Committee (or Polish National Representation), it would be a chance, the first time since 1945 that a voice of Poland would be taken into account by governments and international organizations.

8. Liberation of Poland depends on changes in the entire Soviet bloc, and therefore the common recurrence of oppressed nations against communism and Soviet imperialism. Therefore, Poles should support the formation of the democratic opposition in other countries of the Soviet camp.

9. When communism collapses, the PPP will emerge as a Provisional Government, the aim of which will be to take over the power and call free and democratic elections to the Constituent Assembly.

10. We have a long struggle with the system ahead of us. Therefore, the most important task for organizations concentrated in RNRPD should be - regardless of differences in partial objectives goals, and tactics - the weakening and isolation of communist rule. We shall therefore constantly question the legitimacy of its rule, expose its usurper character – lack of moral and legal title to govern. We shall fight against passive submission to the influence of façade political, social, and trade union organizations, and against passive participation in acts manifesting submission to the rulers. The essence of this fight should be to oppose the so-called "self-serving" of the system, which consists in the fact that almost every citizen while being its victim - yet with its actions strengthens the system.

11. Slogan of "social peace" serves only communists to consolidate the existing system, and with it the economic and social decline. Therefore, apart from activities in the sphere of consciousness, we must:

- a) organize a constant pressure in of economic strikes in order to counter the shifting of costs of system inefficiencies on the society;
- b) organize political strikes, demonstrations, and riots, as long as it is possible to secure the support of a significant part of the society;
- c) ignore the calls for hard work, because for several decades our efforts have been wasted and serve primarily the imperial purposes of the USSR;
- d) apply pressure on supporters of rulers in a form accepted in a given social setting. It is necessary to create a situation where no one who participates in repression against society will be sure of his anonymity and impunity.

12. We cannot count on the Catholic Church winning political and civil rights for us. He is our ally in this fight, but at the same time, an independent society is also its "bulwark", because only complete pacification of society would allow the communists to liquidate the independence of the Church. It should be remembered that we owe the Church the fact that Polish society was not completely Sovietised. The evidence of that was fast rebuilding of the social relationships during the 16 months of the existence of NSZZ "Solidarity" and great self-help in the first months of martial law. So let us support the Catholic moral revival and self-help campaigns so that no one who has been touched by the revenge of the rulers will feel deprived of protection.

## II POLAND OF TOMORROW

### Underground Political Alliance program proposal

#### A. PRINCIPLES OF THE STATE SYSTEM

Poland should be a country of a modern, efficient democracy based on the modified principles of the March Constitution of 1921.

1. The highest legislative power is exercised by a two-chamber Parliament.
2. The deputies of the Lower Chamber (Sejm) are elected in single-mandate ridings on the basis of majority rules, which facilitates the formation of a parliamentary majority.
3. The Upper House of Parliament - the Senate (House of Lands) is elected from among the members of the provincial assemblies on the basis of proportionality. It may return – for reconsideration by the Lower Chamber all Acts under specific timeframe of after their adoption. It is an additional voice of public opinion, but it does not limit the efficiency of government.

4. The highest executive power is exercised by the President through the Prime Minister, who is elected by the parliamentary majority.
5. The president is elected at a joint session of both Houses of Parliament. He represents a Polish State, appoints the judges of the Supreme Court resolves the Parliament at the request of the Prime Minister and calls elections. All of its decrees require the signature (countersignature), of the Prime Minister or the respective minister.
6. The prime minister and ministers must be members of parliament (Sejm) to be politically accountable personally to the voters. They choose their advisers and experts at their own discretion.
7. Regional units - regions (lands) have their own provincial assemblies (parliaments or regional councils), selected on the basis of proportionate elections (five adjetives). Their competencies include all local affairs, apart from affairs reserved for the central government (defense, criminal police, foreign and monetary policy).
8. The judiciary functions independently of state authorities and its internal structure is based on the principles of self-governance.
9. The military and the police are apolitical. Military and police officers may not belong to any political party.
10. The scope of the fundamental rights of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution, such as political liberty, personal freedom, property rights, inviolability of the person, equality before the law, freedom of expression, association, and information can be modified only after the long procedures and voting in both houses of Parliament and most of Provincial Assemblies.
11. National minorities in Poland have constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of unrestricted national, political, religious, and cultural development.

## B. PRINCIPLES OF FOREIGN POLICY

1. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaties and the Big Three Agreements in Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam were concluded without the participation of Poland. Therefore, we consider them to be invalid and will seek to strike through to the provisions in respect to Poland.
2. Due to the situation after the Second World War, it is necessary to:
  - a) to conclude a peace treaty with a united and independent German state, sanctioning the Polish-German border on the Oder and Neisse;
  - b) enter into agreements with independent countries: Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania, *surrendering* to them the former Polish eastern lands, mutually guaranteeing full rights of minorities;
  - c) recognize the current shape of the Polish-Czechoslovak border as final and underwritten agreement guaranteeing full rights of other minorities;
  - d) recognize the necessity of the return of the incoming Russian population from Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia as well as from the Konigsberg District to their homeland;
  - e) The Konigsberg District cannot constitute a German or Russian enclave and its future should be the subject of negotiations by the governments of independent Poland and Lithuania.
3. The Polish national community does not have to live in one state but should be guaranteed basic civil rights and the possibility of unhindered national development and maintaining contacts with the old homeland.
4. For our partners and allies we recognize those Russians who *un-conditionally* recognize the right of all peoples of the Soviet empire to self-determination and independence.
5. To ensure stability in Europe, we believe as desirable the creation of the territory of central and eastern European countries a body of associated countries in the type of West European Economic Community.

### III PROGRAM OF THE LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY "INDEPENDENCE"

#### A. GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS

1. Freedom is the supreme good of man that determines the ability to use - present with other goods. Freedom is inextricably linked with responsibility. Only a free man can assume the responsibility of being a citizen.
2. Political systems, including those based on recognizing human freedom as a superior value, cannot be built in a social vacuum. All utopias drawn from the heads of ideologues, even the noblest, have always proved premature and ineffective, and if they were imposed on society against its will, they brought only misfortune. Thus, the political system must take into account the traditions and culture-specific to each nation. Installation in Poland of a communist utopia was the cause of the deep crisis of the traditional forms of social ties. Rebuilding these ties, based on traditional social institutions rooted in European culture, will become a condition for the proper functioning of society.
3. All people are equal before the law. This statement cannot imply material equality. The latter is a dangerous utopia, the implementation of which must lead to dictatorship by individuals. Only the dictatorship state can provide material equality of citizens. The equalization is done at the cost of breaches of freedom, poverty resulting from low efficiency, and from secondary inequalities, due to different access to privileges.
4. Every authority is willing to reach so far as it will meet a barrier. Therefore, the political system must be based on the principle of equilibrium. This balance must manifest itself within the framework of power structures, not in the form of bargaining between the ruled and the rulers. This bargaining, which took the form of social contracts, was a form of control of absolute power in the era of feudalism and the transitional stage between absolutism and democracy. In Europe at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, they should be considered as an anachronism.
5. Even the most efficient democracy can pose a threat to human freedom, by excessive centralization and bureaucracy. This danger occurs especially when society is politically passive. The democratic form of government must exist in the political and legal minds of society. It creates this awareness, but it also derives from it. To counteract the dangers of bureaucratization of power they are necessary:
  - a) as much decentralization as possible through the creation of local self-government;
  - b) existence of intellectual, professional, political, and trade-union elites;
  - c) raising of moral values that must stand out above politics.

#### B. THE STATE AND THE ECONOMIC SOCIETY

1. The basic task of the state in the economy is to provide a legal framework for the functioning of market mechanisms in the conditions of free competition.
2. The state can and should function in the economy only in the following areas:
  - a) economic infrastructure,
  - b) activities that exceed the possibility of competition (communication, energy, armaments).
  - c) activities that must be carried out centrally, such as monetary policy, projections of "development challenges" actions resulting from these "challenges", demographic problems, participation in international cooperation, etc.
3. Actions by the state that is unacceptable consisting in:
  - a) nationalization as a permanent economic trend;
  - b) permanent financial aid from the state for weaker enterprises;
  - c) price-fixing by the state;

- d) legal monopolization by the state of any area of activities, except in necessary cases (e.g., defense, law enforcement, etc.).
- 4. Due to the exceptional importance of agriculture for the prosperity and independence of the civil society, as well as its relative backwardness, there is a possibility of particular care by the state over this area of the economy.
- 5. State ensures that no interest group has not achieved an undue advantage in society, allowing a to dictate monopolistic terms and threatening the existence of free competition. This applies to both industrial and trade union organizations. The state should take care of the balance between the employees at large and capital. It is unacceptable creation of trade union monopolies standing on:
  - a) compulsory membership in a trade union;
  - b) special privileges for trade union members;
  - c) compulsion to associate in the trade union headquarters. The state introduces anti-trust laws and ensures that they are strictly adhered to.
- 6. Social services can not be a permanent instrument for redistribution of the national income by the state. The state guarantees social benefits (pensions, social assistance, health care) at the minimum level. A higher level of these benefits should be provided within the framework of voluntary agreements between citizens and commercial insurance providers. Assistance for the population being in poverty is the responsibility of the state, but also of non-government organizations and charities.
- 7. The state is obliged to take special care of education, science, and culture in order to make up for the backwardness of civilization. However, the state cannot have a monopoly in these areas.

### C. LIBERAL SOCIETY

- 1. The most appropriate way to eliminate social poverty is the economic development of the whole society. It can only be ensured under the conditions of a liberal economy. Any redistribution measures to ensure alleged social justice and equality impair the effectiveness of the economy. They lead to collectivism, which is the cause of stagnation and cause more injustice at the same time feeding the totalitarian tendencies.
- 2. The basis of a liberal economy is a private enterprise competing on the market.
- 3. Society is not just a collection of individuals with identical goals but divides into groups with different and often conflicting interests. Citizens have the right to associate in political, trade unions, and social organizations to fight for their group interests. The only limitation of the functioning of these organizations is the acceptance of legal principles.
- 4. The proper functioning of society requires pluralism in the field of mass communication - press, radio, and television. Due to the special importance of television, in modern civilization, it is necessary to guarantee access to it for various social forces.

## Annex

### IV FROM COMMUNISM TO A LIBERAL ECONOMY

#### The economy in transition period

The goal of economic changes at the time of independence cannot be reforming the existing mechanisms of the economy. We reject the concept of economic management by the state: only the market and its base

in the form of exclusive ownership of the means of production can be an appropriate regulator of economic life and to ensure in the long-term sustainable development, technical progress, and prosperity. Changes in the economy must have a revolutionary character, its goal will be the creation of a new liberal political-economic system.

1. All legal acts related to the economy will be canceled, in particular:
  - the statutory limit of scope of activities of enterprises;
  - organizational structure;
  - tax regulations;
  - pricing;
  - principles of distribution of production means;
  - limitations in the functioning of the private economy, including the upper limit of employment.
2. The zloty is convertible into other currencies. In order to ensure the stability of the exchange rate, a loan will be taken out from the World Bank. Poland will become a member of the International Monetary Fund. The zloty exchange rate must ensure the profitability of exports. At the same time, the low exchange rate will be attractive for foreign capital (at the beginning, the average wage will be about 20 times lower than in the case of the West, and the productivity will be 2-5 times lower). The export of Polish products and the import of capital must lead to a surplus of the balance of payments, allowing for payment of the debt inherited after the Polish People's Republic.
3. Due to the probable lack of buyers, the enterprises outside of agriculture (except those listed in a separate list), shall be transferred to the ownership of the crews employed in them, represented by the Employee Boards or the General Assembly of Workers. The board appoints the management and the Board of Directors of the company as it sees fit. It also decides about the size and system of remuneration and the distribution of the profits. The employees will be the co-owners of the means of production by virtue of their employment relationship. However, this does not mean exclusive and full ownership. They may not sell or otherwise dispose of any part of the property belonging to the enterprise. Full ownership rights belong only to all workers, represented by the Board or the General Assembly of Workers. The Board may make a decision about partial selling the assets, or by physical disposal of them, also though issuing shares or by adding either natural or legal persons as co-owners. The state does not warrant any special privileges to social (co-op) enterprises. In the event of bankruptcy, these enterprises may be taken over by other sectors.
4. The enterprises not undertaken by employees or bankrupt will be taken over by the state (unless other creditors claim). As far as possible, they will be re-launched under the receivership or sold to other owners. The same applies to unfinished investments. They can be sold (also to foreign capital) on favorable terms. It be prepared a list of enterprises of strategic importance (e.g., railways), which will remain state-owned. The state may allow participation in the undertaking - countries other legal or natural persons. State ownership of enterprises cannot mean a state monopoly on certain areas of social and economic life.
5. The state has a policy of promoting small and medium private property. For this purpose, will be put up for sale machines, equipment, and means of transport unused by the public sector and social (co-op) sectors. The sale will take place on favorable credit terms. State administration (local) may not refuse to register an enterprise, which activity is not in conflict with the law. It should be considered the application of preferential tax rates for this sector. The aim of preferring small capital will be de-monopolization of the economy, change the structure and create a strong middle class of small owners - usually stabilizing society. Support for the small, private initiatives will be the best action designed to prevent unemployment.
6. Banks with different ownership structures are allowed. The state will support the creation of private and social (co-op) banks, especially those which will finance the development of small and medium enterprises. Re-activated will be financial mechanisms as discount bills of exchange, checks, and other financial securities. Created will be securities market, including shares of enterprises. NBP will be divided into several banks with different forms of ownership (with the admission of mixed)

competing with each other. One of them will fulfill the function of the central and currency issuer bank.

7. The state monopoly on foreign trade is abolished. The state regulates the functioning of trade and the trade balance by setting the exchange rate of the currency and customs.

8. Approved is the existence and functioning of foreign capital, under the condition of compliance with existing legislation and re-investment in Poland 50% of the net profits.

9. Introduction of a uniform tax code for the entire economy and taxable will be:

a) net income - progressive tax, however not higher than 50% of net income. The tax applies to all income, regardless of where they are after - get up (profits, wages, fees, dividends, etc.)

b) real estate,

c) land in agriculture; the aim of the land tax will be, inter alia liquidation of weak and neglected farms,

d) sales - indirect (turnover) taxes. These taxes will be applied first to alcohol, cigarettes, and luxury goods and services. The size and scope of the indirect taxes will depend on the fiscal needs of the state and fiscal policy of shaping demand,

e) employee wages - social security fee (today's ZUS contribution). This fee may be abolished in favor of another form at a later date.

10. The state guarantees social benefits at the level resulting from its budgetary revenues (taxes, etc.). It guarantees the retirement pensions at the level at least equal to (purchasing power) from the end of the communist period. At the same time, it supports the formation of private insurance companies to provide better pensions, health care, etc.

11. The land owned by the state-owned farms is sold to individual owners or legal entities. It is allowed to establish social (co-op) enterprises on conditions analogous to those in industry.

12. Restrictions on free trade in agricultural products are being removed. The purchase monopoly is abolished. The headquarters of enterprises providing centralized services to agriculture are dissolved. In their place are created private and social (co-op) enterprises of local reach.

13. Domestic trade enterprises are being reorganized. Creation of decentralized private and social enterprises. Abolition of regulations and centralized distribution. Distribution of all goods, including capital goods and materials, is to be carried out by the market only. All price restrictions are lifted.

14. Creation of a centralized fund, managed by the state with participation in the supervisory board of the broadest possible representation of society, with the objective to guarantee the minimum subsistence to all citizens, in particular potentially the most vulnerable groups. The fund will be financed by the state budget, private foundations, donations, foreign loans, and aid.

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